Mitchell Navarre v. Prosper Operators, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

20-312

MITCHELL NAVARRE
VERSUS

PROSPER OPERATORS, INC., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CAMERON, NO. 10-19624
HONORABLE PENELOPE RICHARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

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VAN H. KYZAR
JUDGE

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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Van H. Kyzar, and Jonathan W. Perry,
Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Kevin L. Camel

Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, LLC

723 Broad Street

Lake Charles, LA 70601

(337) 436-6611

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Mitchell Navarre

Charles A. Mouton

Mahtook & Lafleur, L.L.C.

P. O. Box 3089

Lafayette, LA 70502

(337) 266-2189

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Texas Petroleum Investment Company

Kelly F. Walsh

L. Lane Roy

Brown Sims, P.C.

1100 Poydras Street, 39th Floor

New Orleans, LA 70163

(504) 569-1007

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Prosper Operators, Inc.

KYZAR, Judge.

The plaintiff, Mitchell Navarre, appeals from a trial court judgment
sustaining a peremptory exception of prescription in favor of the defendant, Texas
Petroleum Investment Company, dismissing his claim against it with prejudice.
For the reasons assigned herein, we reverse the decision of the trial court and
remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

According to his original and supplemental and amending petitions, Mr.
Navarre a pumper/gauger/operator with Prosper Operators, Inc. (Prosper), was
injured when he jumped from a fixed platform owned by Texas Petroleum
Investment Company (Texas Petroleum) to a twenty-five-foot jo-boat, the M/V
Amber.’

On June 14, 2015, Mr. Navarre was ordered to perform work on Texas
Petroleum’s fixed platform, which was located on Sweet Lake in Cameron Parish.
At the time, Sweet Lake was experiencing a dangerous sea state of approximately
four feet as a result of Tropical Storm Bill. Mr. Navarre alleged that when he
pulled alongside the platform, he was unable to moor the M/V Amber as the
platform lacked mooring bitts, cleats, or other means by which to secure the vessel
to the platform. Thus, he alleged that he was required to leave the M/V Amber in
gear so that it maintained contact with the platform. He claimed that at some point
the M/V Amber lost contact with the platform and started to drift away. Rather
than be stranded on the platform, Mr. Navarre jumped from the platform to the

vessel, suffering injuries to his neck, back, and left foot as a result.

' The vessel was described as a twenty-five-foot jo-boat in Mr, Navarre’s original petition
and then as a twenty-four-foot jo-boat in his supplemental and amending petition. Prosper
described the vessel as a twenty-one-foot jo-boat in its Verified Complaint for Exoneration or
Limitation of Liability filed in federal court.

On April 7, 2016, Mr. Navarre, as a Jones Act seaman, filed suit against
Prosper in the Thirty-Eighth Judicial District Court in Cameron Parish, via the
saving to suitors clause, alleging general maritime claims of negligence and
unseaworthiness against Prosper. Prosper answered Mr. Navarre’s petition,
alleging numerous defenses including that Mr. Navarre was not a seaman and that
it was entitled to limit its liability to the value of the M/V Amber pursuant to 46
U.S.C. § 181 et seq.”

Thereafter, on September 28, 2016, Prosper filed an action in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, seeking to limit its
liability to Mr. Navarre to the value of the M/V Amber pursuant to 46 U.S.C. §
30505.’ Prosper alleged that although it was the operator, it was not the owner of
the M/V Amber. It further claimed that the M/V Amber was valued at no more
than $20,000.00. As a result of this action, the federal court issued the following
stay order on October 19, 2016:

The commencement of and the further prosecution of any and all
actions, suits, and proceedings already commenced and the
commencement or prosecution thereafter of any and all actions, suits,
or proceedings of any nature and description whatsoever in any
jurisdiction, and the taking of any steps and the making of any motion
in such actions, suits, or proceedings against the Petitioner as
aforesaid, or against the M/V AMBER, or their liability insurers or
against any property of the Petitioner except in this action, to recover
damages for or in respect of any injury, loss, destruction and/or
damages caused by or resulting from the aforesaid event as alleged in
the Complaint, be and they are hereby restrained, stayed and enjoined
until the hearing and determination of this action{[.]”

* 28 U.S.C. § 1333. This provision permits a plaintiff to bring a maritime claim in either
federal or state court.

