Kaitlyn Lebouef Aguillard v. Caleb K. Aguillard

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-757

KAITLYN LEBOUEF AGUILLARD

VERSUS

CALEB K. AGUILLARD

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 18-C-5082-A
HONORABLE JAMES P. DOHERTY, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JONATHAN W. PERRY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of John E. Conery, D. Kent Savoie, and Jonathan W. Perry, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Caleb K. Aguillard
In Proper Person
141 South Sixth Street
Eunice, Louisiana 70535
(337) 457-9331
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

Jack Derrick Miller
Post Office Drawer 1650
Crowley, Louisiana 70526
(337) 788-0768
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Caleb K. Aguillard

Dyan Schnaars
3639 Ambassador Caffery Parkway
The Petroleum Tower, Suite 333
Lafayette, Louisiana 70503
(337) 534-4326
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Kaitlyn LeBouef

Geralyn Siefker
210 West Main Street
Lafayette, Louisiana 70501
(337) 210-5986
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Kaitlyn LeBouef

PERRY, Judge.

This case arises from the Domestic Abuse Assistance Act found in

La.R.S. 46:2131 to La.R.S. 46:2143. Caleb K. Aguillard appeals a judgment of the

trial court granting a protective order to his former spouse, Kaitlyn LeBouef. For

the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Kaitlyn LeBouef (LeBouef)1 and Caleb K. Aguillard (Aguillard)2 were

married in February 2017 and had one child, J.F.A.,3 born on September 26, 2017.

On November 16, 2018, LeBouef filed for divorce under La.Civ.Code art. 102.4 In

her petition, LeBouef requested the parties be awarded joint custody of the child

with her being designated as the domiciliary parent and with Aguillard having

reasonable supervised visitation pending completion of a hair-follicle drug screening

and evaluation for substance abuse. LeBouef also sought child support, exclusive

use of the family home, and other incidental requests.

Aguillard filed an answer and reconventional demand on December 4, 2018,

requesting the parties be awarded joint custody of the child with him having frequent

visitation. In addition to other incidental requests, Aguillard sought exclusive use

of the family home; interim spousal support; issuance of a temporary restraining

order (TRO) prohibiting LeBouef from alienating any community assets, borrowing

against or changing beneficiaries of life insurance policies, and cancelling existing

health, hospitalization, and automobile insurance policies; and issuance of a TRO

1
Formerly Kaitlyn LeBouef Aguillard.
2
Aguillard, an attorney, has represented himself throughout these proceedings.
3
Initials are used to ensure the confidentiality of minors. Uniform Rules—Courts of
Appeal, Rule 5–2.
4
The parties are now divorced by judgment dated November 15, 2019.

against LeBouef pursuant to La.R.S. 9:372.1, prohibiting harassment through direct

or indirect contact with Aguillard’s family or former family members.

On December 17, 2018, the parties appeared before a hearing officer who

recommended, in pertinent part: the parties have joint custody of the child with

LeBouef being the domiciliary parent and with Aguillard having supervised

visitation pending a hair-follicle drug screening; LeBouef have exclusive use of the

family home; Aguillard pay $280 per month in child support; the parties attend

parenting classes; and reciprocal TROs to stop harassment. Both parties objected to

the hearing officer’s recommendations.

On December 26, 2018, Aguillard filed a Rule for Contempt against LeBouef.

Aguillard alleged LeBouef refused to allow him to have unsupervised visitation with

J.F.A. after Aguillard’s hair-follicle drug screening was negative for narcotics.

According to the trial court’s minutes and an Order on Rule signed on January 29,

2019, a pre-trial conference was held on Aguillard’s Rule for Contempt on January

11, 2019. Trial on the issues of interim spousal support, child support, and child

custody was set for April 17, 2019. The trial court’s order further specified Aguillard

remained subject to random hair-follicle drug screenings to be set at the court’s

discretion, and the reciprocal TROs remained in effect.

Aguillard filed a Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Compromise

on February 11, 2019. He sought to enforce certain terms concerning custody,

visitation, interim spousal support, drug screenings, and child support, to which he

alleged LeBouef had agreed.

The record reflects the parties signed a Consent Judgment on March 1, 2019,

settling the issues concerning the use of the family home, child support, interim

spousal support, and separation of community property. On March 6, 2019, the

parties also entered into a Stipulated Joint Custody Implementation Plan and a

2

Community Property Partition Agreement, and a Judgment of Partition was signed

by the trial court.

