Bequnkie Bergeron and Dasha Bergeron v. Eliza Martinez, Josie Villaloro, Courtney Ramsay Kylie Ramsay, Indv. and D/B/A Pharview Stables, LLP and Ford Motor Company

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-681

BEQUNKIE BERGERON AND DASHA BERGERON

VERSUS

ELIZA MARTINEZ, JOSIE VILLALORO, COURTNEY RAMSAY

KYLIE RAMSAY, INDV. AND D/B/A PHARVIEW STABLES, LLP

AND FORD MOTOR COMPANY

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 18-C-0418-C
HONORABLE JAMES PAUL DOHERTY JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, Shannon J. Gremillion, and D. Kent Savoie,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Joseph Ritch
Elliott & Ritch
321 Artesian Street
Corpus Christi, TX 78401
(361) 883-3000
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Dasha Brayon Bergeron, child of Bequnkie Bergeron
Sydni Deann Melancon, child of Bequnkie Bergeron
Meagan Renee Bergeron, child of Bequnkie Bergeron
Lakeisha Denee Hamilton, child of Bequnkie Bergeron
Bradley Bergeron
Carron Dekody Hamilton, child of Bequnkie Bergeron
Bradley Bergeron as widower of Bequnkie Bergeron

Joshua Lewis
Attorney at Law
427 Chemin Metairie Road
Youngsville, LA 70592
(337) 552-2057
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Carron Dekody Hamilton, child of Bequnkie Bergeron
Dasha Brayon Bergeron, child of Bequnkie Bergeron
Sydni Deann Melancon, child of Bequnkie Bergeron
Meagan Renee Bergeron, child of Bequnkie Bergeron
Lakeisha Denee Hamilton, child of Bequnkie Bergeron
Bradley Bergeron
Bradley Bergeron as widower of Bequnkie Bergeron

David J. Calogero
David J. Calegaro, APLC
1031 Camellia Blvd.
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 593-1123
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Kylie Ramsay
Courtney Ramsay

Douglas W. Truxillo
Onebane Law Firm
P. O. Drawer 3507
Lafayette, LA 70502-3507
(337) 237-2660
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Pharview Stables, LLP

GREMILLION, Judge.

The Plaintiffs/Appellants, Carron Dekody Hamilton, Dasha Brayon Bergeron,

Sydni Deann Melancon, Meagan Renee Bergeron, Lakeisha Denee Hamilton,

Bradley Bergeron, and Bradley Bergeron (the Bergerons), appeal the summary

judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees, Courtney Ramsay, Kylie Ramsay, and

Pharview Stables (the Pharview Defendants), dismissing their demands against

those defendants. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

This matter arises from an automobile accident that occurred on April 7, 2017.

According to the petition, Dasha Bergeron was driving a 2000 Ford Focus on

Louisiana Highway 182, also known as North University Avenue, at or near its

intersection with Interstate 49, when Eliza Martinez, driving a 2008 Nissan Murano,

failed to yield right-of-way and struck Bergeron, pushing her into a ditch. The

Bergerons filed suit and named, among many defendants, the Pharview Defendants,

the alleged employers of Martinez, who was allegedly in the course and scope of her

employment. According to the petition, Dasha Bergeron and her guest passenger,

Bequnkie Bergeron, were injured in this collision.

The Pharview Defendants filed a motion for summary in which they disputed

the allegations that Martinez was employed by them. To support this contention, the

Pharview Defendants presented the affidavits of Martinez, Ernestina Montoya-

Gonzales, Jose Villatoro, Courtney Ramsay, and Kylie Ramsay.

Martinez attested in her deposition that at the time of the accident, she and her

co-worker, Montoya-Gonzales, were en route to their place of employment, Chuy’s

Restaurant in Lafayette, Louisiana. She further attested that her husband, Villatoro,

was employed at Pharview Stables and that the couple resided in a house there with

their children. Martinez denied telling anyone at the scene or elsewhere that she was

trying to get medicine for the horses at the stables.

