Jerry Guye, III. and Guye's Construction v. Opelousas Housing Authority

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-363

JERRY GUYE, III, AND
GUYE’S CONSTRUCTION

VERSUS

OPELOUSAS HOUSING AUTHORITY AND
BERKLEY INSURANCE COMPANY

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 17-C-4604-A
HONORABLE GREGORY JAMES DOUCET, DISTRICT JUDGE

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CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

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Court composed of D. Kent Savoie, Candyce G. Perret, and Charles G. Fitzgerald,
Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

Pride J. Doran
Quincy L. Cawthorne
Corrie R. Gallien
Doran & Cawthorne, P.L.L.C.
Post Office Box 2119
Opelousas, LA 70571
(337) 948-8008
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Jerry Guye, III
Guye’s Construction

Robert I. Siegel
Andre M. Boudreaux
Gieger, LaBorde & Laperouse, L.L.C.
701 Poydras Street, Suite 4800
New Orleans, LA 70139-4800
(504) 561-0400
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Berkley Insurance Company

Anna Wise Cunningham Simmons
943 N. Court Street
Opelousas, LA 70570
(337) 942-3141
COUNSEL FOR OTHER DEFENDANT:
Opelousas Housing Authority

PERRET, Judge.

Appellants, Jerry Guye, III and Guye’s Construction, appeal the trial court’s

May 5, 2021 Judgment granting Appellee’s, Berkley Insurance Company

(“Berkley”), exception of no right of action and dismissing all claims against

Appellee with prejudice. After review, we affirm the trial court’s grant of the

exception, but reverse that portion of the judgment dismissing Appellants’ claims

with prejudice. Instead, we remand to permit Appellants’ thirty (30) days from the

mailing of this opinion to amend their petition to allege sufficient facts to assert

their right of action against Berkley.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

Appellants allege that they entered into a contract with Opelousas Housing

Authority (“OHA”) on October 21, 2016, for the installation of exterior doors at

various project sites. The project was to begin around November 29, 2016, and

continue until April 28, 2017. Appellants assert that the agreement specified OHA

could terminate the contract with a ten day “written notice for consistent non-

performance, poor performance or sub-quality work performed by” Appellants.

Appellants appear to have begun work early, on October 20, 2016, but discovered

various regulation violations, which they reported. Several weeks later, Appellants

were informed by Joe Ann Tyler, OHA’s Executive Director, in a manner not

consistent with the contract, that the contract was terminated.

Thereafter, Appellants filed a Petition for Breach of Contract on October 12,

2017, alleging that OHA breached the contract by failing to allow Appellants to

complete the project and such breach caused damages including “lost/postponed

projects, preparatory time securing subcontractors and materials and administrative

time.” Appellants also sought attorneys fees and costs.

On December 10, 2020, Appellants filed Plaintiffs’ Second Supplemental

and Amending Petition for Breach of Contract, adding Berkley Insurance

Company as a defendant.1 The only other addition to Appellants’ petition was

paragraph nine, stating: “That Defendant, BERKLEY INSURANCE

COMPANY, be ordered to produce for inspection, the original or a certified copy

of any and all insurance policies providing coverage for the damages complained

of herein, which policies were in full force and effect at the time of the accident.”

In response, Berkley filed an exception of no right of action. Berkley

alleged that it was named as a direct action defendant and, because Appellants only

asserted claims for breach of contract, Louisiana’s Direct Action Statute does not

provide Appellants a right of action against it. In opposition, Appellants claimed

that Berkley’s policy issued to OHA covers breach of contract “and other acts and

omissions by OHA[,]” thus giving Appellants a right of action against Berkley.

Additionally, Appellants asserted the requirement that a claim be in tort in order

for the Direct Action Statute to apply does not exist when an insurer is sued along

with the insured, and argued that they have, in fact, asserted a tort claim for

negligent breach of contract.

The exception was heard on April 16, 2021. The transcript indicates that the

trial court reviewed the Berkley policy; however, said policy was not admitted into

evidence and a copy does not appear in the appellate record.2 Ultimately, the trial

1
Appellants’ first supplemental and amending petition sought to add Arthur J. Gallagher
Rick Management Services, Inc. as a defendant. Appellants later requested said company be
dismissed, and the trial court accordingly signed an Order on September 1, 2020.
2
On appeal, Berkley objects to Appellants’ attachment of the policy to their Appellant
Brief. As will be noted below, we do not consider the policy in our decision as the policy was
not in the Appellant record and not admitted into evidence at the hearing on the exception of no
right of action.

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court concluded Appellants had no right of action and specifically found that

Appellants’ petition alleged strictly a breach of contract theory.

Appellants assert three assignments of error, namely: the trial court erred in

granting Berkley’s exception of no right of action where (1) Appellant’s “action

was not a direct action against the insurer alone as contemplated under” La.R.S.