On March 22, 2019, Aguillard filed a Motion for Injunctive Relief and Rule

for Contempt pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. arts. 3601–3613. Aguillard alleged

LeBouef abused A.E.A. and N.K.A., his children from a prior marriage, while he

was away from the family home undergoing inpatient rehabilitation from August 4,

2018 to November 12, 2018. The parties appeared before a hearing officer on May

2, 2019. The hearing officer recommended denial of Aguillard’s motion. Aguillard

filed an objection. Aguillard also requested a Watermeier hearing.5

After the hearing officer conference on May 2, 2019, LeBouef filed a Petition

for Protection from Abuse pursuant to La.R.S. 46:2131–2143, charging Aguillard

with domestic abuse. LeBouef alleged physical abuse, sexual abuse, stalking on

social media, and verbal intimidations, which included Aguillard threatening he

would accuse LeBouef of physically abusing A.E.A. and N.K.A. LeBouef was

granted an ex parte TRO and the matter was scheduled for conference before a

hearing officer. See La.R.S. 46:2135(A) and (I). After Aguillard was ordered to

show cause why the TRO should not be converted to a protective order, he obtained

an order to forego a hearing before a hearing officer.

On May 20, 2019, Aguillard filed a First Amending Petition and Supplemental

Petition for Divorce Pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 103(4),6 or Alternatively Pursuant

5
“A ‘Watermier hearing’ is a hearing in chambers, outside of the presence of the parties,
but in the presence of their attorneys, with a record of the hearing to be made by the court reporter,
to inquire as to the competency of a child to testify as to custody.” Patterson v. Charles, 19-333,
p. 20 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/11/19), 282 So.3d 1075, 1089 (quoting S.L.B. v. C.E.B., 17-978, 17-979,
17-980, p. 13, n. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/27/18), 252 So.3d 950, 960, writ denied, 18-1442
(La. 11/20/18), 256 So.3d 992). According to the trial court’s minutes, a Watermeier hearing was
held on May 17, 2019. The trial court determined A.E.A. and N.K.A. were competent to testify in
these proceedings.
6
Under La.Civ.Code art. 103(4), divorce shall be granted upon proof that: “During the
marriage, the other spouse physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking divorce or a child of
one of the spouses, regardless of whether the other spouse was prosecuted for the act of abuse.”

3

to La.Civ.Code art. 103(5).7 Aguillard’s petition alleged that following a

Watermeier hearing, which was held on May 17, 2019, the trial court granted his

Motion for Injunctive Relief pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. arts. 3601–3613. Thus,

Aguillard sought a judgment of divorce on the basis the trial court found LeBouef

had abused A.E.A. and N.K.A.

Speaking to Aguillard’s petition for divorce, on May 28, 2019, the trial court

filed into the record a transcript of its oral ruling on May 17, 2019, Written Reasons

for Judgment, and a concomitant Order. The trial court’s Written Reasons for

Judgment express, in relevant part:

[T]he Court did not comment or make any findings as to the allegations
of abuse of the children as presented in evidence and the Court’s reason
for doing so was purposeful. Specifically, the Court has ruled, and does
reiterate and re-enforce its holding, on the Code of Civil Procedure
Article 3601 Injunction that was issued herein restraining and enjoining
and prohibiting [LeBouef] from approaching the minor children of
[Aguillard] or contacting them either directly or indirectly and from
further publishing any photographs of them on social media for public
viewing based upon the fact that [LeBouef] is not the parent of these
two minor children and has no legal rights when it comes to custody,
visitation, or contact with the children and it was the specific request,
intent and plea of the father that his children have no contact with
[LeBouef]. The Court is of the opinion that there was sufficient
grounds in which to rule on the injunction without the necessity of
making factual findings on the allegations of abuse. Furthermore, the
Court is not satisfied that the testimony of abuse made by the two
children was sufficient for the Court to grant the injunction on the
grounds of abuse and those grounds only. The Court is of the opinion
that in order to make a finding of abuse of the children, additional
corroborating evidence would have to be presented. Furthermore, the
Court notes that in making his request for no contact between
[LeBouef] and the two minor children of [Aguillard], on several
occasions, testified that his concern with [LeBouef] disciplining his
children while they were in a relationship had more to do with the
consequences or issues that may arise from said discipline being raised
by the natural mother of the two minor children and it was not until
after the separation of the parties that defendant became concerned with
the method or extent of the discipline of his children by their
step-mother. Furthermore, the Court notes that there is a fine line
between disciplining a child and abusing a child and as the Court stated
7
Under La.Civ.Code art. 103(5), divorce shall be granted: “After a contradictory hearing
or consent decree, a protective order or an injunction was issued during the marriage against the
other spouse to protect the spouse seeking the divorce or a child of one of the spouses from abuse.”

4

above, to make a finding of abuse additional evidence would be
required.

Following the issuance of the trial court’s reasons, Aguillard dismissed his petition

for divorce on the alternative grounds of La.Civ.Code art. 103(5).

Trial on LeBouef’s Petition for Protection from Abuse was held on June 28,

2019. During trial, LeBouef presented testimony from her father, Bernard LeBouef;

two officers from the Eunice Police Department, Lieutenant Michael Dunn and

Officer Jack Ardoin; and licensed social worker, Jennifer Glasscock.

