Donald Hodge, Jr. v. Jared Oertling

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-707

DONALD HODGE, JR.

VERSUS

JARED OERTLING, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2013-4620
HONORABLE KENDRICK J. GUIDRY, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Chief Judge, Billy H. Ezell, and John E.
Conery, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Donald Hodge, Jr.
Attorney at Law
4148 Palm Street
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808
(337) 794-8873
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Donald Hodge, Jr. As The Administrator Of The Estate of Donald
Hodge, Sr.

Maurice L. Tynes
Attorney at Law
4839 Ihles Road
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70605
(337) 479-1173
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Jared Oertling

Jeffrey A. Carrier
Fuerst, Carrier & Ogden
127 West Broad Street, Suite 300
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 436-3332
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Jared Oertling

Steven William Usdin
John W. Joyce
Laurence D. Lesueur
Barrasso, Usdin, Kupperman Freeman & Sarver, L.L.C.
909 Poydras Street, Suite 2400
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
(504) 589-9700
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Vigilant Insurance Company

Pierce A. Rapin
Kourtney L. Kech
James Edward Sudduth III
Sudduth & Associates, LLC
1109 Pithon Street
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 480-0101
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Ken Begnaud

CONERY, Judge.

This case comes before the court on an appeal by Donald Hodge, Jr., as the

Administrator of the Estate of Donald Hodge, Sr., (Estate of Hodge, Sr.). The trial

court’s May 28th judgments granted summary judgment in favor of Vigilant

Insurance Company (Vigilant) on the issue of coverage, and dismissed all claims

made by the Estate of Mr. Hodge Sr. with prejudice. The trial court also granted

summary judgment based on judicial estoppel in favor of Mr. Jared Oertling on all

claims made by the Estate of Hodge, Sr., also dismissing all claims made by the

Estate of Mr. Hodge, Sr., with prejudice. The trial court additionally granted a

motion in limine filed by Mr. Oertling, and excluded the Estate of Hodge, Sr.’s

expert, Mr. Jeffrey Campbell, based on lack of support for his Expert Report. It is

from these two judgments that the Estate of Hodge Sr. now appeals. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Hodge, Sr. owned a fenced whitetail deer farm at 5890 River Road, in

Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. The farm was licensed by the Louisiana Department

of Agriculture and Forestry (LDAF). Mr. Hodge, Sr. was in the business of selling

and buying whitetail deer under the LDAF license, which required strict record-

keeping of all sales and transfers of deer.

This case is based on a sale in early 2012 of whitetail deer transported from

a whitetail deer farm in Pennsylvania under Mr. Hodge, Sr.’s license. Instead of

transporting the whitetail deer in question to his farm in Calcasieu Parish, the

whitetail deer in question, six does, were off loaded in Carencro, Louisiana, and

transported to Mr. Jared Oertling’s deer farm in Mississippi. This transaction was

based on the sale of the whitetail deer from Mr. Hodge, Sr. to Mr. Oertling in

violation of the federal Lacey Act, which relates, in part, to the illegal

transportation of wildlife. See 18 U.S.C. § 371; 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378. There

was no documentation or record of this transaction made at the time of the transfer

in the records of Mr. Hodge, Sr.

After an inquiry from Pennsylvania about the whereabouts of the whitetail

deer sold in the transaction in early 2012, on October 16, 2012, the LDAF

quarantined Mr. Hodge, Sr.’s whitetail deer farm. The quarantine was imposed

due to the possibility that the whitetail deer in question may have been exposed to

Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD). CWD is a contagious prion disease found in

whitetail deer. Prion is a protein particle believed to be the cause of brain disease.

Symptoms of CDW include long term weight loss, with loss of body conditioning,

as well as increased drinking and urination.

