Joseph Arnaud v. United Specialty Insurance Company

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-599

JOSEPH ARNAUD

VERSUS

UNITED SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 85511
HONORABLE GREGORY P. AUCOIN, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Elizabeth A. Pickett
and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Thomas J. DeJean
DeJean & Leger, L.L.C.
806 South Main St.
Opelousas, LA 70570
(337) 948-9066
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
Joseph Arnaud

Richard E. King
Olivia Y Truong
Jamie A. Futral
Melchiode Marks King, LLC
639 Loyola Ave, Ste 2550
New Orleans, LA 70113
(504) 336-2880
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:
United Specialty Insurance Company
Dave Daigle Hauling, LLC
Glynn Mason

PICKETT, Judge.

Joseph Arnaud appeals a judgment of the trial court dismissing his claims

against the defendants, following a jury verdict which found he did not prove

negligence on the part of Glynn Mason.

FACTS

This lawsuit arises out of a vehicle collision that occurred on Highway 90 in

Lafayette Parish on July 22, 2016. Joseph Arnaud was driving an eighteen-

wheeler in the middle of three lanes at 10:30 p.m. Glynn Mason was driving a

dump truck in the opposite direction. Glynn Mason executed a left-hand turn from

the turn lane. The vehicles collided and were engulfed in flames. Both Mr.

Arnaud and Mr. Mason claimed they had the right of way. Both men were in the

course and scope of their employment at the time of the accident. There were no

witnesses to the collision, and the devices which would have recorded information

from the vehicles were destroyed in the ensuing fire.

Mr. Arnaud filed suit against Mr. Mason, his employer, David Daigle

Hauling, LLC, and United Specialty Insurance Company, their insurance carrier,

alleging that Mr. Mason negligently caused the collision. Mr. Arnaud sought

damages for the injuries he sustained as a result of the accident. The matter

proceeded to a jury trial.

Following a trial, the jury found that Mr. Arnaud did not prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Mason’s conduct was sub-standard or

negligent nor that he was at fault in causing the accident. The trial court issued a

judgment dismissing Mr. Arnaud’s claims against all defendants, in conformity

with the jury’s verdict. Mr. Arnaud now appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Mr. Arnaud asserts two assignments of error:

1. The trial court committed legal error in allowing the police officer
investigating this accident to give his lay opinion as to fault in this
accident.

2. The jury committed manifest error in finding no fault on the part of
defendant driver, Glynn Mason, in causing the accident.

DISCUSSION

Before the trial of this matter began, Mr. Arnaud asked the court to limit the

testimony of the investigating officer, Officer Jeffrey Trahan of the Lafayette

Police Department:

But the more important issue is whether or not it’s relevant to
have either party say, or even the police officer say that they did not
get a ticket in this accident because the officer couldn’t ascertain fault,
he did not issue to each, either party a ticket. And that’s his opinion.
And I think that’s irrelevant. You may think otherwise. I know that if
either party would have pled guilty to a ticket it’s relevant at a
hearing, but the mere fact that the police officer didn’t give a ticket is
the police officers opinion and that should be the province of the jury.

The trial court ruled that the parties could ask the police officer if any traffic

violations were found.

During his testimony, Officer Trahan responded to questions posed by

counsel for the defendants:

Q: In that third paragraph, did you say that no citation was issued?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And how come that was?

A: Due to the conflicting statements.

Q: Okay.

A: How can I word it? Vehicle 1 and 2 both had discontinuing,
not discontinuing, they had irregarding [sic] statements. One,
they were both saying they had a green light, but he was saying
he was unsure. So I couldn’t, I couldn’t cite him for it and

2

come to court and say, I know for sure he ran the red light for
either one.

Q: Okay.

A: So that’s why I decided not to write a citation.

