CA-0020-0081 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Georgette Raymond and Bernard Prejean Individually and on Behalf of Their Minor Child, A. P. v. Iberia Parish School Board

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed October 7, 2020

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

20-81

GEORGETTE RAYMOND AND BERNARD PREJEAN
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR
MINOR CHILD, A. P.

VERSUS

IBERIA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 126473
HONORABLE LEWIS H. PITMAN, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John E. Conery, and D. Kent Savoie, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

George B. Recile
Chehardy, Sherman, Williams, Murray, Recile,
Stakelum & Hayes, L.L.P.
One Galleria Boulevard
Suite 1100
Metairie, Louisiana 70001
(504) 833-5600
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Georgette Raymond and Bernard Prejean individually and
on behalf of their minor child, A. P.

Troy Keller
Attorney at Law
917 North Causeway Boulevard
Metairie, Louisiana 70001
(504) 835-7833
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Georgette Raymond and Bernard Prejean individually and
on behalf of their minor child, A. P.

Henry D.H. Olinde, Jr.
Scott E. Mercer
Douglas S. Smith, Jr.
Olinde & Mercer, LLC
6700 Jefferson Highway
Building 7, Suite B
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806
(225) 240-7297
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Lafayette Parish Communication District

Edwin G. Preis, Jr.
Preis, PLC
102 Versailles Boulevard #400
Lafayette, Louisiana 70509
(337) 237-6062
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Berkley Insurance Company

J. Wayne Landry
Attorney at Law
1500 Jane Street
New Iberia, Louisiana 70563
(337) 365-2341
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Iberia Parish School Board

CONERY, Judge.

The trial court signed a judgment on August 16, 2019 granting the Lafayette

Parish Communication District’s (LPCD) motion for summary judgment. Both

parties agreed that the material facts of the case were not in dispute.1 The trial court’s

judgment was based solely on its interpretation of the law, more specifically La.R.S.

33:9105, which governs the emergency telephone system in Louisiana. For the

following reasons we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Summary of Undisputed Material Facts2

Georgette Raymond (Georgette) is the mother of Anaisha Prejean (Anaisha).

Georgette works as a courier phlebotomist and was employed by Lafayette General

Hospital at the time of the incident which is the subject of this litigation. On

September 18, 2014, Anaisha was eight (8) years old and attending third grade at St.

Charles Street Elementary School (St. Charles) in Jeanerette, Louisiana.

LPCD was established pursuant to La.R.S. 33:9101, et seq. and is a political

subdivision of the State of Louisiana. See La.R.S. 33:9101(A)(3). LPCD is the 911

Public Safety Access Point (PSAP) for Lafayette Parish. LPCD receives 911 calls

1
At oral argument, counsel for LPCD stated, “[T]his is one of those rare motions for
summary judgment. What we all agree there’s no genuine issue of material fact, so it’s a question
of law presented to the Court.” Counsel for the plaintiffs stated, “Your Honor, I agree with counsel,
this is one of those rare opportunities on a motion for summary judgment where there are no
disputed facts. The only question here is what is the Lafayette Parish Communications District’s
duty.”
2
In the plaintiff’s opposition to LPCD’s motion for summary judgment counsel stated,
“LPCD’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment accurately sets forth the
factual background of the instant litigation. As stated in LPCD’s memorandum, the material facts
are not in dispute.” The undisputed material facts summarized in this opinion were taken from the
above-mentioned memorandum filed on behalf of LPCD and also submitted into evidence as
“Exhibits (A-O)” at the hearing on LPCD’s motion for summary judgment. Documentation
supporting the undisputed facts was also admitted into evidence at the hearing.

originating within Lafayette Parish and transfers/relays them to the appropriate

emergency or law enforcement organization or agency. LPCD employees are not

paramedics, emergency medical technicians, or emergency medical dispatchers.

LPCD employees do not triage patients or take medical histories. Additionally, the

employees of LPCD do not dispatch emergency personnel to incident scenes, i.e.,

they do not send emergency medical personnel to the location of a patient.

Acadiana Ambulance Services, Inc. (AASI) provides ambulance services

throughout the State of Louisiana. AASI’s headquarters is in Lafayette, Louisiana,

from which AASI dispatches their ambulances statewide. As part of its dispatch

process, AASI determines which of its ambulances to send to a patient location.

AASI is the exclusive ambulance service provider within the Parish of Iberia and the

City of Jeanerette. There is no contract between AASI and LPCD.

