CA-0020-0153 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Hanover Insurance Company as Subrogee of Gtp Investments, LLC. v. Riceland Aviation, Inc.

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed December 9, 2020

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

20-153

HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY AS SUBROGEE OF GTP
INVESTMENTS, LLC

VERSUS

RICELAND AVIATION, INC., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. C-83-14
HONORABLE CRAIG STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
John D. Saunders, Judges.

AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

Jerald Paul Block
Kendall J. Krielow
Block Law Firm, APLC
P. O. Box 108
Thibodaux, LA 70302
Telephone: (985) 446-0418
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendants/Appellants – United States Aircraft Insurance Group and
Riceland Aviation, Inc.

Robert Emmett Kerrigan, Jr.
Isaac H. Ryan
Duetsch Kerrigan, L.L.P.
755 Magazine Street
New Orleans, LA 70130
Telephone: (504) 593-0792
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendants/Appellees – CNA Insurance Company, GTP Infrastructure
I, LLC, Global Tower Partners, Global Tower, LLC, and GTP
Investments, LLC

John Elliott Unsworth, III
One Galleria Boulevard – Suite 1610
Metairie, LA 70001
Telephone: (504) 841-5080
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee – Continental Insurance Company

Charles E. Riley, IV
Simon, Peragine, et al.
1100 Poydras Street – 30th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70163
Telephone: (504) 569-2030
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee – Hanover Insurance Company

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs, Riceland Aviation, Inc. (Riceland) and its insurer, United

States Aircraft Insurance Group (USAIG) (collectively “Plaintiffs”), brought an

action to recover for the loss of an aircraft which was destroyed when it struck an

unmarked guy wire supporting a communication tower owned by Defendant, GTP

Infrastructure, I, LLC (GTP). A jury trial ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, finding the

defendant 79% at fault. Plaintiffs filed a motion to tax costs against Defendant and

were awarded partial expert witness fees in the amount of $2,050.00 and were denied

costs for trial exhibits. Plaintiffs now appeal the judgment of the trial court which

awarded only a percentage of expert fees and no costs for trial exhibits.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether the trial court erred by awarding only
10.6% of Plaintiffs’ costs for Dr. Robert Post;

(2) whether the trial court erred by awarding only
25.0% of Plaintiffs’ costs for Lemuel Shattuck;
and

(3) whether the trial court erred by failing to award
Plaintiffs costs for their trial exhibits.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 15, 2013, William Precht, Jr. was applying herbicide to an

agriculture field using an aircraft owned by Riceland Aviation. Adjacent to the field

was a guyed tower owned by GTP, which was not equipped with any visibility

enhancing markers. Mr. Precht could not see the unmarked guy wires and struck a

wire with the aircraft. The wire strike caused the total loss of the aircraft and the

death of Mr. Precht. Plaintiffs filed suit for damages against GTP and its insurer for

the loss of the aircraft. After a three-day trial on the merits, the jury returned a

verdict in favor of Plaintiffs and found that Defendants were 79% at fault. The

judgment was rendered and signed on July 19, 2019, awarding Plaintiffs

$509,660.26. Defendants filed a suspensive appeal which has not been ruled upon.

Plaintiffs filed a motion to tax costs along with a memorandum in

support which outlined the expert witness fees and other out-of-court litigation costs.

Attached to the memorandum were detailed invoices of the time billed by each of

their two expert witness. In the memorandum in support, Plaintiffs argued that their

out of court costs included: $10,062.49 in total costs for Dr. Post, $5,243.65 in total

costs for Mr. Shattuck, $2,895.20 in trial exhibit and presentation costs, and

$2,950.04 in lodging costs.

Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion. They argued that

nearly all the costs sought by Plaintiffs were excessive or not allowed under

Louisiana Law. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court issued

written reasons for ruling stating that the expenses sought by Plaintiffs were

excessive and therefore denied. The trial court taxed as costs $1,000.00 as an expert

witness fee for Dr. Post, $1,050.00 as an expert witness for Mr. Shattuck, and denied

all other costs. Plaintiffs now appeal.

