Succession of Barbara Dumesnil Reggie

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 23-61

IN RE SUCCESSION OF BARBARA DUMENSIL REGGIE

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ACADIA, 2019-20217-E
HONORABLE MICHELLE M. BREAUX, DISTRICT JUDGE

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LEDRICKA J. THIERRY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Gary J. Ortego, Ledricka J. Thierry, and Guy E. Bradberry,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Clint M. Bischoff
320 Duson Avenue
P.O. Box 530
Iota, LA 70543
(337) 779-3661
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Barbara Reggie Hornsby

Alan K. Breaud
Timothy W. Basden
Breaud & Meyers
P.O. Box 51365
Lafayette, LA 70505
(337) 266-2200
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
Gregory F. Reggie, Sr., Exceutor of the Estate
of Barbara Dumensil Reggie

John F. Craton
Barousse & Craton
P.O. Box 1305
Crowley, LA 70527
(337) 785-1000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
Gregory F. Reggie, Sr., Exceutor of the Estate
of Barbara Dumensil Reggie

THIERRY, Judge.

A legatee, Barbara Reggie Hornsby, appeals a judgment of possession

concerning her deceased mother’s estate, asserting that the extrajudicial partition

was invalid. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s ruling and

entering of the judgment of possession.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal arises out of the succession proceedings of Barbara Dumensil

Reggie (“Decedent”), a resident of Crowley, Louisiana, who died testate on October

18, 2019. At the time of her death, Decedent had eight children, six of whom were

living. In her testament, Decedent left her estate in undivided equal parts to her

surviving children and successors of her predeceased children. The total value of the

estate was determined to be $1,138,867.10. Decedent’s testament appointed Gregory

F. Reggie, Sr. (“Mr. Reggie”), Decedent’s nephew and also a local attorney, as

executor without independent administration. Mr. Reggie was appointed executor

by order of the trial court on November 14, 2019.

Mr. Reggie, as executor, took charge in dividing Decedent’s assets. The assets

included one piece of immovable property (Decedent’s home), many household

property items, and monetary accounts and investments. The movables, including

furnishings, guns, jewelry, and other household items, were valued at approximately

$63,845.00.

On November 22, 2019, Mr. Reggie emailed the heirs to provide an update

regarding Decedent’s estate. He specifically addressed the household movable items

(emphasis in original):

Contents of the Home
I am devising a process to address the inventory, valuation and
distribution of the contents of the home to you, including art, rugs,

jewelry, china/crystal, furniture, etc. and will advise you about that
soon. I am also looking into options for disposing of what may be left
that no one claims. I will write you all again shortly in a different email
to address a few questions on the contents of the home.

A few minutes later on that same date, November 22, 2019, Mr. Reggie sent

a follow-up email regarding the contents of the home (emphasis in original):

A little later, once I have obtained values on the contents of the
house (as much as practical) and then share them with you, I plan to
follow up with you to ask what items you may want as a priority. It is
possible that others may not want that item and it can easily be directed
to you. If more than one person wants an item, we can deal with that as
needed in a fair process. Whatever items are distributed to you either
way, it seems fair as I write this that we will count that item’s value as
a part of your share of the contents being distributed.

On November 30, 2019, Mr. Reggie issued a partial distribution of cash to the

heirs, including to Barbara Reggie Hornsby (“Ms. Hornsby), the Appellant in this

matter, and daughter and heir of Decedent. Ms. Hornsby received a cash distribution

of $46,868.77, to which she did not object.

On December 1, 2019, Ms. Hornsby emailed Mr. Reggie a list of “[t]hings

Moma [Decedent] said she wanted me to have.” The list included her deceased

parents’ wedding rings, a bracelet and coin from Mexico, her mother’s bird bath,

scapulars, the table in the foyer, the China cabinet in the den, a round table with four

chairs, a twist bracket from Lebanon, the patio furniture, her parents’ bedroom

furniture set, any holy statues and relics, and the freezers. These items were not

bequeathed to Ms. Hornsby in the testament, and there is nothing in the record to

indicate Decedent wished to leave those items to Ms. Hornsby.

