Stephanie Nicole Disatell v. Lance D. Smith

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 21-282 consolidated with CA 21-283

STEPHANIE NICOLE DISATELL

VERSUS

LANCE D. SMITH

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 256,049
HONORABLE PATRICIA EVANS KOCH, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY H. EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Billy H. Ezell, John E. Conery, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

E. Grey Burnes Talley
711 Washington Street
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 442-5231
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Stephanie Nicole Disatell

Candace Wells-Losavio
1024 8th Street
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 528-8808
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Lance D. Smith

EZELL, Judge.

Stephanie Disatell Hart appeals the decision of the trial court below

establishing the terms of the custody Lance Smith and his family exercise over the

former couple’s child. She also appeals evidentiary decisions made by the trial

court and the allowing of Mr. Smith to claim Brody on his taxes every other year.

For the following reasons, we hereby affirm the decision of the trial court.

Mrs. Hart and Mr. Smith were never married, but had a child, Brody, born in

2013. Paternity was immediately acknowledged. When the couple separated in

2016, it began a long history of litigation concerning custody and child support.

Several stipulations were entered into over the following years, as well as contempt

motions and motions to modify both custody and child support. In March of 2020,

Mr. Smith sought to modify custody, seeking to make up time he lost with his son

while he was working out of state. On July 20, 2020, during a pretrial hearing, the

pair entered a stipulation which was recited into the record in open court. Some

issues, namely whether Mr. Smith would be allowed to claim Brody on his taxes in

alternating years and whether he should receive a reduction in child support during

summer months when he had him half the time, were in dispute and tabled for

hearing at a later time. Soon thereafter, disputes arose concerning the agreement

that had been reached and Mrs. Hart sought a hearing to resolve the alleged

disputes. On December 9, 2020, the trial court issued a judgment based on the

transcript of the July pretrial stipulation, allowing Mr. Smith’s family to facilitate

exchanges when he was unavailable due to work, and allowing his family to

exercise his custodial periods when he was away. Mrs. Hart appeals that decision.

On December 14, 2020, the trial court held a hearing to determine the tax

issue. Finding a prior stipulation granted Mr. Smith the right to claim Brody on his

taxes in alternating years, the trial court ruled that the pattern should continue. Mrs.

Hart also appeals that decision.

On appeal, Mrs. Hart asserts six assignments of error. She claims that the

trial court erred in allegedly expanding the July 2020 stipulation on issues she

claims were in dispute without a contradictory hearing. She also claims the trial

court erred in allowing Mr. Smith’s family to pick up or drop off Brody when Mr.

Smith is out of town, in allowing any of Mr. Smith’s family to exercise his

custodial periods when he is out of town, and in ruling on her hearing regarding the

allegedly disputed provisions without taking evidence. She also claims that the

trial court erred in denying her discovery requests concerning Mr. Smith’s work

schedule and locations and in allowing Mr. Smith to claim Brody on his taxes

every other year. We disagree.

Mrs. Hart’s first four assignments of error concern the July 20, 2020

stipulation and the judgment of the trial court setting the oral recitation of that

stipulation into written form. Because they overlap so greatly, we will address

them together.

A transaction or compromise is an agreement between parties seeking an end

to a lawsuit. La.Civ.Code art. 3071. A compromise must either be reduced in

writing or recited in open court and capable of being transcribed from the record of

the proceedings. La.Civ.Code art. 3072. The agreement recited in open court

confers upon each of them the right of judicially enforcing its performance,

although its substance may thereafter be written in a more convenient form. Id.

“The compromise has, as between the interested parties, a force equal to the

authority of things adjudged.” In re Succession of Cole, 12-802, p. 11 (La.App. 3

Cir. 12/26/12), 108 So.3d 240, 249, writ denied, 13-257 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d

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384. They cannot be attacked on account of any error in law or any lesion, but an

error in calculation may always be corrected. Autin-Germany v. Germany, 00-

1924 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/11/01), 789 So.2d 608 (citing La.Civ.Code art. 3078). “A

stipulation has the effect of binding all the parties and the court.” Dolsen v. City of

New Orleans, 559 So.2d 50, 52 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990).

Open court recitations where the parties agree to the stipulations offered by

their respective attorneys constitute a binding compromise or agreement. Carlin v.

Wallace, 00-2892 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 1017. “A declaration made

by a party’s attorney or mandatary has the same effect as one made by the party

himself.” C.T. Traina, Inc. v. Sunshine Plaza, Inc., 03-1003, p. 5 (La. 12/3/03),

861 So.2d 156, 159; La.Civ.Code art. 1853. “[B]ecause a client speaks through his

attorney in court, any statement made by the attorney is held to be an admission by

the client. . . . [A] judicial confession is full proof against the party making it.”

Singleton v. Bunge Corp., 364 So.2d 1321, 1325 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1978). An

admission by stipulation of counsel is of the strongest type. Irving v. E.

Sondheimer Co., 126 So.2d 401 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1960).

Mrs. Hart argues that the trial court erred in allegedly supplementing the oral

stipulation without a hearing or evidence. Specifically, she alleges that the trial

court expanded the stipulation by allowing Mr. Smith’s family to pick Brody up

from school and in allowing his family to exercise his custodial periods if he is out

of town for work. However, a plain reading of the transcript of the oral recitation

of the stipulation shows these allegations are unfounded.

