Dominic Riggs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-218

DOMINIC RIGGS

VERSUS

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
WAYNE M. HEBERT, AND GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-2020-2172
HONORABLE MARILYN C. CASTLE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JONATHAN W. PERRY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Chief Judge, Jonathan W. Perry and Charles
G. Fitzgerald, Judges.

Cooks, Chief Judge, dissents and assigns reasons.

AFFIRMED.

Lawrence Blake Jones
David C. Whitmore
Blake Jones Law Firm, LLC
701 Poydras Street, Suite 4100
New Orleans, Louisiana 70139
(504) 525-4361
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Dominic Riggs

Joseph T. Puhekker
Leah B. Guilbeau & Associates
Caffery Plaza, Suite 100
4023 Ambassador Caffery Parkway
Lafayette, Louisiana 70503
(337) 988-7240
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
and Wayne M. Hebert

PERRY, Judge.

This is an appeal by Dominic Riggs (“Riggs”) from a judgment granting a

motion to enforce a settlement agreement urged by State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company (“State Farm”) on behalf of its insured, Wayne M. Hebert

(“Hebert”) (collectively “Defendants”). For the following reasons, we find the

parties’ compromise constitutes res judicata; thus, we affirm the judgment

dismissing Riggs’s claims against Defendants with prejudice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant litigation began on April 29, 2020, when Riggs filed a petition for

damages against State Farm, Hebert, and his own uninsured motorist insurer, GEICO

Casualty Company (“GEICO”). In his petition, Riggs alleged he was involved in

two separate automobile collisions with Hebert on April 30, 2019. The first cause

of action set forth in Riggs’s petition alleged that “Riggs was operating his 2015

Dodge Journey vehicle on Louisiana Avenue in Lafayette, Louisiana, when suddenly

and without warning the 2015 Chevrolet 1500 owned and operated by Wayne

M. Hebert changed lanes into [Riggs’s] vehicle and then left the scene.” The second

cause of action additionally claimed:

Shortly following the afore-described impact on Louisiana
Avenue in Lafayette, Louisiana, on April 30, 2019, Dominic Riggs
continued operating his 2015 Dodge Journey vehicle behind Wayne
M. Hebert[.] While they were on Webb Street in Lafayette, Louisiana,
[Riggs] was stopped behind [Hebert’s] vehicle when [Hebert] backed
into [Riggs’s] vehicle and then drove off again.

Both asserted causes of action alleged that Riggs “sustained loss and damage . . . for

which defendants are liable unto him.”

Riggs settled his claims against GEICO. Pursuant to a Joint Motion and Order

of Partial Dismissal signed by the trial court on September 23, 2020, Riggs’s claims

against GEICO were dismissed with prejudice.

In response to Riggs’s petition, State Farm filed a Motion to Enforce

Settlement on September 29, 2020. According to State Farm, its insured, Hebert,

had already been released from all liability from Riggs under the terms of a

settlement agreement perfected approximately three months before Riggs filed the

instant suit. On February 3, 2020, Riggs executed a written settlement agreement

(“the Release”) in consideration of State Farm’s policy limits of $15,000.00, which

stated, in pertinent part:

For and in consideration of the sum of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000)
Dollars, Dominic Riggs hereby fully and forever release[s] and
discharge[s] [Hebert]. . . , who does not admit any liability to the
undersigned but expressly denies any liability, from any and all claims,
demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or
nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all injuries known
and unknown, which may have resulted or may in the future develop
from an incident on or about the 30th day of April, 2019, at or near
Louisiana Ave, Lafayette, LA.

In opposition, Riggs argued the language of the Release covered only one of

the two motor vehicle collisions which he alleged had occurred on April 30, 2019.

Riggs contended the Release was restricted geographically to an accident occurring

on Louisiana Avenue and did not cover a second impact that occurred on Webb

Street almost immediately after the first impact.

A hearing was held via Zoom on November 16, 2020, after which a written

judgment was signed on December 7, 2020, granting State Farm’s motion and

dismissing Riggs’s lawsuit against State Farm and Hebert with prejudice. This

appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Riggs contends the trial court “erred in

granting [State Farm]’s Motion to Enforce Settlement which was, in reality, an

exception of res judicata, because State Farm did not carry its burden of proof and

demonstrate that there was no doubt regarding the application of res judicata to the

2

facts of this case.” Riggs submits the rules pertaining to the exception of res judicata

dictate the exception should be overruled when there is doubt regarding whether its

requirements have been met. Riggs argues doubt exists as to the parties intent.

According to Riggs, the parties to the Release have conflicting opinions as to what

differences the parties intended to settle therein. He alleges the Release only covers

the accident referenced in the first cause of action stated in his petition, i.e., the

impact that occurred on Louisiana Avenue. Therefore, Riggs urges this court to

vacate the trial court’s judgment and reinstate his action which concerns the second

impact that occurred on Webb Street.

In reply, State Farm argues the exception of res judicata is not before this court

because it was not submitted to the trial court. In support, State Farm cites Ewing

v. Westport Ins. Corp., 19-551, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/20), 290 So.3d 707, 711,

aff’d, 20-339 (La. 11/19/20), 315 So.3d 175 (“An appellate court cannot consider

issues raised for the first time on appeal which have not been addressed by the trial

court.”). See also Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 1–3, (“Courts of Appeal

will review only issues which were submitted to the trial court[.]”).