22:1269; (2) Appellants “sued defendants pursuant to the terms of the policy at

issue and because a dismissal based upon lack of coverage is premature”; and (3)

Appellants’ “right of action also exist[s] in tort.”

DISCUSSION:

An exception of no right of action challenges whether the plaintiff is of the

class of persons for whom the law provides a remedy. Rebel Distribs. Corp., Inc.

v. LUBA Workers’ Comp., 13-749 (La. 10/15/13), 144 So.3d 825. Evidence may

be introduced in support of or in opposition to the exception “when the grounds

thereof do not appear from the petition.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 931. “The

determination of whether a plaintiff has a legal right to bring an action raises a

question of law, which requires de novo review.” Rebel Distribs. Corp., Inc., 144

So.3d at 833. “Where doubt exists regarding the appropriateness of an objection of

no right of action, it is to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. The burden of

proving that the plaintiff has no right of action rests on the party raising the

exception. Mabile v. Dow Chem. Co., 16-577 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/16)

(unpublished opinion).

Appellants first assert that the trial court erred in applying the Direct Action

Statute to this case because “the statute is not triggered where suit is filed against

an insurer and insured together.” Appellants suggest Soileau v. Smith True Value

& Rental, 12-1711 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So.3d 771, supports their proposition,

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concluding Soileau held that the Direct Action Statute is triggered only when suit

is brought against the insurer alone. However, the supreme court was tasked with

determining whether a suit could proceed against an insurer alone, after the

dismissal of the insured, “when none of [La.]R.S. 22:1269(B)(1)(a)-(f)’s six

enumerated circumstances existed[.]” Id. at 776. Soileau found that if the

tortfeasor is proceeding against the insurer alone, then one of the six circumstances

found in La.R.S. 22:1269(B)(1)(a)-(f) must exist, not that the entirety of the statute

was triggered only by suit against the insurer alone.

Additionally, the statute itself indicates that a plaintiff may bring such an

action against both the insured and insurer: “The injured person or his survivors or

heirs . . . at their option, shall have the right of direct action against the insurer . . .

and, such action may be brought against the insurer alone, or against both the

insured and insurer jointly and in solido[.]” La.R.S. 22:1269(B)(1). In fact, the

supreme court recognized the purpose of the Direct Action Statute in Soileau, 144

So.3d at 775-76:

The Direct Action Statute grants a procedural right of action
against an insurer where the plaintiff has a substantive cause of action
against the insured. . . . In the absence of the Direct Action Statute, a
plaintiff would have no right of action against an alleged tortfeasor’s
liability insurer because the obligation between the plaintiff and the
alleged tortfeasor is delictual in nature, and the plaintiff has no
contractual relationship with the tortfeasor’s insurer. Because the
Direct Action Statute provides the sole procedural right of action
against the insurer in this case, the Direct Action Statute provides the
rules regulating the subject.

The fifth circuit similarly addressed the purpose of the statute in Perkins v.

Carter, 09-673 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/29/09), 30 So.3d 862, and whether the statute

applies when a plaintiff proceeds against both the insured and insurer. In Perkins,

the appellant insurer argued that service was never requested on the insured, thus,

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the plaintiff/appellee failed to meet a requirement of the Direct Action Statute.

The trial court denied the insurer’s exception of no right of action and the fifth

circuit affirmed. On appeal the plaintiff/appellee made the same argument as

Appellants in the current case: “Mr. Perkins argues that the Direct Action Statute

only applies when the action is brought against the insurer alone.” Id. at 866. The

appellee asserted “that because he filed suit against Dr. Woo [the insured] and

USAA [the insurer], he was not filing an action solely against USAA and therefore

the Direct Action Statute did not apply.” Id. The fifth circuit disagreed, stating:

We disagree because appellee only has a right of action against the
alleged tortfeasor’s insurer under the Direct Action Statute.

There is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the
alleged tortfeasor’s insurer. Clark v. Durbin, 590 So.2d 633, 635–36
(La.App. 3 Cir.1991). Therefore, the plaintiff must establish a right of
action through the Direct Action Statute which “was enacted to give
special rights of action to injured tort victims.” Arrow Trucking Co. v.
Continental Ins. Co., 465 So.2d 691, 700 (La.1985). The Direct
Action Statute extends a conditional right to file suit, to some parties
under some circumstances. Foltmer v. James, 01–1510, pp. 4–5
(La.App. 4 Cir. 9/12/01), 799 So.2d 545, 548, writ denied, 01–2777
(La.1/4/02), 805 So.2d 213. The reason the right is conditional is that
no privity of contract exists between a plaintiff injured by a tortfeasor
and that tortfeasor’s insurance company. Id. An injured party obtains a
right of action against another person’s insurance company only if all
the requirements of the Direct Action Statute have been fulfilled. Id.
Accordingly, an insurance company that proves that the requirements
of the Direct Action Statute have not been fulfilled is entitled to
dismissal of the claim against it on an exception of no right of action.
Id.