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III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court has great discretion in awarding costs including expert

witness fees. McDaniel v. Carencro Lions Club, 05-1013, p. 49 (La.App. 3 Cir.

7/12/06), 934 So.2d 945, 980, writ denied, 06-1998 (La. 11/3/06); 940 So.2d 671.

The trial court’s assessment of costs may only be reversed upon a showing of abuse

of discretion. Id.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

EXPERT FEES

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by awarding only 10.6% of

Plaintiffs’ costs for Dr. Post. Expert witness fees are provided for in La. R.S.

13:3666 which provides in pertinent part:

A. Witnesses called to testify in court only to an
opinion founded on special study or experience in any
branch of science, or to make scientific or professional
examinations, and to state the results thereof, shall receive
additional compensation, to be fixed by the court, with
reference to the value of time employed and the degree of
learning or skill required.

B. The court shall determine the amount of the fees
of said expert witnesses which are to be taxed as costs to
be paid by the party cast in judgment either:

(1) From the testimony of the expert relative to his
time rendered and the cost of his services adduced upon
the trial of the cause, outside the presence of the jury, the
court shall determine the amount thereof and include
same.
(2) By rule to show cause brought by the party in
whose favor a judgment is rendered against the party cast
in judgment for the purpose of determining the amount of
the expert fees to be paid by the party cast in judgment,

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which rule upon being made absolute by the trial court
shall form a part of the final judgment in the cause.

In discussing expert witness fees, this court has recently explained:

Expert witness fees for testifying at trial and for
time spent preparing for that testimony are recoverable.
The amount actually billed by the expert is not
determinative of the reasonable amount of taxable as costs.
The determination of the reasonableness of an expert fee
award turns on the particular facts and circumstances of
the case.

Although it is a case-specific determination, courts
have identified multiple factors to consider in determining
a reasonable expert fee award, including the following:
(1) the amount of time consumed by the expert in
compiling his or her report; (2) the amount charged to the
client; (3) the amount of time spent in preparing for trial;
(4) the amount of time spent in court; (5) the expert’s
expertise; (6) the difficulty of the expert’s work; (7) the
amount of the award; and (8) the degree to which the
expert witness’s opinions aided the court in its decision.
A litigant is only entitled to recover as costs the expert fees
incurred directly in connection with the expert’s assistance
at the trial. An expert may receive fees for work done in
preparation for trial, but not for consultations assisting the
attorney to prepare for trial. Bayou Fleet, [Inc. v.
Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 15-487, 15-702, (La.App. 4 Cir.
7/21/16),] 197 So.3d [797,] 811 (citations omitted).

Mace v. Turner, 18-339, p. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/18). “Additional considerations

include the awards to experts in similar cases, the complexity of the problem

addressed by the expert, and the helpfulness of the expert’s report and testimony to

the trial court.” Massie v. Deloach, 04-1425, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05), 896

So.2d 1246, 1252, writ denied, 05-786 (La. 5/6/05), 901 So.2d 1107. Although a

trial judge is not required to set an expert witness fee at the amount charged by the

expert witness, the court may award the full amount charged by an expert witness if

the amount is reasonable in light of the factors. Id. at 1252, Mace v. Turner, 18-339.

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In the motion to fix costs, Plaintiffs sought $10,062.49 in expert fees

for Dr. Post. Of that amount, the trial court awarded only $1,000.00 or 10.6% of the

billed amount. In its reasons for ruling, the trial court explained that the taxed

amount was for the two hours Dr. Post spent testifying in court. In light of the factors

found in Mace and Massie, we find this to be an abuse of discretion. Plaintiffs

included invoices from Dr. Post showing 20.15 hours billed in addition to the two

hours testifying. However, the trial court did not seem to give any consideration to

the time the witness spent preparing outside of court. Admittedly, the bulk of the

time billed by Dr. Post (15.5 hours) was time spent travelling, but this court has

previously considered travel time in determining a reasonable expert fee. In

Bourque v. Allstate Ins. Co., 13-215 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/13), the plaintiffs appealed

the expert witness fees awarded to them. The expert, Dr. Barczyk, appeared at trial

for three hours and was only awarded a $300.00 fee. Id. This court held that,

In light of the time Dr. Barczyk spent in attendance
at the trial and traveling to and from the trial from his
office which is located in Lafayette, we find the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiffs only $300
in expert witness fees and increase the award to $1,250.00.

