Earl Ivory v. Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-521

EARL IVORY

VERSUS

SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY
OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
EUNICE CITY COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 30,269-18
HONORABLE MARK T. HOYCHICK, CITY COURT JUDGE

**********

PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Phyllis M. Keaty, and
Candyce G. Perret, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Donald Lynn Mayeux
Attorney at Law
Post Office Drawer 1460
Eunice, Louisiana 70535
(337) 457-9610
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Earl Ivory

Michael Wayne Landry
Staff Counsel for Safeway Insurance
Post Office Box 92807
Lafayette, Louisiana 70509
(877) 323-8040
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants:
Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana
Jake Vidrine

KEATY, Judge.

Defendants appeal the trial court’s judgment regarding liability and general

damages. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This personal injury matter stems from an automobile collision on June 4,

2018, in the Wal-Mart parking lot in Eunice, Louisiana, between Earl Ivory and Jake

Vidrine. On July 12, 2018, Ivory filed a petition for damages against Vidrine and

his automobile insurer, Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana (hereinafter

collectively referred to as Defendants). Ivory alleged he was driving his 1989 red

Chevrolet truck when Vidrine, who was driving a 2010 white Dodge Charger, was

traveling at a high rate of speed and crashed into the driver’s side door of Ivory’s

truck. Ivory claimed that Vidrine failed to keep a proper lookout, drove carelessly

and recklessly, failed to yield to the right of way, failed to adequately slow down

while driving through a parking lot, failed to stop before crashing into Ivory’s truck,

failed to exercise the last clear chance to avoid the accident, failed to do what Vidrine

should have done and see what he should have seen under the circumstances, and

any other acts of negligence that would be shown at trial. According to his petition,

Ivory sustained personal injuries to his head, neck, back, arms, and legs, which

required medical treatment. Ivory sought damages for past, present, and future pain

and suffering, disability, mental anguish, anxiety, medical expenses, loss of use and

enjoyment, and depreciation of the value of his truck. Defendants answered the

petition and disputed liability, causation, damages, coverage, ownership, and model

year of the truck operated by Ivory. Defendants further asserted the affirmative

defense of “no pay, no play.”

Following a one-day bench trial on April 3, 2019, the trial court denied

Defendants’ affirmative defense of “no pay no play.” It determined that Ivory owned

and operated a 1992 Chevy S-10, which was insured by State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company on the date of the accident. The trial court ruled

the accident resulted from the comparative fault of both Ivory and Vidrine and

assessed each driver fifty percent of the fault. It held that Ivory sustained $20,000.00

in general damages, $2,132.90 in medical expenses, and $1,500.00 in property

damages. In light of its finding of comparative fault, the trial court ordered

Defendants to pay Ivory $10,000.00 in general damages, $1,066.45 in medical

expenses, and $750.00 in property damages, plus judicial interest from date of

judicial demand until paid. It set the expert witness fee for the testimony of

Dr. Reginald Segar to $1,000.00, as court costs, and ordered Ivory and Defendants

to each pay one-half of all court costs. The trial court’s judgment was signed on

April 22, 2019. It is from this judgment that Defendants appeal.

On appeal, Defendants assert the following assignments of error:

(1) [T]he trial judge committed legal error in determining that
plaintiff proved he was the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident,
after the trial judge correctly factually determined that the vehicle
involved in the accident was a 1992 Chevy S-10.

(2) [T]he trial judge committed legal error in determining that
plaintiff was covered by auto liability insurance after the trial judge
correctly factually determined that the vehicle involved in the accident
was a 1992 Chevy S-10.

(3) [T]he trial judge committed legal error in awarding any
compensatory damages since the plaintiff was uninsured at the time of
the accident and the damages for bodily injury did not exceed $15,000
and the amount for property damage did not exceed $25,000.

(4) [T]he trial judge committed legal error in failing to
determine that Ivory was one hundred percent at fault in causing this
accident.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 00-66, pp. 10-11 (La.

