State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services, Child Support enforcement/iv-d Da v. David Alan Landry

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-374

STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT/IV-D

VERSUS

DAVID ALAN LANDRY

consolidated with

22-375
DAVID LANDRY

VERSUS

BETTINA GARZA

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF SABINE, LASES NO. 002642114-01
CONSOLIDATED WITH CIVIL DOCKET NUMBER 69,984
HONORABLE STEPHEN B. BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, John E. Conery, and Candyce G.
Perret, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Kenneth P. Haines
Weems, Schimpf, Haines, Shemwell & Moore
912 Kings Highway
Shreveport, Louisiana 71104
(318) 222-2100
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
David Alan Landry

Gregory H. Batte
Sockrider, Bolin, Anglin & Batte
327 Crockett Street
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101
(318) 221-5503
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
David Alan Landry

Joseph “J.R.” Stevens
Attorney at Law
690 San Antonio Avenue, Suite B
Many, Louisiana 71449
(318) 701-8127
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
David Alan Landry

James S. Seaman
Assistant District Attorney
495 South Capitol Street
Many, Louisiana 71449
(318) 256-6246
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services,
Child Support Enforcement

David C. Hesser
Hesser & Flynn, L.L.P.
215 Ansley Boulevard
Alexandria, Louisiana 71303
(318) 542-4102
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Bettina Garza

CONERY, Judge.

The trial court issued separate judgments relating to child support and custody

issues involving the minor child of the parties, David Alan Landry and Bettina Garza.

Mr. Landry appeals both judgments. Ms. Garza has answered the appeal seeking

modification of the child support award. By request of the parties, this court

consolidated the matters for review. We address the issues under this single cover

and, for the following reasons, affirm each judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The record indicates that Mr. Landry and Ms. Garza were previously married

and domiciled in Texas during the course of their marriage. One child was born of

the marriage, Brooklyn Taylor Landry (born November 6, 2015). The parties were

divorced by a December 13, 2018 judgment (the Texas Judgment) rendered in the

County Court at Law for Starr County, Texas. The Texas Judgment awarded the

parties joint custody of Brooklyn. As domiciliary parent, Mr. Landry was given the

exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child without regard to

geographic location.

Mr. Landry moved to Sabine Parish and filed a September 10, 2019 petition

in the Eleventh Judicial District Court in Sabine Parish titled “Petition to Register

and Enforce Texas Decree of Custody, to Establish Louisiana as the Proper

Jurisdiction for Modification of Custody, Request Modification of Custody, Request

for Setting of Child Support, Contempt of Court and Request for Attorney Fees and

Court Costs, the Appointment of a Mental Health Professional and Discovery.” The

matter proceeded under Docket Number 69,894.

The following day, on September 11, 2019, the trial court signed an Order

establishing Louisiana as the proper jurisdiction to hear the modification and

ancillary family law matters. The trial court Order adopted and registered the Texas

Judgment for enforcement and modification pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, La.R.S. 13:1801, et seq.

On March 27, 2020, Mr. Landry filed a “Petition for Ex Parte Temporary

Child [Custody]” pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 3945,1 claiming that Ms. Garza

failed to return Brooklyn in compliance with the week on/week off visitation

schedule prescribed by the Texas Judgment. That same day, the trial court signed

an order temporarily restricting Ms. Garza’s visitation to supervised visitation on

weekends.

On June 5, 2020, the trial court signed an Interim Consent Judgment which

vacated the earlier temporary custody order and appointed Dr. John Simoneaux,

Ph.D., to perform mental health evaluations on the parties in order to aid the trial

court in making the requested change of custody ruling. The Interim Consent

Judgment also reinstated the week on/week off visitation schedule between the

parties as previously ordered by the Texas Judgment.

The record reflects that Ms. Garza filed an application for child support with

the Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) on July 31, 2020 in Sabine

Parish. DCFS filed a Rule to Show Cause on October 23, 2020, asking the trial court

to determine the amount of child support payments due from Mr. Landry for

1
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3945 states, in pertinent part:

B. An ex parte order of temporary custody of a minor child shall not be
granted unless:
(1) It clearly appears from specific facts shown by a verified petition or
by supporting affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the child
before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition;
(2) The applicant's attorney certifies to the court, in writing, either:
(a) The efforts which have been made to give the adverse party
reasonable notice of the date and time such order is being presented to the court;
(b) The reasons supporting his claim that notice should not be required.