* Pursuant to Pub.L. 109-304. Section 6(c). October 6, 2006, 120 Stat. 1512-1516, §§
181-190 of Chapter 305—Exoneration and Limitation of Liability were redesignated as 46 U.S.C.
§§ 30501-30512. Accordingly, we will cite to the law in effect at the time of Mr. Navarre’s
accident.

* The liability of the owner of a vessel for claims, debts, or liability for certain described
conduct shall not exceed the value of the vessel and pending freight.

2

On September 5, 2019, the federal district court judge dismissed Prosper’s
suit, without prejudice, based on insufficient service. Two days prior to this
dismissal, Mr. Navarre fax filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Plaintiff's
First Supplemental and Amending Petition for Damages, with the hard copy being
received by the Clerk of Court of the Thirty-Eighth Judicial District Court on
September 6, 2019. His motion to file the supplemental and amending petition was
granted by the trial court on September 11, 2019.

Mr. Navarre’s supplemental and amended petition reiterated his claims
against Prosper, added Texas Petroleum as a defendant, and alleged the following

negligence claims against Texas Petroleum:

a. Failing to maintain its well heads in a safe condition;

b. Failing to install mooring bitts to allow for secure mooring of
vessels;

c. Allowing operations to be conducted in its field under

dangerous weather conditions;

d. Dispatched employee on mission under unreasonably
dangerous sea conditions;

€. Failed to provide sufficient means of mooring vessel;

f. Failed to provide an adequate crew;

g. Is liable for any other acts of negligence known only to the
defendant which may be discovered prior to the trial of this
cause.

In response to Mr. Navarre’s supplemental and amending petition, Texas
Petroleum filed a peremptory exception of prescription, arguing that Mr. Navarre’s
claims against it had prescribed. It argued that because the three-year statute of
limitation applicable to general maritime law governed, Mr. Navarre’s September

3, 2019 claim based on his June 14, 2016 accident was prescribed.

Mr. Navarre opposed Texas Petroleum’s exception, arguing that his claim
was not barred by prescription because the tort upon which it was based occurred
on a fixed platform, which was governed by Louisiana rather than general
maritime law. Thus, he argued that his suit against Texas Petroleum was timely
because under Louisiana law, a suit against a joint tortfeasor interrupted
prescription as to all other joint tortfeasors. In the alternative, Mr. Navarre argued
that even if his claim was governed by maritime law, the injunction imposed by the
federal court in Prosper’s limitation action barred him from amending his state
court petition. Thus, he argued that pursuant to the federal doctrine of equitable
tolling, his claim against Texas Petroleum was timely.

Following a hearing on the exception, the trial court sustained Texas
Petroleum’s exception of prescription and dismissed Mr. Navarre’s claim against It
with prejudice. A final judgment was rendered in this matter on February 11, 2020.
Thereafter, Mr. Navarre perfected this appeal.

On appeal, Mr. Navarre asserts two assignments of error:

l. The district court erred in granting the exception of prescription

and dismissing defendant Texas Petroleum Investment
Company when plaintiff Mitchell Navarre timely filed suit
against defendant Prosper Operators, Inc. and Texas Petroleum
and Prosper Operators are joint tortfeasors.

2. Alternatively, the district court erred in granting the exception
of prescription and dismissing defendant Texas Petroleum
Investment Company when plaintiff Mitchell Navarre was
enjoined by order of the federal court from taking any action in

the state court action.
OPINION

“The rules of prescription are designed to prevent old and stale claims from
being prosecuted.” Wells v. Zadeck, 11-1232, p. 7 (La. 3/30/12), 89 So.3d 1145,
1149. The peremptory exception of prescription, provided by La.Code Civ.P. art.

927, may be pleaded at any time in the proceedings, and “evidence may be

introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when the
grounds thereof do not appear from the petition.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 931.

On appeal, the standard of review applied by the reviewing court is based on
whether evidence was introduced at the hearing on the peremptory exception. If
no evidence was introduced, the reviewing court simply determines whether,
based “upon the facts alleged in the petition with all of the allegations accepted as
irue[,]” the judgment sustaining or overruling the exception was legally correct.
Lomont v. Bennett, 14-2483, p. 8 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So.3d 620, 627, cert. denied,
__ US. _, 136 S.Ct. 1167 (2016). If evidence was introduced, the judgment is
reviewed pursuant to the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. /d. In
this instance, although both parties attached exhibits to their memorandums, none
of these exhibits were formally introduced into the record at the hearing on the
exception. Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial court was legally
correct in sustaining the exception based upon the facts alleged in Mr. Navarre’s
petition, with all of the allegations accepted as true.