Tragically, Mr. Hodge, Sr., lost his life in a hunting accident on or about the

day the LDAF imposed its quarantine on his whitetail deer farm. Mr. Hodge, Sr.

had no knowledge of the quarantine. His son Donald Hodge, Jr., was not involved

in the operation of his father’s business. A subsequent LDAF investigation into

the operation of the whitetail deer farm owned by Mr. Hodge, Sr., revealed he had

failed to keep the legally required records for the whitetail deer he sold or

transferred to others.

Donald Hodge, Jr., individually and as the administrator of the Estate of

Hodge, Sr., and his sister, Rachael Hodge, filed suit on March 20, 2013 against the

LDAF in the 14th Judicial District Court. Their petition sought to lift the

injunction maintaining the quarantine. Mr. Hodge, Jr., swore in verified pleadings

that the whitetail deer inside the enclosure at the Hodge farm posed no CWD

transmission risk. Mr. Hodge, Jr. further stated in the petition that LDAF had no

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reason to believe the six does ever reached the Hodge Farm, since they were

delivered to Mr. Oertling at his deer farm in Mississippi, which Mr. Oertling had

admitted.

Despite this admission from Mr. Oertling, the LDAF vigorously opposed the

lifting of the quarantine. In a sworn affidavit filed by the defense, the LDAF

Assistant Commissioner testified that “… investigation indicated that the deer farm

was likely involved in an illegal deer-smuggling operation,” which compelled the

quarantine, along with the discovery of legally insufficient records kept by Mr.

Hodge, Sr. The LDAF required that all the deer tags on the Hodge Farm be

scanned at the Hodges’ expense to ensure none of the deer came from

Pennsylvania. The ongoing quarantine prevented the Estate of Hodge, Sr., from

putting the farm up for sale and required the Estate to sustain the farm at its

expense. The plaintiff’s also claimed damages from the LDAF allegedly suffered

due to the quarantine.

On October 15, 2013, Donald Hodge, Jr., as Administrator of the Estate of

Donald Hodge, Sr., filed the present suit against Mr. Oertling, Ken Begnaud, the

owner of the deer farm in Carencro, Louisiana, and Stacy Fontenot.1 The plaintiffs

claimed damages including loss of income, expenses of maintaining the Hodge

Farm while under quarantine, and the costs associated with the testing of the deer,

the loss of value of the deer and the cost of additional deer not being born. They

also filed a direct action suit naming Vigilant, Mr. Oertling’s homeowner’s insurer

for his home in Slidell, Louisiana.

Shortly thereafter, on November 4, 2013, the Hodges’ signed a settlement

agreement with the LDAF which dismissed the Hodges’ suit against the LDAF.

1
Mr. Fontenot was subsequently dismissed.

3

The parties agreed that the LDAF would be allowed to depopulate the Hodge Farm

at the LDAF’s expense. After the settlement was perfected between the Hodges

and the LDAF, the defendants in the companion suit, Mr. Oertling, Mr. Begnaud,

Mr. Fontenot, and Vigilant, filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the

settlement also released all claims against them. The trial court granted the

summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims. Mr. Hodge, Jr., the Estate of

Mr. Hodge, Sr., and Rachel Hodge appealed.

By June 6, 2018 opinion, a panel of this court reversed the trial court’s entry

of summary judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. See

Hodge v. Oertling, 17-1071 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/18) (an unpublished opinion)

(2018 WL 2731338). Addressing the matter before it, the panel determined that

the settlement agreement and release between the Estate of Hodge, Sr. and Donald

Hodge, Jr., individually and as administrator of the Estate of Hodge, Sr., and

Rachael Hodge, did not also release claims against the remaining defendants in the

second-filed litigation under review.

As relevant to the matter now under consideration, Mr. Oertling and Vigilant

assert that Mr. Hodge, Jr. changed the factual narrative concerning the CWD

transmission risk of the whitetail deer formerly housed at the Hodge Farm in the

tort litigation. Specifically, they contend that Mr. Hodge, Jr. signed verified

documents filed into the record of the LDAF litigation wherein he admitted that the

deer penned on the Hodge farm indeed constituted a CWD transmission risk.