2

Brooklyn and to order an Immediate Income Assignment pursuant to La.R.S.

46:2326.3. The matter addressing the income assignment was assigned Lases

Number 002642114-01, Sabine Parish.

On October 5, 2021, a hearing was held before the District Court Hearing

Officer, assigned to hear child support issues. At the hearing, the parties were

allowed to place in the record stipulations, offerings, and argument on the issue of

child support. On October 13, 2021, the District Court Hearing Officer issued an

interim recommendation to the trial court setting child support at $3,049.66 per

month in favor of DCFS for the benefit of Brooklyn effective October 23, 2020, the

date of filing of the Rule To Show Cause by DCFS. The amount of the child support

award was based on Worksheet B of the Child Support Guidelines, as the parties

equally shared custody pursuant to the Texas Judgment.

The District Court Hearing Officer additionally awarded Ms. Garza $500.00

per month for travel expenses for the time period beginning October 23, 2020 to July

31, 2021, to compensate her for transporting Brooklyn to and from Texas and

Louisiana. Both parties timely filed objections to the recommendation of the District

Court Hearing Officer.

Thereafter, the trial court conducted multi-day, contradictory hearings on the

consolidated cases involving both the request for modification of child custody,

Docket Number 69,894, and on issues surrounding Mr. Landry’s child support

obligations, Lases Docket Number 002642114-01. The trial court resolved both by

separate February 14, 2022 judgments.

3

As to custody, after a full trial on the merits in Sabine Parish Docket Number

69,984, the trial court granted in part and denied in part the modification of the Texas

Judgment, ordering that:

2. Mr. Landry and Ms. Garza continue to have joint legal custody
of Brooklyn Taylor Landry (DOB 11/6/2015);

3. Mr. Landry remains domiciliary parent of Brooklyn;

4. The parties are to continue exercising physical custody of
Brooklyn on a seven-day rotation beginning at 3:00 pm on
Fridays;

5. Ms. Garza is to exercise physical custody in Louisiana;

6. The parties are to submit a Joint Custody Implementation Plan
within 30 days of the signing of this judgment;

7. A separate judgment regarding child support shall be signed
upon presentation by the State of Louisiana, consistent with the
Reasons for Judgment issued herein.

The trial court ultimately designated the Judgment as final pursuant to La.Code

Civ.P. art. 1915(B).2

By a separate but corresponding February 14, 2022 Judgment in Sabine Parish

Docket Number 002642114-01, the trial court set forth the child support order as

follows:

1. The Defendant is ordered to pay child support in the amount
of $3,049.66 per month, effective October 23, 2020, plus the
five percent (5%) expedited process fee as authorized by
LA.R.S. 46:236.5(C), payable to DCFS (Department of
Children and Family Services) P.O. Box 260222 Baton Rouge,

2
As an initial matter, even though no separate “joint implementation order” was issued by
the trial court, La.R.S. 9:335 does not require a particular form for the rendition of a joint custody
implementation order. With respect to what must be included within a joint custody
implementation order, La. R.S. 9:335 expressly states: “The implementation order shall allocate
the time periods during which each parent shall have physical custody of the child so that the
child is assured of frequent and continuing contact with both parents. … The implementation order
shall allocate the legal authority and responsibility of the parents.” La. R.S. 9:335(A)(2)(a) and
(3) (emphasis added). See Hodges v. Hodges, 15-0585 (La. 11/23/15), 181 So.3d 700.

The trial court’s written Judgment in this case meets those requirements.

4

LA 70826-0222, for the support of Brooklyn Taylor Landry,
DOB 11/6/2015.

2. Defendant is ordered to obtain and maintain health insurance
on the minor child, if health insurance becomes available at a
reasonable cost through an employer.

3. An Income Assignment Order issue(s) forthwith.

The judgment further set forth Mr. Landry’s responsibilities to DCFS in

connection with the payment of his child support and ordered that the costs of court

be cast equally between the two parties.

In accompanying “Written Reason’s For Judgment[,]” the trial court

explained that it had accepted the recommendation of the District Court Hearing

Officer and set child support in the sum of $3,049.66 per month, effective October

23, 2020, plus the 5% administrative fee allowed by law. The trial court also

accepted Worksheet B attached to the District Court Hearing Officer’s

recommendation and ordered Mr. Landry to maintain Brooklyn’s health insurance

and pay all out-of-pocket medical expenses.