10/30/00), 773 So.2d 670, 680-81, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained the

standard of review regarding comparative fault determinations as follows:

As with other factual determinations, the trier of fact is vested with
much discretion in its allocation of fault. [Clement v. Frey, 95-1119
(La. 1/16/96), 666 So.2d 607]. Therefore, an appellate court should
only disturb the trier of fact’s allocation of fault when it is clearly wrong
or manifestly erroneous. Only after making a determination that the
trier of fact’s apportionment of fault is clearly wrong can an appellate
court disturb the award, and then only to the extent of lowering it or
raising it to the highest or lowest point respectively which is reasonably
within the trial court’s discretion. Clement, 666 So.2d at 611; Coco v.
Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332, 335 (La.1977).

DISCUSSION

I. Liability

In their fourth assignment of error, Defendants contend the trial court

committed legal error in failing to determine Ivory was one hundred percent at fault

in causing the accident. The trial court determined the accident resulted from the

comparative fault of both Ivory and Vidrine and assessed each driver fifty percent

of the fault.

The trial court’s oral reasons supporting its allocation of fault provides:

As to liability this is one of those accidents where you kind of
shake your head like how [the] heck did this happen? You [have] two
adults driving in a parking lot with no impediments to vision and yet
they run into each other. There nobody, nobody ran a stop sign.

[W]e’ve got an independent witness who believed that Mr. Vidrine was
driving in a reckless [manner] at least when he came around and almost
hit [the witness’s] trailer in her opinion. And maybe that did scare her
and got her a little excited. But then she says that the [sic] did slow
down for the curve.

The position of the vehicle in the photographs does show that he
was in the proper lane of travel at that point. But I don’t understand
how you did[n]’[t] see the red truck coming to that spot, stopping and
then pulling out such that the accident wasn’t avoided. And I don’t
understand how Mr. Ivory who stopped and presumably looked right
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and left[] didn’t see a white car coming and then continued on into the
path of the vehicle. Therefore, I’m finding fault at 50/50. I think that’s
the right thing to do in this matter.

The trial court’s determination of comparative fault was based upon witness

testimony, a witness statement, medical records, photographs, and other evidence

regarding the accident submitted into evidence at trial.

On review, the record contains Ivory’s trial testimony, which reveals he was

seventy-eight years old at the time of trial. Ivory testified that on the day of the

accident, he finished shopping at Wal-Mart when he got into his truck in the parking

lot. He slowly drove towards the back of the parking lot where the oak trees were

located. Ivory stopped at the end of the lane and then proceeded, at which point he

was struck by Vidrine’s vehicle. Ivory revealed that he never saw Vidrine’s vehicle

before the crash. He explained that Vidrine must have approached him from the

opposite direction because Vidrine hit the front of Ivory’s truck. Ivory recalled that

the impact from Vidrine’s vehicle “started on the front fender, the front left fender.

He came on back to the left door all the way back.” Ivory testified that a woman

subsequently approached his window and gave him a piece of paper indicating that

she witnessed the accident.

According to trial testimony, the woman who gave Ivory a piece of paper was

Nancy Cordell. Cordell’s testimony reveals that, on the day of the accident, she and

her dogs were riding with her son in his vehicle. Attached to the vehicle was a trailer

carrying Cordell’s new car. On their way home to DeRidder, they stopped at the

Wal-Mart in Eunice. Cordell took her dogs to use the bathroom by the oak trees

when a white car, driven by Vidrine, caught her attention because it was “coming

down and almost” hit the back of the trailer carrying Cordell’s new car. Cordell

explained that Vidrine continued traveling towards the oak trees while crossing the

parking lines. During that time, Cordell also spotted Ivory in his vehicle. She
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revealed that Ivory waved to her, she waved back to him, Ivory “stopped . . . and

then he started to go[,] and the white car came this way and hit him.” She witnessed

the crash and opined that Vidrine was traveling at approximately twenty-five miles

per hour. According to Cordell’s testimony, Vidrine never applied his brakes or

performed any maneuver to avoid the accident.