Lieutenant Michael Dunn worked with Aguillard at the Eunice Police

Department. Lieutenant Dunn testified he never personally witnessed Aguillard

threaten LeBouef, nor did he recall ever being contacted by LeBouef to report

Aguillard being violent or threatening violence.

On cross-examination, Lieutenant Dunn was asked whether he trusted

Aguillard when they worked together on a daily basis to carry a loaded firearm.

Lieutenant Dunn answered, “Up to a certain point[.]”

On re-direct examination, Lieutenant Dunn clarified his answer, testifying he

did not fully trust Aguillard because of a theft that occurred and his opinion

Aguillard was intoxicated at work. Lieutenant Dunn approximated it was May 2018

when Aguillard allegedly stole prescription medication from his residence. He

testified he heard Aguillard was told to voluntarily resign from the Eunice Police

Department in lieu of criminal charges.

Officer Jack Ardoin testified he also worked with Aguillard at the Eunice

Police Department. He recalled going to LeBouef’s residence in November 2018

and advising LeBouef to contact the Eunice City Marshal’s Office if she became

concerned with Aguillard’s behavior upon his return home from inpatient rehab in

Mississippi. Officer Ardoin recalled LeBouef being fearful. He was also called to

5

LeBouef’s residence only a week earlier, after LeBouef’s father reported a

suspicious package was found in her mailbox.

On cross-examination, Officer Ardoin acknowledged there was no evidence

linking Aguillard to the suspicious package. He also testified he never witnessed

Aguillard commit domestic violence, and he acknowledged Aguillard advocated for

victims of domestic violence in his job as a police officer. Officer Ardoin and

Aguillard attended the police academy together, and Aguillard held the position of

class president.

On re-direct examination, Officer Ardoin acknowledged there being a

movement to impeach Aguillard from the position of class president. However, he

did not recall on what grounds individuals sought to remove Aguillard.

Jennifer Glasscock was accepted by the trial court as a licensed clinical social

worker with the ability for treatment of domestic violence. LeBouef began seeing

her on August 2, 2018, for marriage counseling. Ms. Glasscock testified LeBouef

told her Aguillard had choked her, and she was fearful of him. Ms. Glasscock

diagnosed LeBouef with acute stress disorder, exhibiting symptoms of

overwhelming fear, anxiousness, depression, and fear of harm, both physical and

psychological. She opined LeBouef is a victim of domestic violence and explained

the abuse affected LeBouef’s sense of worth, giving her a sense of powerlessness,

helplessness, and an overwhelming fear. She observed LeBouef had difficulty

falling asleep and staying asleep, decreased appetite, and a sense of guilt which she

testified was a result of gaslighting. Ms. Glasscock defined gaslighting as:

A psychological form of abuse in which the perpetrator places seeds of
doubt and insecurity in the victim and turning -- turning reality into --
into a falsehood, redirecting with lies and manipulation, intimidation
through these methods and leaving the victim unsure, uncertain,
insecure about what is -- what is real, what is true.

6

According to Ms. Glasscock, her treatment has focused on stabilizing LeBouef’s

sense of safety and helping her with managing panic attacks.

On cross-examination, Ms. Glasscock testified it is her job to treat claims of

abuse; it is not her job to substantiate claims of abuse. Ms. Glasscock acknowledged

LeBouef has anger issues, but also noted LeBouef demonstrates a self-awareness

thereof. Also, Ms. Glasscock testified she found LeBouef’s anger to be a natural

human response to the sense of powerlessness and to being overpowered.

LeBouef’s father, Bernard, testified that LeBouef told him of three incidents

of Aguillard’s abuse. The first being when Aguillard choked LeBouef and the

second being when Aguillard hit LeBouef and left a bruise on her leg. He stated

Aguillard called him the morning after hitting LeBouef, crying, claiming

self-defense, and professing remorse. Mr. Bernard testified the third instance of

abuse LeBouef reported to him was the first time Aguillard sexually assaulted her.

Under cross-examination, Aguillard invited Mr. Bernard to elaborate on their

conversation the morning after Aguillard hit LeBouef’s leg. Aguillard asked, “That

was in the last week of July of last year, wasn’t it? I called you in the morning crying

and I told you the night before she had hit me in the face[,] and I swatted her on the

leg. I told you about that, right?” Mr. Bernard replied, “After she told me you had

done that.”

During her testimony, LeBouef recounted several incidents of abuse she

alleged happened during her twenty-one-month marriage to Aguillard.8 The trial

court also accepted excerpts from LeBouef’s handwritten journal, wherein she

8
Aguillard entered rehab on August 4, 2018, where he remained until after LeBouef filed
for divorce on November 16, 2018. Thus, we note Aguillard and LeBouef lived together as
husband and wife for approximately eighteen months.