Id. This increase was awarded even though portions of Dr. Barczyk’s

testimony did not assist the trial court because it consisted of knowledge already

known to the court. Id.

Dr. Post was a highly specialized expert in visual acuity. His testimony

on vision and the ability to see the guy wire which caused the accident were

undoubtedly helpful to the jury in finding Defendant 79% at fault. Considering the

factors, we find that the $1,000.00 expert fee awarded to Dr. Post is unreasonable

and an abuse of discretion.

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On appeal, Plaintiffs are seeking $9,393.49 for Dr. Post’s expert fee.

At a minimum, they believe they are entitled to $7,420.86, 79% of that amount.

However, $333.49 of the sought-after amount is attributed to travel expenses such

as hotel and parking. This court has previously held that there is no statutory

authority for an award of travel expenses, and therefore, these costs will not be

considered in the expert fee. Myers v. Broussard, 96-1634, p. 27 (La.App. 3 Cir.

5/21/97), 696 So.2d 88, 102. After deducting the travel expenses from the invoiced

amount and reducing to 79%, we find that a more reasonable fee for Dr. Post would

be $7,157.40. Accordingly, the trial court’s award for Dr. Post’s fees is increased

from $1,000.00 to $7,157.40.

Plaintiffs also contend that the award to Mr. Shattuck was an abuse of

discretion. We agree. In the motion to fix costs, Plaintiffs sought $5,143.65 in

expert fees for Mr. Shattuck. Of that amount, the trial court only awarded $1,050.00

or 25% of the billed amount. In the reasons for ruling, the trial court explained that

the taxed amount was for the three and a half hours Mr. Shattuck spent testifying in

court and three and half hours of trial preparation. Again, the trial court failed to

consider all the time spent by the expert in preparing for trial. The trial court also

failed to refer to any of the many other factors to be considered when determining a

reasonable fee award. Mr. Shattuck billed a total of 27.9 hours and charged a rate

of $150.00 an hour. He is a veteran agriculture aviator whose testimony was both

compelling and explanatory. Considering the factors, we find that the $1,050.00

expert fee awarded to Dr. Post is unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.

On appeal, Plaintiffs are seeking $4,185.00 for Mr. Shattuck’s expert

fee, and at a minimum believe they are entitled to $3,306.15, 79% of that amount.

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We find that a more reasonable fee for Mr. Shattuck would be $3,306.15.

Accordingly, the trial court’s award of $1,050.00 is increased to $3,306.15.

OTHER COURT COSTS

Plaintiffs also assert that the trial court erred by failing to award costs

for two of their trial exhibits. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1920

provides, “Unless the judgment provides otherwise, costs shall be paid by the party

cast, and may be taxed by a rule to show cause. Except as otherwise provided by

law, the court may render judgment for costs, or any part thereof, against any party,

as it may consider equitable.” Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4533 provides that,

“[t]he costs of the clerk, sheriff, witness’ fees, costs of taking depositions and copies

of acts used on the trial, and all other costs allowed by the court, shall be taxed as

costs.”

Plaintiffs requested that the court tax as cost $570.85 spent to enlarge

two exhibits for trial, and the trial court refused to do so as the exhibits were not

introduced into evidence when the trial was complete. While this court has held that

the copying of exhibits admitted into evidence may properly be taxed as “other costs

allowed by the court,” the exhibits in question were 30x40 “bubble enlargements”

which were not introduced into evidence. Mace v. Turner, 18-339. These exhibits

were not necessary for Plaintiffs to present their case and one of the exhibits had to

be removed from the courtroom because it contained an incorrect ordinance.

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to award

Plaintiffs cost for the exhibits.

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V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding expert witness fees. Accordingly, we amend the judgment

and the award of expert fees to Dr. Post is increased from $1,000.00 to $7,157.40.

We also increase the award of expert fees for Mr. Shattuck from $1,050.00 to

$3,306.15. The portion of the judgment denying Plaintiffs’ costs for exhibits is

affirmed.

AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

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