Sharon Tisdale v. David Hedrick,as Concordia Parish Sheriff

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-1

SHARON TISDALE

VERSUS

DAVID HEDRICK AS SHERIFF OF CONCORDIA PARISH
AND MATTHEW MORGAN

************
APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CONCORDIA, DOCKET NO. 52698
HONORABLE JIMMIE C. PETERS, DISTRICT JUDGE AD HOC

************
SYLVIA R. COOKS
CHIEF JUDGE
************

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Chief Judge, Jonathan W. Perry and Sharon
Darville Wilson, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Charles S. Norris
Christopher Norris
P.O. Box 400
Vidalia, LA 71373
(318) 336-1999
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Sharon Tisdale

Vincent J. Desalvo
7918 Wrenwood Blvd., Suite A
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 927-7035
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Sharon Tisdale

Ronald S. Bryant
Timothy R. Ruchardson
Frosch, Rodrigue, Arcuri, LLC
1615 Poydras Street, Suite 1250
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 592-4600
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
David Hedrick, Concordia Parish Sheriff

COOKS, Chief Judge.

On February 20, 2019, Plaintiff, Sharon Tisdale, after purchasing groceries at

a Wal-Mart store in Vidalia, Louisiana, was walking to her vehicle in the parking

lot. Defendant, Matthew Morgan, approached her and offered to assist her in loading

her groceries into her vehicle. Plaintiff, who stated she was uncomfortable with the

way Mr. Morgan approached her, initially refused the offer of assistance. However,

Mr. Morgan continued to insist that he help her, and she relented and allowed him

to help her.

After the groceries were loaded, Plaintiff closed her rear storage compartment

and went to sit down in the driver’s seat, when Mr. Morgan suddenly jerked the

driver’s side door open and told Plaintiff “I need a ride, and I need it right now.”

Plaintiff attempted to reason with him and even offered him money to leave her

alone. Mr. Morgan declined the offer of money saying “I will need the money later,

but right now I need a ride.” According to Plaintiff, Mr. Morgan became extremely

agitated and began cursing her. He demanded she move over into the passenger seat

so that he could get behind the wheel. Plaintiff refused, telling Mr. Morgan she

could not maneuver over the front seat console.

Mr. Morgan then pulled Plaintiff from the driver’s seat, closed the door and

produced what Plaintiff described as a box cutter. He then began to walk her over

to the other side of the vehicle to place her in the passenger seat. Plaintiff realized

that her assailant was intent upon taking her with him, rather than just taking the

vehicle. Mr. Morgan placed her in the passenger seat, closed the door and began

walking around the vehicle to get to the driver’s side door. Fearing what would

happen to her if she went with Mr. Morgan, Plaintiff opened the door, jumped out

and ran away from the vehicle screaming. Mr. Morgan then ran from the vehicle

toward a bank building between the Wal-Mart parking lot and the highway. Not

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long afterwards, police quickly arrived on the scene and apprehended Mr. Morgan

inside the bank.

Mr. Morgan was a twice convicted felon who was an inmate trustee in the

custody of the Sheriff of Concordia Parish, David Hedrick. Mr. Morgan’s first

felony conviction in 2002 was for forcible rape, the offense occurring on September

24, 1996 in Alexandria, Louisiana.1 Upon his release from that conviction, Mr.

Morgan was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was

eventually assigned to the Concordia Parish Correctional Facility (hereafter CPCF),

located in Ferriday, Louisiana. Sheriff Hedrick, as Concordia Parish’s elected

sheriff, was in charge of the operation of the CPCF and the Concordia Parish jail.

At some point after arriving at the CPCF, Mr. Morgan applied for a trustee

position, which was approved by Warden Lance Moore. Mr. Morgan was

transferred to the parish jail, which is located in the Concordia Parish Courthouse,

just outside of Vidalia and within walking distance of the Wal-Mart.