7

memorialized her relationship with Aguillard.9 According to LeBouef: on March

14, 2017, within a month of their marriage, Aguillard grabbed her by the throat, held

her against a wall, and screamed in her face; on November 13, 2017, before she was

fully recovered from child birth in September 2017, Aguillard forcibly restrained

and sexually assaulted her; on November 23, 2017, Aguillard forced her to have sex;

on May 2, 2018, Aguillard used his foot to kick LeBouef and their infant out of bed

because he was wakened by the infant’s cries to be fed; on June 24, 2018, Aguillard

struck LeBouef’s upper right arm with his fist while she held their sleeping infant;

and on July 23, 2018, Aguillard struck LeBouef with his open palm on LeBouef’s

right thigh. LeBouef explained, “I swatted his right arm like, ‘Oh, boy, be quiet,’

something along those lines and he lost it and as hard -- as he as hard as he could, he

hit me with an open hand on my leg and knocked the wind out of me.” LeBouef

testified Aguillard began blaming her, claiming she hit him in the face, claiming he

had recorded her admitting she hit him first, and bragged that no one would believe

her because he is friends with the cops and the city judge, and his father is an

attorney.10 LeBouef photographed her leg and sent a copy of the picture to a friend.11

9
The record contains Aguillard’s Motion in Limine filed June 27, 2019, the day before
trial, wherein he sought to quash the subpoenas of Lieutenant Dunn and Officer Ardoin, exclude
evidence of other past bad acts, and to suppress LeBouef’s use of a journal which Aguillard
complained had not been produced in response to his discovery requests. During trial, Aguillard
also made a contemporaneous objection to LeBouef’s use of her journal.
In response, LeBouef introduced into evidence her response, dated May 22, 2019, to
Aguillard’s discovery requests, dated May 7, 2019. Therein, the journal was listed as an intended
trial exhibit.
The trial court pronounced Aguillard could either proceed or move to continue the trial.
Aguillard withdrew his objection to the use of the journal’s excerpts and the trial resumed. The
trial court allowed into evidence, under seal, only pages of the journal related to LeBouef’s
testimony, redacted to obscure hearsay.
In his appellate brief, Aguillard alleges he withdrew his objection at trial under duress. Our
appreciation of the trial transcript leads to our finding Aguillard was not constrained when his
objection to the journal’s admission was withdrawn.
10
LeBouef admitted deleting Aguillard’s video and denied hitting Aguillard’s face.
11
The photograph was introduced into evidence.

8

Twelve days later, on August 4, 2018, LeBouef called Aguillard’s parents to

pick him up because, for the second time in a matter of months, he had been

terminated from his job. Aguillard was brought to an inpatient rehabilitation center

while his two children, A.E.A. and N.K.A., remained with LeBouef. LeBouef

brought A.E.A. and N.K.A. to Aguillard’s parents’ home before she filed for divorce

on November 16, 2018.

LeBouef testified Aguillard was often intimidating. He would regularly say,

“I am the law,” remind her of his statuses as an attorney and a police officer, and

display his weapons, i.e., guns, knives, and swords, to frighten her. She recalled an

argument when Aguillard pointed a loaded gun just above her head and laughed

when she became silent. Aguillard also reportedly boasted it would be futile for

LeBouef to report his bad behavior because he knew everyone, his family had clout

in the community, and she would never be believed.

LeBouef felt she was being watched by Aguillard. She testified that during

their marriage, Aguillard created fake social media accounts to follow both his

ex-wife, with whom Aguillard had ongoing custody issues concerning A.E.A. and

N.K.A., and his ex-wife’s boyfriend, John Chatman. LeBouef suspected Aguillard

was behind her recent receipt of multiple friend requests on social media. She also

suspected Aguillard attempted to access her Apple account in late-May 2019.

LeBouef received an email from Apple Support, notifying her of unusual activity on

her Apple account. She had not released her Apple ID or password to anyone other

than him. In January 2019, LeBouef saw Aguillard watching her while he drove

slowly past her home. She stated she was fearful of Aguillard’s behavior, to the

point that she moved back into her parents’ home with J.F.A.

Under cross-examination, LeBouef conceded there had been no physical

abuse by Aguillard since their physical separation on August 4, 2018; however, she

9

maintained Aguillard stalked and harassed her since their separation. LeBouef

denied being comfortable with Aguillard and repeatedly meeting him with no one

else present when they met to exchange their child, J.F.A. She insisted someone else

was always present or their encounter was in a public setting.

When questioned why she agreed to sign the Consent Judgment in March

2019, LeBouef testified she did so because Aguillard’s drug screenings were clean

and because her attorney advised “I was not going to be able to keep you from seeing

your daughter, . . . unfortunately, it would take [J.F.A.] physically being harmed[.]”

Next, questioning LeBouef’s motive for filing a petition for protection in May 2019,

Aguillard asked, “What happened in March [2019] that made your attitude toward

me radically change?” LeBouef denied filing her petition for protection in

retaliation, stating Aguillard began in January 2019 declaring his children had been

abused by LeBouef while he was not living at home from August to November 2018.

