Jeremy Scott Chapman v. Kayla Nicole Chapman

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-157

JEREMY SCOTT CHAPMAN

VERSUS

KAYLA NICOLE CHAPMAN

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. C15210
HONORABLE CRAIG STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHARON DARVILLE WILSON
JUDGE

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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Van H. Kyzar, and Sharon Darville
Wilson, Judges.

AMENDED AND AFFIRMED.

Jack Derrick Miller
Attorney at Law
P. O. Drawer 1650
Crowley, LA 70526
(337) 788-0768
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Kayla Nicole Chapman

Orelia R. Lawdins
Attorney At Law
221 East Academy, Ste. B
Jennings, LA 70546
(337) 275-5124
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Jeremy Scott Chapman

WILSON, Judge.

Kayla Nicole Chapman (Ms. Chapman) sought child support arrearages,

payment of certain medical expenses, payment of expenses for certain

extracurricular activities, and a ruling that her ex-husband, Jeremy Scott Chapman

(Mr. Chapman), was in contempt of court. Mr. Chapman sought a reduction in his

child support obligation as well as a ruling that Ms. Chapman was in contempt of

court. On August 25, 2020, the trial court signed a judgment that reduced Mr.

Chapman’s child support obligation, awarded arrearages to Ms. Chapman, and

ordered Mr. Chapman to pay a portion of certain medical expenses and expenses for

certain extracurricular activities. The trial court did not find either party to be in

contempt of court. Mr. Chapman appeals. We amend the judgment to reflect the

correct calculation of Mr. Chapman’s child support arrearages and affirm the

judgment in all other respects.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide:

1. whether the trial court erred in calculating the amount of Mr. Chapman’s
child support obligation and the amount of his arrearages; and

2. whether the trial court ordered Mr. Chapman to pay an incorrect share of
certain medical expenses and expenses for extracurricular activities.

Mr. Chapman also alleges that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to rule on

his summary motion for modification and termination of child support in an

expedited manner; (2) in dismissing his claim for a modification in the child support

order; and (3) in denying his rule for contempt against Ms. Chapman. These

allegations relate to a judgment signed by the trial court on January 2, 2019,

following the trial court’s consideration of Mr. Chapman’s “Motion and Order for

Contempt, Modification of Custody, Modification and Termination of Support

Obligation, and Reimbursement Claims for Overpayment.” “[J]udgments denying

motions or rules for modification of child support awards” are treated “as final

judgments subject to review on appeal.” Barton v. Barton, 06-2032, p. 8 (La.App.

1 Cir. 8/8/07), 965 So.2d 939, 944. Mr. Chapman did not seek review of the January

2, 2019 judgment in a timely manner; therefore, these assignments of error are not

properly before this court in the present appeal. Furthermore, Mr. Chapman’s

motion for appeal states that the August 25, 2020 judgment is the one he seeks to

appeal.

Ms. Chapman also appealed the August 25, 2020, judgment. On February 9,

2021, the trial court signed a judgment dismissing Ms. Chapman’s appeal for failure

to pay the estimated costs of appeal. Ms. Chapman did not seek review of the

dismissal of her appeal. Ms. Chapman’s memorandum to this court references an

answer to the appeal; however, no such answer was filed with this court, and none

appears in the appellate record. For those reasons, this court does not consider Ms.

Chapman’s assertion that the trial court erred in denying her exception of res

judicata with respect to Mr. Chapman’s request for a reduction in his child support

obligation based on Colby reaching the age of majority.1

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. and Ms. Chapman married on April 1, 2001, in Jennings, Louisiana. Two

children, Colby and Isabelle, were born of the marriage.2 The parties separated on

1
Furthermore, even though the denial of a motion for modification of a child support
obligation is treated as a final judgment for appeal purposes, this court notes that res judicata does
not apply to decrees of child custody and child support because such rulings “are always subject
to modification and are thus never final” for purposes of res judicata. Kaptein v. Kaptein, 19-784,
p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/22/20), 289 So.3d 1198, 1200, writ denied, 20-325 (La. 6/3/20), 296 So.3d
1069, quoting Kleiser v. Kleiser, 619 So.2d 178, 179 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993). “Consequently, such
judgments will not bar subsequent actions brought to modify the provisions for custody and
support.” Kleiser, 619 So.2d at 179.
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Colby was born on August 23, 2000, and has reached the age of majority.
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February 19, 2010, and Mr. Chapman filed a petition for divorce. On April 28, 2010,

the parties entered into a consent judgment that awarded them joint custody of the

children, with Ms. Chapman being designated as domiciliary parent, and set Mr.

Chapman’s child support obligation at $1,000.00 per month. A consent judgment of

divorce was signed on April 19, 2011.