Cordell testified that following the collision, Vidrine kept telling Ivory that it

was his [Ivory’s] fault. She noted that Vidrine’s father, who showed up after the

accident, also kept telling Ivory that it was his fault. Cordell explained that Vidrine

and his father were being very rude and badgering Ivory. She opined that the

collision resulted from Vidrine’s carelessness. After the accident, Cordell

approached Ivory and handed him a piece of paper containing her name, address,

and phone number so that he could give it to the police officers to inform them that

she witnessed the accident. Cordell’s statement, which was submitted into evidence

and in the record on review, states that she witnessed the accident that occurred when

a “white Dodge Charger was racing around my truck and car and wasn’t looking

where he was racing off too [sic]. Red truck was already in motion when white

charger hit him.”

Vidrine, who was twenty years old at the time of trial, testified that he was

employed by Wal-Mart. On the day of the accident, he got into his Dodge Charger

in the parking lot and proceeded northwards. He noticed Cordell walking her dogs

and then he executed a sharp right turn. Vidrine revealed that he was not in a rush

and was traveling approximately fifteen miles per hour when Ivory “came out in

front of” him and caused the collision. He did not see Ivory prior to impact. Vidrine

explained that when Ivory “came in front of” him, Vidrine hit his brakes for about a

minute although it was too late. Vidrine admitted that following the accident, he

was angry and accused Ivory of being at fault. After approximately five minutes,
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however, Vidrine asked Ivory if he was okay. Vidrine acknowledged that his father

subsequently arrived at the accident scene; however, he did not fuss with Ivory.

Rather, his father asked if Ivory was okay.

Based on the foregoing, the trial court heard the testimony and evidence and

weighed the credibility of the witnesses. Considering the evidence presented, the

trial court could reasonably have concluded that Vidrine and Ivory were equally

responsible for causing the collision. After reviewing the entire record, we cannot

say the trial court’s allocation of fault was manifestly erroneous. Therefore, we will

not disturb the result, and this assignment of error lacks merit.

II. Vehicle Identification Number

In their first assignment of error, Defendants contend the trial court committed

legal error in determining that Ivory proved he owned the truck involved in the

accident, a 1989 Chevy S-10, after the trial court factually determined that the truck

involved in the accident was a 1992 Chevy S-10.

In its oral reasons, the trial court discussed the year Ivory’s truck was

manufactured, as follows:

I believe Mr.[] Corney. I think he’s a very sincere and honest
guy. But I think that it goes beyond that. I also believe Mr. Ivory. And
I think this is, this is one of those deals where we [have] a put together
vehicle that Mr. Ivory did and maybe unequivocally was not done in
the proper way. And whatever Mr. Chaumont did to get title to it for
him we’ll never know. . . . [S]omehow he got title and insurance on a
vehicle that probably is 1992. I think the evidence does support more
that it is a 92 vehicle than an 89.

The trial court’s determination that Ivory’s truck was manufactured in 1992 rather

than 1989 was based upon trial testimony, photographs, and insurance documents

submitted into evidence at trial.

On review, the record contains the registration and insurance papers, which

belong to a 1989 Chevy S-10. On the other hand, trial testimony indicates Ivory’s

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truck contained a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), located in the glove

compartment, belonging to a 1992 Chevy S-10. Ivory testified that he owned a junk

yard where he and his sons collected and put together vehicles. He explained that

he and his son bought the frame or “shell” of the truck at issue from John Chaumont

approximately twenty years ago. Ivory and his son worked on it and replaced the

door, glove compartment box, and steering wheel. Ivory explained he was provided

a registration form by Chaumont, who is now deceased, indicating that the truck was

a 1989 Chevy S-10. As such, Ivory took those papers to a State Farm agent who

insured the truck that was damaged in this matter.

Ivory’s testimony was confirmed by trial testimony from his son, Eugene

Ivory. Eugene testified that he replaced the glove compartment. He testified the

replaced glove compartment contained a serial number from a different truck.

Eugene acknowledged that the state troopers were unable to find a VIN number on

the truck at issue. He explained that VIN numbers are usually located on the dash,

door, fenders, or frame.

