Christian Blaine Perkins v. Dusty King

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-547

CHRISTIAN BLAINE PERKINS

VERSUS

DUSTY KING, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ALLEN, NO. C-2020-189
HONORABLE ERROL DAVID DESHOTELS, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Candyce G. Perret, and Sharon Darville
Wilson, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Connor C. Headrick
B. Gene Taylor III
Gold, Weems, Bruser, Sues & Rundell
2001 MacArthur Drive
P. O. Box 6118
Alexandria, LA 71307-6118
(318) 445-6471
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Christian Blaine Perkins

Frank M. Walker, Jr.
Plauche, Smith & Nieset, LLC
1123 Pithon Street
Lake Charles, LA 70605
(337) 436-0522
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company

Michael H. Schwartzberg
Larry A. Roach, Inc.
2917 Ryan St.
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 433-8504
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS:
Kyle King
Don King

Craig Ray Hill
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 1260
Oberlin, LA 70655
(337) 639-2127
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT:
Tammie Maricle

S. Christie Smith, IV
Smith Bush, LLP
P.O. Box 1528
Leesville, LA 71496
(337) 239-2244
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT:
Danny Willis

Charles A. Sam Jones, III
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 995
DeRidder, La 70634
(337) 463-5532
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS:
Dusty King
Kammie King

Romelzy Willis, Jr
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 1368
Oberlin, LA 70655
(337) 639-4600
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT:
Jalyn Sumney

Chad Guidry
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 447
Kinder, LA 70648
(337) 738-2280
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT:
Sandra Suydan

Macy Willis
In Proper Person
2220 Highway 399
Pitkin, LA 70656
DEFENDANT:
Macy Willis

Regan LaFauci
In Proper Person
3041 Ten Mile Road
Pitkin, LA 70656
DEFENDANT:
Regan LaFauci

GREMILLION, Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant, Christian Blaine Perkins, appeals the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company,

the homeowner Defendant-Appellee’s insurer, finding that there were no genuine

issues of fact that its policy did not provide coverage to Perkins. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Perkins attended a wedding reception at the home of Dusty and Kammie King,

Farm Bureau’s insureds. There is no dispute that later in the evening, Perkins was

beaten by the Kings and seven or more other wedding guests. Perkins managed to

initially escape the home on foot but, unfortunately, arrived at the home of Kammie’s

sister, Regan LaFauci, only to be returned to the Kings’ residence by her despite his

pleas for help. Dusty King’s own deposition testimony is undisputed that Kammie

pulled Perkins out of the car and began punching him with her husband and the other

guests joining in to punch, kick, and stomp Perkins−Dusty even admitting to biting

him−causing Perkins to suffer a broken nose, fractured jaw and right eye socket, and

other injuries.

Perkins filed suit against the Kings, the other assailants 1 , and the King’s

insurer, Farm Bureau, in June 2020, alleging:

4.
The Assailants committed the intentional torts of assault, battery,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress when they, without
cause or provocation, severely beat Plaintiff.

....

1
The other defendants besides the Kings include: Macy Willis, Regan LaFauci, Tammie
Maricle, Sandra Suydan, Jalynn Sumney, Danny Willis, Don King, and Kyle King.

8.

After this confrontation, Macy [one of the eight assailants] . . .
falsely and baselessly stated to multiple people at the reception that
Plaintiff was physically harming [his girlfriend]. Upon information and
belief, Macy made these false statements to persuade individuals at the
reception to assault Plaintiff. . . .

9.

Immediately after Macy made these false allegations, [the 8
assailants including the Kings] came outside and rushed toward
Plaintiff to physically attack him. [The Assailants] tore Plaintiff’s shirt
from his body before he was finally able to extricate himself from the
attack.

Once Plaintiff was returned to the King’s residence by LaFauci, he alleged in

his petition:

14.