This sworn admission made by Mr. Hodge, Jr., allowed the fenced deer on the

Hodge farm to be euthanized by the LDAF in lieu of a lengthy five-year quarantine.

Additionally, the Estate of Hodge, Sr. was paid $12,000 by a Louisiana Deer Trade

Association. The notarized documentation executed by Mr. Hodge, Jr., in

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connection with the settlement with the LDAF, also allowed the Estate of Hodge

Sr. to sell a portion of the farmland and equipment for $390,000. Mr. Hodge, Jr.

admitted in his deposition testimony to executing this strategy causing all of the

above mentioned events to occur.

Mr. Oertling explains, however, that in the present litigation Mr. Hodge, Jr.

has taken the opposite position from the one expressed in the documents filed in

the suit with the LDAF and in connection with the settlement of that proceeding.

For instance, in the Petition For Damages, filed October15, 2013, Mr. Hodge, Jr.

claimed that the whitetail deer at the Hodge Farm never constituted a CWD

transmission risk, and therefore were destroyed unnecessarily.

Mr. Hodge, Jr., on behalf of the Estate of Hodge, Sr., now seeks tort

damages from Mr. Oertling for the one-hundred-and-forty whitetail deer

euthanized by the LDAF, as well as damages sustained as a result of the imposition

of a possible five-year quarantine by the LDAF. Mr. Hodge, Jr., on behalf of the

Estate of Hodge, Sr., argued that Mr. Oertling breached a duty to immediately

disclose the whereabouts of the whitetail deer he bought from Mr. Hodge, Sr.

Because of Mr. Oertling’s breach of that duty, the LDAF imposed the five-year

quarantine on the Hodge farm. Mr. Hodge, Jr. admitted during his deposition

testimony, however, that one-half of the whitetail deer destroyed on the Hodge

Farm actually belonged to Mr. Oertling.2

Motions Before The Trial Court Now On Appeal

The trial court heard three motions on May 7, 2021. The first was a motion
2
The record reflects that in September of 2018, Mr. Oertling pled guilty to conspiracy to
violate the Lacey Act ( for his “illegal transportation of whitetail deer” to Mississippi) in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and See 18 U.S.C. § 371; 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378. Among other
penalties Mr. Oertling was sentenced to 36 months of probation and required to pay $120,000.00
in restitution for that offense.

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in limine filed by Mr. Oertling seeking to exclude the Estate of Hodge, Sr.’s expert,

Mr. Jeffery Campbell. A Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment on Coverage

was filed by Vigilant, who provided homeowner’s insurance to Mr. Oertling for his

home in Slidell, Louisiana. The third motion was a summary judgment filed by Mr.

Oertling seeking to dismiss all claims filed by the Estate of Hodge, Sr. seeking tort

damages for the whitetail deer euthanized by the LDAF, and for the imposition of

the quarantine by the LDAF on the deer farm in Lake Charles, Louisiana.

All motions were granted by the trial court in two separate judgments, both

signed by the trial court on May 28, 2021. The first judgment granted Vigilant’s

Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment on Coverage and dismissed all claims

against Vigilant with prejudice. The second judgment, also signed on May 28,

2021, granted two motions filed by Mr. Oertling, which included a motion in

limine excluding Mr. Jerry Campbell as an expert witness for the Estate of Hodge,

Sr., and summary judgment dismissing all claims filed by the Estate of Hodge, Sr.

with prejudice. The trial court dismissed, without prejudice, Mr. Oertling’s motion

for sanctions against the Estate of Hodge, Sr., and ordered each party to be

responsible for their own court costs. The Estate of Hodge, Sr. has appealed the

trial court’s rulings in both judgments, with the exception of the dismissal of

sanctions sought by Mr. Oertling.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The Estate of Hodge, Sr. urges the following assignments of error on appeal:

1. The trial court erred in granting the motion for summary
judgment as the actions of Jared Oertling caused damage to the
Estate which create a genuine issue of material fact.

