Natisha Marie Figaro v. Lafayette Animal Shelter & Care Center

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-610

NATISHA MARIE FIGARO, ET AL.

VERSUS

LAFAYETTE ANIMAL SHELTER &
CARE CENTER, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2019-2584
HONORABLE EDWARD D. RUBIN, DISTRICT JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Phyllis M. Keaty, and D. Kent Savoie, Judges.

APPEAL DISMISSED AS MOOT.

Joy C. Rabalais
H. Edward Barousse, III
Cranay D. Murphy
Kate Bailey Labue
Borne, Wilkes & Rabalais, L.L.C.
Post Office Box 4305
Lafayette, Louisiana 70502-4305
(337) 232-1604, Extension 232
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Lafayette City Parish Consolidated Government

Alfred McZeal, Jr.
In Proper Person
315 Jackson Street
Lafayette, Louisiana 70501
(832) 623-4418
Plaintiff/Appellant:
Alfred McZeal, Jr.

Natisha Marie Figaro
In Proper Person
417 Refinery Street
Lafayette, Louisiana 70501
(832) 623-4418
Plaintiff/Appellant:
Natisha Marie Figaro

KEATY, Judge.

Dog owner appeals a judgment affirming a decision of the Lafayette Animal

Shelter Advisory Board (the Board) which declared her pet, Diamond, a dangerous

dog. For the following reasons, we dismiss this appeal as moot.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Board conducted a Dangerous Dog Hearing on April 18, 2019, regarding

Diamond, a female pit bull mix dog owned by Natisha Marie Figaro. At the close

of the hearing, the eight Board members present unanimously declared Diamond

“dangerous as per City-Parish Consolidated Ordinance Article IV.” Figaro,1 pro se,

sought review of that declaration by filing a “Petition & Appeal” in the Fifteenth

Judicial District Court (the trial court), which set the matter for a rule to show cause.

Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (LCG or Defendant) answered the

Petition, generally denying Figaro’s allegations and asserting affirmative defenses

regarding public body/political subdivision immunity.2 Four exhibits were attached

to Defendant’s answer: 1) Exhibit 1, a copy of the LCG’s ordinances regarding

animals; 2) Exhibit 2, in globo, the evidence/documentation submitted at the Board

hearing; 3) Exhibit 3, an audio recording of the Board hearing; and 4) Exhibit 4, the

minutes from the Board hearing.

At a May 13, 2019 contradictory hearing, the trial court entertained oral

argument from the parties before taking the matter under advisement. In a written

judgment signed on June 6, 2019, the trial court declared Diamond a “dangerous dog”

1
Alfred McZeal, Jr. is also a named plaintiff in this action. Although the Petition gives no
indication as to McZeal’s relationship to Figaro, according to the minutes of the April 18, 2019
Board hearing, he is Figaro’s uncle. We refer to plaintiffs collectively as “Figaro” or “Plaintiff.”
2
The named defendants in this action are Lafayette Animal Shelter & Care Center (the
Shelter), the Board, and Lafayette Consolidated Government. LCG answered the Petition, stating
that it had been erroneously referred to as the “Lafayette Animal Shelter & Care Center, Lafayette
Animal Shelter Advisory Board.”

and dismissed Figaro’s petition with prejudice.3 Therein, the trial court noted that it

had “review[ed] the entire record, including the audio CD of the Dangerous Dog

hearing.” Figaro timely appealed that ruling and is before this court asserting that

the trial court abused its discretion 4 by affirming the Board’s determination that

Diamond was a “potentially dangerous or vicious animal.” Figaro claims that the

appealed judgment is a complete nullity because both the Board and the trial court

violated her rights of due process.

DISCUSSION

At the outset, we feel compelled to address an issue raised in Figaro’s

Appellant Brief, wherein she noted that the trial court failed to set a rule to show

cause within the five-day window mandated by Section 10-266 of the Lafayette City-

Parish Consolidated Government Code of Ordinances (the Ordinances). The

appellate court was faced with a similar complaint in WBR Parish Council, 14-133,

p. 2, where the plaintiff/dog owner argued that the trial court erred “by proceeding

with trial over defendant’s objection that trial was being commenced three days

beyond the statutorily mandated time delay.” While acknowledging that the trial

court set the hearing beyond the proscribed delay, the court of appeal found that the

plaintiff “offer[ed] no evidence to show how his rights were violated or how he was

prejudiced by the three-day delay[,]” nor did plaintiff “seek redress at the appropriate

time through supervisory writs.” Id. Thus, the first circuit found no actionable error

on the part of the trial court.