Contrary to State Farm’s assertion that the exception of res judicata should

have been raised before the trial court, we note La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(B) provides

that an appellate court may, sua sponte, raise and consider the peremptory exception

of res judicata.1 Accordingly, we shall consider whether res judicata bars the instant

litigation instituted by Riggs on April 29, 2020.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Res judicata is a peremptory exception raised to bar a subsequent action.

La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(A)(3). The objectives of the exception of res judicata are

1
Under La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(B), “res judicata . . . may be noticed by either the trial
court or appellate court on its own motion.”

3

the promotion of judicial efficiency and the final resolution of disputes. Steckler

v. Lafayette Consol. Gov’t, 11-427 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/11), 76 So.3d 161, writs

denied, 11-2639, 11-2677 (La. 2/10/12), 80 So.3d 477, 487. Whether a prior

judgment has the effect of res judicata in subsequent litigation is a question of law

which we review de novo. Fogleman v. Meaux Surface Prot., Inc., 10-1210

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/11), 58 So.3d 1057, writ denied, 11-712 (La. 5/27/11), 63 So.3d

995.

The general principles of res judicata are set forth in La.R.S. 13:4231, which

provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment
is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct
review, to the following extent:

(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action
existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished
and merged in the judgment.

(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are
extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes
of action.

(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is
conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any
issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential
to that judgment.

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in considering La.R.S. 13:4231, has set forth

the following prerequisites which must be met for res judicata to bar a second action:

(1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are
the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit
existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and (5) the
cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the
transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first
litigation.

4

Burguieres v. Pollingue, 02-1385, p. 8 (La. 2/25/03), 843 So.2d 1049, 1053.

Consequently, for res judicata to bar the instant litigation instituted by Riggs on April

29, 2020, all five of the aforementioned factors must be satisfied.

The Release signifies a “compromise,” which La.Civ.Code art. 3071 defines

as “a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of

them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal

relationship.” Under La.Civ.Code art. 3076, “A compromise settles only those

differences that the parties clearly intended to settle, including the necessary

consequences of what they express.” According to La.Civ.Code art. 3080, “A

compromise precludes the parties from bringing a subsequent action based upon the

matter that was compromised.” Thus, “[w]hile the doctrine of res judicata is

ordinarily premised on a final judgment on the merits, it also applies where there is

a transaction or settlement of a disputed or compromised matter that has been entered

into by the parties.” Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 14-808, p. 6 (La. 12/9/14), 158

So.3d 761, 766.

The meaning and intent of the parties to a written instrument,
including a compromise, is ordinarily determined from the instrument’s
four corners, and extrinsic evidence is inadmissible either to explain or
to contradict the instrument’s terms. When a dispute arises as to the
scope of a compromise agreement, extrinsic evidence can be considered
to determine exactly what differences the parties intended to settle.

Ortego v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 96-1322, p. 7 (La. 2/25/97), 689 So.2d

1358, 1363-64 (citations omitted).

Here, Riggs’s memorandum in opposition to State Farm’s motion argued

Hebert was released from liability for only one of the accidents which allegedly

occurred between Riggs and Hebert on April 30, 2019. According to Riggs, the

Release was restricted geographically to an accident occurring on Louisiana Avenue

and did not cover a second impact that occurred on Webb Street almost immediately

5

after the first impact. Riggs acknowledged that “as a result of the accident on

Louisiana Avenue, [Riggs was] not asserting a claim against [Hebert] or State Farm

in this matter, as that accident was encompassed in the release submitted by State

Farm.” Thus, despite its inclusion in his petition for damages, Riggs did not contest

State Farm’s motion insofar as it sought to enforce the settlement regarding his first

cause of action—the accident on Louisiana Avenue in Lafayette. Rather, Riggs did

contest State Farm’s motion as it related to his second cause of action only—the

accident on Webb Street in Lafayette. As there is no dispute that the Release is

valid,2 final, and that the parties to the Release and to the instant action are the same,

the first three prerequisites of res judicata under La.R.S. 13:4231 are clearly met.

Thus, the remaining pertinent determinations are whether Riggs’s second cause of

action existed at the time of the Release and whether the second cause of action arose

out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the Release.

In his appeal, Riggs argues the Release is only applicable to the incident “at

or near Louisiana Ave, Lafayette, LA;” however, his claim at issue concerns the

incident on Webb Street, which is the second cause of action set forth in his petition

for damages. State Farm, according to Riggs, failed to meet its burden of showing

the Release barred his instant claim stemming from the incident on Webb Street.

We disagree.

The record reflects the following evidence was introduced at the hearing on

State Farm’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement: Exhibit 1, a demand letter

from Riggs to State Farm, dated January 15, 2020; Exhibit 2, an acceptance letter

from State Farm, dated January 21, 2020, declaring, in relevant part, “State Farm is

willing to settle your client’s claim for $15,000.00[;]” Exhibit 3, the Release

Additionally, in his brief to this court, Riggs admits he is “not asserting that the
2

compromise for the accident on Louisiana Avenue was invalid.”

