Louisiana State University System Board of Supervisors Through Louisiana State University Veterinarian Teaching Hospital v. Robert Johnson

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

20-272

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM BOARD

OF SUPERVISORS THROUGH LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

VETERINARIAN TEACHING HOSPITAL

VERSUS

ROBERT JOHNSON

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 2019-7200A
HONORABLE KERRY LYNDON SPRUILL, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON
JUDGE

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Court composed of Van H. Kyzar, Sharon Darville Wilson, and Charles G.
Fitzgerald, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Fitzgerald, C., dissenting in part and assigns written reasons.

Jerold Edward Knoll
The Knoll Law Firm
P.O. Box 426
Marksville, Louisiana 71351
(318) 253-6200
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT APPELLEE:
Robert Johnson

Amy D. Richard
Louisiana Dept. of Justice-Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9005
(225) 326-6550
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF APPELLANT:
Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors
Louisiana State UniversityVeterinarian Teaching Hospital

WILSON, Judge.

Louisiana State University System Board of Supervisors through

Louisiana State University Veterinarian Hospital (LSU) filed a suit to recover the

balance of an open account established by Robert Johnson for the veterinary

treatment of his cat. LSU appeals the judgment of the trial court granting the

peremptory exception of prescription filed by Mr. Johnson and imposing sanctions

against LSU in the amount of $20,000 for a frivolous lawsuit. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether the trial court erred in sustaining Mr.
Johnson’s peremptory exception of prescription;

(2) whether the trial court erred by declaring moot
LSU’s exceptions to defendant’s reconventional
demands;

(3) whether the trial court erred by rendering
judgment on the merits of Mr. Johnson’s
reconventional demand where plaintiff had not
filed an answer after a ruling upon the
exceptions;

(4) whether the trial court erred by allowing Mr.
Johnson to orally amend his reconventional
demand during a hearing on an exception of no
cause of action to the reconventional demand;

(5) whether the trial court erred by considering
LSU’s discovery requests as evidence to
support a finding of a violation of La.Code.
Civ.P. art 863;

(6) whether the trial court erred in determining
LSU’s pleadings violate La.Code. Civ.P. art
863; and

(7) whether the trial court’s award of attorney’s
fees in the sum of $20,000, interest, and court
costs is unreasonable and excessive.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises out of the December 2011 veterinary treatment of

Mr. Johnson’s stray cat, Hemi, at the LSU Veterinary Hospital. On December 22,

2011, Mr. Johnson took his cat to LSU on a referral from his local veterinarian.

On that date he executed a Small Animal Clinic and Patient Information Form and

Client Fee Estimate Form. Both forms were signed by Mr. Johnson. The Fee

Estimate Form shows that Mr. Johnson made a deposit of $1,000 and the estimated

total for treatment was $1,000 to $2,000.

Subsequently, LSU began providing veterinary treatment for Hemi.

Hemi was discharged and upon follow up re-hospitalized. Mr. Johnson was

informed that previous testing may have been performed incorrectly and he was

advised that he would not be charged for additional testing. Later Mr. Johnson

received notice that Hemi required a surgical procedure. Hemi died on January 23,

2012, before the procedure could be performed.

After Hemi’s death, Mr. Johnson received his statement which was

well above the $2,000 in the estimate and no credits were made for the improper or

duplicate testing. Mr. Johnson was told the matter would be looked into and

agreed to make protest payments in the amount of $100 per month beginning in

November 2012. The last payment to LSU was received September 10, 2014. On

September 19, 2016, the account was placed with the State of Louisiana Office of

Attorney General for collections in the amount of $1,243.88.

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On September 12, 2019, LSU filed suit to recover the outstanding

balance on the open account pursuant to the ten-year prescriptive period provided

by La.R.S. 9:5701(B). Mr. Johnson filed an answer and reconventional demand

claiming that $4,000 of payments had been remitted to LSU, he had only obligated

himself to pay for treatment totaling $1,000 to $2,000, and he was entitled to

reimbursement in the amount of $2,000. He further alleged that LSU be cast with

all costs and attorney’s fees for filing a frivolous claim pursuant to La.R.S.