3
The document signed by the trial court, which is titled “Minute Entry / Ruling,” contains
the decretal language that is necessary for it to be a valid judgment.
4
We note that the proper standard of appellate review of a trial court’s affirmation of the
Board’s decision to declare a dog dangerous within the meaning of the Ordinances is that of
manifest error. See WBR Parish Council v. Jordan, 14-133 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/25/14) (unpublished
opinion).
2

Here, Figaro failed to allege, and our review of the record provides no support

upon which to base an argument, that she suffered any prejudice as a result of the

trial court’s delay in setting the rule to show cause.

In an Appellee Brief filed in this court on December 11, 2019, Defendant

disclosed that the following transpired after the appealed judgment was signed on

June 7, 2019:

On June 18, 2019, Ms. Figaro received a letter from Shelley
Delahoussaye, the shelter supervisor, dated June 17, 2019, informing
Ms. Figaro of the requirements for keeping a dangerous dog. Mrs.
Delahoussaye spoke with Ms. Figaro by phone on the morning of June
18, 2019, during which call Ms. Figaro stated that she would not be able
to meet the requirements of keeping a dangerous dog and asked what
options were available. Mrs. Delahoussaye then informed Ms. Figaro
that Diamond could not be released without having the requirements
met, but that Diamond could be surrendered to the Lafayette Animal
Shelter. Ms. Figaro opted to surrender Diamond to the Lafayette
Animal Shelter, and was additionally advised that Diamond was
ineligible for adoption or rescue and that she would have to be
euthanized. Ms. Katina Richard, a field supervisor for the shelter, then
met Ms. Figaro at her residence for her to sign an Owner Surrender
Form, which she did on June 18, 2019. Ms. Figaro asked Ms. Richard
if the shelter would wait to euthanize Diamond until June 19, 2019, so
that she could have one last visit, and the shelter agreed. Ms. Figaro
visited Diamond on the afternoon of June 19, 2019, and Diamond was
humanely euthanized on June 20, 2019.

Defendant asks this court to dismiss this appeal as moot in light of the foregoing

circumstances, the result of which leaves no justiciable controversy for this court to

decide.

None of the occurrences outlined in Defendant’s Appellee Brief were noted

in the Appellant Brief Figaro filed in this court on November 4, 2019. Moreover, in

the Reply Brief she filed on December 26, 2019, Figaro fails to dispute that any of

the events happened as explained by Defendant or to otherwise refute that this appeal

has become moot. Instead, Figaro insists that Defendant should be precluded from

raising the issue of mootness because it failed to answer this appeal. Moreover,

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Figaro contends that Defendant has improperly clouded the issues as a means of

evading discussion of the merits of her assignments of error.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently enforced the principle that:

Courts may not decide cases that are moot, or where no justiciable
controversy exists. La. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. State of
La., 95-2105 (La.3/8/96), 669 So.2d 1185, 1193; see generally Chief
Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Advisory Opinions: A Wise Change for
Louisiana and Its Judiciary?, 38 Loy. L.Rev.. 329, 362-67 (1992)
(summarizing arguments against permitting the courts to issue advisory
opinions). An issue is “moot” where “it has been deprived of practical
significance and made abstract or purely academic.” La. Associated
Gen. Contractors, Inc., 669 So.2d at 1193 (citing Am. Waste v. Martin
Parish, 627 So.2d 158 (La.1993)). In contrast, a justiciable controversy
exists where there is an “ ‘existing actual and substantial dispute ...
which involves the legal relations of the parties who have real adverse
interest, and upon which the judgment of the court may effectively
operate through a decree of conclusive character.’ ” Id. (quoting St.
Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. GAF Corp., et al., 512 So.2d 1165
(La.1987)).

Suire v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459, 04-1460, 04-1466, p. 24 (La.

4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 55.

Wood v. Fontenot, 04-1174 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05), 896 So.2d 323, writ

denied sub nom. City of New Iberia v. New Iberia Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 05-

801 (La. 5/13/05), 902 So.2d 1023, involved an appeal brought by a police captain,

a policeman’s association, and three individual police officers who filed a suit to

enjoin a city, its mayor, and the city council from entering into an agreement

whereby the parish law enforcement district would assume the duties of the police

department, the result of which would be the elimination of the majority of the city

police department’s positions. The trial court had denied the relief sought by the

plaintiffs on the basis that they failed to provide any authority for the sought-after

injunction. Defendants sought to have this court deny the appeal as moot on the

basis that the agreement which plaintiffs were seeking to enjoin had already been

entered into, and a reduction in the police force had already occurred, which facts

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plaintiffs acknowledged in their pleadings. In dismissing the appeal as moot, we

noted:

“A moot case is one which seeks a judgment or decree which, when
rendered, can give no practical relief.” United Cos. Lending Corp. v.
Hall, 97-2525, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/6/98), 722 So.2d 48, 50.