The trial court, however, rejected the District Court Hearing Officer’s

recommendation that Ms. Garza receive a monthly travel allowance of $500.00, or

any amount for travel, for the period specified in the recommendation. The trial

court found that since Ms. Garza knew she may have to travel to and from

Brooklyn’s residence in Louisiana when she entered the stipulated Texas Judgment

in 2018, she therefore accepted her responsibility for the travel expense involved.

Ms. Garza did not appeal this portion of the trial court’s ruling.

As briefly stated above, Mr. Landry has appealed the respective judgments

rendered regarding support and child custody. Ms. Garza has answered Mr.

5

Landry’s appeal of the order of child support. We address the now-consolidated

appeals in turn.

Docket Number 22-374 – Child Support

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

By a single assignment of error addressing the trial court’s determination of

the amount of child support, Mr. Landry alleges that “[t]he trial court committed

legal error by setting child support pursuant to a flawed Worksheet B calculation.”

(Capitalization removed.)

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard Of Review

We first note that “[w]e review child support determinations using the

manifest error standard of review and we will not disturb the trial court’s order unless

it committed manifest error or abuse of discretion in its determination.” L.E.P.S. v.

R.G.P., 10-1128, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/16/11), 59 So.3d 523, 528-29 (citing State,

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. L.T., Jr., 05-1965 (La. 7/6/06), 934 So.2d 687), writ denied,

11-0770 (La. 5/27/11), 63 So.3d 999.

Child Support - Quantum

Mr. Landry first asserts that he should have sole custody of Brooklyn and

urges that if the court had granted his request for sole custody, he would not owe Ms.

Garza any child support. However, after a full trial on the merits, the trial court

maintained the week on/week off joint custody of Brooklyn, with Mr. Landry as the

domiciliary parent, so Ms. Garza is entitled to payment of child support through

DCFS. At the hearing held before the District Court Hearing Officer, counsel for

DCFS stated:

6

[A]s I understand the issues that are before the Court today, there was
an initial request by Mr. Landry that he should not pay any child support,
you know, I’m not sure that’s a great look considering his income level
and that’s his child, and that’s certainly not something we would agree
with.

The record is clear that Mr. Landry’s primary intent was to obtain full custody

and not have to pay any child support.

In the alternative, Mr. Landry further argues that the trial court should not

have accepted the calculations on Worksheet B contained in both DCFS’ Post-Trial

submission, the District Court Hearing Officer’s Recommendation, and

specifically adopted by the trial court. In its Post-Trial Memorandum in the trial

court, DCFS provided the figures used in reaching the child support award in this

case, where the gross income of the parents exceeds $40,000.00, the highest level

specified in the child support guidelines schedule. La.R.S. 9:315.19.

In this case the monthly gross income of Ms. Garza was determined to be

$2,858.33. This amount was based on her training as a medical assistant and

phlebotomist.3 Due to traveling to and from Texas to Louisiana, she has been

unable to work at either job, but has the ability to earn the amount calculated. Mr.

Landry’s monthly gross income was calculated at $57,064.00. 4 Therefore, the

couples’ total combined monthly gross income was determined to be $59,922.33

by the Hearing Officer.

3
The Hearing Officer based this figure on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (5/20/20) for
both a medical assistant and a phlebotomist.
4
This is an extremely conservative calculation based on Mr. Landry’s wealth. Mr.
Landry’s tax returns, which were submitted into evidence at the October 5, 2021 hearing on the
child support issue in connection with his answers to interrogatories indicate that Mr. Landry’s
combined gross and net income beginning with the year 2016 was over a million dollars; 2017 his
combined gross and net income was over $1.2 million; 2018 his gross and net income was over
$4.5 million. Also submitted into evidence was his 2019 return where his gross and net income
was over $4 million and the 2020 return where his gross and net income was $1,119,537. Further,
at oral argument, Ms. Garza’s counsel claimed that Mr. Landry has assets of approximately $11
million on which he made $1.4 million in interest.

7

The highest level of combined monthly gross income specified in the schedule

of basic child support contained in La.R.S. 9:315.19 is $40,000.00. This amount

requires an award of combined child support in the amount of $2,816.00 per month

for one child. However, La.R.S. 9:315.13 also states:

B. If the combined adjusted gross income of the parties exceeds
the highest level specified in the schedule contained in La.R.S. 9:315.19,
the court:

(1) Shall use its discretion in setting the amount of the basic
child support obligation in accordance with the best interest of the
child and the circumstances of each parent as provided in Civil
Code Article 141, but in no event shall it be less than the highest
amount set forth in the schedule[.][5]

(Emphasis added.)