13:5241. LSU filed the following exceptions to Mr. Johnson’s reconventional

demands: Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action to plaintiff-in-

reconvention’s reconventional demand for over payment; Dilatory Exception of

Vagueness and Ambiguity to plaintiff-in-reconvention’s reconventional demand

for over payment; Dilatory Exception of Want of Amicable Demand to plaintiff-in-

reconvention’s reconventional demand for over payment; Peremptory Exception of

No Cause of Action to plaintiff-in-reconvention’s reconventional demand for

frivolous claim under La.R.S. 13:5241(c); and Dilatory Exception of Vagueness

and Ambiguity to plaintiff-in-reconvention’s reconventional demand for frivolous

claim.

LSU propounded a set of interrogatories and request for production of

documents to which Mr. Johnson answered. In February 2020, Mr. Johnson filed a

peremptory exception of prescription to LSU’s suit on the open account claiming

LSU could not prove a debt evidenced in writing and the applicable prescriptive

period was provided by La.Civ.Code art. 3494. On February 28, 2020, a hearing

was held on the exceptions filed by both parties. The trial court sustained Mr.

Johnson’s exception of prescription. The trial court interpreted La.R.S. 9:5701 to

require a debt evidenced by an authentic act or act under private signature. It

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found that LSU failed to produce documents in the required form and found the

action had prescribed under the three- year prescriptive period of La.Civ.Code art.

3494. Johnson’s claim for overpayment was similarly prescribed and LSU’s

exceptions to the overpayment were rendered moot. Additionally, the trial court

found LSU’s exceptions to the frivolous claim meritless.

The trial court took Mr. Johnson’s demand for attorney’s fees under

advisement and advised that it would accept briefs or letters on the issue of

attorney’s fees. Both parties filed memorandums. On March 20, 2020, the trial

court filed its written reasons for judgment and on April 3, 2020, the trial court

entered judgment granting Mr. Johnson’s exception of prescription as to LSU’s

claim, declaring LSU’s exceptions moot, dismissing Mr. Johnson’s claim for

overpayment, granting Mr. Johnson’s demand for sanctions under La.Code Civ.P.

art. 863 and casting LSU with attorney’s fees in the amount of $20,000 along with

interest and costs of court.

LSU took this suspensive appeal.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Prescription

In its first assignment of error, LSU asserts the trial court erred in

sustaining Mr. Johnson’s peremptory exception of prescription. LSU argued that

the ten-year prescriptive period provided by La.R.S. 9:5701 applied to the suit.

However, the trial court found that the suit had prescribed under the three-year

prescriptive period found in La.Civ.Code art. 3494. We agree with the decision of

the trial court.

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The key issue in this assignment involves statutory interpretation, a

question of law, and is reviewed by this court under a de novo standard of review.

Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 09-449, (La. 10/20/09), 24 So.3d 813. We

render judgment on the record, without deference to the legal conclusions of the

trial court. Id.

Ordinarily, the party who pleads the peremptory exception of

prescription bears the burden of proof. In re Succession of Comeaux, 04–1335

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05), 896 So.2d 1223. However, if on the face of the pleadings

it appears that prescription has run, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that

the action has not prescribed. Id. “The ‘character of an action given by a plaintiff

in his pleadings determines the prescription applicable to it.’” Strahan v. Sabine

Ret. & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 07-1607, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/08), 981 So.2d 287,

291 (quoting Duer & Taylor v. Blanchard, Walker, O'Quin & Roberts, 354 So.2d

192, 194 (La.1978) (citations omitted).

Both parties agree that this action is a suit on an open account.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3494 provides that an action on an open account is

subject to a liberative prescription of three years. The debt in question stems from

the December 2011 treatment of Mr. Johnson’s cat. “Prescription is interrupted

when one acknowledges the right of the person against whom he had commenced

to prescribe.” La.Civ.Code art. 3464. The record indicates that the last payment

made by Mr. Johnson occurred on September 10, 2014. Thus, under the provisions

of La.Civ.Code art. 3494, the claim on the open account prescribed as a matter of

law on September 10, 2017. Therefore, it appears prescription has run, and the

burden shifts to LSU to prove that prescription has not occurred.

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LSU asserts that the longer period found in La.R.S. 9:5701 is the

proper prescriptive period in this case. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5701(B)

provides, “[a]ctions for debts, due to public institutions of higher education in this

state, other than student loans, stipends, or benefits are prescribed by ten years,

provided the debt is evidenced in writing.” (emphasis added).