All of the Assailants . . . then proceeded to beat Plaintiff. They
struck, punched, kicked, and stomped Plaintiff – attacking him across
his entire body – as he lay on the ground. The Assailants’ attack broke
Plaintiff’s nose, fractured his jaw on both sides, fractured his right eye
socket and broke his left eye socket. The Assailants’ attack caused the
cartilage in Plaintiff’s sternum to shift and lacerated his back. Dusty
[King] bit Plaintiff on the neck and arm, tearing skin and muscle. The
Assailants struck Plaintiff repeatedly, and for an extended period of
time.

....

20.

The Assault was caused by the legal fault of the Defendants, including
the following particulars:

A. Battering Plaintiff by intentionally inflicting
harmful and offensive physical contact upon [him] without
his consent;

B. Assaulting Plaintiff by intentionally placing him in
reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery and
corresponding injury.

2

25.

Upon information and belief, at the time of the Attack, there was in full
force and effect a policy of homeowner’s insurance issued by [Farm
Bureau], providing insurance coverage to Dusty King which by [the]
terms and conditions of the policy, [Farm Bureau] assumes liability for
damages as sued for herein.

26.

Upon information and belief, Dusty King[2] negligently allowed and
enabled the Assault to take place on his property by failing to prevent
the foreseeable Assault, and this negligence caused the injuries to
Plaintiff enumerated hereinabove.

Farm Bureau filed an answer to the petition, denying that the policy provided

coverage and further denying that Perkins’s injuries were caused by or arose from

the negligence of Dusty or Kammie King. Instead, Farm Bureau stated that

Perkins’s injuries were “caused by and arose ou[t] of the intentional actions

constituting an attack[,] beating, kicking, assault, biting, harassment and abuse of

plaintiff by multiple assailants which included intentional attacks and assaults by

Dusty King and Kammie King upon plaintiff.” Farm Bureau denied coverage

because there was no “occurrence’ within the terms of the policy as there was no

“accident,” and policy exclusions precluded coverage because the acts were

intentional.

In February 2022, Farm Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment alleging

that there was no genuine issue that its policy did not provide coverage. Perkins

conceded that the intentional acts by the Kings were not covered but argued that the

Kings negligently allowed eight other individuals to foreseeably assault him.

Following a hearing on the motion in April 2022, the trial court granted summary

2
In an amended petition, paragraph 26 was amended to read “Dusty King and Kammie
King” . . .
3

judgment in favor of Farm Bureau in a May 2022 judgment. Perkins now appeals

and assigns as error:

The trial court erred in granting Farm Bureau’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismissing Mr. Perkins’ claims against Farm bureau
based on the negligence of the Insured Defendants.

DISCUSSION

The law pertaining to summary judgment was discussed by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in its per curiam opinion in Hines v. Garrett,
04-806, p. 1 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765 (alteration in original):

We review a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, viewing the record and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. Summary judgment is
warranted only if “there is no genuine issue as to material
fact and [ ] the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” La.Code Civ.Proc. art. 966(C)(1). In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the judge’s role is not to
evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the
truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there
is a genuine issue of triable fact. All doubts should be
resolved in the non-moving party’s favor.

“[F]acts are material if they potentially insure or preclude
recovery, affect a litigant’s ultimate success, or determine the outcome
of the legal dispute.” Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-
2512, p.27 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751, (quoting South Louisiana
Bank v. Williams, 591 So.2d 375, 377 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1991), writs
denied, 596 So.2d 211 (La.1992) (alteration in original). A genuine
issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable
persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on
that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id.

Whether a fact is material is determined in light of the relevant
substantive law. Weingartner v. La. IceGators, 02-1181 (La.App. 3 Cir.
4/17/03), 854 So.2d 898, writ denied, 03-1388 (La. 9/19/03), 853 So.2d
645.

Thibodeaux v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 20-540, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/21), 318 So.3d

465, 467.

Insurance Policy Interpretation

Whether an insurance contract provides coverage is generally a legal question

ripe for summary judgment procedure. Motorola, Inc. v. Associated Indem. Corp.,
4

02-716 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/25/04), 878 So.2d 824, writs denied, 04-2314, 04-2323,

04-2326, 04-2327 (La. 11/19/04), 888 So.2d 207, 211, 212. However, summary

judgment relating to coverage questions should not be granted “unless there is no

reasonable interpretation of the policy, when applied to the undisputed material facts

shown by the evidence supporting the motion, under which coverage could be

afforded.” Id. at 829.

