CA-0021-0741 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Litel Explorations LLC v. Aegis Development Co., LLC

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed April 6, 2022

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-741

LITEL EXPLORATIONS, LLC

VERSUS

AEGIS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. C-823-17
HONORABLE CRAIG STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Candyce G. Perret, and Sharon Darville
Wilson, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Patrick B. McIntire
Oats & Marino
100 E. Vermilion Street, Suite 400
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 233-1100
COUNSEL FOR INTERVENORS/APPELLANTS:
Louisiana Office of Conservation
Louisiana Department of Natural Resource

F. Jonathan Rice
Rice Law Firm
P.O. Box 94275
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(225) 342-5500
COUNSEL FOR INTERVENORS/APPELLANTS:
Louisiana Office of Conservation
Louisiana Department of Natural Resource

Brian W. Capell
Brittan J. Bush
Liskow & Lewis
Post Office Box 52008
Lafayette, LA 70505
(337) 232-7424
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Gary Production Company

Paul J. Hebert
Valerie V. Guidry
Mark D. Sikes
David K. McCrory
Ryan P. McCalister
Ottinger Hebert, LLC
Post Office Drawer 52606
Lafayette, LA 70505-2606
(337) 232-2606
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc.

Douglas C. Longman, Jr.
Jones Walker, LLP
600 Jefferson Street, Suite 1600
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 593-7600
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Apache Corporation of Delaware

F. Gibbons Addison
Boyd A. Bryan
W. Thomas McCall, Jr.
Jones Walker, LLP
445 N. Boulevard, 8th Floor
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
(225) 248-2000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Apache Corporation of Delaware
CanadianOxy Offshore Production Company
Oxy USA, Inc.

Christoffer C. Friend
Meghan E. Smith
Jones Walker, LLP
201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 5100
New Orleans, LA 70170
(504) 582-8000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Oxy USA, Inc.
CanadianOxy Offshore Production Company

Thomas M. Melsheimer
Winston & Strawn, LLP
2121 N. Pearl Street, Suite 900
Dallas, TX 75201
(214) 453-6401
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc.
Pioneer Natural Resources, Inc.

A. Shelby Easterly, III
Easterly Law Office
9538 Hwy 16
Denham Springs, LA 70706
(225) 664-0001
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Terry Calongne, LLC
Penn Enterprises, LLC
CMP Family, LLC

Daniel C. Hughes
126 Heymann Boulevard
Lafayette, LA 70503
(337) 237-6566
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Henry Production Company
Petro Quest Exploration, Inc.

Bruce R. Hoefer, Jr.
D. Russell Holwadel
Heather E. Reznik
Adams, Hoefer, Holwadel, LLC
400 Poydras Street, Suite 2450
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 581-2606
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Denbury Onshore, LLC

Michael L. Schilling, Jr.
Post Office Box 4907
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 739-0777
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
MTBB Acquisitions, LLC

Alan J. Berteau
Matthew B. Smith
Kean Miller, LLP
Post Office Box 3513
Baton Rouge, LA 70821
(225) 387-0999
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
BP America Production Company

John H. Carmouche
Talbot, Carmouche, & Marcello
17405 Perkins Road
Baton Rouge, LA 70810
(225) 400-9991
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Litel Explorations, LLC

David P. Bruchhaus
Mudd, Bruchhaus & Keating
422 E. College Street, Suite B
Lake Charles, LA 70605
(337) 562-2327
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Litel Explorations, LLC

Celeste D. Elliott
Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck, and Rankin
601 Poydras Street, Suite 2775
New Orleans, LA 70130-6027
(504) 568-1990
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
United Specialty Insurance Company

Phillip E. Foco
Bienvenu, Bonnecoze, Foco, Viator, & Holinga, APLLC
4210 Bluebonnet Boulevard
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 388-5600
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Exxon Mobile Corporation
ExxonMobil Oil Corporation
Mobil Oil Exploration & Production Southeast, Inc.

Phillip W. DeVilbiss
Scofield, Gerard, & Pohorelsky
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 900
Lake Charles, LA 70602-3028
(337) 433-9436
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Manti Resources, Inc.

Darrin L. Forte
Garrison, Yount, Forte & Mulcahy
909 Poydras Street, Suite 1800
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 527-0680
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Sandhill Production, Inc.

Jackson D. Logan, III
Attorney at Law
511 Queensberry Drive
Lafayette, LA 70508
(214) 605-0494
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Sandhill Production, Inc.