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, September 18, 2014, Anaisha

began suffering an asthma attack while at St. Charles. Anaisha’s grandmother, Alice

Raymond (Alice), and her aunt, Cherrell Raymond (Cherrell), both live at 606 1/2

Pellerin Street in Jeanerette, Louisiana. Alice (either directly or indirectly) received

word from St. Charles that Anaisha was having an asthma attack at school. Cherrell

subsequently picked Anaisha up from school and brought her back to her home at

606 1/2 Pellerin Street in Jeanerette, Louisiana.

When Alice was notified of Anaisha’s asthma attack, Anaisha’s mother,

Georgette, was at work and “on the road” near Maurice, Louisiana, in Lafayette

Parish. Alice telephoned Georgette and notified her of Anaisha’s condition. At

approximately 10:55 a.m., Georgette called 911 from her cellphone while on the

road in Lafayette Parish. The call from Georgette was received by Delores Sanders

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(Sanders), an LPCD operator. The transcript of Georgette’s initial 911 call to LPCD

provides:

[LPCD] 911. What are you reporting?

[Georgette] My little girl’s having a bad asthma attack at my momma
house right now. I’m not there, but - -

[LPCD] What’s the address?

[Georgette] She’s at 4 - - She’s at 606 1/2 Pellerin Lane in Jeanerette,
Louisiana.

[LPCD] In what? In where?

[Georgette] Jeanerette, Louisiana.

[LPCD] Okay. You’re reaching Lafayette 911. Stay on the line and
I’m going to connect you with Acadian Ambulance. Okay?

[Georgette] Thank you, ma’am.

[LPCD] You’re welcome. Okay. One moment, ma’am.

[Georgette] Okay.

[AASI] This is Acadian. What’s the emergency?

[Georgette] Hi. I need an ambulance to pick my little - - my daughter
up. She is eight years old. She[is] having a bad asthma
attack. She’s in Jeanerette, but I’m located in Lafayette.

[AASI] Okay. Okay. So, what’s the address of your daughter?
Like where is she located?

[Georgette] 606 1/2 Pellerin Street, Laf - - Not - No. Pellerin Street
in Jeanerette, Louisiana.

[AASI] Okay. 606 - -

Upon receiving Georgette’s call, Sanders immediately determined that

Georgette was calling about a medical emergency and, at 10:55 a.m., transferred her

call to AASI. AASI paramedic, Chris Cannon (“Cannon”), received Georgette’s call.

Sanders remained on the line with Georgette and Cannon until Georgette had clearly

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communicated to Cannon the address where Anaisha was located. Before Sanders

dropped out of the conversation, Sanders heard Georgette state at least twice that the

subject street address was in Jeanerette, Louisiana. In response to Georgette's call

of 10:55 a.m., AASI mistakenly dispatched ambulances to Pellerin Street in Scott,

Louisiana, not Jeanerette, Louisiana.

At approximately 11:08:28 a.m., AASI received a call from the Iberia Parish

Sheriff’s Office advising AASI that Anaisha’s emergency was at 606 1/2 Pellerin

Street in Jeanerette, Louisiana. At 11:09:21 a.m., AASI assigned an ambulance,

Unit 24, to go to the Jeanerette, Louisiana address.

At 11:09:51 a.m., Georgette, who was still on the road headed toward

Jeanerette, but still in Lafayette Parish, made a second 911 call to LPCD. LPCD

call-taker, Georgio Green (Green), answered Georgette’s second call. The transcript

of Georgette’s second 911 call to LPCD provides:

[LPCD] 911. What are you reporting?

[Georgette] Hey. I just called somebody to go pick my daughter up
from my house in Jeanerette. She’s not breathing
[Inaudible]. Please hurry up. Please.

[LPCD] Ma’am. Stay on the line. I’ll connect you with Acadian
Ambulance.

[Georgette] Hurry up, please. Please.

[AASI] Acadian Ambulance. Do you have an emergency?

[Georgette] Hurry up. Okay. I called. My daughter, she’s not
breathing right now. She’s in Jeanerette. I need somebody
to go get her right now.

[AASI] Okay. What address do we need to go to?

[Georgette] 606 1/2 Pellerin Street by - -

[AASI] Okay. Ma’am - - Ma’am, hold on. You’re talking too fast.
I’m having trouble hearing you. What’s the address?

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[Georgette] 606 1/2 Pellerin in Jeanerette. I called already [inaudible].
I need somebody to rush there now.

[AASI] Ma’am, listen. I’m - - You’re talking too fast. I'm having
trouble hearing you.