Mr. Landry argues that the amount determined by the trial court of $3,049.66

per month, and giving Mr. Landry credit for the child’s monthly health insurance

premium of $477.73, was flawed and an error of law. Considering the adjusted

monthly gross income of the parties is $59,922.33, which is above the highest level

in the schedule of $40,000.00, DCFS in its Post-Trial Memorandum indicated how

the child support award was calculated and stated:

We have hypothetically continued the schedule of basic child
support obligation beyond the highest level and a worksheet B (50/50
shared custody) was prepared assessing Ms. Garza at $2,858.33/m and
Mr. Landry at $57,064/m, this would result in a recommended guideline

5
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:315.13, cmt. (2001) provides:

If the combined adjusted gross income of the parties exceeds the highest
amount provided for in the schedule, the court is to exercise discretion in setting
the amount of child support guided by the best interest of the child and the
circumstances of each party under Civil Code Article 141. Article 141, which
governs the award of child support at divorce, contains first principles: child
support is to be determined based upon the needs of the child as measured by
the standard of living enjoyed by the child while living with his intact family
and upon the ability to pay of each of the parents. In no case, however, may
the amount awarded be less than the highest amount specified in the schedule.

(Emphasis added.) There is no maximum amount in the schedule.

8

child support amount of $3,049.66/m, giving Mr. Landry credit for the
child’s monthly insurance premium of $477.73.

Based on the calculations submitted by DCFS, we find that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in ordering Mr. Landry to pay $3,049.66 monthly in child

support for Brooklyn. The amount for one child at the $40,000.00 level on the child

support schedule is $2,858.33. DCFS calculated the amount commensurate with the

combined adjusted monthly gross income of the parties of $59,922.33, which was

determined to be $3,527.06. Giving Mr. Landry credit for the $477.73 in health

insurance payments for the child, the trial court fixed child support at $3,049.66 per

month, a figure that we find to be very low considering Mr. Landry’s wealth.

Further, after Mr. Landry was given the credit for the health insurance

payment, the result is an amount of only $191.33 over the $2,858.33 for one child at

the $40,000.00 base level on the child support schedule. Based on the foregoing, we

find no merit in Mr. Landry’s assertion that the amount of the child support award is

flawed and constituted legal error by the use of Worksheet B.

Answer to the Appeal - Retroactivity of the Award of Child Support

By her Answer, Ms. Garza seeks to change the retroactive date of child

support award from October 23, 2020, the date of filing of DCFS’ Rule to Show

Cause. She instead seeks a retroactive date of either the original filing for a

determination of child support by Mr. Landry on September 10, 2019, or Ms.

Garza’s own filing for child support on July 1, 2020.

At the hearing before the District Court Hearing Officer there was a

determination that DCFS was the proper party plaintiff, as argued by counsel for

DCFS:

In terms of retroactivity and what should be applied, my
understanding was it would be that if there had been a previous child

9

support order and the State stepped in to enforce it, we would go by
whatever that previous court had done, retroactive child support, child
support arrearages, and child support [award].

For this interim purpose, I think it’s certainly fine to go by the
State’s actual filing date of October 23, 2020, with the Court reserving
the right to, of course, if the district court does find [it] retroactive to
the original 2019 filing of Mr. Landry that it be modified. … but for
today’s purposes, we would recommend our filing date. [October 23,
2020]

Accordingly, based on the determination at the hearing on October 5, 2021

that the proper party to set and enforce child support was DCFS, we are constrained

to find that the trial court did not abuse its vast discretion in making the child support

award retroactive to October 23, 2020, the date DCFS filed its Rule to Show Cause

for a determination of child support. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial

court’s ruling and deny Ms. Garza’s answer to the appeal.

Docket Number 22-375 – Custody Order

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Regarding the trial court’s custody order, Mr. Landry asserts that “[t]he trial

court committed error by maintaining week on/week off shared custody when the

mother had no residence in the State of Louisiana, no job or means to care for the

child on her week.” (Capitalization removed.)