David N. Luder
Barrasso, Usdin, Kupperman
909 Poydras Street, Suite 2350
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 589-9700
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Hanley Petroleum LLC

Anderson Exploration Company, Inc.
c/o Charles R. Anderson
1632 Hodges Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Anderson Exploration Company, Inc.

M J Kelly, Company
In Proper Person
1945 E 70th Sreet, Suite C
Shreveport, LA 71105
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
M J Kelly Co

Specter Exploration, Inc.
c/o Stephen M. Jenkins
5800 One Perkins Place, Suite 9A
Baton Rouge, LA 70808
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Specter Exploration, Inc.

PERRET, Judge.

In this oilfield environmental contamination suit, the Office of Conservation

of the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, appearing through the

Commissioner of Conservation, Richard Ieyoub (“Office of Conservation”),

appeals a trial court judgment granting defendants’, Pioneer Natural Resources,

Inc. (“Pioneer”) and Gary Production Company (“Gary”), motions for partial

summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCURAL HISTORY

On September 10, 2019, the Office of Conservation filed a petition for

intervention in this legacy case alleging that it has a right to intervene under

La.R.S. 30:29 “[s]ince this suit involves allegations of environmental damage

and/or injury to property located in the State of Louisiana as a result of activities

associated with oilfield or exploration and production sites[.]” As an exhibit to the

petition for intervention, the Office of Conservation attached its Declaration of

Emergency that was signed on September 5, 2019. Specifically, the Declaration of

Emergency states, in pertinent part:

Pursuant to the authority granted to the Commissioner of
Conservation under [La.R.S.] 30:1 et seq., particularly [La.R.S.]
30:6.1:

It is hereby declared that based on an inspection performed on
August 12, 2019 by an Agent of this office, that the GA Lyon # 001 --
SN213688 is leaking gas and oil into the environment. The operator
of record, Sandhill Production Inc. (OC S433), has made several
unsuccessful attempts to stop the leak in order that the well could be
plugged and abandoned. Further, Sandhill Production Inc. is now
financially incapable of continuing remedial activities and therefore is
no longer a responsible party. The subject well is located in Section
30, Township 1l South, Range 04 West, South Thornhill Field,
Jefferson Davis Parish, Louisiana.

It is further declared that this is an emergency that requires
immediate action by the Office Conservation to protect the
environment and the health, safety and welfare of the general public.

It is further declared that the Office of Conservation be
allowed to conduct site restoration activities at the site including, but
not limited to, plugging and abandonment of the subject well and
removal of any surface contamination resulting from the discharge.

Also attached to the petition for intervention were exhibits evidencing that:

(1) the Office of Conservation issued a Compliance Order (No. E-I&E18-1147) on

November 21, 2018, to Sandhill Production, Inc. (“Sandhill”), the last operator of

the GA Lyon Well No. 001 (SN 213688), to remedy the leakage of the surface

casing resulting in the discharge of fluids; and (2) Sandhill responded on August

21, 2019, stating that it “is the current operator of the G.A. Lyon Well #1 and has

labored to not only stop the leak, but also properly plug and abandon the well,” but

that it “has been unsuccessful in this venture and has exhausted its financial and

operational capabilities responding to this situation . . . [and] has no other choice

than to abandon the G.A. Lyon Well #1 and seek orphan status as operator with the

State of Louisiana.”

The petition for intervention was granted on September 12, 2019.

Thereafter, on December 2, 2019, the Office of Conservation filed a first

supplemental and amending petition for intervention to add defendant Pioneer

alleging that it “and/or its predecessors, Mesa Operating Company and Mesa

Operating Limited Partnership, . . . operated the G.A. Lyon #1 Well (SN 213688)

and the G.A. Lyon Well #1-D (SN 215064) located on the plaintiff[’s,] Litel

Exploration, LLC[,] property.”1

1
Plaintiff, Litel Exploration, LLC, incorrectly named Pioneer in the Second
Supplemental and Amending Petition for Damages.

