Estate of Opal Stella Reeves Viola v. Cynthia Angona Lacassin Guillory

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-497

ESTATE OF OPAL STELLA REEVES VIOLA

VERSUS

CYNTHIA ANGONA LACASSIN GUILLORY

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 20-1296
HONORABLE A. GERARD CASWELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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CHARLES G. FITZGERALD
JUDGE

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Court composed of D. Kent Savoie, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Gary J. Ortego,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Savoie, Judge, dissents and assigns reasons.

Bruce A. Gaudin
100 West Bellevue Street
Opelousas, Louisiana 70570
(337) 948-3818
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Estate of Opal Stella Reeves Viola

Brad P. Scott
Jane C. Alvarez
Kayla Martynenko
William C. Charbonnet
Kameron P. Whitmeyer
Scott Vicknair, LLC
909 Poydras Street, Suite 2025
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
(504) 264-1057
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Cynthia Angona Lacassin Guillory

FITZGERALD, Judge.

Here, the plaintiff, the executor of the Estate of Opal Stella Reeves Viola, filed

suit on behalf of the estate against the defendant, Cynthia Angona Lacassin Guillory.

We are now asked to review whether the trial court erred in dismissing this lawsuit.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Joseph Viola and Opal Stella Reeves were married and lived in Louisiana

under the legal regime of acquets and gains. Opal died testate in 2006. Five years

later, in 2011, Opal’s succession was opened and remains under administration in

docket number 11-3860 of the 27th Judicial District Court. Oversimplifying slightly,

Opal’s grandchildren are the beneficiaries of her estate, and Joseph was not given

usufruct over Opal’s share of the former community property.

After Opal died, Joseph remained in possession of all community assets. He

sold some of the community movables, cashed in some of the certificates of deposit,

closed some of the bank accounts, and otherwise converted these community things

into cash which he spent, gave away, or used to open other accounts in his own name.

Significantly, Joseph opened three certificate-of-deposit accounts at American Bank

& Trust Company with Cynthia named as the beneficiary.

Joseph died testate in 2015. A few months later, his succession was opened

and remains under administration in docket number 15-5188 of the 27th Judicial

District Court. At the time of Joseph’s death, the former community had not been

partitioned. And shortly after his death, the funds on deposit in the three CDs were

distributed by American Bank to Cynthia. These funds totaled $216,483.91.

Three years later, in 2018, the executor of Opal’s estate filed a Petition for

Money Due against Joseph’s estate in docket number 18-3307 of the 27th Judicial

District Court. A default judgment was ultimately rendered against Joseph’s estate

“in the full sum of $251,333.27, plus interest at the legal rate from date of judicial

demand until paid in full, and for all costs of court, being one-half (½) of the funds

which were owned by Joseph Viola and Opal Stella Reeves Viola.”

Then, in March 2020, Opal’s estate filed the lawsuit that is before us on appeal.

More particularly, the executor filed a Petition for Money Due against Cynthia in

docket number 20-1296 of the 27th Judicial District Court. The suit seeks a money

judgment in the amount of $216,483.91, representing the total distributions received

by Cynthia from the three American Bank CDs. The matter proceeded to trial on

May 9, 2022, and the case was submitted on stipulated facts. The trial court

dismissed all claims against Cynthia. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Opal’s estate asserts two assignments of error:

1. The trial judge was clearly wrong when he ruled that the
Certificates of Deposit were not owned by Joseph Viola at the
time of his death.

2. The trial judge was clearly wrong when he ruled that the Estate
of Opal Stella Reeves Viola, a judgment creditor of the Estate of
Joseph Viola, could not make a claim against Cynthia Angona
Lacassin Guillory, who was in possession of funds from
Certificates of Deposit as a result of payable on death provisions.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

“In cases submitted on stipulated facts there are no factual findings by the trial

court. Therefore, appellate review is limited to questions of law and should focus

on whether the judgment of the district court was legally correct or legally incorrect.”

Dubroc v. Allen Parish Police Jury, 97-1585, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir., 4/8/98), 711 So.2d.

381, 382, writ denied, 98-1131 (La. 6/5/98), 720 So.2d 688. Because the case before

us was submitted on stipulated facts, we will review both assignments de novo.