6

executed by Riggs on February 3, 2020; and Exhibit 4, a copy of the settlement

check.3 While the appellate briefs before us refer to a document which was

purportedly attached to the opposition memorandum filed by Riggs in response to

State Farm’s motion, the transcript reflects that the trial court was never offered the

evidence or afforded the opportunity to rule on the admissibility of said document.

Thus, we find the document attached to Riggs’s opposition memorandum was not

properly and officially introduced into evidence for our consideration.

“Evidence not properly and officially offered and introduced cannot be

considered, even if it is physically placed in the record. Documents attached to

memoranda do not constitute evidence and cannot be considered as such on appeal.”

Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 07-2143, p. 6 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88.

Further, appellate courts are courts of record and may not review evidence that is not

in the appellate record or receive new evidence. Id.; La.Code Civ.P. art. 2164.

The evidence properly before us shows settlement was suggested by counsel

for Riggs in a demand letter dated January 15, 2020, which, in addition to detailing

Riggs’s alleged injuries, medical treatment, and medical expenses, declared, in

pertinent part:

Our office represents Dominic Riggs in an automobile accident
which occurred on April 20, 2019. Enclosed are the medical records
and bills that pertain to your client’s accident thus far. . . .

. . . The policy limits are clearly in order for Dominic Riggs.[4]

[Counsel for Riggs] hereby makes formal demand for the policy
limits of your insured, Wayne M. Hebert.

3
The check was signed by Riggs and deposited on February 3, 2020.
4
After approximately eight months of medical treatment, Riggs’s medical expenses were
purportedly $4,640.00, and his projected future medical expenses were $4,856.00.

7

On January 21, 2020, State Farm sent an acceptance letter, the Release, and a check

for $15,000.00, representing the liability limit of Hebert’s policy.

At the time the parties agreed to settle, Riggs knew what transpired between

him and Hebert on April 30, 2019. Despite this, the Release states Riggs agreed to:

fully and forever release and discharge [Hebert] . . . from any and all
claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind
or nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all injuries known
and unknown, which may have resulted or may in the future develop
from an incident on or about the 30th day of April, 2019, at or near
Louisiana Ave, Lafayette, LA.

Consequently, we find Riggs’s second cause of action clearly existed at the

time the Release was effected and, further, his second cause of action arises out of

the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the Release. The Release

constitutes res judicata, precluding Riggs’s action instituted on April 29, 2020.

Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of Riggs’s claims against

Defendants with prejudice.

DECREE

Pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(B), we raise and sustain on our own

motion the peremptory exception of res judicata. As a result, we affirm the judgment

of the trial court dismissing, with prejudice, the petition of Dominic Riggs against

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Wayne M. Hebert. All

costs are assessed to Plaintiff/Appellant, Dominic Riggs.

AFFIRMED.

8

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-218

DOMINIC RIGGS

VERSUS

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
WAYNE M. HEBERT, AND GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY

COOKS, Chief Judge, Dissents.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and find the judgment

granting the motion to enforce the settlement agreement was improper. The

language of the settlement provided, in pertinent part, as follows::

. . . from any and all claims, demands damages, actions, causes of
actions or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, and particularly on
account of all injuries known and unknown, which have resulted or may
in the future develop from an incident on or about the 30th day of April,
2019, at or near Louisiana Ave., Lafayette, La.

While the parties debated in the district court over the effect of the words “at

or near Louisiana Ave.,” I find the word an “incident” more controlling and

dispositive herein. State Farm now insists the reference “at or near Louisiana Ave.”

includes the incident on Webb Street which occurred moments after the first incident

on Louisiana Ave. The absence of an “s” to signify State Farm’s intent to include

both incidents is fatal to its argument and at the least creates an ambiguity and doubt

as to the parties’ intent which must be construed against it as the drafter of the

agreement. These are basic contract rules on interpretation. The trial judge

manifestly erred in injecting an “s” in the document and supplying an intent by State

Farm to include both incidents. There was, in the end, no “meeting of the minds”

here. To get to the conclusion that State Farm desired, and the trial court accepted,

that the settlement agreement includes both incidents, requires adding the missing

words to the settlement agreement. GEICO likewise has a different viewing of the

matter, as it concluded two separate accidents occurred.1 Thus, I believe State Farm

in crafting this settlement agreement should have to live with the results of their own

poor choice of wording. The majority seems to imply because counsel for Plaintiff

“suggested” the parties proceed to a settlement, this evidenced an intent to settle both

accidents, when the settlement agreement does not by its plain wording

unambiguously do so. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of the motion

to enforce the settlement agreement and remand the case for further proceedings.

1
I note for the purposes of UM, GEICO is entitled to have Plaintiff exhaust all recovery from the
tortfeasor. Here, GEICO’s position is because two incidents occurred, the potential recovery in
the case was $30,000.00 and, if so, Plaintiff left $15,000.00 on the table which it is entitled to use
as an offset towards its uninsured motorist liability. This is why the parties “intent” must be clearly
evidenced by the document alone.