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The trial court’s judgment reflects its determination that the Texas Judgment was

the result of a written agreement and informal settlement process between the parties

in which no evidence was presented to the trial court. Thus, it is a “consent decree”

and not a “considered decree” subject to the heightened burden of proof as required

by the seminal case of Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193 (La.1986). When the

10

underlying judgment is a consent decree, “the moving party has the burden of proving

that a material change in circumstances has occurred since rendition of the underlying

decree, and that modification will be in the child’s best interest.” Vidrine v. Vidrine,

17-722, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/18), 245 So.3d 1266, 1273. Thus, Mr. Landry, as the

moving party, had the burden of proving that a material change in circumstances had

occurred since rendition of the entry of the Texas Judgment, and that the modification

will be in the best interest of the child. Id. (citing Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La.

2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731).

In Vidrine, 245 So.3d at 1273, a panel of this court discussed the role of an

appellate court in its review of the trial court’s determination in child custody matters

and explained:

A material change in circumstance is a change that “negatively
impacts the welfare of the child.” LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 06-1052, p. 9
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/14/07), 951 So.2d 500, 507. A trial court’s
determination of whether a material change in circumstances has
occurred is a factual finding. See Kyle v. Kier, 17-134 (La.App. 3 Cir.
11/15/17), 233 So.3d 708; See also Bonnecarrere v. Bonnecarrere, 09-
1647 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/14/10), 37 So.3d 1038, writ denied, 10-1639 (La.
8/11/10), 42 So.3d 381. The trial court’s factual conclusions are given
substantial deference by appellate courts in child custody matters.
Steinebach v. Steinebach, 07-38 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/07), 957 So.2d 291.
Unless there is a legal error, “[t]he determinations made by the trial
judge as to custody [ ] will not be set aside unless it clearly appears
[from the record] that there has been an abuse of discretion.” Nugent v.
Nugent, 232 So.2d 521, 523 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1970). See also Mulkey v.
Mulkey, 12-2709 (La.5/7/13), 118 So.3d 357. “The basis for this
principle of review is grounded not only upon the better capacity of the
trial court to evaluate live witnesses, but also upon the proper allocation
of trial and appellate functions between the respective courts.”
McCorvey v. McCorvey, 05-174, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 916
So.2d 357, 362, writ denied, 05-2577 (La. 5/5/06), 927 So.2d 300.

Modification as to Physical Custodial Arrangement

In its Written Reasons for Judgment, the trial court explained that the Texas

Judgment provided for “joint legal custody and periods of physical custody agreed

11

on by the parties or set forth in the Standard Possession Order.” The trial court

further stated that the Standard Possession Order provided “that each parent will

have physical custody of Brooklyn every other week beginning at 3:00 p.m. on

Fridays.” The trial court noted that this part of the Texas Judgment, the Standard

Possession Order, presented a material change in circumstances, since Brooklyn had

been enrolled in school in Negreet, Louisiana6 since August of 2021, having reached

the age of five years.

As characterized by the trial court, the Texas Judgment presented two

“scenarios” of physical custody after Brooklyn reached the age of five years or was

enrolled in school. The first scenario required Ms. Garza to live within “30 miles of

the child[.]” This scenario would give Ms. Garza the right to continue the shared

custody of every other week, “‘so long as that possession is exercised in the area in

which the child attends school.’”

In the second scenario, Ms. Garza’s possession would not require a restriction

to the area where Brooklyn attends school, but would be limited to the 1st, 3rd, and

5th weekends of the month, from 6:00 p.m. on Friday to 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, during

the regular school year. The pickup and drop off would occur at Mr. Landry’s home

in Many, Louisiana.

The trial court modified the Texas Judgment by eliminating a portion of the

requirements in the above stated scenarios. Specifically, the modification included

the following, “Ms. Garza is entitled to continue the every-other-week rotation

if she exercises physical custody in the State of Louisiana.”

6
This court takes judicial notice that the Negreet, Louisiana High School, which houses
grades K-12 is located 9.6 Miles from Many, Louisiana.

12

In eliminating the second scenario, the trial court explained that “Ms. Garza’s

repeated failure to comply with the Texas Judgment,” represented “a material change

in circumstances such that this modification is in the best interest of the child.”

When the Texas Judgment was rendered in 2018, “Ms. Garza definitively lived in

Rio Grande City, Texas, and Mr. Landry definitively lived in Many, Louisiana,

which are over 500 miles apart.” The trial court found that it would be “totally

impractical” for Ms. Garza to try and exercise custody on three weekends a month

without any restrictions on her geographic location.