Over the years, the parties have filed several rules seeking increases and

decreases in the child support obligation. On September 18, 2015, a judgment was

signed that continued joint custody and fixed Mr. Chapman’s child support

obligation at $1,425.00 per month. The judgment also ordered that Mr. Chapman

must pay: (1) seventy-eight percent (78%) of all out of pocket and customary

charges for Isabelle’s dance lessons and costumes; and (2) seventy-eight percent

(78%) of any of the children’s medical expenses not covered by insurance.

Several times in 2016 and 2018, the parties appeared before a hearing officer

who recommended changes in Mr. Chapman’s child support obligation based on his

employment status. Several times, the parties disagreed with the hearing officer’s

recommendations, and, each time, a hearing was held to make determinations

regarding those objections.3

At the time that the instant dispute arose, Mr. Chapman was ordered to pay

child support in the amount of $1,626.004 per month pursuant to the hearing officer’s

recommendations on July 7, 2016, which was made the order of the court on July

18, 2016, after no request for an objection hearing was filed. Another hearing

3
Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:236.5(C)(6) provides that any party who disagrees with
hearing officer’s recommendation may file a written objection, which shall be heard by the trial
court. “Upon the filing of the objection, the court shall schedule a contradictory hearing where the
judge shall accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings of the hearing officer.” Id. If
no objection is timely filed, “the order shall become a final judgment of the court and shall be
signed by a judge and appealable as a final judgment.” La.R.S. 46:236.5(C)(7).
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The amount of child support was set at $1,714.00 per month until insurance was
withdrawn from Mr. Chapman’s wages, then the amount was reduced to $1,626.00 per month.

3

officer’s conference was not held until March 29, 2018. At that time, the hearing

officer recommended child support in the amount of $1,331.00 per month until

Colby turned eighteen, at which time the amount would be reduced to $880.00 per

month.5 The hearing officer’s March 29, 2018 recommendation never became a

final order of the court because Ms. Chapman objected 6 to it and spawned the

proceedings that would lead to this appeal.

After August 23, 2018, when Colby turned eighteen, Mr. Chapman, on his

own accord, began paying $880.00 per month in child support. 7 Mr. Chapman

apparently arrived at the $880.00 per month amount based on the hearing officer’s

recommendation of March 29, 2018. Ms. Chapman’s testimony confirmed that Mr.

Chapman began paying $880.00 after Colby turned eighteen.

5
At the hearing on May 19, 2020, Mr. Chapman’s attorney argued that the hearing officer
made an award of a specific amount for each child at the March 29, 2018 hearing officer’s
conference. This court notes that La.R.S. 9:315.22 supplies certain criteria, which if met, allow
the obligor to unilaterally stop paying child support when a child reaches the age of majority. If
the child support order provides for a certain amount to be paid per child, “the award for each child
shall terminate automatically without any action by the obligor upon each child’s attaining the age
of majority[.]” La.R.S. 9:315.22(A). If the award of child support is in globo for more than one
child, “the award shall automatically terminate without any action by the obligor when the
youngest child for whose benefit the award was made attains the age of majority[.]” La.R.S.
9:315.22(B) (emphasis added). In this case, the court finds that the award of child support was in
globo for two children and that the provisions of La.R.S. 9:315.22 do not apply.
6
Appendix A(D)(4) of the Local Rules of Court, Thirty-First Judicial District, provides
that: “[t]he Hearing Officer’s recommendation is deemed a temporary order on all matters which
shall be forwarded to the District Judge for consideration as a temporary order after the objection
period has expired.” Then, Appendix A(D)(5) of the Local Rules provides that:

If a written objection to the Hearing Officer’s recommendation is timely
filed by either party, the Hearing Officer recommendation shall be forwarded to the
District Judge who may accept, reject, or modify it in whole or in part as a
temporary order after the objection period has expired until a contradictory hearing
can be had. Any such temporary order signed by the District Judge shall be
considered interlocutory in nature.

In this case, the record does not reflect that any such temporary orders were issued. Where a party
objects to the hearing officer’s recommendation, that recommendation does not have an effect of
a court order, and the local rules cannot modify La.R.S. 46:236.5 to do so. Piccione v. Piccione,
01-1086 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/22/02), 824 So.2d 427.
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“The general rule in Louisiana is that a child support judgment remains in full force and
effect until the party ordered to pay it has the judgment modified, reduced, or terminated by the
court.” Ortlieb v. Webb, 20-598, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/26/21) (unpublished opinion).
4

On September 20, 2018, the trial court issued written reasons for ruling which

explained that the trial court would not reduce Mr. Chapman’s child support

obligation based on Colby’s reaching the age of eighteen because Mr. Chapman did

not offer any evidence of his income at the hearings held on May 1, 2018, and August

16, 2018. The trial court indicated that it would sign a judgment in accordance with

its written reasons when one was presented.