LeBouef also denied she was told by Ms. Glasscock to file her petition for protection.

LeBouef’s counsel objected when Aguillard asked, “It sounds like you filed a

Petition for Protection from Abuse after therapy and what you say you remember

and not because of anything that’s being going on at the time?” The trial court

announced:

Here is what the Court takes from what’s been said so far. What
she said was she didn’t realize the problem that she had until she
went through therapy. The therapist helped her to realize what
was going on in her life and it was at that point she decided to
file. That’s what the Court’s finding is and I’ll adopt that as my
finding so far based upon the evidence that I’ve heard.

Finally, Aguillard addressed LeBouef’s journal, primarily focusing on a

discrepancy between LeBouef’s petition for protection, which alleged Aguillard

choked LeBouef in February 2017, and her journal, which alleged Aguillard choked

LeBouef on March 14, 2017. Aguillard suggested LeBouef manufactured the

10

journal and changed the date of the incident after he pointed out he was physically

incapable of mistreating LeBouef in this manner because he had open heart surgery

on February 10, 2017. LeBouef explained she simply misstated the date because she

did not have the journal with her when she wrote the allegations in her petition for

protection. She insisted Aguillard, a month after surgery, was physically capable of

normal activities.

In his defense, Aguillard presented testimony from his child, A.E.A.; his

former mother-in-law, Shelly Lester; and his mother, Leslie Denise Smith Aguillard.

During direct examination, A.E.A. denied ever seeing Aguillard hit, hurt, threaten,

scream, or curse at LeBouef. On cross-examination, A.E.A. acknowledged

Aguillard and LeBouef sometimes argued loudly and used “bad words.”

Ms. Lester testified she spent time with LeBouef and her grandchildren,

A.E.A. and N.K.A., in the summer of 2018. Ms. Lester claimed LeBouef confided

she wanted another child but complained her relationship with Aguillard lacked sex.

Ms. Lester also recounted LeBouef telling her of one fight with Aguillard, during

which LeBouef punched Aguillard in his chest. Ms. Lester said LeBouef bragged

Aguillard was not man enough to hit her. Referring to the incident in July 2018,

Ms. Lester testified LeBouef said she slapped Aguillard before Aguillard slapped

LeBouef.

During her testimony, Leslie Aguillard characterized LeBouef’s temperament

around Aguillard as controlling, and claimed Aguillard, A.E.A., and N.K.A.,

complained about LeBouef’s temper many times. Leslie Aguillard claimed she had

continuous contact with LeBouef and Aguillard throughout their marriage and

denied there was ever any indication Aguillard abused LeBouef. She also denied

ever seeing Aguillard hurt either A.E.A. or N.K.A.

11

Under cross-examination, Leslie Aguillard acknowledged she did not have a

good relationship with LeBouef. In fact, Leslie Aguillard was not invited to her

son’s wedding and claimed she was not allowed to attend Aguillard’s heart surgery.

She admitted that during the first year of Aguillard’s marriage to LeBouef, she did

not speak to LeBouef and Aguillard, and she did not see A.E.A. and N.K.A.

During his testimony, Aguillard denied each of LeBouef’s allegations of

abuse, especially sexual abuse, claiming “we were not having sex.” He described

LeBouef’s attitude with him, A.E.A., and N.K.A. as being “completely hostile.”

Aguillard reiterated his accusation concerning LeBouef’s journal, testifying, “I

started to pick apart in my brief the things that were said in the Petition. Now all of

a sudden when I said I was physically incapable in February of having done this,

after that, now the date changes.”

Aguillard denied LeBouef’s allegations of harassment. Aguillard admitted he

created “an alternative persona profile” when he worked with the Eunice Police

Department in the criminal investigation division, but he denied spying on LeBouef

in this manner. According to Aguillard, he used a fake profile to collect evidence

for a lawsuit against John Chatman, wherein Aguillard alleged he was being stalked,

harassed, and defamed.12

Aguillard conceded “the one time I ever touched” LeBouef was on July 23,

2018. He claimed LeBouef hit his nose with the back of her hand so he slapped her

leg.

Aguillard denied LeBouef’s allegations of intimidation. He explained his use

of the expression “I am the law” was a joke. He denied ever saying it to threaten or

12
We take judicial notice of Aguillard’s suit against John Chatman. See Aguillard v.
Chatman, 17-408 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/18), 239 So.3d 300.

12

intimidate LeBouef. Aguillard further attributed the quote to Sylvester Stallone’s

movie Judge Dredd.

Aguillard denied saying his father was acquainted with judges, his friends

were cops, or that no one would believe LeBouef. He claimed to be more attentive

to A.E.A. and N.K.A. than LeBouef, he denied having anger issues, and described

himself as humble.