2. The trial court erred in granting the motion for summary
judgment on coverage when the clear language of the policy
does not exclude coverage based on the intentional acts and the

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business operation exclusion.

3. The trial court erred in granting the motion in limine to exclude
Appellant’s expert witness at trial.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The abuse of discretion standard is used by an appellate court in reviewing a

trial court’s decisions regarding motions in limine. Royer v. State, Dep’t. of

Transp. & Dev., 16-534 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/11/17), 210 So.3d 910, writ denied, 17-

0228 (La. 4/24/17), 221 So.3d 69.

Motion To Exclude Expert Testimony of Mr. Jeffrey Campbell

In keeping with the order of the trial court's rulings at the hearing held on

May 7, 2021, this court will first address the Estate of Hodge, Sr.’s assignment of

error three, the trial court’s ruling granting the motion in limine filed by Mr.

Oertling to exclude the Estate of Hodge, Sr.’s expert Mr. Jerry Campbell from

testifying at trial.

Plaintiff’s Expert Witness List, dated June 18, 2019, indicated that Mr.

Campbell intended to testify as follows at trial:

Mr. Campbell will testify about raising whitetail deer in captivity
including the purposes thereof, the value of the whitetail deer held on
the Hodge Deer Farm before the extermination of the [herd], the
income the Hodge Deer Farm could have generated had it been
allowed to continue operation or partnered with others to continue
operation, Chronic Wasting Disease, operation of deer farms, feeding,
watering and caring, for whitetail deer, and all other matters related to
the whitetail deer.

Although Mr. Campbell was professionally qualified, the trial court

determined that he had not been given all the data necessary to construct an expert

report that would be helpful to the jury. Therefore, Mr. Campbell’s expert

testimony would only serve to confuse the issue with the jury, especially since the

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jury would be required to determine how many deer were owned by Mr. Oertling

and how many by the Estate of Hodge, Sr.

The Estate of Mr. Hodge, Sr., argued at the hearing on the motion that Mr.

Campbell provided his report and his CV, which showed he was very experienced

in appraising deer, having begun appraising deer in 2005. He had never been

disqualified as an expert in any court. Counsel argued there was enough

information in his report not to exclude him at that time and, if a trial were held,

opposing counsel could question his methods, qualifications and underlying facts

in his opinion. Counsel therefore contended that Mr. Campbell was qualified

under La.Code Civ.P. art. 702, and the trial court should, therefore, deny the

motion.

The trial court disagreed. Mr. Campbell’s Expert Report stated that the herd

owned by Donald Hodge, “was depopulated in the fall of 2013. Total 140 deer.”

Mr. Campbell indicated that his opinion in the Expert Report was based on “Fair

Market Value at the time of death.” Mr. Campbell also based the damage

estimation on “industry wide standards,” which provided that, “[E]ach doe would

have been expected to produce 2 fawns each year.” Does most common birth of 2

fawns is one buck and one doe.” “Based on 3 years production each doe would

have produced 3 bucks and 3 does in 3 years.”

In his Expert Report Mr. Campbell “[E]stimated that there would be 82 does

in the herd at the time of depopulation.” So, a loss of 82 bucks per year at $10,000

each over a period of three years would equal $2,460,000.00. The loss of 82 does

per year at $5,000 each over a period of three years would equal $1,230.000.00, for

a total production of $3,690,000.00.

The trial court reiterated in it reasons given on the record that Mr. Campbell

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did have the proper qualifications, as he had never before been excluded from

testifying at trial. However, the trial court was extremely familiar with the

documents and data submitted during discovery, and determined that Mr.

Campbell had not been supplied by counsel for the Estate of Hodge Sr., with the

information necessary to assist the jury at trial, based on the report before the court.