In cases involving statutory interpretation, the fundamental question is

legislative intent and the ascertainment of the reason or reasons that prompted the

legislature to enact the law. Kolwe v. Civil & Structural Eng’rs, Inc., 18-398,

(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/21/19), 264 So.3d 1262, writ denied, 19-483 (La. 5/20/19), 271

So.3d 1269. The starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language

of the statute itself. Winmill Tire, LLC v. Colt, Inc., 19-766, (La.App. 3 Cir.

5/6/20), 303 So.3d 1049. “When a law is clear and unambiguous and its

application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as

written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the

legislature.” La.Civ.Code art. 9. However, if the language of the law is

susceptible of different meanings, “it must be interpreted as having the meaning

that best conforms to the purpose of the law.” La.Civ.Code art. 10 “The words of a

law must be given their generally prevailing meaning,” and “their meaning must be

sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a

whole.” La.Civ.Code arts. 11,12. “Laws on the same subject matter must be

interpreted in reference to each other.” La.Civ.Code art. 13. Moreover,

“[t]echnical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar

and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according

to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.” La.R.S. 1:3. “Courts should give

effect to all parts of a statute and should not give a statute an interpretation that

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makes any part superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be avoided.” McLane

S., Inc. v. Bridges, 11-1141, pp. 6-7 (La. 1/24/12), 84 So.3d 479, 483.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5701 provides that the debt must be

“evidenced in writing” for the longer prescriptive period to apply. A debt is a type

of obligation in Louisiana law. As laws on the same subject matter are interpreted

in reference to each other, we must consider the statute in light of Louisiana

obligations law. Book III, Title III, Chapter 5 of the Louisiana Civil Code covers

proof of obligations. Louisiana Civil Code Article 1832 provides, “[w]hen the law

requires a contract to be in written form, the contract may not be proved by

testimony or by presumption, unless the written instrument has been destroyed, lost,

or stolen.” The subsequent code articles go on to describe different forms of

writings in Louisiana law for purposes of proving obligations. The only two forms

mentioned are authentic acts and acts under private signature. It then follows that

these two writings are the only writings accepted under Louisiana law for the

purpose of proving an obligation when written form is required by law.

Ordinarily, Louisiana law does not require an open account to be in

written form. However, La.R.S. 9:5701 expressly states the debt must be

evidenced in writing. Thus, for purposes of applying the longer prescriptive period,

written form is required by law to prove the obligation, and the writing must take

the form of either an authentic act or act under private signature. Under

La.Civ.Code art. 1833, an authentic act requires the writing be executed in front of

a notary public and two witnesses. An act under private signature must be signed

by both of the parties. La.Civ.Code art. 1837.

As the party who is demanding performance of an obligation, LSU

bears the burden of proving the existence of the debt. La.Civ.Code art. 1831. LSU

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submitted three documents: Client Fee Estimate Form, Small Animal Clinic and

Patient Information Form and an invoice. Neither of these forms were executed

before a notary or signed by LSU. As such, they are neither authentic acts nor acts

under private signature. Therefore, LSU has failed to prove a valid debt owed by

Mr. Johnson which is evidenced in writing as required by La.R.S. 9:5701. Since

LSU has not met the requirements of La.R.S. 9:5701, the longer prescriptive period

does not apply to this case and the action has prescribed under the three-year

prescriptive period for open accounts found in La.Civ.Code art. 3494.

LSU contends that since the legislature did not include the words

authentic act or act under private signature in the statute, we must resort to the

dictionary definitions of the word “writing” to include any written record. We

disagree. Our courts have held that “[I]t is presumed the Legislature enacts each

statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same

subject. Thus, legislative language will be interpreted on the assumption that the

Legislature was aware of existing statutes, rules of construction, and judicial

decisions interpreting those statutes.” State v. Campbell, 03-3035, p. 8 (La. 7/6/04),

877 So.2d 112, 117 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, when the legislature

required that the debt be evidenced in writing under La.R.S. 9:5701, it did so with

knowledge of the code articles requiring certain forms as proof of written

obligations.