At the conclusion of the hearing on LeBouef’s petition for protection, the trial

court took the matter under advisement. A ruling thereon was issued at the

conclusion of additional proceedings held on July 9, 2019,13 wherein the trial court

found LeBouef had proven domestic abuse and was entitled to a protective order

against Aguillard. In oral reasons, the trial court expounded, in relevant part:

I am concerned on the issue of abuse for the issuance of a
protective order. I find that there’s a lot of animosity and there appears
to be an element of the parties wanting revenge against the other for
what happened during the time that they were together, particularly
from the point towards the latter part of 2018 up until the time of
November of 2018 and thereafter. I don’t find any instances of abuse
since November of 2018. I know Mr. Aguillard says that the abuse, in
order for the issuance of the protective order, has to be immediate and
likely to happen but that’s not what Revised Statute 46:2135 says. It
says, in part, “The court shall consider any and all past history of abuse
or threats thereof, in determining the existence of an immediate [and]
present danger of abuse. [There is] no requirement that the abuse itself
be recent, immediate[,] or present,” so taking that into consideration,
the plain language of it, the Court has to be guided by those terms.

If I had by [sic] druthers in this matter, I would issue a 9:372 and
372.1 but that’s not what’s before me. It may come about in further
proceedings because I believe there are other issues in this case that
have not yet been litigated but I do find that Ms. LeBouef was placed
in a difficult position that had to do with your -- with your addiction at
the time, Mr. Aguillard. She was trying to raise these children. I find
that from the testimony of Ms. Glasscock that Ms. LeBouef was
exhibiting the symptoms of an abusive relationship at that time. The
Court also notes that -- and went back and read the excerpts from the
diary. I find that the diary is a contemporaneous notation of what
occurred during this relationship. In taking the totality of the diary, the
13
Trial on Aguillard’s petition for divorce pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 103(4) was held
on July 9, 2019.

13

Court finds that there is a probability of abuse and I’m going to grant
Ms. Kaitlyn LeBouef a title 46 protective order.

The protective order, signed on July 10, 2019, remains in effect until January 10,

2021.

Aguillard appeals,14 contending the trial court erred in granting the protective

order. He presents the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court committed legal error by failing to apply the
appropriate legal standard for the issuance of a protective order.

2. The trial court committed legal error by granting a Protective
Order to LeBouef where there was no immediate need for protection.

3. The trial court committed legal error and an abuse of
discretion by granting a Protective Order where the petitioner had not
met her burden of proof as a matter of law.

LAW

The Domestic Abuse Assistance Act, La.R.S. 46:2131 to La.R.S. 46:2143,

provides protection in the form of TROs and protective orders for persons subject to

domestic abuse. This law “provide[s] a civil remedy for domestic violence which

will afford the victim immediate and easily accessible protection.” La.R.S. 46:2131.

Domestic abuse is not limited to physical or sexual abuse, but includes “any offense

against the person, physical or non-physical, as defined in the Criminal Code of

Louisiana, except negligent injury and defamation, committed by one family

member, household member, or dating partner against another.”

La.R.S. 46:2132(3).15

14
We note that in addition to the instant appeal, there is another appeal pending in this case
under this court’s docket number CA20-064. Therein, Aguillard seeks review of the judgment
dated November 15, 2019, whereby the trial court granted LeBouef’s petition for divorce pursuant
to La.Civ.Code art. 103(5) and granted a non-expiring injunction to LeBouef pursuant to
La.R.S. 9:372.1.
15
The phrase “physical or non-physical” was added to this definition by 2015 La. Acts
No. 85, § 1.

14

Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:213516 states, in relevant part:

A. Upon good cause shown in an ex parte proceeding, the court
may enter a temporary restraining order, without bond, as it deems
necessary to protect from abuse the petitioner, any minor children, or
any person alleged to be an incompetent. Any person who shows
immediate and present danger of abuse shall constitute good cause for
purposes of this Subsection. The court shall consider any and all past
history of abuse, or threats thereof, in determining the existence of an
immediate and present danger of abuse. There is no requirement that
the abuse itself be recent, immediate or present. The order may include
but is not limited to the following:

(1) Directing the defendant to refrain from abusing,
harassing, or interfering with the person or employment or
going near the residence or place of employment of the
petitioner, the minor children, or any person alleged to be
incompetent, on whose behalf a petition was filed under
this Part.

....

B. If a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the
matter shall be set within twenty-one days for a rule to show cause why
the protective order should not be issued, at which time the petitioner
must prove the allegations of abuse by a preponderance of the
evidence. . . .

Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:213617 states, in relevant part:

A. The court may grant any protective order or approve any
consent agreement to bring about a cessation of domestic abuse as
defined in R.S. 46:2132, or the threat or danger thereof, to a party, any
minor children, or any person alleged to be incompetent, which relief
may include but is not limited to:

(1) Granting the relief enumerated in R.S. 46:2135.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court is granted wide discretion in the issuance of protective orders.