The parties disagreed on the wording of the judgment. However, a judgment

was prepared by Ms. Chapman’s attorney and presented to the trial court. And, on

January 2, 2019, the trial court signed that judgment, which dismissed Mr.

Chapman’s “Motion and Order for Contempt, Modification of Custody,

Modification and Termination of Support Obligation, and Reimbursement Claims

for Overpayment” with prejudice. The judgment clarified that all of Isabelle’s

dance-related expenses fell with the definition of extracurricular activities that the

parties had to pay in proportion to their incomes.

On January 22, 2019, counsel for Mr. Chapman filed a “Motion and Order to

Substitute Judgment” with regard to the January 2, 2019 judgment. The motion

alleged that the trial court requested that a joint judgment be submitted with thirty

days from a status conference held on December 11, 2018, and that Ms. Chapman’s

version of the judgment was signed before the expiration of the delay and in violation

of Uniform Rules―District Courts, Rule 9.5. The trial court signed a judgment on

January 23, 2019, which indicated that Mr. Chapman’s “Motion and Order for

Contempt, Modification of Custody, Modification and Termination of Support

Obligation, and Reimbursement Claims for Overpayment” was denied after hearings

held on May 1 and August 16, 2018. The written reasons dated September 20, 2018,

are also referenced in this judgment. It is somewhat unclear what exactly is being

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denied as “Denied” is handwritten over the portion of the judgment which states that

Mr. Chapman’s motions are dismissed.

Mr. Chapman’s motion to substitute judgment was set for hearing on March

12, 2019, but the hearing was passed without date and never took place. The court

minutes do not reflect that counsel for either party were present when the matter was

called.

On August 26, 2019, Ms. Chapman filed an amended rule for arrearages and

contempt.8 Ms. Chapman alleged that Mr. Chapman failed to pay his share of dance

expenses, dental expenses for the children, and expenses related to Isabelle’s broken

arm. She also alleged that Mr. Chapman was in arrears due to his unilateral reduction

in his child support obligation in August of 2018. After Mr. Chapman’s exceptions

of no cause and no right of action with regard to the rule for contempt were denied,

Mr. Chapman answered the April 23, 2018 rule and the August 2, 2019 rule. He

also requested a modification of the child support order based on Colby’s reaching

the age of majority. Ms. Chapman disagreed with the hearing officer’s

recommendations, and the matter proceeded to a hearing on May 19, 2020. On June

8, 2020, the trial court signed reasons for ruling which stated that Mr. Chapman

owed child support arrearages in the amount of $25,574.65, $747.00 to the dance

studio, and $5,721.97 for medical bills. The trial court did not find Mr. Chapman to

be in contempt of court.

On August 25, 2020, the trial court signed a judgment that reduced Mr.

Chapman’s child support obligation to $880.00 per month, retroactive to February

11, 2020 (i.e., the date Mr. Chapman filed his answer to Ms. Chapman’s rules for

8
On April 23, 2018, Ms. Chapman had filed a rule for arrearages and sought to have Mr.
Chapman held in contempt of court. She alleged arrearages in the amount of $707.46 for his share
of Isabelle’s dance lessons and costume expenses as well as arrearages in the amount of $2,028.00
for his share of dental expenses incurred on June 13 and 14, 2017.

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arrearages and again requested a reduction in his child support obligation based on

Colby turning eighteen years old); ordered Mr. Chapman to pay $25,574.65 in child

support arrearages; ordered Mr. Chapman to pay $5,721.97, representing his portion

of certain medical expenses; ordered Mr. Chapman to pay dance-related expenses to

Showstoppers Dance Studio; and cast Mr. Chapman with costs. It is from this

judgment that Mr. Chapman appeals.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a child support case, including one regarding a request for modification of

a child support obligation, the standard of review is manifest error. Moody v. Moody,

19-642 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/20) (unpublished opinion), writ denied, 20-523 (La.

9/8/20), 301 So.3d 35. Accordingly, “[i]n order for this court to reverse a trial

judge’s factual findings, manifest error must exist. Under a manifest error standard

of review, this court can only reverse if it finds, based on the entire record, that there

is no reasonable factual basis for the factual finding and that the fact finder is clearly

wrong.” Id. (citations omitted).

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The trial court ordered Mr. Chapman to pay $25,574.65 in child support

arrearages. The trial court reached this amount by finding that: (1) Mr. Chapman’s

child support obligation was $1,626.00 per month as of the hearing officer’s

recommendations on July 7, 2016, which became the order of the court by judgment

signed on July 18, 2016; (2) Mr. Chapman had been paying only $880.00 per month,

resulting in an underpayment of $746.00 per month, since July 1, 2017; (3) the

underpayment was made for thirty-one months and ten days, from July 1, 2017,

through February 10, 2020; and (4) Mr. Chapman was in arrears of $1,906.65 as
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determined at the hearing officer’s conference on July 7, 2016 (which was noted to

be an amount stipulated to by the parties).

