Gail Ford v. Mark Garber

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-808

GAIL FORD

VERSUS

MARK GARBER, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20194454
HONORABLE LAURIE A. HULIN, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Candyce G. Perret, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Guy E.
Bradberry, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

G. Karl Bernard
Karl Bernard Law, LLC
1615 Poydras Sreet, Suite 101
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 412-9953
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Gail Ford

Lawrence E. Marino
Cearley W. Fontenot
Daniel J. Phillips
Oats & Marino
100 E. Vermilion Street, Suite 400
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 233-1100
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Mark Garber, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Lafayette Parish
Freddie Laque, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Sheriff of Lafayette
Parish

PERRET, Judge.

In this employment discrimination and retaliation case, Gail Ford

(“Plaintiff”) appeals a trial court’s judgment that granted summary judgment in

favor of Mark Garber, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Lafayette Parish,

and Freddie Laque, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Sheriff of Lafayette Parish

(collectively, “the Defendants”), which dismissed her retaliation claims pursuant to

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS:

On December 5, 2005, the Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office (“LPSO”) hired

Plaintiff to work as a Correctional Officer. According to the petition, in January

2015, Plaintiff was “reassigned as a bailiff for the 15th Judicial District

Courthouse” and was “responsible for enforcing court rules, maintaining order,

providing security, safely guiding inmates in and out of the court, and announcing

the Judges’ arrival and departure from the courtrooms.” Plaintiff’s employment

with LPSO was terminated on September 13, 2017.

On July 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendants asserting that

they “without lawful reason, explanation or justification, discriminated against

[her] on the basis of her sex[,]” and that they also “retaliated against [her] by

terminating her employment because she filed grievances involving her

discriminatory mistreatment by her supervisors and fellow male officers.”

Specifically, Plaintiff’s petition sets forth the following pertinent facts and

assertions to allege her discrimination and retaliation claims:

1
On October 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment wherein she consented to the dismissal of all claims except “her Title VII
Retaliation Claim.”

10.

On or about May 25, 2017, Ford was advised to report to the
office of her immediate supervisor, Lt. [Frederick] Laque. When Ford
arrived, Lt. Laque and Paula Fuselier, another bailiff in the 15th JDC,
were waiting on Ford in Lt. Laque’s office. During the meeting,
Officer Fuselier alleged that Ford was “not polite” to her during their
interactions in the courthouse. Ford voiced her disagreement with this
[sic] Officer Fuslier’s assessment of their professional relationship.
Officer Fuselier became hostile and combative. Notwithstanding
Officer Fuselier’s behavior, Ford remained calm and deescalated the
situation without incident.

11.

Not long after the meeting, Officer Ford informed Lt. Laque
that the interaction made her feel extremely unsafe. Lt. Laque
dismissed Ford’s concerns. He considered the interaction a harmless
“cat fight.”

12.

On or about May 26, 2017, Ford submitted a formal grievance
regarding Officer Fuselier’s conduct during the meeting that occurred
on [the] previous day. Officer Ford forwarded the grievance form to
Lt. Laque, who was responsible for forwarding grievances up the
chain of command.

13.

Lt. Laque, without permission or notice to Officer Ford,
amended Officer Ford’s grievance form to state that the incident did
not take place in his office nor while he was present.

14.

After Officer Ford filed her grievance, Lt. Laque began
speaking disparagingly about Officer Ford to her colleagues. He
would do so loudly and intentionally while Ford was in earshot.

15.

On or about June 15, 2017, Officer Ford filed a complaint with
Defendants’ Human Resource Department. Ford’s complaint
reiterated the incident involving Officer Fuselier but also included the
decision made by Lt. Laque to amend her grievance with false and/or
misleading statements without her authorization or knowledge.

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16.

The following day, Officer Ford met with Major Jules
Broussard about her Human Resource complaint. Following their
discussion, Major Broussard informed Officer Ford that he would be
handling her complaint and her grievance instead of Internal Affairs.

17.

On or about June 26, 2017, Major Broussard formally closed
his investigation into Officer Ford’s complaint and grievance and
concluded that there was no wrongdoing on the part of Officer
Fuselier or Lt. Laque.

18.

Officer Ford decided to appeal. Pursuant to the LPSO protocol,
Officer Ford requested a three person review panel to review Major
Broussard’s findings and decision. Not long after Officer Ford made
this requests, Major Broussard informed her that her request for a
panel review was denied.

19.

Nevertheless, Lt. Laque continued to make Officer Ford’s work
environment increasingly hostile. He continued to belittle and
demean Officer Ford in front of other courthouse employees.

20.