In its oral reasons for ruling the trial court stated:

All right. Well[,] you notify Mr. Campbell to strike one up in
the lost column. I’m going to grant the motion. Mr. Campbell is
excluded as a witness at this time based off of his report, which I
believe wholeheartedly he lacks sufficient facts and data. Part of the
facts of this case, I have over two big stacks of facts and data that he
does not address in his report. I believe he only spit out calculations
based off of what was provided to him. And this is not addressing his
expertise, whether or not he can provide calculations in the future.
This is solely based on the motion I have before me at this time and
his report. He’s excluded as an expert to put forth any information or
opinions regarding his calculations based on insufficient facts and
data. I do not believe his information will help the jury make any
determination at this time, because they have to make other
determinations. And this does not speak to his skill or experience or
training or education under [La.Code Civ.P art.] 702, that’s what I’m
guided by. I’m performing the gatekeeping function of the Court and
I will not let the jury hear his testimony as it presently stands.

That’s the ruling of the Court….

The trial court then granted the motion of Mr. Oertling to exclude Mr.

Campbell as an expert at trial. Based on the reasons stated by the trial court, we

find there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, and affirm the

portion of the judgment of May 28, 2021, excluding Mr. Jeffery Campbell as an

expert witness on behalf of the Estate of Hodge, Sr.

Standard of Review – Summary Judgment

A court of appeal reviews summary judgments de novo, using the same

standard used by the trial court. Higgins v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.,

20-1094 (La. 3/24/2021), 315 So.3d 838. Pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art.

9

966(A)(2), the summary judgment procedure is favored and must be construed to

accomplish its purpose of “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of

every action, except those disallowed by Article 969.”

Article 966(A)(3) further provides that the “motion for summary judgment

shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that

there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” When the issue presented by the motion for

summary judgment is one on which the movant will not bear the burden of proof at

trial, the movant must show “the absence of factual support for one or more

elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense.” La.Code

Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). The adverse party must then “produce factual support

sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the

mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

Vigilant’s Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Coverage

The trial court next heard Vigilant’s renewed motion for summary judgment

on the issue of coverage based on the allegations made by the Estate of Hodge, Sr.,

against Mr. Oertling’s homeowner’s policy, which provided coverage for his home

in Slidell, Louisiana.3

The case of Melder v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 02-2674

(La.App. 1 Cir. 2/11/05), 906 So.2d 513, writ denied, 05-0671 (La. 5/6/05), 901

So.2d 1098, provides the framework for the trial court’s determination of the

application of a policy exclusion to the facts before the court. The panel in Melder

3
Mr. Oertling also opposed the summary judgment filed by Vigilant with the trial court,
but did not appeal the trial court’s ruling. Only the Estate of Hodge, Sr. filed a direct action
petition seeking coverage in 2014, a year after suit was filed against Mr. Oertling. Mr. Oertling
never submitted a claim for coverage, or requested a defense from Vigilant.

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explained:

An insurance policy is an agreement between parties and should be
interpreted using ordinary contract principles. Ledbetter v. Concord
General Corp., 950809 (La.1/6/96), 665 So.2d 1166, 1169. If the
language in an insurance contract is clear and unambiguous, the
agreement must be enforced as written. See LSA-C.C. art. 2046;
Magnon v. Collins, 98-2822 (La.7/7/99), 739 So.2d 191, 197. Further,
insurance companies have the right to limit coverage in any manner
they desire, so long as the limitations do not conflict with statutory
provisions or public policy. Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 93-
1480 (La.4/11/94), 634 So.2d 1180, 1183. And finally, regarding
such limitations, it is the insurer’s burden to show that a loss falls
within a policy exclusion. Classert v. Butler, 98-1991 (La.App. 1st
Cir.11/5/99), 746 So.2d 787, 792.

Id. at 515.