An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed

employing the general rules of interpretation of contracts. McQuirter v. Rotolo, 11-

188 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/14/11), 77 So.3d 76. “Interpretation of a contract is the

determination of the common intent of the parties.” La.Civ.Code art. 2045. “When

the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no

further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.” La.Civ.Code art.

2046. “The words of a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning.”

La.Civ.Code art. 2047. “Words susceptible of different meanings must be

interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the object of the contract.”

La.Civ.Code art. 2048. “Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of

the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a

whole.” La.Civ.Code art. 2050.

An insurer bears the burden of proving that an exclusion applies under the

policy. La. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 616

So.2d 1250 (La.1993). Additionally, exclusionary clauses in insurance policies are

strictly construed. Calogero v. Safeway Ins. Co. of La., 99-1625 (La. 1/19/00), 753

So.2d 170. However, an insurance policy, including its exclusions, “should not be

interpreted in an unreasonable or strained manner so as to enlarge or to restrict its

provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve

an absurd conclusion.” Motorola, 878 So.2d at 829.
5

Farm Bureau’s policy provides liability coverage as follows:

SECTION II- LIABILITY COVERAGES

COVERAGE E- PERSONAL LIABILITY

IF a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages
because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an
occurrence to which this coverage applies, we will:

1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which an
insured is legally liable, except punitive and/or exemplary damages.

An occurrence is defined in the policy as:

7. “occurrence” means an accident, including exposure to conditions,
which result in:

a. bodily injury; or
b. property damage

The policy then provides for exlucsions:

SECTION II – EXCLUSIONS

....

1. Coverage E – Personal Liability and Coverage F – Medical
Payments to Others do not apply to bodily injury or property
damages:

a. resulting from intentional acts or directions by you or any insured.
The expected or unexpected results of these acts or directions are
not covered.

The trial court granted summary judgment at the conclusion of the hearing and stated:

In the Court’s opinion calling a[n] intentional act negligent enabling is
too big a bait for the Court to swallow. The Court finds that these
damages were obviously from intentional beatings. And by stating that
they were as a result of some form of negligence is going further than
the Court . . . will permit. . . . [T]he Court finds that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, even though there may be fifty versions of how
the fight occurred, to me that is of no moment. That is not material
issues of fact that the Court would consider that would prevent such a
motion for summary judgment.

We agree with the trial court and affirm its grant of summary judgment in favor of

Farm Bureau.

6

Liability

Citing several cases from the 1980s and Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99-

1222 (La. 11/30/99), 752 So.2d 762, Perkins first argues that social hosts can be

liable for negligence for failing to prevent the intentional torts of third parties. In

Posecai, the plaintiff was robbed at gunpoint in the parking lot of a Sam’s store.

Plaintiff argued that Sam’s should have provided a security detail outside of the store

because a neighboring area was known to be a high-crime area. The trial court found

the robbery was foreseeable and could have been prevented if a security detail had

been provided by Sam’s in the parking lot. The Supreme Court undertook a duty-

risk analysis to determine whether Sam’s owed a duty to plaintiff and set forth that

a business does have a duty to protect patrons from foreseeable criminal acts of third

parties. The supreme court noted, however, that there generally is no duty to protect

patrons from criminal acts of third parties. The supreme court concluded that a

balancing test was the best method to determine the duty owed by a business and

requires a case-by-case analysis of the facts stating: “The foreseeability of the crime

risk on the defendant’s property and the gravity of the risk determine the existence

and the extent of the defendant’s duty.” Id. at 768. The court found that Sam’s owed

no duty to plaintiff to provide security because the crime was not foreseeable.

Employing this method, we find there is no genuine issue of material fact that

this crime was not reasonably foreseeable from a duty-risk standpoint. Is it

reasonably foreseeable that a gang of ten adults at a wedding reception will

administer a severe beating to a man who has managed to escape after being chased

but is unknowingly brought back to the reception by the homeowner’s sister and

removed from the vehicle by the homeowner wife who begins hitting plaintiff with

eight other individuals thereafter joining in? We think not. More succinctly, the

Posecai rationale does not apply to situations in which the insureds participate in the
7

criminal activity. The Posecai rationale involves repetitive criminal activity at a

place of business, not the very particular circumstances presented in this case.