In essence, this is a collection suit. Opal’s estate obtained a money judgment

against Joseph’s estate in the amount of $251,333.27 which it now seeks to enforce

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against Cynthia, a third party. The action against Cynthia is governed by

La.Civ.Code art. 1419. That article states:

When there is an administration and a creditor asserts and
establishes his claim after payment has been made to other creditors or
distribution of the estate in whole or in part has been made to successors
pursuant to a court order, the claim of the creditor must be satisfied in
the following order: first, from the assets remaining under
administration in the estate; next, from the successors to whom
distribution has been made; and then from unsecured creditors who
received payments, in proportion to the amounts received by them, but
in this event the creditor may not recover more than his share.

Opal’s estate alleges that Cynthia received distributions from Joseph’s estate

totaling $216,483.91. The subject assets are specifically the funds from three CDs

opened by Joseph and made payable on death to Cynthia. Louisiana Revised

Statutes 6:314 addresses payable-on-death accounts. In relevant part, La.R.S. 6:314

states:

A. Upon the death of a depositor who has deposited a sum in any
bank account evidencing by the depositor’s signature an intention that
upon the death of the depositor, the funds shall belong to one or more
named beneficiaries of the depositor, the bank may pay the deposit,
together with the dividends or interest accruing thereto, to the named
beneficiaries for whom the deposit was made. Upon receiving a death
certificate, the bank may disburse funds to the named beneficiaries.
The beneficiaries shall be specifically named in the deposit account
records of the bank.

B. The title of such an account must include the terms “in trust
for”, “as trustee for”, or “payable on death to”, such beneficiary or
beneficiaries. Such beneficiaries must be specifically named in the
deposit account records of the bank.

....

E. No bank paying a beneficiary in accordance with this Section
shall be liable to the estate or any heir of the decedent nor shall the
account holder be liable for any estate, inheritance, or succession taxes
which may be due the state, and delivery of the funds shall constitute a
full and complete discharge of the bank for the payment or delivery so
made and shall relieve the bank from all adverse claims thereto by a
person claiming as a surviving or former spouse or a successor to such
a spouse. No tax collector, creditor, heir, legatee, personal

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representative, or any other person shall have any right or cause of
action against the financial institution on account of such payment, and
R.S. 47:2410 shall not apply to such cases.

F. The provisions of this Section shall apply notwithstanding the
fact the decedent designates a beneficiary by last will and testament.
The provisions of this Section shall not prohibit any right of forced
heirship or the collation or collection of funds due to any spouse, heir,
legatee, creditor, or other person having rights or claims to funds of the
deceased depositor.

We now turn our attention to the specific assignments of error asserted by

Opal’s succession.

First Assignment of Error

The succession initially contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that

the CDs were not owned by Joseph at the time of his death. In this first assignment,

Opal’s estate appears to be appealing the trial court’s oral reasons for judgment

rather than the judgment itself. The judgment merely dismisses all claims asserted

by the estate against Cynthia.

But even still, the transcript reveals that there was never a finding by the trial

court that the payable-on-death accounts were not owned by Joseph at the time of

his death. Instead, the trial court notes several times that Opal’s estate failed to

address any of this in Joseph’s succession proceeding. In other words, Opal’s estate

did not adjudicate in Joseph’s succession proceeding whether the payable-on-death

accounts are assets of Joseph’s estate, nor did Opal’s estate point to any order from

that proceeding which addresses the classification or distribution of the funds from

these accounts. 1

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In addition, the issue of whether the subject accounts were community property was not
addressed in the 2018 lawsuit. And any rights that Opal’s beneficiaries may have had under
Louisiana Matrimonial Regimes Law appear to have been merged into the money judgment.

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Importantly, the trial court below was not asked to declare or adjudicate

whether the payable-on-death accounts were assets of Joseph’s estate. Opal’s estate

did not ask for this relief in its petition, and the petition was not enlarged at trial.

(The case was submitted on stipulated facts, and the stipulated facts mirror the

allegations pleaded in the petition.) Furthermore, if Opal’s estate had requested this

relief, the executor of Joseph’s estate would have been a necessary party to this

litigation. La.Code Civ.P. art. 734.

For these reasons, the first assignment of error is without merit.