On or about [August 22] 2017, Officer Ford and a fellow
bailiff, Officer Devlin Ca’bean 2 , were on duty in their assigned
courtroom during a criminal court proceeding. The criminal
defendant at the hearing, Tony Ben, fled the courtroom after the Judge
sentenced him to incarceration for violating probation. Officer Ford
and Officer Ca’bean were unable to apprehend Mr. Ben prior to
exiting the courtroom. However, the suspect was quickly
apprehended in the hallway outside of the courtroom.

21.

On or about August 24, 2017, Lt. Laque called Officer Ford
into his office. Lt. Laque demanded that Officer Ford sign a form
stating that she willfully and intentionally stood idly by and allowed a
criminal defendant escape while on duty. Because Officer Ford and

2
In the petition, Officer Devlin’s last name was spelled as “Ca’bean;” however, the
record indicates that the proper spelling of his last name is “Cabe’an.”

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her [sic] Officer Ca’bean attempted to apprehend the defendant, she
did not sign the document.

22.

Because Officer Ford refused to sign the form, Lt. Laque
became angry. He pounded his desk with his fist in an effort to
intimidate or force Officer Ford to sign the document. In an effort to
deescalate the situation, Officer Ford suggested to Lt. Laque that they
have a meeting with the judge who was in the courtroom that day. Lt.
Laque refused.

23.

The next day, Lt. Laque called Officer Ford into his office.
Once again he demanded that Officer Ford sign the form stating that
she failed to attempt to apprehend the fleeing defendant. Officer
Ford, once again, refused.

24.

Lt. Laque became very angry again. He threw papers off his
desk, shouted, belittled, and physically slammed his fist on the desk.
Officer Ford feared for her safety. Her body trembled uncontrollably
during the outburst. Eventually, she found the courage to ask Lt.
Laque if she could go home for the rest of the day. Notwithstanding
Officer Ford’s refusal to sign the form, upon information and belief,
Lt. Laque submitted a falsified form to Internal Affairs.

25.

Officer Ford completed a grievance form against Lt. Laque
regarding the most recent incident occurring in his office. Officer
Ford took her grievance directly to Laque’s supervisor, Capt. Dale
Thomas, who immediately attempted to dissuade Officer Ford from
filing her grievance.

26.

On or about August 30, 2017, Officer Ford received a
correspondence from Internal Affairs. The correspondence informed
her of an ongoing investigation into her alleged unsatisfactory conduct
involving the aforementioned courtroom incident. Upon information
and belief, at no time was Officer Ford’s male colleague, Officer
Ca’bean, the subject of an Internal Affairs investigation.

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27.

In response to the Internal Affairs correspondence, Officer Ford
contacted witnesses who were present during the courtroom incident.
Ford also spoke with the attorney that represented the defendant who
fled the courtroom and the defendant himself. Officer Ford was told
that several of her male colleagues were joking about trying to get her
fired.

28.

A week after she received the Internal Investigation letter, Ford
was interviewed by Sergeant Montgomery and Sgt[.] Michael
[Babineaux]. After the interview, on or about September 13, 2017,
Officer Ford’s employment was terminated.

On December 5, 2019, the Defendants filed an answer to the petition, which

included general denials and affirmative defenses.

On July 1, 2022, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment,

asserting that Plaintiff “cannot establish a prima facie case for disparate treatment

or retaliatory termination” and that “[e]ven if she could make a prima facie case,

the case should still be dismissed because there was a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for her termination.” In support of

their motion, the Defendants attached the following four exhibits: Exhibit 1 --

portions of the deposition of Lieutenant Frederick [Freddie] Laque, Jr.; Exhibit 2 --

portions of the deposition of Plaintiff, with the following exhibits as attached to

that deposition: (Exhibit A) May 25, 2017, grievance form; (Exhibit B) June 25,

2017, correspondence; (Exhibit C) June 15, 2017, correspondence; (Exhibit D)

June 22, 2017, correspondence; (Exhibit E) July 14, 2017, correspondence;

(Exhibit F) August 24, 2017, grievance form; (Exhibit G) August 25, 2017,

grievance form; (Exhibit H) August 30, 2017, notice of Internal Affairs

investigation; (Exhibit I) September 5, 2017, statement of inmate Tony Ben;

(Exhibit J) September 5, 2017, statement of attorney Irvin Celestine; (Exhibit K)

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September 13, 2017, notice of termination of Gail Ford; Exhibit 3 -- portions of the

deposition of Major Jules Broussard; and Exhibit 4 -- portions of the deposition of

Staff Sergeant Alex Montgomery, with portions of Exhibit 2 as attached to that

deposition.