On the morning of February 20, 2019, Mr. Morgan was assigned to work with

other trustees on the Courthouse grounds. The group of trustees was under the

supervision of Concordia Parish Deputy Sheriff Morris Wilson. At some point,

Deputy Wilson left the courthouse to run some errands. He testified he believed this

was okay because there was a social function being conducted at the Courthouse and

other deputies would be present to supervise the inmates. The trial court noted the

record established no other deputies were aware they were expected to supervise the

inmates. Noticing the lack of supervision, Mr. Morgan, who was dressed in blue

jeans and a black jacket, simply walked away from the Courthouse and made the

walk to the Vidalia Wal-Mart where he attempted to kidnap Plaintiff.

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Mr. Morgan was initially charged with aggravated rape, but he and the State entered into a plea bargain where he
agreed to plead guilty to forcible rape. He was sentenced to serve thirty years at hard labor with twenty years of
the sentence to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Mr. Morgan was
given credit for time served and was subsequently granted parole.

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As a result of the incident. Plaintiff suffered only minor physical injuries.

However, she sustained significant emotional trauma from the incident. She initially

saw Dr. Huey Moak, a general practitioner, a few days after the incident. She

complained of being very nervous and an inability to sleep. He prescribed her with

anxiety medication (Xanax).

She next saw Joe Swoveland, a licensed professional counselor, on March 11,

2019. She treated with Dr. Swoveland on several occasions and he found her to be

suffering from anxiety and depression. Mr. Swoveland testified Plaintiff was

restless, unable to sit still and had an exaggerated startle response. She also

complained of chest pain, abdominal distress, increased heart rate and obsessive

thoughts. She complained to Mr. Swoveland that she had been affected by the

incident to such a degree she could not even attend her church. By her third visit to

Mr. Swoveland, Plaintiff said she began experiencing frequent nightmares. She told

Mr. Swoveland she began sleeping with a weapon on her bedside table when her

husband was not at home. Her husband worked in the oil and gas industry and was

frequently offshore for upwards of a week or more at a time. Mr. Swoveland, who

could not prescribe medication, believed the Xanax Plaintiff was taking was not of

a sufficient dosage to alleviate her anxiety. Mr. Swoveland also noted that the

relationship between Plaintiff and her husband suffered significantly, as Plaintiff felt

her husband was not sufficiently supportive and was becoming frustrated that she

was not getting better. Mr. Swoveland did note that by her April 11, 2019 visit

Plaintiff had, for the first time since the incident, gone by herself to a local store to

buy goods. She stated she experienced some anxiety, but was able to cope by using

cognitive techniques she learned at therapy. She also went on a shopping trip with

female friends, but experienced significant panic when a male employee of one of

the stores helped load some plants in her vehicle. Mr. Swoveland was adamant in

his diagnosis that Plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Mr.

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Swoveland stated it was his goal in treating Plaintiff, to make enough progress

through therapy to decrease her symptoms to a point that she would no longer meet

the PTSD criteria. He did believe she had made some, limited progress, but was

unsure if she would ever recover.

Plaintiff began treating with Dr. Warren Lowe, a medical psychologist. Dr.

Lowe immediately diagnosed that Plaintiff suffered from PTSD, which he

categorized as severe in nature. He noted prior to the incident Plaintiff had no

psychological problems but following the attack by Mr. Morgan she had

“hypervigilance, startle reactions, a very significant amount of anxiety, much

difficulty being out, and even in the company of others, but certainly at that time not

even going out alone.” Dr. Lowe continued Plaintiff on Xanax and also started her

on Lexapro, an antidepressant medication. Dr. Lowe felt Plaintiff was “trying very

hard” to cope with her situation but was having difficulty making much progress.

There was a break in Plaintiff’s office visits with Dr. Lowe’s due to the Coronavirus

pandemic. When he saw her after an approximate one-year period, Plaintiff stated

her PTSD symptoms still occurred, but were not as frequent. She did acknowledge

she would not answer her door unless she knew who was ringing the doorbell and

she was still suffering frequent flashbacks. Dr. Lowe found the Lexapro had caused

Plaintiff to gain significant weight since the last visit. He reluctantly agreed to put

her on a lesser dosage for the benefit of her self-esteem. Dr. Lowe last saw Plaintiff

on November 16, 2020. Plaintiff agreed she would continue to see Dr. Patricia

Brawley, a McComb, Mississippi licensed professional counselor and mental health

therapist. Dr. Lowe concluded after his numerous treatments with Plaintiff that she

would, “more likely than not, require psychological treatment including medication

for an indefinite period of time. At a minimum, I would estimate this treatment will

be necessary for at least the next five to ten years, but perhaps much longer.”