In Haas v. Romero, 07-974, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/20/08), 977 So.2d 196,

writ denied, 08-650 (La. 6/6/08), 983 So.2d 917, this court explained the opinion

testimony a lay witness can provide:

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 701 permits lay witnesses
to offer testimony in the form of opinions or inferences if such
testimony is 1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and is
2) helpful to a clear understanding of his or her testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue. A trial court is afforded broad
discretion in permitting testimony of a lay witness in accordance with
Article 701. Eldridge v. Carrier, 04-203 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/17/04),
888 So.2d 365, writ denied, 04-3174 (La.3/11/05), 896 So.2d 66;
La.Code Evid. art. 701, comment b.

“[T]he trial court has vast discretion in deciding the admissibility of evidence, and

its decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.

O'Neill v. Thibodeaux, 97-1065 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/98); 709 So.2d 962.”

Whitehead v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 99-896, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir.

12/22/99), 758 So.2d 211, 219, writ denied, 00-0209 (La.4/7/00), 759 So.2d 767.

The defendants argue that Mr. Arnaud did not make a contemporaneous

objection to Officer Trahan’s testimony, and thus any error was waived. We find

that the objection made before the beginning of trial was sufficient to preserve the

issue for appeal. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 1635.

Mr. Arnaud cites Maricle v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 04-1149

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05), 898 So.2d 565, to support his claim that the opinion

testimony of Officer Trahan was inadmissible. In Maricle, this court found that an

inexperienced state trooper who was not qualified as an expert in accident

reconstruction was improperly allowed to give opinion testimony regarding how

3

the accident in question occurred. That case is distinguishable from the case

currently before us, where Officer Trahan testified that, based on the statements of

Mr. Arnaud and Mr. Mason, he could not determine who was at fault and declined

to issue a citation to either driver. This left the jury to determine the issue of fault.

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of

Officer Trahan.

This court discussed the manifest error standard of review and the burden of

proof of the plaintiff alleging negligence of the defendant in Guidry v. Bernard,

14-234, p. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/18/14), 142 So.3d 1063, 1067, writ denied, 15-74,

(La. 4/2/15), 164 So.3d 814:

The trial court’s factual findings are subject to the manifest
error standard of review, and, in order for an appellate court to reverse
the trial court’s factual finding, the appellate court must review the
record in its entirety and make a determination that there is no
reasonable factual basis for the finding and the record establishes that
the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Dotie v.
Safeway Ins. Co. of La., 46,840 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/14/12), 87 So.3d
942 (citing Stobart v. State, through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880
(La.1993)). Further, the appellate court should not reweigh the
evidence or substitute its own factual findings for those of the trial
court just because it would have decided the case differently. Id.

In Miller v. Leonard, 588 So.2d 79, 81 (La.1991) (citations
omitted), the supreme court discussed the burden of proof in
negligence cases, including those cases where the defendant brings a
reconventional demand, stating:

In civil suits the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving negligence of the defendant by a preponderance
of the evidence. Moreover, a plaintiff-in-reconvention
bears the burden of establishing his claim in the same
manner as the plaintiff in the main demand. Proof by
direct or circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
constitute a preponderance when the entirety of the
evidence establishes the fact or causation sought to be
proved is more probable than not. If the party bearing
the burden of proof fails to satisfy his burden of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence, his case fails to
outweigh his adversary’s case and he necessarily loses.

4

Mr. Arnaud testified that he had the green light and the right of way. Mr.

Mason testified that he had the green arrow and the right of way. Mr. Arnaud

argues that in Mr. Mason’s written statement to Officer Trahan, Mr. Mason said he

“thought” he had the right of way. At trial, he testified that he did have the right of

way. There was no additional evidence to support either Mr. Arnaud’s version of

the facts or Mr. Mason’s version of the facts. There were no witnesses and no

documentary evidence. The jury was forced to make a credibility determination.

A jury is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility, and the manifest error

standard demands we afford great deference to the jury's view of the evidence.

Bonin v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 03-3024 (La.7/2/04), 877 So.2d 89. We find the jury’s

determination that Mr. Arnaud failed to prove that Mr. Mason was negligent by a

preponderance of the evidence is supported by the record. Therefore, there is no

manifest error.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed

to Mr. Arnaud.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules−Courts of Appeal, Rule 2−16.3.

5