On January 12, 2020, Mr. Reggie created a partition process of the movable

items within Decedent’s home and shared it with the heirs via email. That email

states, in relevant part:

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Once all of the valuations [of the household, movable property]
are completed I will email you a spreadsheet listing everything with
values for you to determine what may interest you. I will also send
pictures of all of the jewelry. Everyone will have an overall “budget”
to make their selections, based on their percentage interests in the total
value of all items—in the same percentages as the previous cash
distribution. It will all be spelled out again before you select, but as an
example, if the total value of all personal items being distributed is
$50,000 and you have a 12.5% interest, your budget will be $6,250. If
you don’t select enough items (value) to use up your budget, you will
get the remainder in cash at distribution time. If you select more than
your budget, as long as no one else selects the same things, you can
have those “over budget” items and receive less cash distribution in the
end. I hope everyone will be able to get the items most important and
useful to them, and if more than one person wants the same item, we
can always allow you to “bid it up” until someone gets it. Friendly
bidding, of course. Once finally decided, you will be asked to take away
all of your items quickly, and by a certain date, so we can put the house
on the market.

....

In the end, any items not selected will be given away—to you, or
to charity, or tossed out. We will try to use as little money as possible
to dispose of unclaimed items.

All heirs, including Ms. Hornsby, agreed to the terms of this email, namely

that each heir would be allowed to select any desired movable property items and

place a bid on such items, with a starting value set by Mr. Reggie and agreed upon

by the heirs. If no competing bid was placed by another heir, then the heir who made

the bid would be credited with purchasing the item, and the amount would be

deducted from the heir’s share of the succession property. If multiple heirs bid on

the same item and were not “over budget,” then they could engage in “friendly

bidding.” Ms. Hornsby does not dispute that she agreed to the terms set forth in the

January 12, 2020 email.

The heirs then began placing bids on the items within decedent’s home. Ms.

Hornsby made her bids on February 8, 2020, and ultimately selected about 150

items, totaling around $32,000.00 in value. Several of the items that she bid on were

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also bid on by other siblings. Following her bidding, Mr. Reggie emailed Ms.

Hornsby on February 9, 2020, and requested that she email him her top picks. The

subject line of the email is entitled “I need your top picks,” and the body of the email

states (emphasis in original):

Babs,

Thanks for pulling through yesterday. I know it’s tough but we
got it done.

A little follow-up now that everyone has selected. Long story
short, I will need you to prioritize your picks. As you will recall,
everyone has a budget proportional to their ownership interest. It’s
12.5% (1/8th each for you and your sib[ling]s) of the value of the
personal property, so about $8,300/person.

Your selections totaled a little over $32,000 (not counting the
“left over” jewelry you want but did not select as a priority) covering
many, many items. And that is a good thing and I think you will be able
to get most of it. But right now your existing selections overlap with 25
selections of other family members. Other than those 25 overlaps, there
are only another 7 overlaps in total. So we need to solve this together
quickly.

The solution is for you to take the spreadsheet I sent you after
our walkthrough and pick the $8300 in items that will be your
“official selections.” That will put you in the same situation as the
others who selected closer to the budgeted amount. If there is a conflict
with your “official selections” and those of others’ “official
selection[s]” we will work that out. For the items that are not in your
“official selection” but are in someone else’s “official selection” they
will get the item—just as you will get the items in your “official
selection” tha[t] no one else has selected. There are many, many items
you selected that do not overlap with anyone else and at the end of this
process you will get all of those extra selections automatically. Please
get me your “official selections” tomorrow (Monday) so we can resolve
the remaining overlaps and wrap up this phase of the process, keeping
us on schedule to get everyone their property and have it removed from
the house so we can sell the house. Thanks for helping to work through
this.

With much love,

Gregory

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Ms. Hornsby replied to Mr. Reggie’s email above, saying “[t]his is my list,”

followed by several household items and pieces of jewelry indicated by bidding

number. Mr. Reggie replied to that email later that same day, stating:

Babs,

Thanks for your cooperation in getting us to this point. The
selections have all been made and I am sorting them out. Here is how
yours comes out.

You will get your selected items in the attached spreadsheet
marked in light green, except not what is marked in red (someone else
picked it as their first choice and it wasn’t in your first choice category
so it will be theirs) and not what is marked in orange (yet) because it
overlaps with someone else’s first choice. If someone who has a
conflict goes to a second round of picking to make up for an overlap,
and they pick something in your secondary selections, then it will be a
“tie” and we will bid on those items or select other things. But we’ll
cross that bridge if we come to it.