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Not long after beginning treatment with Dr. Lowe, Plaintiff also began seeing

Dr. Brawley. Her first visit with Dr. Brawley was in September of 2019. Plaintiff

related she had difficulty sleeping, was easily frightened and cried constantly. Dr.

Brawley agreed with the other healthcare professionals that Plaintiff suffered from

PTSD as a result of the incident with Mr. Morgan. On her second visit with Dr.

Brawley, Plaintiff described an incident where she was unable to answer her door

for a repairman she knew was coming, but instead hid in the bathroom until he left.

She explained to Dr. Brawley she had extreme difficulty in eating at restaurants and

doing many simple things, such as filling her vehicle with gas. Despite the social

distancing requirements implemented during the pandemic, Plaintiff still could not

stand in a line of people, even six feet apart. Plaintiff explained to Dr. Brawley that

on the rare instances she went shopping, if she was required to stand in line with

other people, she would simply leave the store when panic was beginning to set in.

As with Dr. Lowe, the pandemic limited the face-to-face sessions with Dr. Brawley,

but videoconferencing and telephonic sessions were conducted. In her deposition,

Dr. Brawley felt Plaintiff learned some coping skills, but “still [has] a ways to go”

and the negative triggers she experiences from the incident will always remain as a

part of her life.

As a result of the traumatic event inflicted upon her by Mr. Morgan, on

January 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed a petition seeking to recover personal injury

damages she sustained as a result of the incident in the Wal-Mart parking lot. Named

as defendants were Sheriff Hedrick, individually and in his capacity as the Sheriff

of Concordia Parish, and Mr. Morgan. Plaintiff asserted she sustained physical pain

and suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life,

medical related expenses, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of

Mr. Morgan’s attack on her person. The matter proceeded to a bench trial on March

12, 2021.

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As to the issue of liability, the trial court found the Sheriff’s employees at the

Correctional Facility were clearly negligent through their actions and inactions in

allowing Mr. Morgan to acquire trustee status. The court also found Mr. Morgan

was granted trustee status in large part because he had skill in air conditioner repairs.

This, the trial court concluded, led to a lack of extensive vetting of Mr. Morgan as

specifically required by the Policies and Procedures Manual. The trial court noted

the Correctional Facility could not produce Mr. Morgan’s written request nor any

record stablishing a review by the department ever took place. In his deposition,

Warden Lance Moore could only recall interviewing Mr. Morgan, but could not

recall what was specifically discussed or what trustee status was granted. He could

not even say that Mr. Morgan’s trustee application had ever been reduced to writing.

Combined with the Correctional Facility’s failure to follow the mandates of the

Policy Manual in the trustee application process, the trial court found the clear

language on the Policy Manual unequivocally provided that any inmate with a

“history of sex offence convictions” cannot qualify for trustee status at any level.

Mr. Morgan should have been immediately eliminated from consideration of trustee

status on this fact alone.

The trial court then found that the negligence of the Sheriff’s employees

continued when he was moved to the parish jail. The trial court noted, despite a

clear policy to the contrary, Mr. Morgan was not required to wear prison clothing or

clothing that identified him as an inmate. The trial court specifically found “[t]here

was never a satisfactory explanation” for why this occurred. Further, Deputy Wilson

left the Courthouse to obtain supplies at a nearby establishment without alerting

anyone to supervise his four-man trustee unit. This left Mr. Morgan unsupervised

and in civilian clothes. He simply blended into the crowd and wandered away. Thus,

the trial court found Sheriff Hedrick, through the actions of his employees, was

guilty of gross negligence in the attack upon Plaintiff.