Montoya-Gonzales confiirmed that Martinez picked her up at her home. They

were on their way to work at Chuy’s when the accident occurred. Montoya-

Gonzales testified that Martinez was not employed by Pharview Stables and was not

on an errand for Pharview Stables.

Villatoro’s affidavit confirmed that his wife was not employed at Pharview

Stables and that she was en route to work at Chuy’s at the time. Villatoro also

confirmed that his wife was not using the vehicle for any errand on behalf of

Pharview Stables, where Villatoro was employed as a laborer.

Courtney Ramsay attested that at all pertinent times, he was the owner of

Pharview Stables, an equine training center in Arnaudville, Louisiana. Pharview

Stables had two employees, Nicole Poret, the manager, and Jose Villtoro, a stable

hand. At no time did the Pharview Defendants pay wages to Martinez, control

Martinez’s activities, task Martinez with performing any duties or responsibilities

for them, or have any expectation that Martinez would perform any act on their

behalf. The Pharview Defendants had no knowledge of Martinez’s activities at the

time of the accident. Pharview Stables’ day-to-day operations did not involve the

use of private automobiles. All feed, supplies, and medications were delivered by

FeedPro or Dr. Marilyn Rumbaugh, the veterinarian. This testimony was echoed by

Kylie Ramsay, who also owned Pharview Stables.

The Bergerons opposed the motion for summary judgment and presented the

Uniform Motor Vehicle Traffic Crash Report, the affidavit of Dasha Bergeron, and

employment records from Chuy’s. Dasha Bergeron attested that after the accident,

Martinez was talking with someone on her phone, at first in Spanish but later in

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English. She recalled Martinez telling either the police officer or the person on the

phone that she was picking up feed for horses.

The employment records, the Bergerons argue, show that neither Martinez nor

Montoya-Gonzales worked at Chuy’s on April 7, 2017. The records do reflect that

neither worked that day.

The Bergerons argued that the statement overheard by Dasha Bergeron about

Martinez picking up feed for the horses raises a genuine issue of material fact

regarding her status as a servant of the Pharview Defendants. The Pharview

Defendants argued that even were one to assume that Martinez stated that she was

going to get feed for the horses, that fact does not establish a master-servant

relationship between them. Further, the Pharview Defendants objected to the

statement as hearsay.

The trial court reviewed the motion and opposition and ruled in favor of the

Pharview Defendants, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact

regarding a master-servant relationship between Martinez and the Pharview

Defendants. The Bergerons then perfected this devolutive appeal.

As their sole assignment of error, the Bergerons assert that the trial court erred

in granting summary judgment because the “dueling affidavits” of Dasha Bergeron

and Martinez create a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary

judgment.

ANALYSIS

Courts of appeal review summary judgments de novo applying
the same analysis as the trial court. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of
La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991). Summary judgment is
governed by La.Code Civ.P. arts. 966 and 967. Article 966 provides
that while the burden of proving entitlement to summary judgment rests
with the mover, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial
on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary
judgment, the mover’s burden does not require him to negate all
essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action or defense, but
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rather to point out that there is an absence of factual support for one or
more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action or defense.
Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support
sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary
burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Hardy
v. Bowie, 98–2821 (La.9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606.

Berard v. Home State Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 11-1372, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/9/12), 89

So. 3d 470, 471–72.

The Pharview Defendants argue that the affidavit of Dasha Bergeron should

not be considered because the statement of Martinez that she was picking up feed

for the horses constitutes hearsay that is inadmissible in summary judgment. 2015

La. Acts No. 422, §1, significantly amended the summary judgment procedure

outlined in La.Code Civ.P. art. 966. Among the amendments included in Act 422 is

La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(2), which provides:

The court may consider only those documents filed in support of
or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and shall consider
any documents to which no objection is made. Any objection to a
document shall be raised in a timely filed opposition or reply
memorandum. The court shall consider all objections prior to rendering
judgment. The court shall specifically state on the record or in writing
which documents, if any, it held to be inadmissible or declined to
consider.