[Georgette] Okay. My daughter stopped breathing. She’s in Jeanerette.

[AASI] Okay. Now, you have 606 - -

[Georgette] And ½.

[AASI] And what’s the - -

[Georgette] Pellerin. P-e-1-1-e-r-i-n.

Green had listened in on Georgette’s first call to LPCD, and therefore she was

already aware of the situation. She immediately transferred Georgette’s second call

to AASI, where Matthew Cavender (Cavender), an AASI paramedic took over the

call. Green remained on the line until she was certain that Georgette was

communicating with AASI and had given the AASI representative the proper

address in Jeanerette. AASI Unit 24 arrived on scene at Anaisha’s grandmother’s

home at 11:17:26 a.m., departed the scene at 11:26:33 a.m., and arrived at Iberia

Medical Center with Anaisha at 11:38:02 a.m.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs, Georgette and Bernard Prejean, the child’s father, filed suit

individually and on behalf of their minor child against the Iberia Parish School Board

(IPSB) seeking damages as the result of the purported failure of the teachers and

staff at St. Charles to properly follow the Individualized Health Plan (IHP)

established for Anaisha, which resulted in an apoxic ischemic brain injury and

permanent disability. In their First Amending and Supplemental Petition the

plaintiffs also filed suit against IPSB’s insurer, Berkley Insurance Company.

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In their Second Supplemental and Amending Petition for Damages, the

plaintiffs asserted a claim against AASI and LPCD seeking damages as a result of

the alleged negligence of AASI’s dispatcher. LPCD moved for summary judgment

claiming there were no genuine issues of material fact and that it was entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law. LPCD filed extensive undisputed material facts

supported by numerous exhibits in conjunction with their motion for summary

judgment and memorandum in support. The plaintiffs filed a memorandum in

opposition with a single exhibit, which was an advisory opinion from the Attorney

General of the State of Louisiana. The plaintiffs argue that based on the Attorney

General’s opinion, and its interpretation of the statutory language at issue, LPCD

had a duty to transport Anaisha.

Oral argument was heard by the trial court on October 1, 2019, and the court

rendered a written judgment on October 16, 2019 granting the motion for summary

judgment in favor of LPCD. The plaintiffs’ have filed a timely devolutive appeal

from that judgment.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Georgette and Mr. Prejean have assigned a sole error on appeal which states

as follows:

The District Court reversibly erred as a matter of law in granting
summary judgment to the Lafayette Parish Communications
District (“LPCD”). Specifically, the District Court erred in
concluding, contrary to a pertinent Advisory Opinion from the
Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, that LPCD’s duty
was limited to transfer, and did not encompass transport.

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LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.

12-884, p. 7 (La. 1/30/13), 110 So.3d 1038, 1044, reiterated the language of Smitko

v. Gulf South Shrimp, Inc., 11-2566, p. 7 (La. 7/2/12), 94 So.3d 750, 755 that

“‘[a]ppellate review of the granting of a motion for summary is de novo, using the

identical criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary

judgment is appropriate.’”

The supreme court further stated that, when dealing with a case where there

are no material issues of material fact in dispute, the law is clear:

When summary judgment is granted in the context of statutory
interpretation, there are no material issues of fact in dispute and the sole
issue before us is a question of law as to the correct interpretation of the
statue at issue. Vizzi v. Lafayette City-Parish Government, 2011–2648,
p. 2 (La.7/2/12); 93 So.3d 1260, 1262. Legislation is the solemn
expression of the will of the legislature. La. C.C. art. 2; First Nat. Bank,
USA v. DDS Const., LLC, 2011-1418, p. 12 (La.1/24/12); 91 So.3d 944,
953. The determination of the legislature’s will must start with the
language of the statute itself. McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hosp.,
2010-2775, p. 11 (La.7/1/11); 65 So.3d 1218, 1227. The words used
must be interpreted as they are generally understood. La. C.C. art. 11;
McGlothlin, 2010-2775, p. 11; 65 So.3d at 1228. When the words of a
statute are clear and unambiguous, and the application of the law does
not lead to absurd consequences, the statute should be applied as written
and no further effort should be made to determine the legislature’s
intent. La. C.C. art. 9; La. R.S. 1:4; In re: Succession of Faget, 2010-
0188, p. 8-9 (La.11/30/10); 53 So.3d 414, 420. Accordingly, we are
bound to a strict interpretation of the plain language of the statutory
provisions which are before us.