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The trial court also found Mr. Morgan committed an intentional tort against

Plaintiff, and that fault in causing Plaintiff’s damages, along with the Sheriff’s fault,

must be quantified pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 2323(A). The trial court then

allocated ninety percent (90%) of the fault in causing Plaintiff’s damages to Sheriff

Hedrick and ten percent (10%) to Mr. Morgan.

On the issue of damages, the medical records and depositions of the medical

professionals who treated Plaintiff were introduced at trial. Plaintiff testified at trial

and spoke of her continuing nightmares, panic attacks, inability to sleep, fear of

crowds and fear of close contact with unfamiliar men. Despite the significant

counseling she has received and medication she has taken, she remains in fear of

things such as standing in the line at a store, pumping gas, sitting at a restaurant,

hearing her doorbell ring and panicking if anyone approaches in her direction from

behind. She testified her life has been significantly and detrimentally altered as a

result of the incident with Mr. Morgan.

Sue Calkins, a close friend of Plaintiff, testified she has known her for over

forty years and has observed the severe changes in Plaintiff since the incident. Ms.

Calkins stated Plaintiff was not an overly cautious woman or a worrier, but that

completely changed after February 20, 2019. Although she felt Plaintiff was trying

her best, she is often simply unable to cope with her anxiety.

Plaintiff’s husband also testified as to how the incident significantly changed

his wife’s life. He also stated it had severely impacted not just her, but the lives of

her family and close friends. He stated the February 20, 2019 attack changed his

wife from “fearless to fearful.”

As to special damages, the trial court noted they consisted of past and future

healthcare expenses and there was “little to no conflict with regard to those

amounts.” Plaintiff was awarded past healthcare expenses of $5,865.00 and future

healthcare expenses of $10,500.00.

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As to general damages, the trial court gave the following reasoning for

awarding $250,000.00 to Plaintiff for the injuries she sustained:

All of the healthcare providers’ testimony points to one basic
fact—Mrs. Tisdale will never completely recover from the effect of the
injury she sustained on February 20, 2019. While all of the caregivers
agree that she is a totally honest patient, is goal oriented, and has done
everything within her power to cope with he recurring effects of PTSD,
they also agree that her efforts will more probably than not be
insufficient to affect a complete recovery. No matter how hard she may
try, the ”triggers” will always be there, and when she encounters the
wrong one, it will have a devastating effect on her ability to cope.

In most personal injury cases, we are faced with a physical injury
that has emotional side effects. The results of the injury are visible to
all, and always present. In Mrs. Tisdale’s case, her injury is invisible
to everyone else, and while it is always underlying, she never knows
when a smell, sound, event, or even her imagination will trigger her
uncontrollable response. While she has good and bad days, she cannot
go to sleep without first wondering if she will have recurring
nightmares; and she never wakes up knowing what type of day it will
be. When she stops at a store, eats at a restaurant, pumps gas into her
vehicle, goes to church, or even welcomes someone into her home, she
cannot predict the reaction—and this is a fact she must live with for the
rest of her life. While others will try their best to give support to Mrs.
Tisdale’s situation, they will always fail to understand her reactions to
some of the most basic of human interactions. Thus, Mrs. Tisdale must
face every minute practically on her own.

There is no medication to prevent Mrs. Tisdale’s PTSD attacks,
and her learned coping skills will come to the surface, not in preparation
of an attack, but only after her vulnerabilities have been exposed. This
fact gives meaning to the testimony of Dr. Lowe that she must struggle
to characterize her PTSD events as challenges and not absolute failures.

The court has reviewed the post-trial briefs filed by the litigants,
and have taken into consideration the jurisprudence submitted for
review. However, a factfinder must determine the general damage
award by the facts and circumstances of the case before the court, and
must do so by assessing the effects of a particular injury to a particular
plaintiff under the particular circumstances existing. Youn v. Mar.
Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993). In this case, the court finds
the appropriate general damage award to be $250,000.00.