It is well established that appellate courts will not
render advisory opinions from which no practical results
can follow. As a result, Courts have established the rule
that moot questions will not be considered on appeal. So
strong is this prohibition that an appellate Court, as a
matter of judicial economy, has a right to consider the
possibility of mootness on its own motion and to
dismiss the appeal if the matter has become moot.

Wood, 896 So.2d at 325-26 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Whitney

Nat’l. Bank of New Orleans v. Poydras Center Assocs., 468 So.2d 1246, 1248

(La.App. 4 Cir.1985). See also Cain v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections, Ouachita Par.,

335 So.2d 711, 712 (La.App. 2 Cir.), cert. denied, 336 So.2d 871 (La.1976) (“While

no motions were filed contending that this case is now moot, this court has the right

to consider this possibility ex proprio motu. C.C.P. art. 2164.[5] Moot questions will

not be considered on appeal.”)

In rejecting the Wood plaintiffs’ argument “that the implementation of the

Agreement is an ongoing occurrence rather than a singular event and that, as a result,

its enforcement can be enjoined[,]” we reasoned, “the Plaintiffs would have us ‘reach

back in time’ and undo the implementation of the agreement, and cause the

Department to be reconstituted in its previous form. We cannot, in this case, enjoin

the occurrence of events which, as the Plaintiffs have acknowledged, have already

occurred.” Wood, 896 So.2d at 326, 327.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2164, titled, “Scope of appeal and action to
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be taken; costs,” provides, in pertinent part, that an “appellate court shall render any judgment
which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal.”
5

Given the fact that Diamond, the subject of this appeal has been euthanized,

we are unable to offer any practical relief to Figaro that would bring back her pet.

Nevertheless, we will perform a bare due process review of the proceedings that took

place before the Board and in the trial court.

Throughout her briefs to this court, Figaro repeatedly refers to Diamond as

having been declared “potentially dangerous or vicious animal.” We note that

Article IV of the Ordinances, which is titled “POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS,

DANGEROUS OR VISCIOUS ANIMAL,” clearly differentiates between a

“dangerous dog” and a dog that is “potentially dangerous.” Section 10-262 of

Article IV includes the following definitions:

Potentially dangerous animal or dog means: (1) an animal or dog
while at large menaces, chases, displays threating or aggressive
behavior or otherwise threatens or endangers the safety of any person,
domestic animal, or livestock while on streets, sidewalks, public
grounds, or private grounds; (2) any animal or dog that due to
combination of size, strength and aggressiveness, that demonstrates
aggressive or threating behavior directed against a person or animal at
a place in time where the person or animal was conducting themselves
peaceably and lawfully; (3) an animal or dog that aggressively bites or
causes physical injury to any person, domestic animal, or livestock
either on public or private property; or (4) any animal or dog with a
known propensity, tendency or disposition to attack unprovoked, inflict
an injury upon a human, pet, or livestock while on streets, sidewalks,
or on public or private grounds.

Dangerous animal or dog means: (1) Any animal or dog which
when unprovoked, on two separate occasions within the prior 24 month
period, engages in any behavior that requires a defensive action by any
person to prevent bodily injury when the person and the animal or dog
are off the property of the owner of the animal or dog; or (2) any animal
or dog which, when unprovoked, bites a person causing an injury[.]

Our review of the record reveals that both the Board and the trial court

declared Diamond a dangerous dog, as opposed to being merely potentially

dangerous. Exhibit 2 to Defendant’s answer contains two Finalized Animal Control

Issue Summaries completed by Animal Control Officer Carolyn Giuffrida

documenting two instances, on January 14, 2019, and on March 8, 2019, when
6

Diamond bit someone off of the property where it lived with Figaro. The minutes

of the Board hearing show that Figaro was present at the April 18, 2019 Dangerous

Dog Hearing concerning Diamond. Finally, on the audio of that hearing, Figaro

admits that Diamond did, in fact, bite the two individuals as noted in Officer

Giuffrida’s reports.

The properly submitted evidence confirms that Diamond bit two people while

off of Figaro’s property. Thus, we conclude that neither the Board nor the trial court

committed manifest error in decreeing Diamond a dangerous dog within the meaning

of the Ordinances. Moreover, this appeal has been rendered moot by the course of

events that have transpired since the appeal judgment was rendered. Thus, we

hereby, on our own motion, dismiss this appeal as moot.

DECREE

Appeal dismissed as moot. All costs of this appeal are assessed against

Plaintiffs, Natisha Marie Figaro and Alfred McZeal, Jr.

APPEAL DISMISSED AS MOOT.

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