On October 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for summary

judgment wherein she consented to “the dismissal of all claims with [the]

exception of her Title VII Retaliation Claim.” Additionally, Plaintiff alleged that

the adverse employment action was not her termination but “when Defendants,

who were well aware of [her] protected activity, escalated a matter that was

initially the subject of a written warning to an Internal Affairs Complaint and

Investigation.” Plaintiff argued that she has demonstrated a prima facie claim for

retaliation under Title VII and attached the following exhibits in support of her

opposition: (1) her September 30, 2022 sworn affidavit along with attachments

evidencing her grievances; (2) her March 16, 2021 deposition; and (3) the March

17, 2021 deposition of Major Jules Broussard.

On October 10, 2022, the Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion

for summary judgment arguing that the court “should not consider [Plaintiff’s] new

argument that the [Internal Affairs] investigation is actually the retaliatory adverse

employment action because she did not plead that in her Petition[,]” but that even

if the court considers this new argument, her retaliation claim should be dismissed

“because there was a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the investigation, and

[Plaintiff] presented no evidence that the reason was pretextual nor that the true

reason was to retaliate against her.”

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Following a hearing, the trial court issued a judgment on October 18, 2022

granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In her reasons for

judgment, the trial judge stated as follows:

After review and consideration of the evidence, this Court finds
that Ms. Ford was terminated for a legitimate non-discriminatory
basis. Staff Sergeant Alex Montgomery, who was the investigator in
the Internal Affairs investigation, testified in his deposition, that the
matter involving the courtroom incident wherein Ms. Ford refused to
sign the conference sheet was the matter being referred to or requested
by Ms. Ford to be referred to Internal Affairs. Sergeant Montgomery
also agreed that the reason Ms. Ford was terminated was based upon
these violations, including her interference with and [sic] Internal
Affairs investigation. As such, the burden now shifts to the plaintiff
to prove that her employer’s reason were [sic] merely pretexutal [sic]
and the true reason for the action was discriminatory. Based on the
evidence submitted, plaintiff has not carried her burden to show this.
Both Plaintiff and Deputy Cabe’an, her male counterpart, were given
a Conference Sheet (written warning) and the opportunity to sign.
Ms. Ford refused to sign the conference sheet and as such an Internal
Affairs investigation was conducted; which recommended Ms. Fords
termination. Therefore, this Court grants Defendants[,] Mark Garber,
in his official capacity as the Duly Elected Sheriff of Lafayette Parish,
and Freddie Laque’s, in is official capacity as Lieutenant Sheriff of
Lafayette Parish, Motion for Summary Judgment finding that Plaintiff
cannot establish a prima facie case for disparate treatment or
retaliatory termination.

Plaintiff now appeals alleging the following sole assignment of error: “The

Trial Court erred when it applied the law governing Title VII Discrimination

Claims when granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees as to

Plaintiff-Appellant’s retaliation claim.” It is worth noting at this time that this

court reviews a judgment, not the reasons for judgment. See Bellard v. American

Cent. Ins. Co., 07-1335 (La. 4/18/08), 980 So.2d 654; La.Code Civ.P. arts. 1918,

2082, and 2083. “The written reasons for judgment are merely an explication of

the Trial Court’s determinations. They do not alter, amend, or affect the final

judgment being appealed[.]” State in Int. of Mason, 356 So.2d 530, 532 (La.App.

1 Cir. 1977). In this case, the October 18, 2022 judgment granted “Defendants[’]

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Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims for disparate

treatment or retaliatory termination against the Defendants.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The summary judgment procedure is expressly favored in the law and “is

designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every

action[.]” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2). “Appellate courts review summary

judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the district court’s

consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate.” Duncan v. U.S.A.A.

Ins. Co., 06-363, p. 3 (La. 11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544, 547. Under this standard of

review, this court must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact

and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “A fact is

‘material’ when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to [a] plaintiff’s

cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery.” Smith v. Our Lady of the

Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p. 27 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751. “[F]acts are

material if they potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect a litigant’s ultimate

success, or determine the outcome of the legal dispute.” Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting S. La. Bank v. Williams, 591 So.2d 375, 377 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1991), writs

denied, 596 So.2d 211 (La.1992)).

The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment rests with the

mover: here, the Defendants. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). In this matter, the

Defendants will not bear the burden of proof at trial; the burden of proof rests with

the Plaintiff. Thus, once the Defendants properly support their motion for

summary judgment, then under La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1), they need only

point out to the trial court the absence of factual support for one or more elements

essential for Plaintiff to establish a Title VII retaliation claim.

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Thereafter, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff “to produce factual support

sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the

[Defendants are] not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art.