Moreover, the analysis of whether a homeowner is negligent under these

circumstances must focus on the social policy that would be advanced by finding

that homeowners who admittedly intentionally engaged in an assault with a large

group of others owed a duty to prevent their co-conspirators from engaging in the

assault. This result defies logic because of the criminal actions of the party to whom

a duty is assessed. Purely from a social policy standpoint, the intentional criminal

acts of the homeowners and their cohorts necessarily eliminate any duty that can be

based in negligence. Otherwise, a homeowner would have an incentive to have

others commit crimes against third-parties on their properties in order to avoid the

intentional act exclusion present in every liability policy written. This reasoning is

further supported by the holding in Hewitt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 98-221 (La.App. 4

Cir. 1/27/99), 726 So.2d 1120. In Hewitt, a negligent supervision claim was

excluded (the minor who was negligently supervised was, however, an “insured”

under the policy), because “[t]he focus of the policy exclusion is on the cause of the

damages, not the cause of action alleged. All damages caused by intentional acts

are excluded, regardless of the classification of the cause of action against the

individual defendants.” Id. at 1124-25. A party cannot circumvent the intentional

act exclusion by rephrasing the intentional acts as negligence. Id.

The other cases cited by Perkins are similarly inapplicable to these unusual

circumstances and only stand for the proposition that a homeowner could,

theoretically, be liable for the intentional act of a third-party to its guest. In

Broussard v. Peltier, 499 So.2d 1026 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1986), the homeowner sister

of the plaintiff owed no duty to the plaintiff to prevent the third-party ex-boyfriend

from assaulting her while the homeowner was asleep. Notably, the homeowner did
8

not participate in the assault. In Blackledge v. Font, 06-1092 (La.App. 1 Cir.

3/23/07), 960 So.2d 99, the Fonts hosted an end-of-the-school-year party for their

son. A guest at the party was playing a competitive game of basketball and punched

the plaintiff in the face. The parents owed no duty to the plaintiff because the guest’s

actions were unforeseeable. Again, the insured homeowners did not participate in

the assault. In Clement v. Armoniet, 527 So.2d 1004 (La.App. 5th Cir.), writ denied,

531 So.2d 475 (La.1988), the homeowner parents were away, and their eighteen-

year-old son threw a party at which alcohol was served to minors. The son broke up

a fight and, thereafter, went upstairs; however, other subsequent fights broke out

between the teenagers, and the defendant guest karate-kicked plaintiff, injuring him.

The insured son was assessed 50% fault essentially for failing to end the party after

the first fight and for serving alcohol to minors. The apportionment of fault was

affirmed by the appellate court. Notably, the insured son was not involved in any of

the fights.

Perkins alleges there are genuine issues of fact whether the homeowners knew

their guests would assault Perkins when he was returned by LaFauci; in other words,

that it was foreseeable by the Kings. For the reasons already noted, we find this to

be irrelevant when the insureds were active participants in an intentional assault.

Perkins further claims there are seven disputed material facts.3 For the reasons noted

3
Perkins claims the following facts are material: Farm Bureau’s Material Fact: 1) Plaintiff
did not receive any ‘accidental’ injuries on the subject evening of 10/20/2019 at the King residence
such that whatever injuries he did receive arose out of the assault/altercation/attack/abuse/physical
molestation which was not an accident and which was intentional such that there is no coverage
for the injuries arising out of those actions.
1) Mr. Perkins was assaulted twice, at two separate times, on October 19-20, 2019. 2) Eight
guests on the Insured Defendant’s property participated in the Assaults against Mr. Perkins. 3)
Multiple guests of the Insured Defendant assaulted and chased Mr. Perkins away from the Property
during the First Assault. 4) Between the First Assault and the Second Assault, the Insured
Defendants negligently took insufficient action to prevent the Second Assault. 5) The Insured
Defendants failed to sufficiently monitor or limit the consumption of alcohol by guests on their
property. 6) The Insured Defendants did not instigate, cause, or direct the other guests’ intentional
torts in either the First Assault or the Second Assault.
9

by the trial court, none of these “facts” bear relevance when there is no dispute that

the homeowners and their guests intentionally assaulted the victim in concert with

each other. Which guest threw which punch, kick, bite, or stomp is immaterial.