1. FOYER: You picked the whole 4 shelf curio cabinet. Someone else
picked only the “tea cups and ballerina” and “pair of dancing
figurines” in the cabinet. Do you want to let them take those or do
you want me to set up a bid—or some other process?
2. MASTER BEDROOM: You and someone else picked the pair of 3
drawer night stands. You and someone else picked the lingerie
cabinet and dresser with single mirror. Do you want to [sic] me to
set up bidding or do you want to pick something else? I am writing
the others this same paragraph at the same time as you.
3. JEWELRY: There is overlap on the several pieces you selected.
Would you like to pick again or bid for these pieces[?] I can create
a list of what is still available after all selections are tallied once I
sort all of this out.

I think that’s it. Once we clear the overlapping selections you
will have a lot of fantastic family heirlooms.

Please let me know how you want to proceed on the items above.
Lots of love,

Gregory

P.S. I’m asking in advance that if I have made any inadvertent
errors (I hope not), please work with me to get them corrected. This has
been quite complex.

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Ms. Hornsby replied to that email on February 14, 2020, saying: “Was at a

meeting last night. Who wants mother’s and dad[’]s rings.” Mr. Reggie did not

reveal who wanted the wedding rings, as all heirs agreed that the bidding process

would be confidential.

On February 16, 2020, Mr. Reggie emailed the heirs regarding the remaining

items and explained round two of the bidding process. He noted that “[a]t this point

everyone has gotten a chance to select what they want in round one.” He explained

that he was “slashing everything [besides the jewelry] to half-price” to be chosen

in the next round of selections (emphasis in original). On February 18, 2020, Mr.

Reggie emailed Ms. Hornsby individually regarding her bids on the jewelry items,

writing:

Babs,

I earlier forwarded you bids on the overlapped jewelry that you
and others have selected in round one; specifically on jewelry items
number 118, 129 and 178. I have not heard back from you. If I do not
hear from you by the end of the day tomorrow, Wednesday, I will
assume that you do not want to bid and will let them go. The other
person for item 177 has dropped out so that item is yours. Thanks and
lots of love.

Seven minutes later after Mr. Reggie sent the above email, Ms. Hornsby

replied “I am pulling my bid on all items.” Mr. Reggie replied, “OK, thanks for

letting me know. Lots of love always.” When asked at trial what she meant by that

email, Ms. Hornsby said: “I mean, I was pulling out of the bidding process. I was

pulling my bids because I wanted to get with an attorney. I mean, he told me I

couldn’t have what I originally picked.” On the other hand, Mr. Reggie interpreted

Ms. Hornsby’s statement of “I am pulling my bid on all items” in its literal sense,

i.e., that Ms. Hornsby simply wished to remove her bids and opt for the cash value

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of her $8,300.00 share of movable property instead. He did not believe that she

wished to withdraw from the bidding process entirely.

Accordingly, Mr. Reggie continued to move forward with the bidding process.

On February 20, 2020, Mr. Reggie emailed Ms. Hornsby the following:

Babs,

Please let me know when you can pick up your items at the
house. We are trying to close it out for sale of the house.

FOYER: curio cabinet and contents;
DEN: round table with crocheted table cloth, curved glass china
cabinet;
YVONNE-BARBARA ROOM: king bed;
JEWELRY: #s 7, 19, 24, 63, 109, 121, 170, 177, 180, 220, 240, and
242 and/or 243 (I think one is your Mexico cross?). The jewelry is at
my house for safekeeping.

Please let me know if I missed anything or made any errors in
selections above. We are in the home stretch.

Also, please get me any Round 3 picks you may have by the end
of the day tomorrow—Friday. Thanks!

Lots of love,

Gregory

On February 22, 2020, after failing to receive a response from Ms. Hornsby,

Mr. Reggie again emailed Ms. Hornsby to check in:

Barbara, I still haven’t heard from you and we are trying to move
the process along. I don’t know where you stand in this anymore.
Whatever you want is fine with me, but I would appreciate your letting
me know since I’m trying to do this in the proper fashion. Please get
back to me and let me know what you want to do. Thank you.