It is clear from the words of the statute that the legislature intended to

extend the prescriptive period for debts owed to educational institutions, but only

with a heightened burden of proof. LSU has failed to meet that burden. Not only

do the documents submitted by LSU fail to meet the form requirements, but they

also fail to prove the extent of the debt. The Client Fee Estimate Form only

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contains an estimate of potential costs and the Small Animal Clinic and Patient

Information Form does not include any amounts. The only documents showing a

total amount of debt incurred are the invoices submitted, which were signed by

neither party. None of the documents submitted by LSU contain the whole of the

agreement between the parties, nor display a meeting of the minds between the

parties as to the extent of the debt. Consequently, there exist no writing, in any

form, which evidences the debt. Since LSU has failed to prove the debt owed by

Mr. Johnson in an acceptable writing, the trial court was correct in finding that the

prescriptive period of La.R.S. 9:5701 did not apply, and the action was prescribed

under La.Civ.Code art. 3494.

LSU’s Exceptions

In its second assignment of error, LSU asserts that the trial court erred

by declaring moot LSU’s exceptions to Mr. Johnson’s reconventional demands.

We find that this assignment lacks merit. Mr. Johnson’s reconventional demand

contained a demand for overpayment and a demand for a frivolous claim. When

the trial court determined that LSU’s claim was prescribed, it recognized that Mr.

Johnson’s demand for overpayment had also prescribed during the same three-year

period. “According to Louisiana jurisprudence, an issue is ‘moot’ when a judgment

or decree on that issue has been ‘deprived of practical significance’ or ‘made

abstract or purely academic.’” Cat's Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans Through

Dep't of Fin., 98-601, p. 8 (La. 10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1193; Perschall v. State,

96-0322, p. 18 (La. 7/1/97); 697 So.2d 240, 253; Louisiana Associated Gen.

Contractors, Inc. v. State, 95-2105, p. 10 (La. 3/8/96); 669 So.2d 1185, 1193. Once

the demand for overpayment was prescribed, that necessarily rendered LSU’s

exceptions to the demand for overpayment moot as a ruling on those exceptions

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could have no practical effect once the demand was dismissed. We find no error in

the trial court’s ruling.

LSU further argues that it is entitled to a ruling on its exceptions to the

demand for a frivolous claim. Specifically, LSU argues that it was entitled to a

ruling on its exceptions prior to a trial on the merits. Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure Article 929 provides that the “declinatory exception, the dilatory

exception, and the peremptory exception when pleaded before or in the answer

shall be tried and decided in advance of the trial of the case.” LSU is correct that it

is entitled to a ruling on the exceptions prior to a trial on the merits. As the record

makes clear, however, this case never made it to trial and the matter was disposed

of in a hearing by a rule to show cause. Furthermore, in its written reasons for

judgment, the trial court found that each of the exceptions to the demand for

frivolous claim lacked merit. Thus, we find no error.

In its third assignment of error, LSU asserts the trial court erred by

rendering judgment on the merits of Mr. Johnson’s reconventional demand where

plaintiff had not filed an answer after a ruling upon the exceptions. Although the

motion for sanctions was asserted in Mr. Johnson’s reconventional demand, a

motion for sanctions is not a private cause of action “but is rather a remedial tool

available to the court.” Snavely v. Ace Pain Mgmt., LLC, 17-237, p. 4 (La.App. 3

Cir. 12/13/17), 258 So.3d 37, 40. The trial court imposed sanctions against LSU

pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 863(E) which provides that sanctions “shall be

imposed only after a hearing at which any party or his counsel may present any

evidence or argument relevant to the issue of imposition of the sanction”(emphasis

added). Thus, a trial was not necessary for the trial court to impose sanctions. A

hearing was held on February 28, 2020 where both parties had the opportunity to

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present argument and evidence relevant to their various exceptions as well as the

issue of the sanctions for a frivolous claim. Both Mr. Johnson and LSU were

present for the hearing and participated in argument and the introduction of

evidence. Mr. Johnson introduced the discovery requests as evidence to which

LSU did not object and LSU offered to stipulate to the content of the discovery

requests. As a hearing was properly held pertaining to the imposition of sanctions,

this assignment of error lacks merit.

In its fourth assignment of error, LSU asserts the trial court erred by

allowing Mr. Johnson to orally amend his reconventional demand during a hearing

on an exception. We find this assignment also lacks merit. Article XXII of Mr.