Whether it was seven or eight guests, whether Kammie “started it” when she drug

Perkins out of the car or someone else did is also irrelevant.

While this analysis is more properly addressed in the policy exclusions

analysis, we address it here to be certain that a negligent “enabling” claim will not

survive when all of the parties, including the insureds have intentionally committed

criminal acts. The only “enabling” occurring in this case was the intentional

enabling of the homeowners who, with a group of their guests, assaulted Perkins.

Furthermore, as discussed below, this policy would provide no coverage as this was

not an “occurrence” under the policy terms of this particular insurance contract.

Occurrence

Perkins argues that intentional assaults are accidents because whether an

incident constitutes an accident is based on whether the event was expected “from

the perspective of the victim.” We disagree. Perkins cites a portion of a Louisiana

Civil Law Treatise relating to Commercial General Liability Polices (CGL) for this

proposition:

The courts have held that whether a claim results from an
“accident” will be determined from the viewpoint of the victim. If the
injury was unforeseen and unexpected by the victim, then his injury
results from an accident.

15 La.Civ.Law Treatise, Insurance Law & Practice §6:7 (William Shelby McKenzie

and H. Alston Johnson, III).

In a footnote, the cases Perkins relies on in brief and discussed below are

mentioned. However, the rest of the section goes on to describe instances where the

10

courts have deemed an occurrence an “accident” from the victim’s viewpoint under

a CGL policy (emphasis added):

Intentional Injury. The comprehensive general liability policy
precluded coverage for intentional injuries by excluding such injuries
from the definition of “occurrence.” The definition of an “occurrence”
includes only “bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured.” Rather than placing the
intentional injury exclusion in the definition of occurrence, the 1986
Commercial General Liability Policy uses an express exclusion.
Exclusions for intentional injury are discussed generally in § 5:5, supra,
which should be reviewed in conjunction with this section. This section
will deal only with particular applications of the intentional injury
exclusion in commercial liability policies.

The jurisprudence, and particularly the leading cases of Rivers v. Brown
[168 So.2d 400 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1964)]and Baltzar v. Williams [254
So.2d 470 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1971)], establish the proposition that an
intentional injury inflicted by an employee does not preclude coverage
for the vicarious liability of the employer. An exclusion for injury
expected or intended by the insured must be read from the viewpoint of
the insured claiming coverage, the employer. Both Rivers and Baltzar
involved assaults committed by corporate employees in the course of
their employment. Their intentional acts were held not to be the
intentional act of the corporation, even though the employee in Rivers
was the president and principal shareholder of the corporation.

Cases have found the exclusion applicable to misconduct of corporate
insureds. The insured in Thibodeaux v. Western World Ins. Co. was a
lumber company held liable for an intentional trespass in deliberately
going on adjoining land and harvesting timber without permission. The
court held that coverage for such willful act was excluded under the
definition of “occurrence” in the lumber company’s CGL policy. The
court did not discuss who authorized the trespass or how the decision
was made, but the court’s opinion clearly implied a management
decision to engage knowingly in such unauthorized activity. Also, the
court did not discuss the vicarious liability cases such as Rivers and
Baltzar.

These issues were specifically dealt with in Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller
Oil Purchasing Co., a federal Fifth Circuit opinion which adopted the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the district court. That court
found that a company which had contracted to dispose of a hazardous
waste resembling crude oil knowingly introduced this waste into
Ashland’s pipeline, which resulted in corrosive damage to Ashland’s
refinery. The court found that the insured’s management was aware of
the plan to dispose of the hazardous waste and of its corrosive
properties, and therefore the resulting property damage was expected
or intended by the corporate insured. The court distinguished Rivers
and Baltzar as involving the unauthorized, reflexive intentional acts of
11

individual employees. Instead, the Ashland case involved a pre-
concerted plan carried out by the management of the corporate insured.
Both Thibodeaux and Ashland are appropriate applications of the
intentional injury exclusion to corporate activities. Coverage for
injuries resulting from a management decision to engage knowingly in
a business activity which will inflict such injury should be excluded.
Id.