Mr. Chapman argues that the trial court erroneously calculated the child

support arrearages because it failed to make the reduction of child support to $880.00

per month retroactive to Mr. Chapman’s initial modification request on November

29, 2017. This court finds that the trial court did not err in failing to make the

reduction retroactive to November 29, 2017, because to do so would make the

reduction effective nearly nine months before Colby reached the age of majority.

Mr. Chapman further argues that the applicable amount of child support was

$1,331.00 based upon the hearing officer’s recommendation of March 29, 2018.

This court finds that the trial court did not err in failing to use $1,331.00 as the

amount of the child support obligation because the March 29, 2018 recommendation

did not become the order of the court due to Ms. Chapman’s timely objection thereto.

Mr. Chapman also objected to this recommendation.

We find that the trial court correctly found that Mr. Chapman’s monthly child

support obligation was $1,626.00 per month since no recommendation of the hearing

officer made after July 7, 2016, was made the order of the court. We further find

that the trial court correctly calculated the amount of the underpayment as $746.00

per month. We find that the trial court erred in calculating the arrearages based on

thirty-one months and ten days of underpayment from July 1, 2017, because the

testimony established that Mr. Chapman did not began paying the reduced amount

of $880.00 per month until August of 2018. We find that Mr. Chapman was in

arrears for seventeen months and seventeen days, from August 25, 2018, through

February 10, 2020. Therefore, the correct amount of arrearages is $13,116.88 plus

$1,906.65 for prior arrearages, for a total amount of $15,023.53, and we amend the

judgment to reflect that Mr. Chapman owes this amount in child support arrearages.
8

Mr. Chapman argues that his share of extraordinary medical expenses should

be limited to seventy-eight percent (78%) of those incurred by in-network providers

pursuant to the stipulation of the parties on June 17, 2014.

The trial court ordered Mr. Chapman to pay $5,721.97 for his share of medical

expenses and dance related expenses. This represents ninety percent (90%) of the

following amounts: (1) $2,600.00 for treatment by Dr. Rawleigh Fisher, oral

surgeon; (2) $1,890.00 for orthodontic expenses; (3) $1,037.75 for treatment by Dr.

Michael Holland, orthopedic surgeon. The ninety-percent share was set by the

hearing officer’s recommendations of July 7, 2016, and is applicable to costs not

covered by insurance. The parties stipulated that Mr. Chapman owed $747.00 to

Showstoppers Dance Studio for his share of Isabella’s dance-related expenses. For

these reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling in this regard.

The final issue in the case is the request of counsel for Mr. Chapman that this

court “admonish and/or sanction” Ms. Chapman’s counsel for “unprofessional

personal attacks” and disparaging remarks made in Ms. Chapman’s brief on the

grounds that such statements violate Uniform Rules―Courts of Appeal, Rule 2‒

12.2(C).9 Ms. Chapman’s attorney stated: “In almost 48 years of practicing law and

trying numerous cases, the undersigned has never encountered anything near what

has occurred in this case.” This court notes the complaints of Ms. Chapman’s

attorney that counsel for Mr. Chapman has made this matter “extremely

complicated, time-consuming[,] and expensive” and recognizes that his tone is less

than courteous. We also note that counsel for Mr. Chapman made similar comments

in her reply brief when she stated: “the actions of Counsel for Kayla Chapman

9
Rule 2‒12.2(C) provides that “[t]he language used in the brief shall be courteous, free
from vile, obscene, obnoxious, or offensive expressions, and free from insulting, abusive,
discourteous, or irrelevant matter or criticism of any person, class of persons, or any court, or judge
or other officer thereof, or of any institution.”
9

violated Rules 3.3 and 3.4 of the Professional Rules of Conduct. His actions further

convoluted the record and prejudiced Jeremy Chapman. Kayla Chapman cannot

take advantage of her attorney’s improper and unprofessional actions.”

A violation of Rule 2‒12.2(C) “shall subject the author . . . of the brief to

punishment for contempt of court, and to having such brief returned.” While we do

not think that the comments of Ms. Chapman’s attorney rise to the level of

sanctionable conduct, we remind both counsel that personal attacks on opposing

counsel are prohibited and recommend that the tenets of Rule 2‒12.2(C) be closely

heeded in the future.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we amend the judgment to reflect that the total

amount of arrearages due from Mr. Chapman is $15,023.53. In all other respects,

the judgment is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are taxed equally between the

parties.

AMENDED AND AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Rule 2-16.3 Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.

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