Johnson’s reconventional demand sought “costs for filing this ‘frivolous claim’

lacking merit under existing law and which cannot be supported by a good faith

argument as specifically provided for in La. R.S. 13:5241.” Mr. Johnson and the

trial court recognized that the cited statute was incorrect. In its reasons for ruling,

the trial court found that the mistake in citation of law was not fatal to the claim,

citing to Prejean v. Guillory, 09-495 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/13/10), 28 So.3d 1174,

rev'd in part, 10-740 (La. 7/2/10), 38 So.3d 274. Under La.Code Civ.P. art. 854,

no technical forms of pleading are required. Thus Mr. Johnson was not required to

specifically cite a statute for his cause of action, and the mistake in citation was

harmless error. Mr. Johnson never sought leave to amend his pleadings, nor did the

court ever grant leave to amend the pleadings. Instead, the trial court found that,

ignoring the miscited statute, the words of Mr. Johnson’s demand plainly stated he

was seeking costs for a “frivolous claim lacking merit under existing law and

which cannot be supported by a good faith argument.” This constituted a clear,

concise statement of facts supporting a demand for attorney’s fees for filing a

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frivolous claim. An amendment of the pleadings was neither sought after nor

necessary.

Sanctions

LSU’s final three assignments of error revolve around the issue of

sanctions. In its Sixth assignment of error, LSU asserts that the trial court erred in

determining LSU’s pleadings violated La.Code. Civ.P. art 863. The decision of a

trial court to impose sanctions is reviewed using the manifest error/clearly wrong

standard. Blanchet v. Boudreaux, 15-60 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/19/15), 175 So.3d 460,

writ denied, 15-2156 (La. 1/25/16), 185 So.3d 749. The trial court’s finding of fact

may not be set aside unless the finding is clearly wrong in light of the record

reviewed in its entirety. McKelvey v. City of Dequincy, 07-604 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/14/07), 970 So.2d 682. Based on our review of the record, we find the trial

court did not manifestly err in finding that sanctions were warranted against LSU.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 863(B) provides that the

signature of a party or attorney certifies:

(1) The pleading is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.

(2) Each claim, defense, or other legal assertion in
the pleading is warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law.

(3) Each allegation or other factual assertion in the
pleading has evidentiary support or, for a specifically
identified allegation or factual assertion, is likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery.

(4) Each denial in the pleading of a factual
assertion is warranted by the evidence or, for a
specifically identified denial, is reasonably based on a
lack of information or belief.

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If the court determines a certification has violated this article, the court shall

impose upon the person who made the certification or the represented party, or

both, an appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other party

the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the

pleading, including reasonable attorney fees. La.Code. Civ.P. art 863(D).

An attorney must make an objectively reasonable inquiry into the

facts and law before filing a pleading. Subjective good faith will not satisfy the

duty of reasonable inquiry. Murphy v. Boeing Petroleum Servs., Inc., 600 So.2d

823, 826 (La.App 3 Cir. 1992). The trial court determined that the original petition,

and documents attached thereto by LSU, readily confirm that the judgment sought

against Mr. Johnson was prescribed under the three-year prescriptive period for

open accounts found in La.Civ.Code art. 3494. Furthermore, the trial court held

that the argument for the longer prescriptive period of La.R.S. 9:5701 was specious

given that it was readily apparent from records in LSU’s possession that they could

not prove a valid debt through a legally enforceable writing. Given these facts,

LSU failed to certify a claim warranted by existing law or a non-frivolous

argument for the extension of existing law.

In addition to the petition, LSU filed multiple exceptions to Mr.

Johnson’s reconventional demands. The trial court viewed each of the exceptions

as meritless and determined that “this case clearly represents a mountain made out

of a molehill with the filing of multiple exceptions by LSU to the reconventional

demand filed by Johnson.” LSU filed an exception claiming a want of amicable

demand as to Mr. Johnson’s claim for overpayment. However, given that LSU

instituted this suit on the open account, it is evident LSU would not have complied

with an amicable demand had it been given. As to the dilatory exceptions of

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vagueness and ambiguity for a frivolous claim, the trial court held that the demand

was based on documents totally within LSU’s control and it “would be non-

sensicle to require reconvenor to allege with particularity each of the items that

justified the filing.” The demand for overpayment was equally alleged in a clear

and concise statement. Mr. Johnson’s pleading alleged that he obligated himself to

pay between $1,000 and $2,000 on the estimate form and he had made payments in

the sum of $4,000, thus he was owed a sum of $2,000 for overpayment. The

language clearly stated a cause of action, and adequately informed LSU of the

nature of the cause of action.