Section 5:5 under the “Personal Liability Coverage” section is titled

“Exclusion of intentional injury and related exclusions” and states:

Liability policies generally exclude coverage for bodily injury and
property damage which are intentionally inflicted. Such an exception
to coverage may appear as a specific exclusion. For example, many
earlier homeowners policies provided that the policy does not apply “to
bodily injury or property damage which is either expected or intended
from the standpoint of the insured.” Other policies, written on an
occurrence basis, excluded intentional conduct in the definition of an
“occurrence,” which is defined to mean “an accident, including
injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy term,
in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the Insured.” Most insurers have revised their
intentional injury exclusions to restrict coverage in light of judicial
interpretations of earlier policy provisions. Also, insurers have added
additional exclusions specifically directed at certain conduct. For
example, the ISO homeowners form in Appendix D, infra, contains
express exclusions for liability arising out of communicable diseases,
sexual molestation, corporal punishment, physical or mental abuse and
controlled substances. Other policies contain an additional exclusion
for “willful and malicious acts.” Since the majority of “intentional
injury” cases have arisen under homeowners policies, this coverage
issue will be treated here, although cases involving similar exclusions
in automobile and general liability policies also are discussed. Also, this
section will cover the related “assault and battery” exclusion included
in some commercial policies.

Specific issues under automobile and CGL intentional injury exclusions
are discussed in §§ 3:37 and 6:7, respectively.

Id.

The Farm Bureau policy language does not include the “neither expected nor

intended from the standpoint of the insured” language. Most importantly, the

circumstances of the above cases could not be more distinct than those here where

the policyholder homeowner participated in the assault. Nothing in the present case

could be deemed accidental, neither from the assailants’ perspectives nor the
12

victim’s perspective. Perkins knew the gang of wedding guests were a threat to him

since he attempted to flee from them not once, but twice. If every brutal, intentional

assault was deemed an “accident,” the intentional act exclusion would be rendered

meaningless. This is not a CGL policy where, in some circumstances, for example,

an employer’s insurance policy may provide coverage for an intentional act of an

employee. The cases cited by Perkins are not applicable. Furthermore, the reasoning

set forth by McKenzie and Johnson is applicable here: When the corporate

management/homeowners knowingly engage in the intentional activity that will

inflict injury, coverage should be excluded.

In West v. City of Ville Platte, 237 So.2d 730, 732 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1970), the

policy excluded “accidents arising out of an assault or alleged assault.” The plaintiff

in West had a variety of claims including wrongful arrest and failure to render

medical aid that would properly be based in negligence. This language and the facts

are inapplicable to the case at hand. In another case cited by Perkins, Redden v. Doe,

357 So.2d 632 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1978), the plaintiff was forced off the road and ended

up in the bayou where she received injuries when the would-be robbers dragged her

out of her upside-down vehicle. The policy did not exclude intentional acts and the

opinion noted that “we are here concerned with the obligations and responsibilities

of an insurance company to its own policyholder as distinguished from the insurer’s

liability under an ordinary liability policy.” Id. at 633 (emphasis added). We find

these facts inapplicable to the ones at bar.

Finally, Perkins cites Tsolainos v. Tsolainos, 59 F.Supp.2d 592 (E.D.La.

1999). In Tsolainos, the defendant/ex-husband killed his ex-wife when he ran over

her. Although he was arrested and charged with murder, the court found that the ex-

husband’s intent was a contested genuine issue of material fact precluding summary

judgment. The court did find that the ex-husband’s intent “does not determine
13

whether there was an accident under Louisiana law,” citing the 1959 case of

Jernigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1959). Id. at 596. We note

that the Tsolainos court noted in a footnote that, “If Tsolainos pleads guilty to or is

convicted of killing the decedent, or if other sufficient evidence of Tsolainos’s intent

is adduced, the matter may then be ripe for summary judgment.” Id. at 595 n. 3. We

find this case distinguishable from the one at hand. There is no genuine issue that

the homeowners and other assailants intended to assault Perkins.