The major issue in this appeal is whether federal substantive maritime law,
which Mr. Navarre invoked pursuant to his claim against Prosper through the
saving to suitors clause, applies to his claim against Texas Petroleum. We find that
it does not.

While it is true that “[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of
substantive admiralty law[,]” the United States Supreme Court has held that
“Te]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.” EF. River S.S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 2298-99 (1986);

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822 (1938).

In this instance, accepting the allegations contained in his supplemental and
amending petition as true, Mr. Navarre’s claim against Prosper invoked federal
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). However, his claim against Texas
Petroleum does not invoke federal jurisdiction because the accident occurred on a
fixed platform located in navigable waters within Louisiana’s boundaries. In
Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 1839-40
(1969), the Supreme Court stated that accidents involving fixed platforms,
otherwise known as artificial islands, “had no more connection with the ordinary
stuff of admiralty than do accidents on piers. Indeed, the Court has specifically
held that drilling platforms are not within admiralty jurisdiction. Phoenix
Construction Co. v. The Steamer Poughkeepsie, 212 U.S. 558, 29 S.Ct. 687, 53
L.Ed. 651, affirming[,] 162 F. 494 (D.C.1908).”

Even if the matter were heard in federal court, Louisiana law would still
apply to the Texas Petroleum claim because the claims against Prosper and Texas
Petroleum “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138 (1966). Thus, a
federal court hearing this matter could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Texas Petroleum claim even though it fails to satisfy an independent basis of
federal subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, the Texas
Petroleum claim would be governed by state substantive law. Erie, 304 U.S. 64;
13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3567 (3d ed. 2019).

As noted by Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Jerome B.
Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 548, 115 S.Ct.

1043, 1055 (1995):

I concur in the Court’s judgment and opinion. The Court
properly holds that, when a court is faced with a case involving
multiple tortfeasors, some of whom may not be maritime actors, if one
of the putative tortfeasors was engaged in traditional maritime activity
alleged to have proximately caused the incident, then the supposedly
wrongful activity “involves” traditional maritime activity. The
possible involvement of other, nonmaritime parties does not affect the
jurisdictional inquiry as to the maritime party. Ante, at 1051-1052. I
do not, however, understand the Court’s opinion to suggest that,
having found admiralty jurisdiction over a particular claim against a
particular party, a court must then exercise admiralty jurisdiction over
all the claims and parties involved in the case. Rather, the court
should engage in the usual supplemental jurisdiction and impleader
inquiries. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988 ed., Supp. V); Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 14; see also ante, at 1047. I find nothing in the Court’s
opinion to the contrary.

See also David W. Robertson, Admiralty Jurisdiction Over One Co-Tortfeasor
Cannot Effectuate Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Another, 37 J. Mar. L. & Com. 161
(April 2006).

Accordingly, we find that Louisiana substantive law applies to Mr.
Navarre’s claim against Texas Petroleum. We will now review the exception of
prescription pursuant to Louisiana law.

Louisiana “[dJelictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one
year.” La.Civ.Code art. 3492. Prescription is interrupted “when the obligee
commences action against the obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction and
venue.” La.Civ.Code art. 3462. “An interruption of prescription resulting from the
filing of a suit in a competent court and in the proper venue or from service of
process within the prescriptive period continues as long as the suit is pending.”
La.Civ.Code art. 3463. It is settled that Louisiana has done away with the
principle of solidarity of obligations for joint tortfeasors except in the case of those
who conspire together to cause injury, loss, or damage. La.Civ.Code art. 2324(A).

Under the present law, joint tortfeasors, two or more defendants who together

cause injury, loss, or damage, are liable only for their own degree of fault.

La.Civ.Code art. 2324(B). “Interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor
is effective against all joint tortfeasors.” La.Civ.Code art. 2324(C).

In Taylor v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 579 So.2d 443, 445-46 (La.1991),
the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

Under article 3462 of the Civil Code prescription is interrupted
when the obligee commences action against the obligor, in a court of
competent jurisdiction and venue. After considering the plain words
of the article, legislative history, doctrinal opinion and jurisprudential
interpretation, we conclude that such a suit has the same interruptive
effect whether it is filed in a federal, Louisiana or another state’s
forum, if the suit is properly and timely filed under the laws of the
forum.

