Succession of Delquan Dequincy Logan

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

20-565

SUCCESSION OF DELQUAN DEQUINCY LOGAN

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 107109-L
HONORABLE MARILYN CARR CASTLE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Charles G.
Fitzgerald, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Kenneth H. Hooks, III
H. Price Mounger, III
Dodson & Hooks
112 Founders Dr.
Baton Rouge, LA 70810
(225) 756-0222
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLANT:
Tyrone Logan

Brian C. Colomb
Gordon McKernan Injury Attorneys
2505 Verot School Road
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 541-6584
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
India Michelle Labry

PICKETT, Judge.

Tyrone Logan appeals the judgment of the trial court removing him as

administrator of the succession of his deceased son, Del’Quan Logan, and

appointing India Labry, the mother of the decedent’s two minor children, as

administratrix.

FACTS

Del’Quan Logan died in a workplace accident on July 11, 2019, while

employed offshore when he fell off a barge and drowned. Del’Quan had two

young children at the time of his death. According to pleadings filed by Tyrone

Logan (hereinafter referred to a Mr. Logan), Del’Quan’s father, and India Labry,

the mother of Del’Quan’s two minor children, Del’Quan died intestate.

Mr. Logan filed a Petition for Appointment of Administrator of Succession

on August 12, 2019. The petition claimed the only property of value was a mobile

home valued at $3,500 and the Jones Act claim for personal injury that Mr. Logan

would file on behalf of his grandchildren. In the sworn detailed descriptive list

attached to the petition, Mr. Logan did not list any debts of the succession. The

trial court issued an order on August 13, 2019, appointing Mr. Logan as

administrator of the succession.

Ms. Labry filed a Motion to Remove Tyrone Logan as Administrator, and

Appoint India Labry as Independent Administratrix on August 28, 2019. Ms.

Labry alleged that as the mother and natural tutor of Del’Quan’s only heirs, she

was entitled to be appointed administratrix of the estate, and Mr. Logan was not

the proper legal representative of her and the decedent’s children. She also alleged

that Mr. Logan’s petition did not identify any grounds upon which he could be

appointed as administrator pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 3097(B), which states:

No person may be appointed dative testamentary executor,
provisional administrator, or administrator who is not the surviving
spouse, heir, legatee, legal representative of an heir or legatee, or a
creditor of the deceased or a creditor of the estate of the deceased, or
the nominee of the surviving spouse, heir, legatee, or legal
representative of an heir or legatee of the deceased, or a co-owner of
immovable property with the deceased.

In response to Ms. Labry’s motion to remove him as administrator of his

son’s estate, Mr. Logan filed an opposition on November 4, 2019, a week before

the scheduled hearing on Ms. Labry’s motion. In that opposition, he alleged for

the first time that he is a creditor of the succession. Mr. Logan introduced a proof

of claim that included the bill from the funeral home and a bill for use of a

municipal hall for a gathering after Del’Quan’s funeral. Mr. Logan alleged that

funeral expenses are a succession debt, and because he paid the funeral expenses in

excess of $13,000.00 in July, he was a creditor of the succession when he filed the

petition to be appointed administrator.

Ms. Labry introduced evidence in the form of an affidavit from Robert

Judge, a representative of Del’Quan’s employer. The affidavit stated that Mr.

Judge had paid the full costs of the funeral expenses to the funeral home. The

funeral home agreed to reimburse Mr. Logan $360, the only amount that he had

actually paid to the funeral home. Further, Mr. Judge attempted to pay Lafayette

for the rent charged for use of the reception hall owned by the city, but Lafayette

refused the payment because it had already been paid. Mr. Judge’s affidavit stated

that he would reimburse the payor of that charge. Attached to the affidavit were

copies of the checks, a receipt from the funeral home, and e-mails between Mr.

Judge and representatives of the funeral home.

The trial court held a hearing on Ms. Labry’s motion to remove Mr. Logan

on November 12, 2019. The trial court noted that it had not received a copy of Mr.

Logan’s opposition before the hearing. After hearing arguments, the trial court
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determined that Mr. Logan’s initial petition failed to state grounds upon which he

could be appointed administrator. Thus, Ms. Labry’s pleading seeking removal of

Mr. Logan as administrator alleged valid grounds for Mr. Logan’s removal.

Finally, Mr. Logan’s eleventh-hour attempt to qualify as administrator as a creditor

failed, as Ms. Labry was appointed administratrix of the succession as

representative of her children, the decedent’s only heirs.

Mr. Logan now appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Mr. Logan asserts two assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in removing Tyrone Logan as administrator of the
Succession of DelQuan DeQuincy Logan.

A. The trial court erroneously placed the burden of proof on Mr. Logan to
establish he was qualified as administrator at the time of his
appointment and the trial court’s determination that Mr. Logan’s failure
to plead his qualifications in his Petition for Appointment of
Administrator made his appointment invalid and null was legal error.

B. To the extent the Petition for Appointment of Administrator was vague
as to Mr. Logan’s qualifications as administrator, it was cured by
evidence submitted by Mr. Logan that he was qualified to be
administrator as a creditor of his son’s estate under the provisions of
La.Code Civ.P. art. 3097(B).

C. Ms. Labry submitted no evidence that Mr. Logan was not qualified to
be administrator at the time of his appointment nor that he had become
disqualified.

2. The district court erred in appointing India Labry as independent
administratrix of the Succession of Del’Quan DeQuincy Logan. Mr. Logan
had already been appointed administrator and his removal was in error.

A. The order of preference in La.Code Civ.P. art. 3098 operates only
where one or more persons seek to be appointed administrator of a
succession. Once Mr. Logan was appointed, the preference of La.Code
Civ.P. art. 3098 did not inure to Ms. Labry’s benefit.

B. The beneficiary for a Jones Act claim is irrelevant for the purposes of
determining the administrator of a succession.

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DISCUSSION

In Succession of Simon, 03-1127 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/04), 866 So.2d 349,

this court addressed a situation similar to this case. The decedent’s mother

qualified as the succession representative, and the decedent’s surviving spouse and

mother of the decedent’s minor child sought to remove her as administrator and

replace her. Simon, like this case, involved a decedent whose heirs had a Jones Act

claim. This court found that the party seeking to remove the appointed

administrator bore the burden of proving that the administrator was unqualified.

Though neither party introduced any evidence at the hearing in Simon, this court

found that the detailed descriptive list was prima facie proof of the contents

thereof, citing La.Code Civ.P art. 3137. Because the decedent’s mother failed to

allege any debts of the succession, and she did not allege she was an heir or the

representative of an heir, the court found the trial court properly removed the

mother as administratrix.

In the case before us, Ms. Labry introduced evidence that she, not Mr.

Logan, was the legal representative of her children as their natural tutor. Thus, she

proved that the only stated ground in Mr. Logan’s petition to be appointed

administrator was not valid, and he had no grounds to be appointed administrator.

Therefore, Ms. Labry was the first person to file a valid claim to be appointed

administrator pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 3097(B). The burden of proof then

shifted to Mr. Logan to show that he was entitled to remain as administrator. The

trial court found that Mr. Logan’s alleged status as creditor was irrelevant since it

was not pled in his original pleadings, and by the time of the hearing it appeared

that all the debts he alleged the succession owed him had been paid.

We find no error in the trial court’s judgment. Ms. Labry, as personal

representative of the heirs of the succession, proved that Mr. Logan was not
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qualified to serve as administrator. She further showed that she was qualified to

serve as administrator of the succession. The judgment of the trial court is

affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed

to Mr. Logan.

AFFIRMED.

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