Defendants’ witness, Jason Corney, also testified at trial. Corney was

accepted by the trial court as an expert in personal automobile appraisal for purposes

of insurance claims. He examined Ivory’s truck and determined the VIN number in

the glove compartment did not match the VIN number contained on the truck’s

registration. According to Corney, the glove compartment’s VIN number belonged

to a 1992 truck whereas the VIN number on the registration papers provided by Ivory

belonged to a 1989 Chevy S-10.

Based on the foregoing, the trial court heard the evidence and weighed the

credibility of the witnesses. Considering the evidence presented, the trial court

reasonably could have concluded that the truck at issue was registered as a 1989

truck and contained a glove compartment taken from a 1992 truck. It could have
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also reasonably concluded that this same truck belonged to Ivory. Therefore, we

will not disturb the result, and this assignment of error lacks merit.

III. Insurance

In their second assignment of error, Defendants contend the trial court

committed legal error in determining that Ivory was covered by automobile liability

insurance after the trial court factually determined that the truck involved in the

accident was a 1992 Chevy S-10. According to Defendants, the liability insurance

policy submitted into evidence belonged to a 1989 Chevy S-10 whereas the vehicle

involved in the accident was a 1992 Chevy S-10. Defendants assert there is no proof

of liability insurance such that the “no pay, no play” defense should reduce Ivory’s

award to zero.

Louisiana’s “no pay, no play” law, La.R.S. 32:866, provides in pertinent part:

A. (1) There shall be no recovery for the first fifteen thousand
dollars of bodily injury and no recovery for the first twenty-five
thousand dollars of property damage based on any cause or right of
action arising out of a motor vehicle accident, for such injury or
damages occasioned by an owner or operator of a motor vehicle
involved in such accident who fails to own or maintain compulsory
motor vehicle liability security.

The purpose of the “no pay, no play” law is “to reduce the premiums charged for

motor vehicle insurance and to discourage the ownership and operation of uninsured

motor vehicles.” Bryant v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 03-3491, 04-28, p. 14 (La.

9/9/04), 881 So.2d 1214, 1222.

The trial court’s determination that “no pay, no play” was inapplicable stems

from witness testimony and other evidence presented at trial regarding the accident.

In its oral reasons, the trial court explained:

But I am not all convinced that the vehicle was uninsured.
Because I don’t think that State Farm would be let off the hook had
Sta[t]e Farm [been] sued in this matter. The man paid insurance
premiums on it. I haven’t had anything to tell me otherwise on that.
He did what the law of compulsory motor vehicle liability security law
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says and he, I mean it’s not he was trying to [commit] fraud and swap
vehicles and that was the question I asked Mr. Corney and anybody else.
And of course you had the opportunity to prove that so. That’s not our
situation. [We are] not having some kind of shell game where he’s
trying to pull something over on the insurance company or over on this
court.

. . . I believe the vehicle was insured and I believe that. And that’s my
ruling that the vehicle was insured because of his good faith efforts to
insure the vehicle at the time. He was not driving any other vehicle at
the time and even though it had improper certificates of title or
registration, I still believe that the insurance was on the vehicle properly.
At least to the extent that the provisions of the no pay no play would
not apply in this case.

On review, the record contains a Certificate of Title, which shows the date

acquired as December 28, 2016, and the date issued as January 3, 2017. It was issued

to Ivory for title to a 1989 red Chevrolet with a VIN number of

1GCBS14E1K2264303. The same VIN number appears on a State Farm automobile

insurance policy and insurance card, also in the record, issued to Ivory for coverage

of a 1989 Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck with a policy period of January 1, 2018

through July 1, 2018. Ivory’s trial testimony reveals that this insurance and

registration belonged to the truck involved in the accident at issue.

Based on the foregoing, the trial court heard the evidence and weighed the

credibility of the witnesses. Considering the evidence presented, the trial court

reasonably could have concluded that the truck involved in the accident is the same

truck identified in the title and insurance documents. It was also reasonable for the

trial court to conclude that the truck was insured at the time of the accident.

Accordingly, we will not disturb the result.

We note Defendants’ argument on appeal that this case conflicts with the

holding in Carrion v. Sandifer, 40,880 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/12/06), 926 So.2d 784,

wherein the second circuit held the “no pay, no play” statute provided for in La.R.S.