The trial court agreed with counsel for Vigilant that Mr. Oertling’s guilty

plea for the illegal transportation of whitetail deer to Mississippi, which is

uncontradicted, definitely excluded coverage under the policy provision for

Intentional Acts. Intentional Acts in the Vigilant policy at issue provides:

Intentional Acts: We do not cover any damages arising out of
an act intended by any covered person to cause personal injury or
property damage, even if the injury or damage is of a different degree
or type than intended or expected. An intentional act is one whose
consequences could have been foreseen by a reasonable person. But
we do cover such damages if the act was intended to protect people or
property unless another exclusion applies. This exclusion does not
apply to Employment practices liability.

The trial court also found that there was no question that the Business

Pursuits Exclusion excluded coverage under the policy based on the undisputed

evidence that Mr. Oertling and Mr. Hodge, Sr. were in business together with Mr.

Oertling providing the capital and Mr. Hodge buying, caring for, and advising Mr.

Oertling about the sale of the deer he purchased on behalf of Mr. Oertling.

Business Pursuits in the Vigilant Policy provides:

Business Pursuits: We do not cover any damage arising out of a
covered person’s business pursuits, investment or other for-profit

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activities, for the account of a covered person or others, or business
property.

But we do cover damages arising out of volunteer work for an
organized charitable, religious or community group, an incidental
business away from home, incidental business at home, incidental
business property, incidental farming, or residence premises
conditional business liability unless another exclusion applies.

The Policy also explicitly defines the term “business” as “any employment,

trade, occupation, profession, or farm operation including the raising or care of

animals” Although the Policy goes on to define each of the limited carveout

exceptions to the business pursuits exclusion, none of those exceptions apply here,

and the Estate of Hodge, Sr. does not argue otherwise.

Further, the trial court found that the Vigilant policy provisions also did not

provide coverage for any damages suffered by the Estate of Hodge, Sr. based on

the LDAF quarantine placed on the farm located in Lake Charles, Louisiana. In

making this determination, the trial court relied on an affidavit filed by the defense

in which the LDAF Assistant Commissioner testified that “… investigation

indicated that the deer farm was likely involved in an illegal deer-smuggling

operation,” which compelled the quarantine, along with the discovery of legally

insufficient records from Mr. Hodge, Sr.

The trial court stated in its oral reasons given on the record at the hearing on

May 7, 2021:

The Court is going to grant Vigilant’s motion to exclude
coverage for these proceedings. I do not find there’s any genuine
issue of material fact and none can be re-created by arguing various
theories, alleging various theories, and walking back on various
theories.

As to the intent, I believe the guilty plea cannot be disputed. It
is a material fact. The allegations and the facts all developed thus far
–just because you can maybe dispute the implications of or have a
different interpretation or different argument, the Court looks at the

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summary judgment standards with regard to intent. I do not believe
there’s a genuine issue regarding intent in this matter on Mr.
Oertling’s behalf. Therefore, there’s a very elaborate operation spelled
out in the facts with regard to the deer and how they were transported
from Pennsylvania, I believe – if I’m not right about the state the
record will reflect the correct state, coming down to Carencro or
Crowley in the transport. That’s not disputed. That’s facts. That’s in
evidence. And people may be able to interpret that differently, but for
summary judgment, I do not. I do not believe it’s a genuine dispute of
fact on that issue.

As to the business pursuits, the policy exclusion does not talk
about whether you’re making money or if there was a profit. It talks
about a person’s business pursuits. Business is defined as farm
operation, raising or care of animals. So[,] the Court reads, “We do
not cover any damage arising out of covered person’s raising or care
of animals in this policy.” I do not believe there’s a genuine issue of
material fact as to the dispute of [what] Mr. Oertling was raising, had
a farm operation, whether it was in Mississippi or Louisiana, raising
animals. A deer is an animal.

For those reasons, Vigilant is out….

After conducting a de novo review of the record, we affirm the ruling of the

trial court, granting Vigilant Insurance Company’s Renewed Motion For Summary

Judgment and dismissal of all claims made against Vigilant by the Estate of Hodge,

Sr., with prejudice.