966(D)(1). The Plaintiff “may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of [her]

pleading, but [her] response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial. If [she] does not so respond, summary judgment, if

appropriate, shall be rendered against [her].” La.Code Civ.P. art. 967(B).

DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff contends she is the victim of sex discrimination and retaliation for

protesting the discrimination allegedly perpetrated by her supervisors at LPSO.

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that she was one of two bailiffs that were involved in

an August 22, 2017 inmate incident and, despite both bailiffs being admonished by

Captain Dale Thomas for their job performance and receiving a written warning

for their job performance in the form of a conference sheet, she was the only bailiff

“now the subject of an Internal Affairs Investigation and subject to termination[.]”

Plaintiff alleges that “[t]here is absolutely no evidence in the record that

Defendants have ever subjected a male bailiff to the same kind of treatment, i.e.,

escalating a matter that was initially the subject of a written warning to an Internal

Affairs Complaint and Investigation.” Plaintiff argues that even though she

abandoned her sex-based discrimination claims in response to the Defendants’

motion for summary judgment, “the [t]rial [c]ourt failed to properly evaluate [her]

retaliation claim” and erred when it “applied the law governing Title VII

discrimination claims.”

Under Louisiana law, it is unlawful for an employer “to intentionally

discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, or terms,

9

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the individual’s race, color,

religion, sex, national origin, or natural, protective, or cultural hairstyle.” La.R.S.

23:332(A)(1). Discrimination is also unlawful under federal law pursuant to Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids an employer from

discriminating against “any individual” based upon that individual’s “race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII also

contains an antiretaliation provision that prohibits “an employer to discriminate

against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

For Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case for retaliation, she must prove,

“by a preponderance of the evidence, that: ‘(1) she engaged in an activity protected

by Title VII; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link

existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.’”

Washington v. Bd. of Supervisors for Univ. of La. Sys., 19-578, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir.

3/11/20), 297 So.3d 69, 72, writ denied, 20-807 (La. 10/14/20), 302 So.3d 1120

(quoting Brooks v. S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 03-231, pp. 48-49 (La.App. 4

Cir. 7/4/14), 877 So.2d 1194, 1221, writ denied, 04-2246 (La. 11/19/04), 888 So.2d

208.) As stated in Brooks, 877 So.2d at 1221 (internal citation omitted):

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the
defendant introduces evidence, which, if true, would permit the
conclusion that the adverse action was non-discriminatory, the
plaintiff/employee assumes the burden of establishing that the reason
or reasons given were a pretext. To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff
must show that “but for” the protected activity, the adverse
employment action would not have occurred.

10

After reviewing and accepting all of the allegations in Plaintiff’s petition as

true and applying the legal principles set forth above, we find her petition sets forth

sufficient facts to state a cause of action for retaliation. Therefore, we must now

determine whether Plaintiff proved, by a preponderance of evidence, a causal link

between an adverse employment action and a protected activity.

In Plaintiff’s statement of facts in dispute, she admits that “[o]n August 22[,]

2017, [she] and Deputy Devlin Cabe’an (who is male) were assigned as bailiffs to

Judge Rubin’s courtroom at the Lafayette Parish Courthouse” and that “[d]uring

court proceedings, Judge Rubin ordered that the bailiffs restrain . . . Tony Ben to

the courtroom, but [Tony Ben] absconded from the courtroom.” Plaintiff stated in

her opposition to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment that “[a]s a result

of the [August 22, 2017] incident, Lt. Laque served both [Plaintiff] and Cabe’an

with identical written warnings or ‘conference sheets’ for alleged poor job

performance involving the handling of Tony Ben[,]” but that she “did not agree

with Lt. Laque’s characterization of the events involving Tony Ben” and “refused

to sign the conference sheet.”

In Sergeant Alex Montegomery’s June 22, 2021 deposition, he testified that

he was an employer of the LPSO from 1984 through 2019 and explained the

various ways in which an officer is disciplined within the sheriff’s office.

Specifically, Sergeant Montegomery testified as follows:

You can have a -- basically a written warning, Conference Sheet, with
no suspension or anything. You can have a suspension, where you
lose some compensation, and you also lose time. You have situations
where you can lose privileges, such as your off-duty capability of
working off-duty security. You have transfers, demotions, and you
also have [p]ost-counseling type of discipline, where you may see a
particular training officer for a particular training, bad habits you may
have, or you may see a psychiatrist for anger management.

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....

After that the person is notified, they sign that they’ve received the
warning, or the notification of the infraction, and either it’s placed in
your personnel file, and some of the infractions, based on who they
are or what they are, like your Conference Sheet, can be taken out of
your file within one year.