The Pharview Defendants raised the issue of admissibility of Dasha

Bergeron’s affidavit in a reply memorandum filed into the record on July 16, 2019,

after the motion for summary judgment was heard on July 12, 2019. The trial court

considered the statement in Dasha Bergeron’s affidavit and granted summary

judgment anyway. We find no error in considering the statement, as the Pharview

Defendants missed the deadline for filing their reply memorandum. See La.Code

Civ.P. art. 966(B)(3).

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2320, which imposes vicarious liability on

masters and employers reads, in pertinent part, “Masters and employers are

answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the
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exercise of the functions in which they are employed.” The Louisiana Supreme

Court has indicated that determining whether a master-servant relationship exists

requires:

proof and assessment of several factors, including payment of wages
by the employer, the employer’s power of control, the employee’s duty
to perform the particular act, the time, place and purpose of the act in
relation to service of the employer, the relationship between the
employee’s act and the employer’s business, the benefits received by
the employer from the act, the motivation of the employee for
performing the act, and the reasonable expectation of the employer that
the employee would perform the act.

Reed v. House of Decor, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1159, 1161 (La.1985). The factor that

weighs most heavily in this calculus is the right of the putative employer to control

the work of the putative employee. Roberts v. State through La. Health and Human

Res. Admin., 404 So.2d 1221 (La.1981). “The right of control necessarily

encompasses supervision, selection and engagement, payment of wages or salary,

and the power to dismiss.” Doe v. Parauka, 97-2434, p. 5 (La. 7/8/98), 714 So.2d

701, 704.

Applying these principles to the present case, our initial task is to ascertain

whether the Pharview Defendants met their burden of proof in establishing that there

was no master-servant relationship between them and Martinez.

The Ramsays attested that they were the owners of Pharview Stables, which

had two employees, Nicole Poret and Jose Villtoro, Martinez’s husband. At no time

did the Pharview Defendants pay wages to Martinez, control Martinez’s activities,

require Martinez to perform any duties or responsibilities for them, or have any

expectation that Martinez would perform any act on their behalf. They further

attested that they had no knowledge of Martinez’s activities at the time of the

accident. Pharview Stables’ day-to-day operations did not involve the use of private

automobiles. All feed, supplies, and medications were delivered by FeedPro or Dr.

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Marilyn Rumbaugh, the veterinarian. This testimony covers every aspect of the

master-servant relationship: selection and engagement, supervision, wages, and

dismissal power. We find that the Pharview Defendants carried their burden of proof

on summary judgment. Our next task is to determine whether the Bergerons

established their burden of producing evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue

of material fact.

Nothing in Dasha Bergeron’s affidavit addresses the core elements of a

master-servant relationship. It simply states that Martinez said she was picking up

feed for horses. Assuming that this was a mission for the Pharview Defendants, it

does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. As noted above, Article 2320 imposes

liability on masters for the acts of their servants “in the exercise of the functions in

which they are employed.” This requires that the Bergerons prove that Martinez was

in fact employed by the Pharview Defendants and that she was acting in exercise of

the functions in which she was employed. The opposition and attachments do not

establish even an inference that Martinez was in fact employed by the Pharview

Defendants.

CONCLUSION

The Pharview Defendants bore the burden of persuading the court that there

was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a master-servant

relationship between them and Martinez. This they accomplished; their affidavits

directly addressed the core elements of a master-servant relationship. This shifted

the burden of producing some evidence which created an issue of material fact to the

Bergerons. The affidavit of Dasha Bergeron does not raise a genuine issue of

material fact. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court granting summary

judgment is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are taxed to Plaintiffs/appellants,

Carron Dekody Hamilton, Dasha Brayon Bergeron, Sydni Deann Melancon,
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Meagan Renee Bergeron, Lakeisha Denee Hamilton, Bradley Bergeron, and Bradley

Bergeron.

AFFIRMED.

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