Motion For Summary Judgment Filed On Behalf Of Defendant Jared Oertling

The trial court’s ruling granting the summary judgment against the Estate of

Hodge, Sr., and in favor of Mr. Oertling states as follows:

We’re here today on a Motion For Summary Judgment filed by
Jared Oertling. It has been well briefed and well opposed with
pleadings, attachments, the history of the case, as well as Mr. – as
well as the Hodge [E]state opposition. The court has taken that into
account and has appreciated the Hodge’s [E]state affidavits. Because
of my ruling -- I’m not going to rule on whether the affidavit
testimony comes in because it was – I read it, but it did not affect the
elements of the argument, does not affect my ruling, so I’m not going
to throw them out because it’s not going to matter. I do not find – I
am granting the Summary Judgment dismissing the case by the
[E]state against Oertling – as prayed for by Oertling, let me say it that
way. I don’t know what it does to the rest of the defendants. And –

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so I’m just speaking on the motion that’s filed before me. I’m
denying that -- I’m granting that motion, excuse me, granting that
motion. I do not find a duty exists and for that – there’s many, many
reasons why I’m granting their motion and I’ll go through them for
you because I know a record needs to be made and an explanation,
and the [E]state is entitled to an explanation and reasons for my
judgment.

I do not find a duty between Jared Oertling and Donald Hodge,
[Sr.] There is no – material fact to me is that tainted deer came from
Pennsylvania on Mr. Hodge, [Sr.’s] ticket, if you will. For that reason
alone, based on the affidavit of the LDAF agent way back in 2013, the
farm would have been quarantined.4 No genuine issue about that. It’s
a material fact because the farm had been quarantined. The fact the
farm had been quarantined by the actions of Donald Hodge [Sr.] tells
me that quarantine would have happened. Any damages from that is
on Donald Hodge,[Sr.] The facts speak to that, that’s where this case
is at. We’ve had over seven years of discovery, dispositions, records
I’ve reviewed myself since I’ve been on the bench. It is clear to me
no equivocation whatsoever that there’s no genuine issue of that
material fact with regard to the quarantine. I do not find a duty owed
by Oertling to Donald Hodge, Sr. Because of the facts and how this
was developed, and Hodge, whether it was hobby or not, Hodge with
Oertling or not, that’s immaterial to me with regard to this ruling. He
in fact was transporting some deer that was going to go to Oertling.
That’s clear in the facts. That’s undisputed. It’s material to me and
it’s material – and I do not believe a reasonable factfinder could find
otherwise and these particular facts speak to a particular ruling that –
that—and that’s what I’m basing it on under Summary Judgment Law.

Trial Court’s Recognition Of Judicial Estoppel Based On Actions Of The Estate

The trial court further found that judicial estoppel applied, as urged by Mr.

Oertling in his motion and order for leave of court to file supplemental and/or

amending affirmative defenses, signed by the trial court on March 19, 2021. The

Estate of Hodge, Sr. did not brief this issue at the district court level and failed to

specify error on appeal or brief it on appeal to this court. See Rule 1-3, Uniform

Rules, Louisiana Courts of Appeal (“The Court Of Appeal will review only issues

4
In an affidavit filed by the defense, the LDAF Assistant Commissioner testified that
“…investigation indicated that the deer farm was likely involved in an illegal deer-smuggling
operation” which compelled the quarantine, along with the discovery of legally insufficient
records from Mr. Hodge, Sr.

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which were submitted to the trial court and which are contained in specifications or

assignments of error, unless interest of justice clearly requires otherwise.”).

The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that “‘judicial estoppel [is] an

equitable doctrine designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process by

prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the

exigencies of the moment.’” Webb v. Webb, 18-0320, p. 9 (La. 12/5/18), 263

So.3d 321, 328 (quoting Miller v. Conagra, Inc., 08-0021, p. 9 (La. 9/8/08), 991

So.2d 445, 452).

Although its equitable nature precludes the reduction of equitable estoppel to

a precise formula or test, the United States Supreme Court has noted that several

factors typically inform a court’s decision on its application as follows:

First, a party’s later position must be clearly inconsistent with its
earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party
has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier
position .... A third consideration is whether the party seeking to
assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or
impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.