2

On June 21, 2021, defendants Pioneer and Gary filed motions for partial

summary judgment arguing that, pursuant to La.R.S. 30:93, the Office of

Conservation “is only permitted to seek recovery of costs incurred pursuant to an

emergency declaration under [La.R.S. 30:6.1] from the last operator of record of

the Well, including its working interest owners.” Pioneer and Gary allege that

because neither they nor their predecessors were the last operator of record of the

GA Lyon No. 1 Well (SN 213688) and the dual completion GA Lyon No. 1-D

Well (SN 215064), they are not liable for the expenses and costs incurred by the

Office of Conservation in responding to the emergency declared on September 5,

2019. In support of its motion for partial summary judgment, Pioneer attached the

following exhibits: (1) the Office of Conservation’s petition for intervention; (2)

the June 14, 2021 affidavit of Keith Dronet; (3) the October 24, 2019 deposition of

Matt Simon; (4) the Office of Conservation’s motion and incorporated

memorandum filed on October 30, 2019, requesting reimbursement of all costs and

expenses incurred securing the GA Lyon No. 1 Well (SN 213688); and (5) the May

20, 2021 deposition of Gary Ross. In Gary’s motion for partial summary

judgment, it “adopts and incorporates Pioneer’s Motion and Memorandum in

Support” and “fully incorporates the evidence presented by Pioneer in support of

Pioneer’s Motion to the extent applicable to Gary’s Motion.”

In Pioneer’s memorandum in support of the motion for partial summary

judgment, it alleges that Mesa Operating Limited Partnership (“Mesa”), its

predecessor, was the operator of the GA Lyon No. 1 Well and the dual completion

GA Lyon No. 1-D Well (collectively the “Lyon Well”) from August 16, 1991,

until May 1994, when Aegis Energy, Inc. became the operator of the Lyon Well.

Pioneer alleges that since the termination of its lease in 1995, neither it “nor its

3

predecessors ever owned a working interest in any other mineral lease covering the

Lyon Well.” Pioneer alleges that Sandhill became the owner of record for the

Lyon Well on March 1, 2015, pursuant to an amended permit to drill issued by the

Office of Conservation. Pioneer alleges the Lyon Well began to leak gas and

liquids from the surface equipment during Sandhill’s operations in 2018 or 2019.

Pioneer argues that only one company, Elm Springs, Inc., responded to the Office

of Conservation’s “Emergency Bid Proposal EMER202-003” and that the Office

of Conservation contracted with it to resolve the declared emergency. At that time,

Pioneer argues the Office of Conservation limited its recovery to that which is

provided by La.R.S. 30:93A(4), which states “For a response to any emergency as

provided in R.S. 30:6.1, recovery of costs shall be against the responsible party.”

Thus, Pioneer alleges that because “[i]t is undisputed that [it] was neither the last

operator of record, nor was it a working interest owner with the last operator of

record,” the Office of Conservation is not permitted to recover the costs incurred

pursuant to the declared emergency.

On July 8, 2021, the Office of Conservation filed an opposition to the

motions for partial summary judgment arguing that “Pioneer and Gary overlook

the fact that the GA Lyon No. 1 Well was orphaned at the time of the

expenditures[,]” and that “the portion of R.S. 30:93 that applies to this case is not

just subsection A(4), as Pioneer and Gary argue, but also subsections A(1) and

A(3), which specifically deal with orphaned well sites where no trust fund has been

established to handle plugging and abandoning the well.” In support of its

opposition, the Office of Conservation attached the affidavit of its employer, Brent

Campbell, who testified that the Lyon Well was orphaned, and that “[n]o site-

4

specific trust fund has ever been created for the Lyon Well by any former

operator.”

In the Office of Conservation’s memorandum in opposition, it agrees with

defendants that “[f]or a non-orphaned well, where funds are spent in response to an

emergency, recovery is against the ‘responsible party’ as set forth in subsection

A(4); that is, against the operator of record[,]” but that “for an orphaned well,

whether the funds are spent in response to an emergency or not, recovery is against

prior operators and working interest owners in inverse chronological order as set

forth in subsections A(1) and A(3).” Accordingly, the Office of Conservation

argues the interpretation proposed by defendants, that there can be no recovery

against prior operators and working interest owners once funds are spent in

response to an emergency, “is not consistent with the general scheme of the statute,

which is to shift the financial responsibility for dealing with an orphaned well

away from the State and on to those who owned and operated the well.”

Both Pioneer and Gary filed reply memorandums in response to the Office

of Conservation’s opposition alleging that the wellsite was not orphaned (1) when

the emergency declaration was made, (2) when the emergency bid package was

sent to only three contractors, (3) when the sole bid was submitted, and (4) at the

time the work began. Thus, Pioneer and Gary argue that the work “was done

pursuant to the original emergency bid proposal” and that the “bidding procedure

never met the requirements of an orphan restoration project.”