Louisiana Land, 110 So.3d at 1044-45.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:9105

The statute at issue provides for the methods that may be used by a

communication district’s emergency telephone system and provides as follows:

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A. The emergency telephone system shall be designed to have
the capability of utilizing at least one of the following four methods in
response to emergency calls:

(1) “Direct dispatch method”, that is a telephone service to a
centralized dispatch center providing for the dispatch of an appropriate
emergency service unit upon receipt of a telephone request for such
services and a decision as to the proper action to be taken.

(2) “Relay method”, that is a telephone service whereby pertinent
information is noted by the recipient of a telephone request for
emergency services, and is relayed to appropriate public safety agencies
or other providers of emergency services for dispatch of an emergency
service unit.

(3) “Transfer method”, that is a telephone service that receives
telephone requests for emergency services and directly transfers such
requests to an appropriate public safety agency or other provider of
emergency services.

(4) “Referral method”, that is a telephone service that, upon the
receipt of a telephone request for emergency services, provides the
requesting party with the telephone number of the appropriate public
safety agency or other provider of emergency services.

B. The governing authority of the district shall select the method
that it determines to be the most feasible for the district. A district may
contract with another communication district to perform all or part of
its functions and duties.

La.R.S. 33:9105.

After the October 1, 2019 hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of LPCD and

stated from the bench:

Thank you, gentlemen. I considered this in depth, actually
around 3:30 this morning. But I’ll have to agree with the motion for
summary judgment filed by Lafayette Parish Communications District.
I’m going to grant the motion. I don’t see an obligation other than
transferring the call to the private ambulance owner, in this case
Acadian Ambulance, making sure they had the correct address and they
completed their duties as defined by statute.

We agree with the trial court’s ruling, which is supported by undisputed

material facts demonstrating that the LPCD chose to use the “Transfer method,” as

defined in La. R.S. 33:9105(A)(3), as its method of responding to emergency calls.

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The language of La.R.S. 33:9105(A)(3) indicates that by use of the “Transfer

method,” LPCD is simply required to directly transfer the request for emergency

services “to an appropriate public safety agency or other provider of emergency

services.”

In this case, AASI was the selected provider of emergency services, and the

undisputed facts confirm that in both transfers to the AASI representatives that the

LPCD operators remained on the line to assure that the proper address of 606 1/2

Pellerin in Jeanerette, Louisiana was received by AASI. Accordingly, in interpreting

La.R.S. 33:9105(A)(3) as the applicable statute, “we are bound to a strict

interpretation of the plain language of the statutory provisions which are before us.”

Louisiana Land, 110 So.3d at 1044-45. Those provisions do not include any further

duty on the part of LPCD other than the transfer of the calls to AASI, “to an

appropriate public agency or other provider of emergency services” concerning the

emergency situation Anaisha was experiencing. La.R.S. 33:9105(A)(3).

The plaintiffs filed La.Atty. Gen. Op. No. 93-152 (January 7, 1994) as their

sole exhibit in support of their position. The plaintiffs argue that the Opinion

provides that La.R.S. 33:9105(A)(3) includes a duty by LPCD to provide

transportation from a public safety agency, and the “duty of transport encompasses

the risk of negligent transport.” Counsel for the plaintiffs freely admits that he could

find no case law to support this proposition.

Importantly, “[o]pinions of the Attorney General are advisory only and are

not law.” Guidroz v. Lewis, 626 So.2d 736, 738 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1993). Although

some courts may find an opinion of the Attorney General persuasive, in this case the

question posed in Opinion 93-152 is completely distinguishable from the undisputed

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facts at issue in this case, which was readily admitted by the plaintiffs in their

memorandum in opposition submitted to the trial court.

In pertinent part, Opinion 93-152 addressed the question of:

What are the obligations of the [communications] district when it has
dispatched a privately owned ambulance to a medical call which then
refuses to transport the patient? The district normally dispatches
another private provider to handle the transport. Is the district thereby
assuming any responsibility to provide transportation? If a second or
all private providers refuse to transport a patient, what are the
responsibilities of the ‘911’ center?

Id. at 4. This case does not concern a refusal to transport, and the undisputed facts

show that LPCD completed the transfer to AASI as required by the plain language of

La. R.S. 33: 9105(A)(3). Given that significant factual distinction, we do not find the

Attorney General’s Opinion dispositive of this matter. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’

assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment entered in favor of

Defendant/Appellee, Lafayette Parish Communication District is affirmed in its

entirety. All costs are assigned to the Plaintiffs/Appellants Georgette Raymond and

Bernard Prejean.

AFFIRMED.

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