The trial court’s concern was based on evidence presented in the record that

Ms. Garza had repeatedly failed to timely return Brooklyn from visits in Texas

according to the schedule.

However, now that Brooklyn had enrolled in school in Negreet, Louisiana, the

trial court found that it was “especially important to ensure that Ms. Garza does not

travel 1,000 miles round trip with Brooklyn to exercise one weekend of visitation,”

and have Brooklyn possibly miss school, which would be the result of scenario two.

As for modification of scenario one, the trial court further found that “Ms.

Garza’s living arrangements represent[ed] a material change in circumstances such

that this modification is in the best interest of the child.” At the time of the hearing,

the trial court explained, Ms. Garza essentially resided in both Rio Grande City,

Texas and Many, Louisiana.

We note, however, that initially it was Mr. Landry who chose to leave his

home in Texas and move to Many, Louisiana, making it extremely difficult for Ms.

Garza to exercise her weekly custodial time with her daughter. Nevertheless, the

evidence demonstrated that she tried her best to do so, albeit returning the child late

13

on several occasions. Mr. Landry’s move occurred prior to the Texas Judgment, and

she had no other choice.

In August of 2021, however, Brooklyn was enrolled in school in Negreet,

Louisiana and Ms. Garza began regularly traveling to Louisiana, some five hundred

miles each way, living in a high-end, fully equipped travel trailer during her weeks

of physical custody, all exercised near Many. Ms. Garza also testified that she

recently began renting an apartment in Many, Louisiana.

The trial court explained that once Brooklyn was enrolled in school, the Texas

Judgment required that Ms. Garza must “live[] within 30 miles of the child[,]” in

order to continue the weekly custody rotation. The trial court found that, despite

maintaining her legal residence in Texas, Ms. Garza had been providing a “safe and

wholesome environment and ensuring Brooklyn [was attending] school during her

periods of physical custody” in Many, Louisiana.

Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that

“as long as Ms. Garza keeps Brooklyn in the [S]tate of Louisiana,” the joint custody

arrangement would continue.

Best Interest of the Child - Louisiana Civil Code Article 134

The trial court specifically found for written reasons “that continuing this

arrangement with this modification is in the best interest of the child.” First, the trial

court found that “both parties demonstrated that they love and care for Brooklyn,

and that they are involved in her schooling and medical care.” Citing La.Civ.Code

art. 134(A)(2) & (4).7 Further, the trial court found that both parties agreed “that

7
Louisiana Civil Code Article 134(A) provides “Factors in determining child’s best
interest,” including: “(2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the
child[,]” and “(4) [t]he capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food,
clothing, medical care, and other material needs.”

14

Brooklyn has been attending school in Negreet, Louisiana, and Ms. Garza has been

exercising visitation in Many, Louisiana since August 2021.” Citing La.Civ.Code

art. 134(A)(10) & (14). 8 Most importantly, the trial court found that the “equal

custody arrangement has been in place since December 2018, half of this six-year

old child’s life.” Citing La.Civ.Code art 134(A)(5).9 Additionally, Louisiana has a

“long-standing and codified preference for joint custody.” Citing La.Civ.Code art.

132; See also La.R.S. 9:335(A)(2)(b).

The trial court discussed the claims alleged by both Mr. Landry and Ms. Garza,

which they respectively maintained warranted a material change in circumstances.

By his argument, Mr. Landry sought sole custody of Brooklyn, whereas Ms. Garza

sought to be named the domiciliary parent. Those allegations had earlier prompted

the trial court to appoint Dr. Simoneaux to evaluate both parties.

In his custody recommendations following his Court ordered appointment, Dr.

Simoneaux expressed concern about a relationship Ms. Garza might have with a man

who had not been part of his evaluation. Mr. Landry had previously objected to

Brooklyn being in this man’s presence. Ms. Garza testified that the man worked off

(shore) and that “the relationship was not serious.” Although Dr. Simoneaux

testified that the alleged relationship troubled him, any opinion he could give as to

why the man would not appear for an evaluation would be pure speculation.

Additionally, there was no evidence admitted at the hearing confirming that Ms.

8
Louisiana Civil Code Article 134(A) provides further pertinent factors as follows: “(10)
The home, school, and community history of the child[,]” and “(14) [t]he responsibility for the
care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.”

9
Louisiana Civil Code Article 134(A)(5) requires consideration of “[t]he length of time
the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity
of that environment.”

15

Garza was still in a relationship with this man, or anyone else, or that the man has a

criminal history as alleged.