Second Assignment of Error

In its second assignment of error, Opal’s estate contends that the trial court

erred in ruling that “the Estate of Opal Stella Reeves Viola, a judgment creditor of

the Estate of Joseph Viola, could not make a claim against Cynthia Angona Lacassin

Guillory, who was in possession of funds from Certificates of Deposit as a result of

payable on death provisions.”

The essential question here is whether the Estate of Opal established the

essential elements of La.Civ.Code art. 1419. Among other things, this statute

mandates the order by which claims of succession creditors may be satisfied. The

record before us reveals that Joseph’s succession is still open and under

administration, that the payable-on-death accounts (or funds distributed therefrom)

have not been listed or found to be assets of his estate, and that no judgment of

possession has been issued. Indeed, there is no evidence that any of Joseph’s estate

assets have been distributed to any of his successors.

In the end, the Estate of Opal has failed to establish that it has a cognizable

action as judgment creditor against Cynthia. The essential elements of Article 1419

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were simply not proven. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the estate’s

lawsuit.

DECREE

For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of

this appeal are assessed to Joey Angona, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of

Opal Stella Reeves Viola.

AFFIRMED.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-497

ESTATE OF OPAL STELLA REEVES VIOLA

VERSUS

CYNTHIA ANGONA LACASSIN GUILLORY

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SAVOIE, J. dissents and assigns written reasons.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. I would reverse the trial

court’s judgment, which found in favor of Cynthia Angona Lacassin Guillory and

dismissed the lawsuit against her.

Opal’s estate contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that the

Certificate of Deposit Accounts (CDs) were not owned by Joseph Viola at the time

of his death. The majority opines that the trial court did not make a finding that the

CDs were not owned by Joseph at the time of his death, because it was not

specifically stated in the judgment. I disagree.

The judgment in this case renders judgment in favor of Cynthia and dismisses

all claims asserted against her. It makes no findings of fact. In its oral ruling, the

trial court specifically states, “I don’t believe that the funds that were Payable on

Death[,] were part of the decedent’s estate.” The trial court further states, “I find

that the [payable-on-death] funds were never brought into the Estate of Joseph

Viola.” While it is true that written and oral reasons do not form part of the

judgment, an appellate court is entitled to use the trial court’s reasons to gain insight

into the judgment. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507. “A

trial court’s reasons for judgment may elucidate the trial court’s thought process

when reaching factual findings.” Keo v. Heng, 22-130, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/26/22),

___So.3d___, ___ n.9. Accordingly, in my opinion, the trial court made a finding

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of fact in its oral ruling that Joseph did not own the CDs at the time of his death.

This finding led the trial court to rule in favor of Cynthia. Further, based on the

record and law, this finding of fact is erroneous.

First, the parties entered seven stipulations into the record. Stipulation

Number Seven states, “Subsequent to the death of Joseph Viola, Cynthia Angona

Lacassin Guillory withdrew $216,483.91 from three accounts at American Bank that

were owned by Joseph Viola at the time of his death.” Stipulation Number Seven

then lists the three American Bank & Trust Company Certificate of Deposit accounts

at issue in this case. “A stipulation has the effect of a judicial admission or

confession, which binds all parties and the court.” Ellis v. Heinzen, 22-67, p. 12

(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/26/22), ___So.3d___, ___, writ denied, 22-1710 (La. 1/25/23),

___So.3d___ (quoting R.J. D’Hemecourt Petroleum, Inc. v. McNamara, 444 So.2d

600, 601 (La.1983) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820, 105 S.Ct. 92, 83

L.Ed.2d 39 (1984). A stipulation is law of the case. Id.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 872 defines an “estate” as:

The estate of a deceased means the property, rights, and
obligations that a person leaves after his death, whether the property
exceeds the charges or the charges exceed the property, or whether he
has only left charges without any property. The estate includes not only
the rights and obligations of the deceased as they exist at the time of
death, but all that has accrued thereto since death, and the new charges
to which it becomes subject.

It has been stipulated that Joseph owned the accounts at the time of his death.

Therefore, and in accordance with La.Civ.Code art. 872, the CDs are part of Joseph’s

estate. Consequently, I find the trial court erred when it found that the CDs were not

owned by Joseph Viola at the time of his death and had to be “brought into the

estate.”