A hearing on the motions for partial summary judgment was held on July 16,

2021. Following arguments, the trial judge provided oral reasons for his ruling:

And, like I said, this one has been going over in my head a lot
of times, okay. But I have to go - - I have to read the statute. I have
to read the statute as written. And it’s a poorly written statute. It says

5

if it’s an emergency, you shall go against the responsible party, and it
defines the responsible party, okay. It does not give us any leeway,
okay. So I’m going to grant the motion for partial summary
judgment.

Thereafter, on August 9, 2021, the trial judge rendered a judgment that

granted the motions for partial summary judgment and dismissed, with prejudice,

all claims against Pioneer and Gary for costs and expenses incurred by the Office

of Conservation in its efforts to control or plug the Lyon Well. The trial judge

further ordered that the partial summary judgment be designated as final and

appealable under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915B(1).2

The Office of Conservation now appeals this judgment, alleging the

following sole assignment of error: “The Trial Court erred in granting the motions

for partial summary judgment and dismissing the claims of the Office of

Conservation and Commissioner Ieyoub for recovery of costs expended to control

the Lyon well.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute, are reviewed

by appellate courts under the de novo standard of review, and the appellate court is

not required to give deference to the lower court in interpreting a statute.

Domingue v. Bodin, 08-62 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 654. Our review of

questions of law is simply to determine whether the trial court was legally correct

or legally incorrect. Id. If the trial court’s decision is based on an erroneous

2
La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915B(1) provides as follows:

When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or
sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims,
demands, issues, or theories against a party, whether in an original demand,
reconventional demand, cross-claim, third-party claim, or intervention, the
judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final
judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason
for delay.

6

interpretation or application of the law, rather than a valid exercise of discretion,

that decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court. Id.

Further, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s granting of a motion for

summary judgment de novo. Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 06-363 (La. 11/29/06),

950 So.2d 544. Under this standard of review, the appellate court uses the same

criteria as the trial court in determining if summary judgment is appropriate:

whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the mover is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

In 1993, the Louisiana Legislature enacted the “Louisiana Oilfield Site

Restoration Law,” finding that “[a] present and future benefit to the environment,

public health, safety, and welfare would be to clean up, close, and restore oilfield

sites.” La.R.S. 30:81A(1). In the public interest and within the police power of the

state, the legislature established “an oilfield site restoration commission and an

oilfield site restoration fund to provide for the proper and timely cleanup, closure,

and restoration of oilfield sites, to be administered by the assistant secretary of the

office of conservation within the Department of Natural Resources.” La.R.S.

30:81(B).

In 1999, the Louisiana Legislature provided a separate method for the

Department of Natural Resources to conduct operations at oilfield sites in

emergency situations “which [are] of such magnitude as to require immediate

action to prevent substantial or irreparable damage to the environment or a serious

threat to life or safety based on recognized criteria, standards or industry

practices[.]” La.R.S. 30:6.1A. Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:6.1, titled

“Declaration of emergency,” further provides:

7

B. Upon declaration of an emergency, the commissioner shall
notify the operator of record. Notification shall be made by telephone
at the emergency number on file in the commissioner’s office,
telegraph, facsimile, or personal appearance. If the operator cannot be
contacted for notification within twenty-four hours or if the operator
of record fails to begin abatement procedures within twenty-four
hours after notice by the commissioner, the commissioner shall begin
the emergency procedures provided for in this Section. Refusal on the
part of the operator to begin abatement procedures after notification
by the commissioner shall constitute a failure or refusal to comply
with the provisions of this Title and rules, regulations, and orders
issued thereunder.

C. When an emergency situation is declared, the commissioner
is authorized to undertake the containment and abatement of the
pollution source and pollutants and may retain personnel or contract
for these purposes with persons who shall operate under his direction.
All contracts let by the commissioner to respond to a declared
emergency shall be exempt from the provisions of Chapter 10 of Title
38 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 and the Louisiana
Procurement Code. However, the commissioner may employ an
informal bidding procedure by which bids are solicited from at least
three bidders. He may order the operator of record or owner to
undertake the containment, abatement, or cleanup of such pollution
source and pollutants. Failure to comply with his order shall be a
violation of this Title and shall be punishable as provided in this Title.
The commissioner shall submit an annual report to the House
Committee on Natural Resources and Environment and Senate
Committee on Natural Resources listing the number and type of
emergencies declared within the previous year.

D. (1) The commissioner may issue permits, variances, or other
orders as necessary to respond to the emergency, which shall be
effective immediately upon issuance, and any request for hearing,
appeal, or request for review shall not suspend the implementation of
the action ordered. The term of any such emergency action shall be
limited to the time necessary to address the emergency conditions.