After examining the record, we cannot say the trial court committed

manifest error in determining that, “the filing of the prescribed principal demand

and the various exceptions thereto has resulted in the unnecessary delay to the

resolution of the legal issues and has needlessly increased the cost of this litigation

which unfortunately exceeds the original amounts in dispute. Said filings were

clearly made for improper purposes under the law.” Given that this debt was

nearly ten years old, LSU had ample time to conduct adequate research on the law

of prescription and whether the documents it possessed met the requirements. A

rational trier of fact could easily determine that the sheer volume of meritless

exceptions filed on an apparently prescribed claim, for such a minor amount, were

only filed to harass and increase the costs of litigation.

In its fifth assignment of error, LSU asserts the trial court erred by

considering LSU’s discovery requests as evidence to support a finding of a

violation of La.Code. Civ.P. art 863. We disagree.

For sanctions to be imposed, an evidentiary hearing must take place.

Although the pleadings determine whether there has been a violation of the statute,

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the law does not require that the issue of sanctions be determined on the face of the

pleadings alone. The submitted discovery requests provided further evidence that

the pleadings submitted violated La.Code. Civ.P. art 863. In addition to finding

that the pleadings were not warranted by existing law, the trial court found that

they were presented for an improper purpose. This was further evidenced by the

submitted discovery requests. Interrogatories #5, #6, #7, #9, #10 and #12 all

sought information pertaining to a tort claim for medical malpractice and such

inquiries were not supported by the facts of the case. Similarly, nine of the

requests for production of documents were completely irrelevant to the case at

hand. The trial court found that given the small amounts in dispute and limited

legal issues in question, there was no need for the discovery requests other than

harassment and other improper purposes. The trial court reviewed the evidence as

a whole and could imply from the improper nature of the discovery requests that

the purpose of the original pleadings were also improper. Together with the

discovery requests, the trial court found the purpose of the pleadings by LSU to be

harassment. Thus, we find this assignment lacks merit.

In its final assignment of error, LSU asserts the trial court’s award of

attorney’s fees in the sum of $20,000, interest, and court costs is unreasonable and

excessive.

If, upon motion of any party or upon its own
motion, the court determines that a certification
has been made in violation of the provisions of this
Article, the court shall impose upon the person
who made the certification or the represented party,
or both, an appropriate sanction which may include
an order to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing
of the pleading, including reasonable attorney fees.

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La.Code. Civ.P. art 863(D). “The trial court's determination of the type and

amount of sanctions is reviewed using the abuse of discretion standard.” Blanchet,

175 So.3d at 462.

A trial court has considerable discretion as to the
type and severity of sanctions to be imposed, once it
determines that sanctions are appropriate. The trial court
must consider four factors to determine the appropriate
sanction award: 1) what conduct is being punished or is
sought to be deterred?; 2) what expenses or costs were
caused by the violating rule?; 3) were the costs or
expenses “reasonable” as opposed to self-imposed,
mitigatable, or the result of a delay in seeking the
intervention of the court?; and 4) was the sanction the
least severe to achieve the purpose of the rule? The goal
to be served by imposing sanctions pursuant to [La.Code
Civ.P.] art. 863 is not wholesale fee shifting, but rather
the correction of an abuse of litigation by the awarding of
reasonable, not necessarily actual, attorney fees.

Acosta v. B & B Oilfield Servs., Inc., 12–122, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12), 91

So.3d 1263, 1269 (quoting Thibodeaux v. Billiott, 04–1308, p. 8 (La.App. 5 Cir.

3/1/05), 900 So.2d 110, 115) (citations omitted).

The trial court determined that the pleadings filed by LSU were not

warranted by existing law, and moreover were filed for improper purposes of

harassment, unnecessary delay, and needlessly increased the costs of litigation.

The trial court noted that it must acknowledge the position of seniority and high

esteem enjoyed by Mr. Johnson’s counsel, Jerold Edward Knoll. In calculating its

award of attorney’s fees, the trial court found that Mr. Knoll’s legal experience and

expertise command a premium price for his legal services. Given the expertise of

counsel and the amount of time the suit has dragged, we find the sanctions imposed

were neither unreasonable nor excessive. We find that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in casting LSU with attorney’s fees in the amount of $20,000 together

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with legal interest from the date of award and all costs of court incurred in these

proceedings. We hold the sanctions imposed.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to LSU in the amount of $1,640.64.

AFFIRMED.

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