While this issue was not addressed in the majority opinion, I find that Opal’s

estate has a right of action to bring this suit against Cynthia. The CDs at issue were

opened by Joseph with presumably community funds. Upon Opal’s death, one-half

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of their community funds were owned by her estate. Therefore, one-half of the

money used to open the CDs was owned by Opal’s estate. Joseph did not have

usufruct over this money. Cynthia was named as the payable-on-death beneficiary

for the CDs. Louisiana Revised Statutes 6:314 is the relevant statute for payable-

on-death accounts. This statute absolves the bank of any liability or adverse claim

against it by a creditor for disbursement of the funds in the account. La.R.S.

6:314(E). However, La.R.S. 6:314(F) (emphasis added) specifically states that

“[t]he provisions of this Section shall not prohibit any right of forced heirship or the

collation or collection of funds due to any spouse, heir, legatee, creditor, or other

person having rights or claims to funds of the deceased depositor.”

The statute is clear that any creditor with claims to the funds in the account

has a right to collect those funds. Joseph is deceased, and the funds at issue are now

in Cynthia’s possession. Opal’s estate is a creditor with a “claim[ ] to funds of the

deceased depositor,” having obtained a money judgment against Joseph’s estate in

the amount of $251,333.27, plus interest and costs.

In its oral ruling, the trial court finds that Opal’s estate does not have a cause

of action based on La.Civ.Code art. 961. Louisiana Civil Code Article 961 relates

to the effect of acceptance of a succession. It states, “Acceptance obligates the

successor to pay estate debts in accordance with the provisions of this Title and other

applicable laws.” Cynthia did not receive the funds at issue in this case through

Joseph’s succession. They were transferred to her, and she received them as the

payable-on-death beneficiary, also known as a non-probatable asset, albeit still

assets. As such, La.Civ.Code art. 961 does not apply to this case.

Further, the majority opinion finds that Opal’s estate “has failed to establish

that it has a cognizable cause of action as judgment creditor against Cynthia.” This

conclusion is based on La.Civ.Code art. 1419, which states:

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When there is an administration and a creditor asserts and
establishes his claim after payment has been made to other creditors
or distribution of the estate in whole or in part has been made to
successors pursuant to a court order, the claim of the creditor must be
satisfied in the following order: first, from the assets remaining under
administration in the estate; next, from the successors to whom
distribution has been made; and then from unsecured creditors who
received payments, in proportion to the amounts received by them, but
in this event the creditor may not recover more than his share.

(Emphasis added.)

It is my opinion that the majority misconstrues the petition’s allegations and

the relief sought. The petition does not allege that petitioner is a judgment creditor

of Cynthia, rather it alleges that “Petitioner is a Judgment Creditor of the Estate of

Joseph Viola.”

Further, Cynthia argues that Joseph’s estate “is currently still open and under

administration” and “there has been no judgment of possession issued by the Court

in the succession making any distribution of estate assets to any heirs.” As such,

La.Civ.Code art. 1419 also does not apply to this matter. Louisiana Civil Code

Article 1419 only applies when a creditor asserts his claim after there has been

payment or distribution of the estate pursuant to a court order. This is supported by

the revision comments to La.Civ.Code art. 1419, which state that the article

modernizes the older version of the law, but “does not change the basic thrust of

prior law where new creditors appear after distribution is made.” (Emphasis

added.) See La.Civ.Code arts. 1067 and 1068 of the Civil Code of 1870.

Regardless of whether La.Civ.Code art. 1419 applies, that issue should have

been raised as an exception of prematurity by Cynthia in the trial court. It was not.

An exception of prematurity is a dilatory exception that must be filed prior to or in

the answer. La.Code Civ.P. art. 928. The prematurity objection is waived unless

pleaded therein. La.Code Civ.P. art. 926. The court may not supply the exception

of prematurity.

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Opal’s estate is a judgment creditor of Joseph’s estate, pursuant to a judgment

rendered on November 4, 2019. The funds at issue were part of Joseph’s estate at

the time of his death, and they are now in Cynthia’s possession. Opal’s estate has a

right to bring this claim and has a valid cause of action. For these reasons, I would

reverse the trial court and render judgment in favor of the Estate of Opal Stella

Reeves Viola.

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