Finally, on February 22, 2020, Ms. Hornsby replied to Mr. Reggie and said:

I was advised by my attorney not to speak with anyone until I
meet with him. He wants both dad and mom[’]s will, succession and all
appraisals on home furnishings for 660 West 17th st. and jewelry. Also,
he wants a copy of the house appraisal, and all correspondence between
us.

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Mr. Reggie sent Ms. Hornsby two emails on February 22, 2020, attaching the

requested jewelry valuations by Buttross Jewelers and letting her know that the home

appraisal and values of home furnishings were previously sent to her.

On February 27, 2020, Mr. Reggie again contacted Ms. Hornsby via email:

Babs,

I hope that by now you have had a chance to speak to your
attorney and can let me know if and when you will be picking up the
items you originally selected in Round 1, or if you are sticking by your
email stating that you are pulling your bids on all items. I need to move
the process along and plan to do so but want to give you the chance
again to get these items before I let them go to others. You will recall
that the items you take (or don’t take) are accounted for by deducting
(or not) the stated value of the items from future cash distributions. If I
don’t hear from you I will assume you want the cash instead of the
items, as explained at the beginning of the process, and will move
forward on that basis. Love,

Gregory

On February 28, 2020, Mr. Reggie emailed Ms. Hornsby, asking if Aaron III

(Ms. Hornsby’s son) could bring her the items she originally selected. She replied to

his email and said: “I have Clint Bishoff as my attorney and he will [be] handling

this for me.”

On March 18, 2020, two of the heirs held a garage sale of some of the

household movable property items they received from Decedent’s estate. The value

of those items were subtracted from their respective $8,300.00 shares.

On February 21, 2020, counsel for Gregory F. Reggie Sr. filed a Petition for

Authority by Executor to Sell Immovable Property at Private Sale, in which he stated

that he received an offer by a buyer to purchase the home of Barbara Dumensil

Reggie for $330,000.00. He asked the Court for authority to sell the property for that

amount. On April 2, 2020, the district judge in Acadia Parish signed a judgment that

gave Gregory F. Reggie, Sr. permission to sell the decedent’s home for $330,000.00.

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Barbara Hornsby expressed intermittent interest in purchasing the home, but could

not afford the price. The house was sold to the buyers with court approval.

On May 14, 2020, Mr. Reggie made a second cash distribution to the heirs.

Ms. Hornsby received her 1/8 share, totaling $87,500.00. She did not object to this

distribution.

In July of 2020, after no heir expressed interest in several leftover pieces of

Decedent’s jewelry, Mr. Reggie sold those pieces of jewelry for scrap metal to

Lafayette Coin and Jewelry. He chose to sell the unwanted pieces and distribute the

proceeds to the heirs instead of throwing them away.

On September 21, 2020, Gregory F. Reggie, Sr. filed the detailed descriptive

list of the Estate of Barbara Dumensil Reggie in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court.

On November 21, 2020, he filed a Petition for Possession and Rule to Show Cause.

On February 10, 2021, Ms. Hornsby’s attorney filed a Motion to Traverse Detailed

Descriptive List of Succession Property and several rules to show cause. The hearing

on these matters were originally scheduled to be heard on November 22, 2021, and

after agreement by all parties, was continued to March 7, 2022.

The trial took place on March 7, 2022 with the ruling announced from the

bench on March 8, 2022. The trial court orally granted Mr. Reggie’s petition for

possession, which placed the heirs in possession of the property distributed to them.

The court stated, in relevant part:

The court finds, after reading the memorandums, after listening to the
testimony yesterday, that all of the heirs at that time, January 12 th of
2020, agreed to how the process was going to work in the selection
process, the share that each was going to get, which was approximately
$8300.

....

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So at this time the Court finds that the distribution was an in-kind
distribution. The Court finds that there was not a sale. Therefore, the
question before the Cout is putting the petition for possession. The
Court is going to grant that petition for possession.