All costs were assessed against Sheriff Hedrick. A final judgment was signed on

May 3, 2021. Sheriff Hedrick appealed the trial court’s judgment, asserting two

assignments of error:

1. The District Court erred in apportioning only ten percent (10%) of
the fault to Matthew Morgan.

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2. The District Court erred in finding that $250,000.00 was a
reasonable award for general damages in this matter.

ANALYSIS

I. Trial Court’s Apportionment of Fault.

Sheriff Hedrick does not appeal the trial court’s determination that he was

grossly negligent in his actions, which led to the injuries sustained by Plaintiff.

Sheriff Hedrick only asserts Mr. Morgan should have received a higher

apportionment of fault.

In Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 00-66, pp. 10-11 (La.

10/30/00), 773 So.2d 670, 680-81, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained the

standard of review regarding comparative fault determinations as follows:

As with other factual determinations, the trier of fact is vested
with much discretion in its allocation of fault. [Clement v. Frey, 95-
1119 (La. 1/16/96), 666 So.2d 607]. Therefore, an appellate court
should only disturb the trier of fact’s allocation of fault when it is
clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Only after making a
determination that the trier of fact’s apportionment of fault is clearly
wrong can an appellate court disturb the award, and then only to the
extent of lowering it or raising it to the highest or lowest point
respectively which is reasonably within the trial court’s discretion.
Clement, 666 So.2d at 611; Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d
332, 335 (La.1977).

Sheriff Hedrick relies on Marceaux v. Gibbs, 96-2839 (La.9/9/97), 699 So.2d

1065, to support his argument that the trial court erred in only imposing ten percent

(10%) fault to Mr. Morgan in this case. In Marceaux, the inmate was granted trustee

status because he was deemed a “model prisoner.” While on a work detail, the

inmate and another prisoner were able to sneak into a volunteer fireman hut where

they were able to find and drink some alcohol that was present. Then, while his

supervisor was talking with others, the inmate managed to sneak into his

supervisor’s vehicle, which had the keys in the ignition, and drove off. In a matter

of minutes, the inmate, who was legally drunk, ran a red light and struck the

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plaintiff’s vehicle. The Marceaux inmate was part of a detail of five prisoners the

Acadia Parish Sheriff released to the Town of Iota for use on public projects. The

Town was required to furnish security for the prisoners, with the provision that the

prisoners be directly supervised by a commissioned law enforcement officer.

However, on this day, the Town deviated from its prior practice, with only a public

works department employee, lacking law enforcement background, in charge of

supervision. The district court assigned the inmate thirty percent (30%) fault, the

Town sixty-five (65%) fault and the Acadia Parish Sheriff five percent (5%) fault.

On appeal, this court reversed the finding of gross negligence on the part of the

Acadia Parish Sheriff, and also found the Sheriff was entitled to indemnification

from the Town of Iota in accordance with the law. Marceaux v. Gibbs, 95-1397

(La.App. 3 Cir. 8/14/96), 680 So.2d 1189, writ granted, 96-2839 (La. 1/31/97), 687

So.2d 391. This court also found the inmate was not guilty of an intentional tort, but

rather ordinary negligence. After granting writs, the Louisiana Supreme Court

affirmed this court’s finding that the Acadia Parish Sheriff was not guilty of gross

negligence. The Supreme Court then, finding the inmate was not guilty of an

intentional tort, reassessed fault to place seventy percent (70%) on the inmate and

thirty percent (30%) on the Town of Iota.

Marceaux is clearly distinguishable from the instant case as it did not involve

gross negligence on the part of the sheriff, nor did it involve an intentional tort on

the part of the inmate.

Sheriff Hedrick also cites Thomas v. Sheridan, 07-1291 (La.App. 1 Cir.

2/8/08), 977 So.2d 303, where the court assigned fifty percent (50%) fault to both

the sheriff and the inmate. In Thomas, the inmate had been admitted into the ICU

for symptoms of OxyContin withdrawal. He was under the guard of a sheriff’s

deputy. The inmate’s legs were shackled and he was handcuffed. However, to allow

him to eat while in the hospital bed, the inmate’s left hand was released. After eating,

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but before re-cuffing the inmate’s hand, the deputy approached the bed and the

inmate grabbed the deputy’s gun with his left hand. The deputy was able to flee the

room and alerted authorities. The inmate quickly got out of bed and was able to grab

a nurse, and a hostage situation ensued. Eventually the inmate was subdued, and no

physical injuries were sustained. However, a suit for emotional damages was filed.