Zedner v. U.S., 547 U.S. 489, 504, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 1987, 164 L.Ed.2d
749 (2006) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51,
121 S.Ct. 1808, 1815, 149 L.Ed.2d 968).

The doctrine of judicial estoppel “is designed to protect the integrity
of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately
changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment.”
Miller, 08-0021 at 9, 991 So.2d at 452 (citing New Hampshire, 532
U.S. at 749-50, 121 S.Ct. 1808).

Webb, p.18, 263 So.3d at 332.

Noting its “equitable” nature, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained in

Webb that the doctrine of estoppel is invoked at the court's discretion given the

specific factual context before it, including any harm that may be posed to third

parties. Webb, 263 So.3d at 332.

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The trial court’s reasons that the application of equitable estoppel was

warranted in this case were explained on the record in open court:

I’m further dismissing the matter under judicial estoppel.
Whether I independently found Summary Judgment or not, I
separately find that this matter and [E]state is prohibited from
deliberately changing positions as they see fit under this fact pattern.
I think seven years of discovery is sufficient enough to – if there’s
some other evidence developed. It has been difficult for the Hodge
[E]state to make arguments today. The Court is familiar with a party
having to allege alternative theories. This is not an alternative theory
case.

This is a charge of strategies as it sees fit during the course of
litigation that has led to inconsistent position[s], inconsistent
statements, inconsistent arguments, inconsistent motions and rulings,
quite frankly, based upon the inconsistent positions already given by
the [E]state. So, I find the first element under judicial estoppel, and so
applying the parties position must be clearly inconsistent one. We
have that here.

The Court must have accepted this previous position. I have
accepted previous position myself because I made a ruling on the
intentional claims under Vigilant as – as to Vigilant’s dismissal and
there have been other arguments that the Court has accepted prior to
me and since I’ve been on the bench regarding the various positions
that Hodge [Estate] has submitted to the Court.

And lastly, the prior positions have not been inadvertent. It’s
not inadvertence. There’s two mutually exclusive lawsuits that began
in this case way back in 2013 or so, arguing two different theories,
two different positions. And depending on what the outcome could
have been, depending on what the benefit to the [E]state was, that was
the argument that was put forward. I do not see that as alternative
theories. I see that as strategy decisions based to maximize whatever
recovery, maximize arguments, and for those reasons, I find the
positions taken by the [E]state in this matter, the various positions, not
to be inadvertent.

For those reasons, I’m granting the Summary Judgment. Any
clarification needed on my ruling – rulings today?

Finding no abuse of discretion, we hereby affirm the trial court’s ruling on

this issue.

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Motion For Sanctions Filed On Behalf Of Jared Oertling

Mr. Oertling’s motion for sanctions against the Estate of Hodge, Sr. had

been deferred by the trial court until after the trial. However, for the sake of

completeness of the record, the trial court denied the motion for sanctions in its

May 8, 2021 judgment. We likewise find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion

and affirm its ruling.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the May 28, 2021 judgments of the trial

court which granted Vigilant Insurance Company’s Renewed Motion For

Summary Judgment on Coverage and dismissed all Claims made by Donald Hodge,

Jr, As the Administrator of the Estate of Donald Hodge, Sr. with prejudice. We

also affirm the second judgment granting the motion in limine filed by Jared

Oertling, excluding the plaintiff’s expert Jerry Campbell as an expert witness at

trial. We further affirm the second judgment granting the motion for summary

judgment filed by Jared Oertling in its entirety dismissing all claims made by

Donald Hodge, Jr, As the Administrator of the Estate of Donald Hodge, Sr. with

prejudice. Additionally, we also affirm in the second judgment the trial court’s

determination that “[E]ach party shall be responsible for the court costs

respectively incurred by them.”

AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Rule 2-16.3 Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.

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