Additionally, reasonable people could not conclude that this beating was an

“accident” from Perkins’ perspective. “Accident” is a common word that need not

be defined because its meaning is widely understood as something that is unforeseen

and not intended. Dictionary.com defines accident as “an undesirable or unfortunate

happening that occurs unintentionally and usually results in harm, injury, damage,

or loss; casualty; mishap[.]” www.dictionary.com/browse/accident (Last visited

February 3, 2023). It is commonly understood that an accident is “[a]n unforeseeable

and unexpected turn of events that causes loss in value, injury, and increased

liabilities. The event is not deliberately caused and is not inevitable.”

www.thelawdictionary.org/accident. (Last visited February 3, 2023). Moreover,

intentional is an antonym for accidental. See www.thesaurus.com/browse/accidental

(Last visited February 3, 2023). Using the ordinary meaning attributed to the term

“accident,” as required by Louisiana law in interpreting words of an insurance

contract and given the undisputed facts that the homeowners and their guests

intentionally assaulted Perkins, and that Perkins was acutely aware of the impending

danger, this is not an “occurrence” under the terms of this policy. Moreover, even

assuming arguendo that this was an “accident” under Louisiana law, the intentional

act exclusion would exclude coverage under this insurance policy as discussed

below.
14

Exclusions

Here, Perkins concedes that the exclusion prohibits coverage of the Kings’

intentional beating of Perkins but argues that the Farm Bureau policy does not

exclude coverage for the Kings’ negligence, “even if the negligence relates to the

foreseeable intentional acts of third parties” because the policy language is very

specific in excluding coverage for intentional torts “by you or any insured.”

Although this issue is rendered moot by our above finding that there was no

occurrence, for the sake of argument, even assuming there was a covered “accident”

this exclusion would pretermit coverage. Based on the duty/risk analysis above,

there is no negligence in this case, only intentional acts and intentional enabling by

the homeowners and their guests. Perkins argues that “Louisiana case law supports

the proposition that an intentional acts exclusion does not exclude coverage when

the insured party was not the person who performed the intentional act,” citing

several cases like the ones above involving employers and employees, where the

insured did not commit any intentional act, but ignoring the obvious conclusion that

the insureds here did, in fact, engage in the intentional act along with their guests.4

CONCLUSION

There is no genuine issue of fact that the injuries suffered by Perkins were

intentionally caused by the insureds and their guests. To claim that the Kings, who

were admittedly active participants in the intentional beating, “negligently enabled”

eight other adults to participate exceeds the limits of common sense and is contrary

4
Perkins cites Nizzo v. Wallace, 08-525 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/25/08), 2 So.3d 441, writ denied,
08-2990 (La. 2/13/09), 999 So.2d 1150 (employee sued employer for intentional tort of employee
for vicarious liability and negligent selection and training of employees); Jones v. Doe, 95-1295
(La.App. 3 Cir. 4/24/96), 673 So.2d 1163 (school sued for intentional tort of a student); Leon Lowe
& Sons, Inc. v. Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 572 So.2d 206 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1990) (employer
is “insured,” not “employee” in vicarious liability matter for intentional tort); White v. LeGendre,
359 So.2d 652 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1978) (referencing the illegitimate child’s mother as responsible
for the torts of the minor child).
15

to the ordinary meaning of accident. Moreover, for the Kings’ policy to provide

coverage in this instance would be contrary to public policy because it would

promote the purchase of insurance policies with the intent of having others commit

intentional acts on one’s behalf. Simply, there was nothing negligent about any of

the actions taken by any of the assailants in this matter, and having conducted a de

novo review of the record, we find no error in the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Farm Bureau. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the

Plaintiff-Appellant, Christian Blaine Perkins.

AFFIRMED.

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