(2) An action for injunctive relief against any order issued
pursuant to the declaration of an emergency shall be brought in the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to such
action.

(3) The party bringing an action under this Subsection has the
burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that
granting injunctive relief shall not endanger or cause damage to the
public health or the environment. If such injunctive relief is granted,
the party bringing such an action shall provide an adequate bond.

8

E. In addition, when an emergency is declared, emergency
response personnel or contractors shall be authorized to undertake
necessary actions to contain and abate the pollution source and
pollutants.

F. In responding to an emergency, the commissioner may
utilize any funds allowable under federal law or state law or any funds
which have been appropriated for such purposes, including but not
limited to the Oilfield Site Restoration Fund pursuant to R.S. 30:80 et
seq. Recovery of costs expended shall be in accordance with the
statutes, rules, and regulations applicable to the source of funds.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:86, titled “Oilfield Site Restoration Fund,”

allows money from the fund to be used for oilfield site assessment or restoration

and also for costs associated with the response to an emergency. Specifically,

La.R.S. 30:86E(1), (5), and G, provide (emphasis added):

E. Except as otherwise provided in this Section, the monies in the
fund may be disbursed and expended pursuant to the authority and
direction of the secretary or assistant secretary for the following
purposes and uses:

(1) Any oilfield site assessment or restoration conducted by the
Department of Natural Resources pursuant to this Part, and the
payment of the principal, interest, and legal fees, credit
enhancement fees, trustee fees, and other related costs of
issuance or ongoing expenses in connection with issuance of
bonds or other debt obligations on behalf of the commission, at
the direction of the secretary, pursuant to R.S. 30:83.1 for the
purpose of financing the costs of such oilfield site assessments
and restorations.

....

(5) Any costs associated with response to any emergency as
provided in R.S. 30:6.1 unless directed by the commission not
to expend monies in the fund pursuant to Subsection G of this
Section. The department shall seek to recover from the
responsible party any monies disbursed and spent from the fund
for any emergency as defined in R.S. 30:6.1 within six months
of the initial expenditure for such emergency.

....

G. Upon declaration of an emergency as defined in R.S. 30:6.1, the
assistant secretary shall notify the commission of the declared

9

emergency. A meeting of the commission shall be held within ninety
days after the emergency declaration. At such meeting, the
commission may direct that no monies in the fund be disbursed or
spent for response activity related to the emergency declaration.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:93 (emphasis added), titled “Recovery of site

restoration costs; emergency costs,” provides as follows:

A. If the assistant secretary undertakes restoration of an orphaned
oilfield site under this Part or responds to any emergency as provided
in R.S. 30:6.1, the secretary shall seek to recover all costs incurred by
the secretary, assistant secretary, penalties, and other relief from any
party who has operated or held a working interest in such site, or who
is required by law, rules adopted by the department, or a valid order of
the assistant secretary to control, clean up, close, or restore the oilfield
sites or other facilities, structures, or pipelines under the
commissioner's jurisdiction pursuant to R.S. 30:1 et seq. in
accordance with the following:

(1) All oilfield sites for which there is no site-specific trust fund
shall be restored with monies provided by the fund. Except for
the responsible party, the secretary shall not be authorized to
recover restoration costs from parties which formerly operated
or held a working interest in an orphaned oilfield site unless
restoration costs for a particular orphaned oilfield site including
support facilities exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars.
Recovery of costs under this Paragraph shall be from the parties
in inverse chronological order from the date on which the
oilfield site was declared orphaned.

(2) For each oilfield site which becomes orphaned and for
which a site-specific trust fund has been created and is fully
funded under the provisions of R.S. 30:88(F), recovery of costs
shall be against only the responsible party, and the site shall be
restored in the following manner:

(a) Using funds in the site-specific trust fund established for the
specific site.

(b) Using funds collected from any responsible party in such
site where the site-specific trust fund is insufficient.

(c) If funds collected under Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this
Paragraph are insufficient to fully restore said orphaned oilfield
site, the fund shall provide funds necessary to make up any
deficiency.

10

(3) If the oilfield site does not meet the provisions of R.S.
30:88(F) and restoration costs exceed two hundred fifty
thousand dollars, recovery of costs shall be from the parties in
inverse chronological order from the date on which the oilfield
site has been declared orphaned, except that a party shall be
exempt from liability for restoration of an orphaned oilfield site
as provided for in this Part in which said party had an operating
or working interest if, and only if, the party complies with all of
the following:

(a) The party makes full and reasonable timely contribution to
the Oilfield Site Restoration Fund.