Id.

The fifth circuit then concluded that service on the insured was waived, and

all requirements of the statute were met. While we recognize that this portion of

the Perkins decision suggests the circumstances enumerated in La.R.S.

22:1269(B)(1)(a)-(f) must be met despite the fact the petition was filed against

both the insured and insurer, whereas Soileau suggests those circumstances need

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only be met if the action is filed against the insurer alone, the significance of these

cases is that the Direct Action Statute does apply when both the insured and insurer

are named defendants. As noted by both Soileau and Perkins, without the Direct

Action Statute, no right of action would exist for a plaintiff against the defendant’s

insurer as no privity of contract exists between the two. Therefore, we find the

Direct Action Statute does apply to the case herein. Appellants’ assignment of

error number one is without merit.

Considering this conclusion, we reiterate the well settled premise that “the

Direct Action Statute is designed to facilitate the recovery of damages ex delicto; it

does not authorize a direct action based solely on a breach of contract.” Mabile,

16-577, p. 5; see also Pate v. Tim Clark Constr., LLC, 487 F.Supp. 3d 536, 544

(E.D. La. 2020) (“Louisiana state and federal courts . . . have consistently held that,

‘The Louisiana Direct Action Statute applies only to torts and not to contract

disputes.’”).

In Mabile, the first circuit considered whether Dow had a right of action

under the Direct Action Statute. Dow asserted that the suit arose from a personal

injury suit originally filed by Mr. Mabile against Dow. Dow sued Westgate and its

insurers for indemnification based on a contract between Dow and Westgate. The

trial court and appellate court concluded that Dow’s suit against Westgate and its

insurers was based on a contract. Thus, the Direct Action Statute did not provide

Dow a right of action against the insurers.

In Pate, homeowners sued their contractor and its insurer for breach of

contract and alleged damages caused by faulty elevation work. The insurer

asserted the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Louisiana’s Direct Action

Statute and, therefore, the claims against it should be dismissed. After reviewing

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the plaintiffs’ petition and the insurance policy, the court concluded that the

plaintiffs’ claims only stemmed from the “express or implicit obligations under the

elevation contract.” Pate, 487 F.Supp. 3d at 546. The court further stated, “The

Court agrees with [the insurer’s] assessment that Plaintiffs’ ‘negligence’ claims are

derivative of, and implicit in, [the insured’s] obligations under the elevation

contract . . . . Because Plaintiffs’ claims against [the insured] are based in contract

and not tort, Plaintiffs have no procedural right to sue [the insurer] under the Direct

Action Statute.” Id.

We recognize that violations of contractual obligations may give rise to tort

actions. “[W]hen a person negligently performs a contractual obligation” he may

commit an action in tort. “[T]he same acts or omissions may constitute breaches of

general and contractual duties and may give rise to both actions in torts and actions

in contract.” Everett v. Philibert, 08-2270, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/8/09), 13 So.3d

616, 620 (citations omitted). However, in that case, the plaintiffs “must show that

their negligence claims are separate and distinct and not arising from the breach of

contract claim. Particularly, the tort claim must arise from a duty other than one

imposed by the contract.” Id (citations omitted). For example, a petition may

“also allege[] a breach of duty owed to all persons[.]” Id. In Everett, the damages

asserted in the petition only arose “from the duty created by the contract to build a

house competently . . . . The only allegations in the petition are for breaches of

duty confected by contract[.]” Id.

Based on the above, we consider whether Appellants have stated a right of

action under the Direct Action Statute. Berkley attached Appellants’ petitions in

support of its exception of no right of action motion. Appellants’ petitions only

state claims based in contract. The original petition alleges the parties entered a

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contract for Appellants to install doors and that the contract could be terminated “at

any time by OHA via a 10-day written notice for consistent non-performance, poor

performance or sub-quality work performed by Plaintiff.” Appellants then asserted

that OHA terminated the contract without complying with the ten-day written

notice requirement. Appellants only assert damages associated with OHA’s breach

of the contract. Additionally, Appellants’ Second Supplemental and Amending

Petition for Breach of Contract makes no changes other than adding Berkley as a

defendant. In fact, the second amending petition does not even establish the

relationship between OHA and Berkley, as it fails to mention that Berkley

provided OHA with an insurance contract covering this event. Instead, the second

amending petition only adds one additional paragraph: “That Defendant

BERKLEY INSURANCE COMPANY, be ordered to produce for inspection the

original or a certified copy of any and all insurance policies providing coverage for

the damages complained of herein, which policies were in full force and effect at

the time of the accident.” The second amending petition does not assert any

allegations of privity of contract between Appellants and Berkley such as

allegations of Appellants being a third party beneficiary or additional named

insured to the Berkley policy.