Ned v. Laliberte, 18-999 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/26/19), 277 So.3d 517. A court of appeal

reviews the issuance of domestic abuse protective orders for abuse of the trial court’s

16
The italicized language was added to La.R.S. 46:2135(A) by 2015 La. Acts No. 85, § 1.
17
The italicized language was added to La.R.S. 46:2136(A) by 2015 La. Acts No. 85, § 1.

15

discretion. Fontenot v. Newcomer, 10-1530, 10-1531 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/4/11), 63

So.3d 1149. The trial court’s finding of fact, including its assessment of the weight

of the evidence, evaluation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and credibility

determinations, may not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. Craig

v. Bishop, 19-166 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/23/19), 283 So.3d 521; Cummings v. Bishop,

19-168 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/23/19), 283 So.3d 507. To reverse the trial court’s factual

determination, the appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual

basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and that the record establishes

the finding is clearly wrong. Rabalais v. Nash, 06-999 (La. 3/9/07), 952 So.2d 653.

“Where the [fact-finder’s determinations] are reasonable, in light of the record

viewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse. Even where the court of

appeal is convinced that it would have weighed the evidence differently to reach a

different result[.]” Id. at 657.

However, “when a trial court applies incorrect legal principles and these errors

materially affect the outcome of a case and deprive a party of substantial rights, legal

error occurs.” Vidrine v. Vidrine, 17-722, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/18), 245 So.3d

1266, 1274 (citing Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731). When a

trial court commits legal error, “the manifest error standard is no longer applicable,

and, if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court should make its own

independent de novo review of the record and determine from a preponderance of

the evidence.” Evans, 708 So.2d at 735.

DISCUSSION

The crux of Aguillard’s appeal is his argument the trial court legally erred

because it applied the wrong legal standard to determine if LeBouef was entitled to

a protective order. He argues the allegations which form the basis for an order of

protection to be issued must show recent abuse. He contends the trial court

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erroneously applied the law concerning the issuance of TROs, which does not

require the allegations which form the basis for issuance of a TRO to be recent,

immediate, or present.

Aguillard asserts the trial court’s first legal error is that it did not apply

La.R.S. 46:2135(B). In brief, Aguillard submits, “because the trial court did not

point to a single allegation as having been proved, it is pure speculation that the trial

court found that any allegation was proven pursuant to La.R.S. 46:2135(B).”

It is well settled that the trial court’s reasons for judgment, oral or written,

form no part of the judgment. Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 07-1335 (La. 4/18/08),

980 So.2d 654; La.Code Civ.P. art. 1918. “[A]ppellate courts review judgments, not

reasons for judgment.” Bellard, 980 So.2d at 671. A trial court’s reasons for

judgment are mere explanations of its determinations which do not alter, amend, or

affect the final judgment being appealed. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-571 (La. 4/1/11),

61 So.3d 507.

Unlike Aguillard, we are mindful that while the trial court’s reasons offer

insight, we review judgments. We do not interpret the trial court’s failure to “point

to a single allegation as having been proved” in its oral reasons as conjecture. The

obvious implication from the trial court’s judgment is that LeBouef proved by a

preponderance of the evidence her entitlement to the issuance of a protective order

against Aguillard. We review judgments, not reasons for judgment, and the

judgment before this court explicitly declares the trial court found LeBouef proved

entitlement to a protective order. Consequently, we find this contention is not

intrinsically indicative of legal error and is insufficient to provoke de novo review.

The second legal error, Aguillard contends, is the trial court failed to apply

La.R.S. 46:2136. In support of this contention, he again points our attention to the

trial court’s oral reasons, wherein it refers to La.R.S. 46:2135(A). He argues the trial

17

court relied solely on La.R.S. 46:2135(A), not La.R.S. 46:2135(B) and

La.R.S. 46:2136, to determine if LeBouef was entitled to a protective order.

Aguillard submits La.R.S. 46:2135(A) applies only to temporary restraining

orders; La.R.S. 46:2135(B) and (D) apply to protective orders, requiring a petitioner

to prove the allegations of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence; and

La.R.S. 46:2136 applies to protective orders, which he argues requires a petitioner

to prove recent abuse. He expounds that La.R.S. 46:2135(A) addresses the standard

for the issuance of a TRO and what evidence may be considered to constitute an

“immediate and present danger of abuse” in connection therewith. Aguillard stresses

La.R.S. 46:2135(A) was amended in 2015 to add, “The court shall consider any and

all past history of abuse, or threats thereof, in determining the existence of an

immediate and present danger of abuse. There is no requirement that the abuse itself

be recent, immediate or present.” He further underscores that same language was

not added to La.R.S. 46:2136. In brief, Aguillard argues without citation to any

supportive authority, “the Legislature intended to afford courts the broad discretion

to consider all facts, regardless of the time of occurrence, in deciding whether to

issue a temporary restraining order under La.R.S. 46:2135(A).”