(b) The party creates a site-specific trust account for the
restoration of the oilfield site and is in compliance with the
terms and conditions of the site-specific trust account.

(c) The party makes full disclosure in compliance with R.S.
30:88(G) in the transfer of an oilfield site.

(d) The party complies in full with any penalty assessment
which has become final under this Part for any violation under
this Part.

(e) The party is not determined to be an individual, partnership,
corporation, or other entity which is an operator or working
interest owner in an oilfield site determined to be orphaned.

(f) The party is not determined to be a partnership, corporation,
or other entity for which a general partner, an owner of more
than twenty-five percent ownership interest, or a trustee has
held a position of ownership or control in another partnership,
corporation, or other entity which is an operator or working
interest owner in an oilfield site determined to be orphaned.

(g) The party complies with all reviews of site-specific trust
accounts as set forth in this Part, including additional
contributions thereto if deemed necessary.

(4) For a response to any emergency as provided in R.S. 30:6.1,
recovery of costs shall be against the responsible party.

B. The secretary may file suit in a court of competent jurisdiction in
East Baton Rouge Parish to recover these costs. The secretary may
settle or resolve any suits, disputes, or claims for any penalty under
the provisions of this Part. Costs recovered under this Subsection
shall be deposited into the Oilfield Site Restoration Fund.

11

The Louisiana Oilfield Site Restoration Law also provides a list of

definitions in La.R.S. 30:82, wherein it defines a “Responsible party” as follows:

(11) . . . the operator of record according to the office of conservation
records, who last operated the property on which the oilfield site is
located at the time the site is about to be abandoned, ceases operation,
or becomes an unusable oilfield site, and that operator’s partners and
working interest owners of that oilfield site. A working interest owner
is the owner of a mineral right who is under an obligation to share in
the costs of drilling or producing a well on the oilfield site.

DISCUSSION

The issue before this court is whether La.R.S. 30:93A(4) (recovery against

the responsible party, i.e. the last operator/working interest owner), added by Acts

2019, No. 193, limits the Office of Conservation’s ability to recover oilfield site

restoration funds that were incurred in its efforts to control or plug and abandon the

Lyon Well. The Office of Conservation argues that both Pioneer and Gary, being

prior operators of the well, are on the hook for the restoration costs expended by

the fund because the Lyon Well was orphaned and there was no site-specific trust

fund ever established for the well.

Although we agree with the Office of Conservation’s argument that for

typical abandoned wells, La.R.S. 30:93A(1)-(3) provides for recovery from not

only the “responsible party” but also prior operators and working interest owners,

we find the clear and unambiguous language utilized by the legislature in La.R.S.

30:93A(4), 30:86E(5), and 30:86(G) creates a separate and distinct limitation as to

recoupment of costs incurred pursuant to a response to any emergency as provided

in La.R.S. 30:6.1. As previously stated, La.R.S. 30:93A(4) (emphasis added)

provides “For a response to any emergency as provided in R.S. 30:6.1, recovery of

costs shall be against the responsible party.” “When a statute is clear and

unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the

12

provision must be applied as written[] with no further interpretation made in search

of the legislature’s intent.” Bergeron v. Richardson, 20-1409, p. 3 (La. 6/30/21),

320 So.3d 1109, 1111-12. As such, when the Office of Conservation declared an

emergency as to the Lyon Well and paid Elm Springs, Inc. for its work with money

from the Restoration Fund, it limited its recovery to the “responsible party,” which,

according to La.R.S. 30:82(11), is the last operator (Sandhill) and its working

interest partners.

Pioneer and Gary introduced evidence in support of their motions for partial

summary judgment proving that: (1) on September 5, 2019, the Commissioner of

Conservation declared the Lyon Well an emergency pursuant to La.R.S. 30:6.1; (2)

at the time the Lyon Well was declared an emergency, Sandhill was the operator of

record; and (3) they were not, nor are they currently, working interest owners with

Sandhill. Based on these undisputed facts, we find the trial court properly granted

the partial summary judgments in favor of Pioneer and Gary.

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment that granted Pioneer

and Gary’s motions for partial summary judgment and its order dismissing, with

prejudice, all claims against them for recoupment of costs and expenses incurred in

Office of Conservation’s efforts to control or plug and abandon the Lyon Well. All

costs of this appeal are assessed to Appellant, the Office of Conservation of the

Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, appearing through the Commissioner

of Conservation, Richard Ieyoub.

AFFIRMED.

13