The accompanying judgment was signed on June 7, 2022. That judgment

found, in relevant part, that the petition for possession filed by Mr. Reggie be

granted, and the rules to show cause and motion to compel filed by Ms. Hornsby be

denied. The judgment of possession became a final appealable judgment on

September 2, 2022, which Ms. Hornsby now appeals. In particular, she appeals the

trial court’s ruling that the distribution of household items was an in-kind partition

and not a sale. She seeks nullification of the effects of the partition as it relates to the

disposal of household movable property. She further requests that the trial court’s

denial of her motion to compel be reversed. Professor Elizabeth Carter, a professor

of law at the Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, filed an amicus

curiae brief in support of Ms. Hornsby.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The appellant, Barbara Reggie Hornsby, alleges the following assignments of

error on appeal:

1. The trial court erred in granting the Executor’s petition for Judgment of
Possession rendered on June 7, 2022, when (1) there was a lack of agreement
amongst all heirs to the voluntary nonjudicial partition process of household
movable Succession property as it was executed; and (2) there was a lack of
agreement amongst all heirs regarding the final division of household
movable Succession property; and (3) Louisiana law requires agreement
amongst all heirs to both the process and the final distribution to affect such a
partition; and

2. The trial court erred in finding the process utilized by the Executor to affect a
nonjudicial voluntary partition of the household movable Succession property
was valid when: (1) the Executor conducted several sales in an attempt to
partition property; and (2) the Executor did not seek court authorization to
conduct those sales as required by Louisiana law; and

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3. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to compel discovery
when: (1) the denial was predicated on the court’s finding discovery was a
moot point since the court had granted the petition to have the heirs placed in
possession and denied the request for the sales to be nullified, and (2) both of
those predicate rulings were made in error.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

The standard of review is disputed. Ms. Hornsby states that the standard of

review is de novo, while Mr. Reggie avers that the standard of review is manifest

error.

It is well settled that an appellate court’s review of a trial court’s factual

finding is subject to the manifest error of review. In such a case, the reviewing court

may not set aside the trial court’s finding, unless it is “clearly wrong.” Rosell v.

ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). “[W]here there is conflict in the testimony,

reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be

disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own

evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.” Id. at 844. “This principle is grounded

not only upon the better capacity of the trial court to evaluate live witnesses, but also

upon the proper allocation of trial and appellate functions between the respective

courts.” Succession of Love, 16-245, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/28/16), 201 So.3d 1027,

1030 (internal citations omitted).

However, when a legal error occurs amidst the fact-finding process, the

manifest error standard of review is not applicable. Instead, the appellate court must

make its own de novo review of the record. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541, 97-577 (La.

2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731. “A legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect

principles of law and such errors are prejudicial. Legal errors are prejudicial when

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they materially affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights.” Id. at

735 (internal citations omitted).

One of the primary issues before the court is consent; namely, whether Ms.

Hornsby consented to the process of distributing the estate assets. Clearly,

determining whether she consented and/or subsequently withdrew her consent is a

highly fact-driven process. In fact, Ms. Hornsby herself recognizes the issues before

this court are ones of fact, as she stated in her appellate brief that “[t]he key question

for this Court is whether there was an agreement between Appellant and all

remaining co-legatese that authorized the actions taken by the Executor pursuant to

his February 9, 2020, email which changed the partition process set forth in the

January 12, 2020 email.” Similarly, the question of whether a partition or sale

occurred is a fact-intensive process that involves examining the method of

distribution.

The questions before this court are factual ones, and therefore the manifest

error standard of review applies.

Assignment of Error Number One

In her first assignment of error, Ms. Hornsby alleges that the method of

distribution of assets undertaken by Mr. Reggie failed to constitute a valid voluntary

nonjudicial partition because she did not consent to the process.

More specifically, Ms. Hornsby does not dispute that she agreed to the terms

of the January 12, 2020 email that outlined the bidding process of her mother’s

movable property. Rather, she alleges that Mr. Reggie unilaterally changed the terms

of the bidding process in his February 9, 2020 email and that she never agreed to the

changes. She claims that the February 9, 2020 email placed a limit on her bidding

power, and that no such limit was set forth in the January 12, 2020 email.

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The law is clear that Ms. Hornsby’s consent was required in order to partition

the movable property absent court approval. To constitute a valid nonjudicial

partition, all interested parties must agree to the partition. La.Code Civ.P. art. 4602.

If no agreement can be reached among all interested parties, then judicial partition

is required. Id.

We find that the record supports the trial court’s determination that Ms.

Hornsby consented to the partition process. Mr. Reggie’s January 12, 2020 email at

issue states, in relevant part (emphasis added):

If you select more than your budget, as long as no one else selects the
same things, you can have those “over budget” items and receive less
cash distribution in the end. I hope everyone will be able to get the items
most important and useful to them, and if more than one person wants
the same item, we can always allow you to “bid it up” until someone
gets it.