The trial court explained that Dr. Simoneaux described Ms. Garza as “highly-

sensitive, impulsive, and prone to paranoia and delusions.” He was also concerned

with Ms. Garza’s “lack of adherence to court orders and the fact that she had not

relocated to be closer to Brooklyn.” We again note, however, that it was Mr.

Landry’s decision to move to Many, Louisiana. The trial court remarked that, with

regard to Mr. Landry’s specific allegation that Ms. Garza abuses alcohol, Dr.

Simoneaux did not administer a test related to alcohol abuse, but expressed little

concern.

The trial court reported, however, that Dr. Simoneaux “expressed concern

over Mr. Landry’s criticism of Ms. Garza and [his] obsession with money.”

However, Mr. Landry admitted in his interview with Dr. Simoneaux that Ms. Garza

was a good mother.

In regard to Ms. Garza’s allegations that “Mr. Landry has abused [her] and/or

Brooklyn, Dr. Simoneaux expressed little concern.” The trial court determined that

Dr. Simoneaux stated “that Mr. Landry did not show signs of psychological

problems that would support the grave allegations of abuse.”

In conclusion, after reviewing Dr. Simoneaux’s recommendations, the trial

court found as follows:

In the face of these problematic behaviors and the rather
tumultuous relationship between the parents, Dr. Simoneaux
repeatedly expressed the importance of the involvement of both
parents in Brooklyn’s life, as well as his belief that the equal
physical custody schedule should remain in place. He made
clear “[he has] no doubt that both of them very much love this
child.” In fact, Dr. Simoneaux suggested that the parents live on the
same property to facilitate their shared custody arrangement.
Therefore, while the Court acknowledges that concerning events and

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behaviors have arisen in this family in the past, particularly with
respect to Ms. Garza, the Court continues the shared custody
arrangement the parties have followed since the Texas judgment
was rendered, with Ms. Garza to exercise physical custody in
Louisiana.

(First emphasis added.) (Alteration in the original.)

Mr. Landry argues that the trial court committed legal error by finding that

joint custody was to be maintained, especially in light of Ms. Garza’s alleged failure

to establish a legal residence in Louisiana, and her not having sufficient resources to

support Brooklyn during her weeks of physical custody. We do not agree. We here

note that if Mr. Landry had followed the Court Order for child support in Docket

Number 22-374 discussed infra, Ms. Garza would have had sufficient income and

resources. He certainly had more than sufficient resources to do so.

As seen above, the trial court’s ruling does not require Ms. Garza to establish

a permanent legal residence in Louisiana, only that Ms. Garza’s physical custody of

Brooklyn was to be exercised in Louisiana. It does not go unnoticed that Ms. Garza

had to resort to having DCFS sue Mr. Landry for a determination of child support,

which led to a finding that he was substantially in arrears in the amount of $45,595.24,

as determined by the District Court Hearing Officer, and as of this date the amount

due is approximately $69,792.52.10 This is especially troubling given the District

Court Hearing Officer’s observation that Mr. Landry’s average monthly income was

conservatively found to be $57,064.00.

Based on the ruling of the trial court in the child support dispute, and assuming

that Mr. Landry actually pays the support ordered, Ms. Garza should now have

sufficient resources to support Brooklyn during her weeks of physical custody in a

10
This amount included two payments of $800.00 the Hearing Officer found was paid by
Mr. Landry toward his child support obligation.

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suitable residence. The record reflects that despite the hardships imposed by the lack

of child support, and her lack of sufficient resources, Ms. Garza has maintained a

close and loving relationship with Brooklyn since 2018 when Mr. Landry moved

with Brooklyn to Louisiana. We therefore leave the trial court’s custody

arrangement undisturbed.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons the trial court’s Final Judgment, in Docket Number

22-374, dated February 14, 2022, setting the amount of child support payments due

from Mr. David Landry for his minor daughter, Brooklyn Taylor Landry, at

$3,049.66 per month, retroactive to October 23, 2020 is affirmed in its entirety. We

assess legal interest from October 23, 2020 on all arrears until paid. In addition, the

trial court’s Judgment, in Docket Number 22-375, also dated February 14, 2022,

modifying the Texas Judgment with respect to a determination of shared child

custody for the minor child, Brooklyn Taylor Landry, is also affirmed in its entirety.

All costs of this appeal are assessed to Mr. David Landry.

AFFIRMED.

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