Sergeant Montgomery continued to testify regarding Plaintiff’s August 22,

2017 courtroom infraction and the Internal Affairs investigation, as follows:

Q. Okay. And so it’s your testimony that the matter involving a
courtroom incident wherein Ms. Ford refused to sign a -- I think
you called a written notification, i.e., Conference Sheet, that’s
the matter that was referred to -- or requested by Ms. Ford to be
referred to Internal Affairs?

A. That’s correct.

Q. How did you get involved in this investigation?

A. I was the investigator in Internal Affairs. Captain Todd Credeur was
the captain of Internal Affairs. He assigned the case to me.

Q. Describe for me what steps did you take in investigating the
matter. What was the first thing you did -- and I know you –
I’m not asking, you know, every little detail, but just the major
steps that you engaged in while investigating this matter?

....

A. That particular day, the Conference Sheets were
developed. Deputy Ford, Deputy Cabe’ne, both of them were
given their Conference Sheets by the Lieutenant. Cabe’ne
signed his. Ford refused to sign hers, and I think at that point
she decided she wanted to sign a grievance, I think, from past
history maybe dealing with her supervisor.

And in that same meeting there, she advised Lieutenant
Laque that she wanted to have a meeting with the Judge. And
she was told by the lieutenant, “That can’t happen until we get
approval from the Captain, Captain Thomas. Let me speak
with him first, and then I’ll get back with you.” And from what
I remember was [sic] he proceeded to go to Captain Thomas
and inform him of the refusal to sign the Conference Sheets and
the request of a grievance, and during that time Deputy Ford
proceeded to contact Judge Rubin’s law clerk and proceeded to

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set up a meeting with Judge Rubin after being told to pause
until she got approval -- or Lieutenant Laque got approval.

....

And I think she went home that day, and I believe that is
the point when she was requesting a grievance and also Internal
Affairs to possibly take over the investigation versus Lieutenant
Laque and Captain Thomas.

....

At that point there, the supervisors felt that they would
give her what she wanted, and they gave -- they contacted
Captain Credeur with Internal Affairs and asked Internal Affairs
to go ahead and take it over at her request. So we took it over,
and she was officially served to let her know that Internal
Affairs was handling the case.

Sergeant Montgomery and Sergeant Mike Babineaux gathered the facts

pertaining to the allegations of Plaintiff’s unsatisfactory performance and

insubordination. While conducting the investigation, Sergeants Montgomery and

Babineaux realized that not only was Plaintiff interfering with their investigation

but she was being untruthful.

Following the Internal Affairs investigation, the review personnel, which

consisted of Major Art Lebretton, Major Dondi Hardin, and Lieutenant Toby

Landry, sustained all charges brought against Plaintiff for her unsatisfactory work

performance, false statements, insubordination, and interferences with the

investigation. On September 13, 2017, Captain Todd Credeur notified Plaintiff

that because all of the allegations against her were sustained, her employment with

LPSO was terminated. Sergeant Montgomery stated in his deposition that it is his

“understanding that the reason [Plaintiff] was terminated was based upon these

violations, including her interference with the [Internal Affairs] investigation.”

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After reviewing the evidence submitted on the motion for summary

judgment, we find there is no causal link between Plaintiff’s protected activity (i.e.

filing grievances involving her discriminatory mistreatments by her supervisors

and fellow male officers) and her alleged adverse employment action (i.e. the

Internal Affairs investigation). As previously stated, Plaintiff stated in her

opposition that she “did not agree with Lt. Laque’s characterization of the events

involving Tony Ben” and “refused to sign the conference sheet.” It was Plaintiff’s

decision to not accept Lieutenant Laque’s warning (conference sheet), which

triggered the Internal Affairs investigation. Further, an argument can be made that

the Internal Affairs investigation was proper and in the best interest of Plaintiff

considering the fact that she continued, even after receiving the warning, to file

grievances against her supervisors, Lieutenant Laque and Captain Thomas. Thus,

even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case for a retaliation claim, we agree

with the Defendants that her claim should be dismissed because “there was a

legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the [Internal Affairs] investigation, and

[Plaintiff] presented no evidence that the reason was merely a pretext for

retaliation.” Accordingly, based on the record, we find Plaintiff failed to show a

causal link between a protected activity and an adverse employment action.

For these reasons, we affirm the October 18, 2022 trial court judgment that

granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, Mark Garber, in his official

capacity as the Sheriff of Lafayette Parish, and Freddie Laque, in his official

capacity as Lieutenant Sheriff of Lafayette Parish. All costs of this appeal are

assessed against Plaintiff, Gail Ford.

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AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

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