In other words, Mr. Reggie specifically recognized that the heirs could bid over their

$8,300.00 respective budgets, but that they were not entitled to the overbudgeted

item(s) when another heir selected the same item(s).

In accordance with the terms of this email, Ms. Hornsby placed bids on her

deceased mother’s household property on February 8, 2020. Her selections exceeded

her $8,300.00 budget and overlapped with many of the selections of the other heirs.

On February 9, 2020, Mr. Reggie emailed her and asked her to prioritize her top

selections: “The solution is for you to take the spreadsheet I sent you after our

walkthrough and pick the $8300 in items that will be your ‘official selections’”

(emphasis in original). Ms. Hornsby replied to that email with several “official

selections.”

At the trial on this matter, Ms. Hornsby testified that she did not understand

what Mr. Reggie meant by “official selections” in his February 9, 2020 email. When

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asked at trial if she agreed to Mr. Reggie’s proposed solution of picking $8,300.00

worth of “official selections,” Mrs. Hornsby said: “I never agreed to changing any

of the rules.” She testified many times that she was “confused” regarding Mr.

Reggie’s emails. Ms. Hornsby was asked about her confusion on cross-examination

at trial: “Ms. Hornsby, when you received an e-mail from Mr. Reggie that you didn’t

fully understand, why didn’t you call him?” She replied, “I just didn’t.”

On February 18, 2020, Ms. Hornsby emailed Mr. Reggie and said, “I am

pulling my bid on all items.” She maintains that this email signified her intent to

withdraw from the bidding process entirely.

On the other hand, Mr. Reggie testified that he interpreted that email to mean

Ms. Hornsby was merely pulling her bids, not pulling out of the entire process. Mr.

Reggie testified that Ms. Hornsby agreed to the process of disposing of the movable

household items. He thoroughly explained the bidding process before the trial court

and testified as to the emails at issue. He testified that he did not change any of the

rules regarding the process. He further testified that when Ms. Hornsby sent the

email withdrawing her bids, “she refused to participate in the bidding. But she didn’t

quit the process…. She – you know, she was still in it, but she didn’t want to bid any

more.”

Following Ms. Hornsby’s “I am pulling my bid on all items” email, Mr.

Reggie continued to email Ms. Hornsby regarding the items she previously agreed

to take. Clearly, these subsequent emails evidence an understanding that Mr. Reggie

thought she was still involved in the agreed-upon partition process. Ms. Hornsby

could have simply clarified to Mr. Reggie that she was withdrawing from the entire

process, but she did not.

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We find that the trial court was not “clearly wrong” in its factual findings

regarding Ms. Hornsby’s consent. Although the “official selections” sentence of the

February 9, 2020 email may be open to different interpretations, one interpretation

is that it did not constitute a “rule change” as suggested by Ms. Hornsby, but rather

further explained and was consistent with the January 12, 2020 email. It is reasonable

to assume that Ms. Hornsby’s subsequent email responses, in which she set forth her

official selections, affirmed her consent to the partition process.

Additionally, Ms. Hornsby’s February 18, 2020 email, in which she stated, “I

am pulling my bid on all items,” can be interpreted in different ways. The plainest

and simplest interpretation is that Ms. Hornsby simply wished to pull her bids and

receive the cash distribution instead. The language used does not indicate an intent

to withdraw her consent to the entire process altogether. We find that the trial court,

in its wide discretion over factual findings, was not manifestly erroneous in

determining that Ms. Hornsby consented to the partition process.

In her amicus curiae, Professor Carter suggests that ratification of the outcome

of the extrajudicial partition is also necessary in addition to consent. She explains

that “[e]xtrajudicial partition, therefore, is a two-step process” requiring both

consent and ratification. In support, she cites Marcel Planiol & George Ripert,

Treatise on the Civil Law, Vol. 3, Part 2 §§ 2354 (La. St. Law Inst. Trans. 1959)

(footnotes omitted), which states, in part:

A distribution is valid even if no written record of it was made.
The physical distribution of the property suffices, if it is made with the
intention to be final. However, the parties run the risk of later proof,
because of the restrictions which French law imposes on the proof of
contracts. Still, the distribution can be proved by judicial oath.