The transcript of the July 20, 2020 hearing begins with Mrs. Hart’s attorney

stating that “we have a judgment, a consent judgment, and we’re going to go

through piece by piece.” The attorneys then read from an agreement into the

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record, beginning by establishing a heightened Bergeron standard for custody

alterations. Later, Mr. Smith’s attorney states that “Lance’s family shall be entitled

to exercise any of his periods, period.” Mrs. Hart begins to state she had believed

it to be just Mr. Smith’s mother, when her attorney states “Anyone in his family

just like anyone in your family. . . . It’s your time, anyone in your family can get

him.” Mrs. Hart then did not raise any concerns or objections to Mr. Smith’s

family having Brody during Mr. Smith’s custody periods. She did not give any

further indication that she did not understand what her counsel recited, nor any

opposition after it was explained that his family was simply getting the same rights

that were extended to hers. Her attorney was crystal clear in what was agreed to.

Again, any statement made by her attorney is held to be an admission by Mrs. Hart

Singleton, 364 So.2d 1321. The court did not err in finding the parties agreed that

any of Mr. Smith’s family could exercise his visitation, as it was clearly agreed to

by Mrs. Hart’s attorney on the record. Nor did the trial court expand the

stipulation in setting forth that judgment for the very same reason.

Likewise, when the subject of the custodial exchanges was brought up, Mrs.

Hart made no complaints when her attorney agreed that any of his family could

pick him up from school. In fact, her attorney responded, “And her family as

well[,]” indicating that the families each had equal opportunity to facilitate

exchanges. When Mr. Smith’s attorney stated, “[sic] Ever how many is allowed

for him to put on the school pickup list he will handle that[,]” her attorney replied

“Okay. That’s up to him.” While there had been explicit mention of Mr. Smith’s

new wife and his mother doing exchanges, his aunt was specifically mentioned at

the same time. A plain reading of the transcript indicates that there was never any

intention to limit the pickup to Mr. Smith’s new wife and his mother. Mrs. Hart,

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again, did not object to Mr. Smith filling as many pickup spots as the school would

allow, indicating she understood his family would be entitled to do so. Regardless,

her attorney clearly agreed that would be the case. Therefore, we conclude that the

stipulation entered into in open court by the parties’ attorneys is a valid and

binding compromise and its terms are enforceable. Once again, the trial court did

not supplement or expand the agreement made by the parties, as the transcript

supports the trial court’s rendering of the stipulation into judgment form.

Mrs. Hart next claims that the trial court erred in ruling on her motion for a

hearing on disputed provisions of the judgment without taking evidence. We

disagree. The trial court had the plain language of the transcript before it, the very

language the parties had agreed to. That was the only evidence the trial court

needed to understand the parties’ intent on the matters before it.

In fact, the trial court was exceedingly patient with the parties, who plainly

sought to have their lives micromanaged by it. The former couple would often go

around in circles over ground that had been plainly covered. Mrs. Hart sought to

litigate minor matters such as bus rides or who did homework on Mr. Smith’s

nights with the child. However, the judgment issued by the trial court properly

mirrored the language of the stipulation entered into in open court. Mrs. Hart

cannot now seek to revise what she clearly agreed to as set out by her attorney.

Though often difficult to sort through, due to the quarrels of the parties, the

language of the transcript is clear and the trial court’s reading of it was correct.

The trial court’s actions concerning the stipulation set forth on July 20, 2020, show

no error. All assignments of error concerning that stipulation and the subsequent

judgment encapsulating it are devoid of merit.

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Mrs. Hart next claims that the trial court erred in denying her request for

information about Mr. Smith’s work schedule and locations, which she sought after

the stipulation had been entered into on custody. The trial court has broad

discretion in regulating pretrial discovery. Osborne v. McKenzie, 43,658 (La.App.

2 Cir. 10/22/08), 998 So.2d 137, (citing Bell v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 06-

1538 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So.2d 654; and Rodsuwan v. Christus Health N. La.,

41,043 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/17/06), 930 So.2d 1116), writ denied, 08-2555 (La.

1/9/09), 998 So.2d 726. The trial court denied the requests as moot, finding that

the information related to custody of Brody, not to the remaining issues before it,

namely tax issues or a possible modification in child support. We can find no error,

much less any abuse of the trial court’s discretion, in the trial court’s finding that

this issue was moot, as custody had been established by the July 20, 2020

stipulation and was not being contested at the time. This assignment of error is

without merit.

Finally, Mrs. Hart claims that the trial court erred in awarding Mr. Smith the

ability to claim Brody on his taxes every other year. Again, we disagree. The

record before this court shows that the parties entered a previous stipulation on

April 2, 2018. That stipulation was clear that “the parties shall alternate the minor

child for all federal and state tax deduction purposes” with Mrs. Hart having odd

numbered years and Mr. Smith having even years. Nothing in the record before

this court has altered that agreement. That stipulation is the basis of the trial

court’s decision, and that basis is sound. Mrs. Hart raises concerns about $202.00

in arrearages Mr. Smith owed at the time of the December 2020 hearing. However,

the trial court was aware of these when it made its determination and ordered Mr.

Smith to pay them by the end of that year in order to claim the deduction. Nothing

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in the record indicates that he did not. Again, based on the record before this court,

we can find no error in the decision of the trial court to hold Mrs. Hart to

agreements she willfully made.

For the above reasons, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed.

Costs of this appeal are hereby assessed against Mrs. Hart.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

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