The record on appeal is also devoid of the Berkley insurance policy and the

policy was not admitted as evidence during the hearing. Although the trial court

considered the policy at the hearing, we find such consideration was inappropriate.

“Generally, evidence supporting or controverting an exception of no right of action

is admissible; in the absence of evidence, however, the factual averments in the

pleadings are taken as true.” Mabile, 16-577, p. 6. As there is no evidence

admitted in this case, we take the allegations in the petitions as true. As stated

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above, there are no tort allegations made by Appellants in their petitions. After

reviewing the record, we find that the claims made against OHA are based entirely

in contract; thus, Appellants have no procedural right to sue Berkley under the

Direct Action Statute. Based on this determination, and the fact that the policy is

not in the record, we do not consider whether Appellants may pursue their claims

under the Direct Action Statute as claims covered by the terms of Berkley’s policy.

Appellants’ suit stems solely from a breach of contract, to which the Direct Action

Statute does not apply. Appellants’ assignment of error number two has no merit.

Furthermore, based on our review of the record discussed above and the

allegations made in the petition and amending petitions, we find no merit to

Appellants’ third assignment of error regarding tort claims.

Additionally, assuming, arguendo, that the Direct Action Statute did not

apply to this suit, no right of action exists for Appellants to initiate a lawsuit

against Berkley because no allegations of privity of contract between Appellants

and Berkley have been asserted in the petitions and no evidence has been admitted

to establish privity of contract. In Randall v. Lloyd’s Underwriter’s at London,

602 So.2d 790 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992), the fourth circuit considered on writs

whether a plaintiff stated a right of action against an insurer for failing or refusing

to pay a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor pursuant to its contractual obligations.

The plaintiff suffered a work injury and originally filed suit against the insured and

its insurer for his personal injuries. Because the plaintiff failed to prove coverage,

a judgment was rendered against the insured alone. Subsequently, the plaintiff

filed a second suit against the insurer for breach of contract, alleging the insurer

failed to pay the judgment rendered in the first suit pursuant to its contractual

obligations to do so. The insurer filed exceptions of no cause and no right of

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action and argued the plaintiff “is not a party to the insurance contract; and, (2)

Louisiana’s Direct Action Statute is inapplicable to suits grounded in contract.” Id.

at 791. The trial court denied the exceptions, but the fourth circuit reversed. The

fourth circuit concluded:

It is a well-accepted principle in Louisiana jurisprudence that,
absent a contrary statutory provision, actions ex contractu cannot be
maintained against a party by an individual who is not party thereto.
In the instant case, there was no privity of contract between Randall
and Lloyd’s which would give rise to a breach of contract claim
against Lloyd’s.
....
Because we have determined that the trial court erred in failing
to maintain relator’s exception of no right of action, we need not
address the issue of whether Louisiana’s Direct Action Statute allows
him to maintain a breach of contract action against Lloyd’s.
Id. (citations omitted).

“In Louisiana, a plaintiff may sue under an insurance policy when he is a

named insured, additional insured, or third-party beneficiary of the contract.”

Haddad v. Elkhateeb, 10-214, p. 19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/11/10), 46 So.3d 244, 257, n.

11, writ denied, 10-2076 (La. 11/12/10), 49 So.3d 895. As previously discussed,

Appellants have made no allegations that they are a named insured, additional

insured, or a third party beneficiary to a contract of insurance with Berkley.

Lastly, while we affirm the trial court’s ruling on the exception itself, we

reverse the trial court’s judgment insofar as it dismisses Appellants’ lawsuit with

prejudice. According to La.Code Civ.P. art. 934, “[w]hen the grounds of the

objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of

the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment

within the delay allowed by the court.” Appellants have not been given the chance

to amend their petition since adding Berkley as a defendant and may potentially

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plead more sufficient allegations, establishing that they have a right of action.

Thus, we find Appellants should be permitted to amend their petition alleging

sufficient facts to indicate their right of action. We remand this case to allow

Appellants thirty (30) days from the date of mailing of this opinion to amend their

petition to sufficiently state a right of action against Berkley.

DECREE:

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment granting

Berkley Insurance Company’s exception of no right of action. However, we

reverse the trial court’s dismissal of this case with prejudice and remand to allow

Jerry Guye, III and Guye’s Construction, thirty (30) days from the mailing of this

opinion to amend their petition and sufficiently allege a right of action against

Berkley. Costs of this appeal are assigned to Jerry Guye, III and Guye’s

Construction.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

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