32:866 does not allow a good faith exception to the requirement of liability coverage.

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Defendants herein allege that because the trial court found Ivory’s vehicle was a

1992 Chevy S-10, and since the insurance policy belonged to a 1989 Chevy S-10, it

erroneously allowed a good faith exception to La.RS 32:866 in contravention to

Carrion by concluding there was coverage since Ivory was in good faith.

We disagree as Carrion, 926 So.2d 784, is distinguishable from the facts of

this case. In Carrion, the plaintiff was in an accident and thought he would be

covered under his automobile liability policy. Before his accident, the plaintiff had

paid his premium to keep his policy effective. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the

agent could not accept the premium because he lost his license to do business. At

trial, the insurer submitted into evidence a copy of the notice of non-renewal mailed

to the plaintiff before expiration of the policy and prior to the car accident. Thus,

the policy was not in effect on the date of the plaintiff’s accident. In this case, Ivory’s

insurance policy was in effect and provided coverage for his truck on the day the

accident occurred. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

IV. Damages

In their third assignment of error, Defendants contend the trial court

committed legal error in awarding compensatory damages since Ivory was uninsured

at the time of the accident and the damages for bodily injury did not exceed

$15,000.00 and the amount for property damage did not exceed $25,000.00.

Defendants contend the trial court incorrectly awarded $20,000.00 in general

damages for a treatment period of approximately nine months after the accident

because it is excessive and fails to take into account the pre-accident pain.

General damages, which include pain and suffering, physical impairment and

disability, and loss of enjoyment of life, are speculative in nature and incapable of

being fixed with mathematical certainty. Thibeaux v. Trotter, 04-482 (La.App. 3 Cir.

9/29/04), 883 So.2d 1128, writ denied, 04-2692 (La. 2/18/05), 896 So.2d 31. The
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fact finder’s award of general damages is subject to the abuse of discretion standard

of review. Simon v. Lacoste, 05-550 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/05), 918 So.2d 1102. A

general damage award should only be increased or reduced if it is beyond that which

a reasonable trier of fact could assess for the effects of a particular injury to a

particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances of the case. Id. In making that

determination, the appellate court should not rely on a comparison of prior awards

in cases with similar medical injuries but should rely on the primary considerations

of the duration and severity of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering. Guillot v. Doe, 03-

1754 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/30/04), 879 So.2d 374.

In this case, the trial court explained the following in its oral reasons: “Clearly

Mr. Ivory had a pre[-]existing back condition along with other problems. I didn’t

hear anything about a pre-existing neck or a rib condition. He was still hurting after

ten months[.] Sounds like he’s still having problems now.” The trial court awarded

$20,000.00 in general damages.

The trial court’s award of general damages was based upon the testimony and

medical evidence presented at trial. Our review of the record reveals that Dr.

Reginald Segar, a family physician, testified on Plaintiff’s behalf as a family practice

medical expert. Dr. Segar testified that he examined Ivory on June 11, 2018. Ivory

presented with complaints of headaches, dizziness, and pain in his ribs, neck and

back. Ivory informed Dr. Segar that he was in an automobile accident a few days

earlier which caused him pain in his ribs, neck, and back. Dr. Segar recalled Ivory

was in a previous accident years earlier in 2012 that resulted in back pain. Dr. Segar

opined, however, that the instant accident increased Ivory’s back pain. Upon

examination, Ivory exhibited tenderness in his neck, shoulders, and back with

decreased range of motion along with tender ribs. Dr. Segar’s impression was a

cervical trapezius strain and rib injury and aggravation of the lower back with
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headaches, and he prescribed anti-inflammatory medication. Degenerative disc

disease was noted on subsequent x-rays performed on Ivory. Dr. Segar opined that

a car accident could have caused pain and aggravated his pre-existing condition. Dr.

Segar revealed that Ivory expressed symptoms of continued neck and back pain on

June 24, 2018, and more x-rays were ordered. On August 6, 2018, Ivory was still

experiencing rib, neck, and back pain. Thereafter, Ivory continued presenting to Dr.