It is Aguillard’s contention that the phrase “to bring about a cessation of

domestic abuse” found in La.R.S. 46:2136(A) requires a petitioner seeking a

protective order demonstrate a present need for protection, i.e., recent abuse. Citing

this court’s decision in Fontenot, 63 So.3d 1149, Aguillard submits in brief

“[c]urrent, controlling jurisprudence has consistently interpreted the language of

La.R.S. 46:2136 to impose a burden on the petitioner to show an immediate or

present need for protection in order for a protective order to issue.” Thus, he argues

the trial court legally erred in granting the protective order because LeBouef did not

show any recent abuse.

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Aguillard contends the trial court’s decision should be reversed for legal error.

He urges this court to forego the customary standard of review for abuse of discretion

and, instead, review this matter de novo on the basis of the trial court’s alleged failure

to apply the appropriate legal standard for the issuance of a protective order. We

find Aguillard’s contentions untenable.

“The purpose behind the entire legislative scheme in [La.R.S. 46:2131 to

La.R.S. 46:2143] is to provide relief to victims of domestic violence by establishing

‘a civil remedy for domestic violence which will afford the victim immediate and

easily accessible protection.’” Bettevy v. Bettevy, 19-327, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/6/19), 283 So.3d 1047, 1050 (quoting Fontenot, 63 So.3d at 1151). This court

recently examined how La.R.S. 46:2135 and La.R.S. 46:2136 affect the proceeding

for a protective order in Bettevy, 283 So.3d at 1049-50 (emphasis added):

Pursuant to La.R.S. 46:2135(B), the allegations of abuse entitling
a person to a protective order must be established by a preponderance
of evidence. In issuing the temporary order of protection, for good
cause shown, the trial court must consider “any and all past history of
abuse, or threats thereof, in determining the existence of an immediate
and present danger of abuse.” La.R.S. 46:2135(A). “There is no
requirement that the abuse itself be recent, immediate, or present.” Id.

It has been held that “good cause shown” applies to both the
temporary restraining order and the other protective orders. Dvilansky
v. Correu, 16-279 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/26/16), 204 So.3d 686, writ
denied, 16-2081 (La. 1/9/17), 214 So.3d 871; S.L.B. v. C.E.B., 17-978,
17-979, 17-980 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/27/18), 252 So.3d 950, writ denied,
18-1442 (La. 11/20/18), 256 So.3d 992.

....

Therefore, it follows that all history of abuse or threats, past and
present, must be considered in proving the allegations of abuse and
entitlement to a protective order. La.R.S. 46:2135(B).

Thus, La.R.S. 46:2135 and La.R.S. 46:2136 should be read in pari materia. As such,

we do not agree with Aguillard’s contention the trial court can consider past abuse

only for issuance of a TRO under La.R.S. 46:2135(A), and recent abuse must be

19

proved for issuance of a protective order under La.R.S. 46:2136(A). We further note

Aguillard’s dissection of La.R.S. 46:2136(A) ignores the phrase “or the threat or

danger thereof.” Construing La.R.S. 46:2135 and La.R.S. 46:2136 together, the trial

court has vast discretion to consider “all history of abuse or threats, past and

present,” in determining whether to issue an order of protection. Bettevy, 283 So.3d

at 1049. Consequently, we find no merit in Aguillard’s second assignment of error.

In his final assignment of error, Aguillard contends the trial court both legally

erred and abused its discretion when it did not require LeBouef to meet her burden

of proving sufficient grounds for issuance of a protective order. He alleges

LeBouef’s testimony was incredible, Ms. Glasscock’s opinion was flawed, and the

trial court erred in admitting and relying on a journal which he alleges LeBouef

fabricated.

We note that the charges set forth in LeBouef’s petition for protection are

similar to those memorialized in LeBouef’s journal. Though Aguillard alleges he

was ignorant of the existence of the journal until days before the trial, the details in

LeBouef’s petition put Aguillard on notice as to what LeBouef was alleging. Even

without Aguillard’s waiver, the trial court did not err in admitting LeBouef’s journal

and considering it supportive evidence to LeBouef’s testimony, bolstering her

credibility.

In light of our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused

its vast discretion in granting LeBouef’s request for a protective order. We do not

find manifest error in the trial court’s assessment of the weight of the evidence,

evaluations of the witnesses’ demeanor, and credibility determinations. Craig, 283

So.3d 521; Cummings, 283 So.3d 507. We find a reasonable factual basis exists for

the finding of the trial court that LeBouef’s charges of physical, sexual, and

psychological abuse by Aguillard are credible. Ms. Glasscock’s testimony and

20

professional opinion are also particularly significant and supportive of LeBouef’s

allegations. Consequently, we find a reasonable factual basis exists for the finding

of the trial court, and the record establishes the trial court’s finding is not clearly

wrong. Rabalais, 952 So.2d 653.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The

costs of this matter are assessed to Defendant/Appellant, Caleb K. Aguillard.

AFFIRMED.

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