Prescription is interrupted when the obligee commences action
against the obligor in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue.
La.Civ.Code art. 3462. A court of competent jurisdiction is a court
which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of, and is the proper
venue for, the action or proceeding. La.Code Civ.P. art. 5251(4).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of
a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or
proceedings and to render a valid and definitive judgment. La.Code
Civ.P. arts. 2-3. The clear and simple words of the statutes indicate
that an obligee’s action against his obligor timely brought in a court of
competent jurisdiction and venue in Louisiana or another state will
interrupt prescription.

The legislative history and doctrine also indicate that this is the
meaning of article 3462. Following the French law, the early
Louisiana codes provided for a legal interruption of prescription
through the service of citation to appear before a court of justice.
La.Civ.Code arts. 50, 52 (1808); La.Civ.Code arts. 3482, 3484 (1825);
La.Civ.Code art. 3518 (1870); C.Civ. arts. 2242, 2244-2246 (1804).
Subsequently, the legislature by Act 39 of 1932 enacted La.R.S.
9:5801, which provided for the interruption upon the mere filing of
suit in a court of competent jurisdiction, in order to relieve a party
having a cause of action from the responsibility for delay in the
service of citation. See Taglialavore v. Ellerbe, 149 So. 296, 297
(La.App. 2nd Cir.1933); Comment, Interruption of Prescription by
Judicial Action in Louisiana, 14 Tul.L.Rev. 601, 602, 605 (1940).
Under Act 39 of 1932, the filing of a suit in a competent court outside
Louisiana was sufficient to interrupt prescription. Kozan v. Comstock,
270 F.2d 839, 845 (Sth Cir.1959); see also Rhinehart v. Doswell, 23
La. 662, 6 La.Ann. 766 (1851). Additionally, there was doctrinal
opinion to the effect that the courts should consider such a proceeding
in a foreign forum an interruption of prescription, for there was
nothing in the statutes which indicated that their application was
restricted to suits filed in Louisiana courts. Comment, Interruption of

8

Prescription by Judicial Action in Louisiana, supra at 603.; see also
Kozan v. Comstock, supra.

Accordingly, it has become well settled that prescription may

be interrupted under article 3462 by the timely filing of a suit in a

court of competent jurisdiction and venue, regardless of whether it is a

federal, Louisiana or another state court. See Board of

Commissioners v. Toyo Kisen Kaisha, 163 La. 865, 113 So. 127

(1927); Rhinehart v. Doswell, supra; Pickard v. Baugh, 565 So.2d

1102 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990); LaFargue v. St. Amant, 433 So.2d 1061

(La.App. 5th Cir.1982); Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So.2d 639 (La.App.

Ist Cir.1960); Driscoll v. New Orleans Steamboat Co., 633 F.2d 1158

(Sth Cir.1981); Kozan v. Comstock, supra; Scharff v. Cameron

Offshore Services, 475 F.Supp. 48 (W.D.La.1979).

In this instance, Mr. Navarre’s accident, which occurred on June 14, 2015,
was, as alleged in the petiton, caused by the joint liability of Prosper and Texas
Petroleum. He initially filed suit against Prosper on April 7, 2016, within the
three-year prescriptive period applicable to a maritime action for personal injury or
death, 46 U.S.C. § 30106, as well as the one-year prescriptive period provided by
La.Civ.Code art. 3492. In filing suit against Prosper, Mr. Navarre invoked the
saving to suitors clause. As stated by Professor Schoenbaum, “the saving to suitors
clause institutes concurrent federal-state jurisdiction over in personam admiralty
actions, so that an admiralty plaintiff in an in personam claim may choose between
filing an ordinary civil action or bringing a ‘libel’ in admiralty.” 1 Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 4:2 (6th ed. 2018).

Because the Thirty-Eighth Judicial District Court exercised concurrent
jurisdiction over Mr. Navarre’s admiralty action, it was a court of competent
jurisdiction and venue to hear this matter. Therefore, Mr. Navarre’s suit against
Prosper was sufficient to interrupt prescription against Texas Petroleum pursuant
to La.Civ.Code art. 2324(C), even though his action sounded in admiralty law.

Thus, we find that the trial court legally erred in sustaining Texas Petroleum’s

peremptory exception of prescription. Accordingly, the trial court judgment is

reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Based on our finding, Mr. Navarre’s second assignment of error is rendered moot.
DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court sustaining Texas
Petroleum Investment Company’s peremptory exception of prescription is reversed,
and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The costs of
this appeal are assessed to Texas Petroleum Investment Company.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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