The trial court found one hundred percent (100%) fault on the part of the sheriff’s

office. The first circuit reversed in part, finding fifty percent (50%) fault on both the

sheriff and the inmate.

We find the facts in Thomas are quite distinguishable from the instant case

and not persuasive here. The spontaneous escape of the inmate in Thomas was not

a confluence of numerous grossly negligent actions on the part of the sheriff’s office

as we have in this case. It is hard to imagine a more grossly negligent series of

events which led to Mr. Morgan’s escape from the Concordia Parish Courthouse and

the subsequent attack on Plaintiff. It is conceded that Mr. Morgan’s past offense as

a violent sex offender should have precluded him from any possibility of attaining

trustee status. Mr. Morgan also was allowed to mingle among citizens attending a

function at the Courthouse while wearing street clothes with no insignia identifying

him as an inmate. Most egregious of all, is the uncontroverted fact that a sheriff’s

deputy simply left his supervisory post to run errands, leaving a group of inmates,

dressed in street clothes, wholly unsupervised and able to walk away with no

difficulty.

In this case, Sheriff Hedrick and his employees were guilty of gross

negligence that directly led to a life-altering attack on the Plaintiff. The failure of

Sheriff Hedrick to perform his duty of overseeing the inmate was the proximate

cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. The Sheriff was by far in the best position to prevent

the harm that occurred to Plaintiff. Under these circumstances, we find the trial court

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was not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous in allocating ninety percent (90%) of

the fault to Sheriff Hedrick for his department’s grossly negligent actions.

II. General Damages.

The Sheriff also argues the trial court erred in awarding general damages

which exceeded the highest reasonable amount Plaintiff may be awarded. In

Wainwright v. Fontenot, 00-492, p. 4 (La. 10/17/00), 774 So.2d 70, 74 the court

discussed stated the standard to be used by an appellate court when reviewing a

quantum award:

The assessment of “quantum,” or the appropriate amount of
damages, by a trial judge or jury is a determination of fact, one entitled
to great deference on review. As such, “the role of an appellate court in
reviewing general damages is not to decide what it considers to be an
appropriate award, but rather to review the exercise of discretion by the
trier of fact.” Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1260
(La.1993). Moreover, before a Court of Appeal can disturb an award
made by a [factfinder,] the record must clearly reveal that the trier of
fact abused its discretion in making its award. Only after making the
finding that the record supports that the lower court abused its much
discretion can the appellate court disturb the award, and then only to
the extent of lowering it (or raising it) to the highest (or lowest) point
which is reasonably within the discretion afforded that court.

Even were we to find this award on the high side, we can only disturb the trier

of fact’s determination if it abused its discretion. Youn, 623 So.2d 1257. Since the

attack, Plaintiff has undergone over three years of professional treatment from four

healthcare providers, including three that are experts in treating patients with

emotional trauma. There was no prior history of Plaintiff receiving any

psychological treatment. All the healthcare providers were consistent that Plaintiff

suffered from PTSD, which more likely than not would affect her for the remainder

of her life. No medical evidence was presented to counter these findings. Therefore,

considering the life-altering injuries the trial court attributed to the accident, and the

uncontradicted testimony of all the healthcare providers that Plaintiff will never fully

recover from the effect of the injuries she sustained on February 20, 2019, we do not

find the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $250,000.00 in general damages.

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See Lawrence v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 13-1296 (La.App. 4 Cir.

10/15/14), 151 So.3d 917, writ denied, 14-2382 (La. 2/6/15), 158 So.3d 821.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs

of this appeal in the amount of $7,450.81 are assessed to defendant-appellant, Sheriff

David Hedrick.

AFFIRMED.

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