Segar approximately every month through March 26, 2019. At his appointment on

November 6, 2018, Dr. Segar opined that Ivory had reached maximum medical

improvement even though he was still experiencing neck, back, and rib pain. On

March 26, 2019, Dr. Segar discharged Ivory despite his continued complaints of pain.

Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion

in awarding $20,000.00 in general damages.

With respect to special damages, Defendants allege the trial court erred in

awarding the full medical expenses for treatment that consisted both of alleged

accident-related injuries and heart problems that were not accident-related.

In Simon, 918 So.2d at 1104-05, this court recognized the following regarding

awards of medical expenses:

[W]hen a plaintiff alleges that medical expenses were incurred “and
that allegation is supported by a bill, unless there is sufficient
contradictory evidence or reasonable suspicion that the bill is unrelated
to the accident, it is sufficient to support the inclusion of that item in
the judgment.” [Esté v. State Farm Ins. Co., 96-99, p. 10 (La.App. 3
Cir. 7/10/96), 676 So.2d 850, 857.] A factfinder errs if it fails to award
the full amount of medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident
and proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Revel v. Snow, 95-462
(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/95), 664 So.2d 655, writ denied, 95-2820 (La.
2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1084.

In this case, the trial court awarded $2,132.90 in medical damages. On review,

the record reveals that Ivory presented the following medical bills totaling

approximately $2,132.90 for accident-related treatment: Dr. Segar, $1,250.00;

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Acadian Medical Center, $863.59; and Bellard’s Pharmacy, $19.35. Thus, Ivory

introduced evidence of past medical expenses that were incurred during his periods

of treatment for accident-related injuries. No evidence was offered to contradict

these bills or to provide reasonable suspicion that they were incurred for an unrelated

accident or occurrence.

We note Defendants’ argument on appeal that some of the medical expenses

were incurred for examinations and treatments on days where Dr. Segar treated Ivory

for both accident-related damages and heart-related damages that were not caused

by the accident. Dr. Segar addressed this issue at trial, stating that he maintains two

separate records for a patient who is already being treated by Dr. Segar and is

subsequently involved in an accident with injuries. In such instances, Dr. Segar

explained that he bills for the accident separately from what he would bill to

Medicare if a patient would present for regular treatment. Dr. Segar testified that

his medical expenses in this matter were only related to the accident at issue.

Accordingly, we find the treatments, services, and prescriptions were

corroborated and causally connected to the accident at issue by the testimony offered

by Dr. Segar. Therefore, based on the uncontroverted medical evidence in the record,

we affirm the trial court’s award of Ivory’s accident-related and incurred medical

expenses of $2,132.90.

Finally, Defendants allege Ivory failed to establish that he owned the damaged

truck and, therefore, failed to establish an essential element to his property damage

claim. Defendants contend that because the truck was a total loss, i.e., repair costs

exceeding vehicle value, the issue of salvage arises. Defendants opine that title

should transfer to Safeway to sell the vehicle and recoup the salvage value because

the trial court awarded Ivory the full actual cash value with no deduction for salvage.

This court has stated the following with regard to property damage claims:
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When property is damaged through the legal fault of another, the
primary objective is to restore the property as nearly as possible to the
state it was in immediately preceding the damage; it is well settled that
the measure of damage is the cost of restoring the property to its former
condition. In assessing damage to the property, generally, courts have
considered the cost of restoration as the proper measure of damage
where the thing damaged can be adequately repaired.

Rogers v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 01-443, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/01), 796

So.2d 862, 867 (quoting Coleman v. Victor, 326 So.2d 344 (La.1976)).

In this case, the trial court awarded $1,500.00 in property damages. The trial

court’s award was based on the testimony of Defendants’ expert appraiser, Corney.

On cross-examination, Corney testified that the truck sustained more than $2,000.00

in damages.

After having carefully reviewed the record, we are convinced that the trial

court did not err in awarding Ivory $1,500.00 for the property damage to his truck

as a result of the accident.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Costs of this

appeal are assessed to Defendants, Jake Vidrine, and his automobile insurer,

Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana.

AFFIRMED.

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