The validity of distribution without a record has been doubted at
times, because Art. 816 declares that action for distribution lies in all
cases where distribution has not taken place. But the term “acte de

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partage” must not be understood literally. The statute contemplates the
ordinary case of distribution, where the parties draft an instrument in
which they state their agreements. If they do not so proceed, there is no
reason to derogate from the rules of evidence, and to refuse to recognize
a distribution which actually took place, and which the parties admit.
Otherwise, distribution would become a solemn act, of which the
written record would be an essential element of validity. That would be
contrary to the usage in modern law, and also contrary to the very
liberal wording of Art. 819.

Despite Professor Carter’s reliance on Planiol’s treatise, such does not set

forth a mandatory requirement of ratification. In fact, Planiol plainly states that “[a]

distribution is valid even if no written record of it was made”—in other words, even

in the absence of a document signifying ratification.

Beyond that, the application of basic rules of statutory interpretation do not

lead to a requirement of ratification. Louisiana Civil Code Article 9 provides that

“[w]hen a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd

consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may

be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” The applicable article on

nonjudicial partition of succession property does not require ratification. It merely

requires agreement by all parties. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 4602. This article is clear

and unambiguous and therefore must be applied as written.

Essentially, Professor Carter asks this court to expand the law to expressly

require ratification as a second step in perfecting a nonjudicial partition. We decline

to do so.

Assignment of Error Number Two

In her second assignment of error, Ms. Hornsby alleges that the trial court

erred in finding that the distribution of the decedent’s household movable items

constituted a valid nonjudicial partition because Mr. Reggie conducted sales and did

not seek court authorization of the sales. Ms. Hornsby alleges that three improper

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sales occurred: (1) the partition process for household movable property; (2) the

garage/estate sale held on March 18, 2020; and (3) the selling of jewelry to Lafayette

Coin and Jewelry. Conversely, Mr. Reggie asserts that the distribution process was

an extrajudicial partition requiring no prior court approval.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 1293 states: “The partition of a succession is the

division of the effects, of which the succession is composed, among all the coheirs,

according to their respective rights.” A partition “is a sort of exchange, which the

coheirs make among themselves, one giving up his right in the thing which he

abandons for the right of the other in the thing he takes.” La.Civ.Code art. 1382.

Court approval for judicial partitions is not required when the parties reach a mutual

agreement regarding a nonjudicial partition. La.Code. Civ.P. art. 4602. Louisiana

Code of Civil Procedure Article 4602 dictates two circumstances when partitions

must be judicial: “(1) A party is an unrepresented absentee, minor, or mental

incompetent; or (2) All the interested parties cannot agree upon a nonjudicial

partition.”

Mr. Reggie cites the case of Succession of Matherne, 472 So.2d 240, 243

(La.App. 1 Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted) to support his contention that the

distribution in this case constituted a partition rather than a sale:

The trial court was correct in holding that this was not a sale, but
rather was an agreement to partition as stated in paragraph 12.5. The
partition of a succession is the division of the effects, of which the
succession is composed, among all the coheirs, according to their
respective rights. La. C.C. art. 1293. Partition is a sort of exchange,
which the coheirs make among themselves, one giving up his right in
the thing which he abandons for the right of the other in the thing he
takes. La. C.C. art. 1382. Here, plaintiffs agreed to abandon their rights
in the company stock in exchange for cash. Therefore, the trial court
concluded that “the mere fact that the Settlement Agreement mentions
an exchange of stock for cash does not change the partition into a sale
under the code articles and jurisprudence relied upon by petitioners.”

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On the other hand, a sale is defined as “a contract whereby a person transfers

ownership of a thing to another for a price in money. The thing, the price, and the

consent of the parties are requirements for the perfection of a sale.” La.Civ.Code art.

2439. When a credit sale occurs, a prior court order is required, with such an order

specifying “the terms of the sale and the security.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 3263. Court

authorization for the sale of succession property at private sale is necessary for a

succession under ordinary administration. La.Code Civ.P. art. 3281.

We find that the Civil Code’s articles on partition apply in this case. Here, the

heirs participated in “a sort of exchange” as set forth in La.Civ.Code art. 1382. Mr.

Reggie, in accordance with his duties as executor, determined the value of the

Decedent’s household movable property. The total value was then divided among

the heirs, of which Ms. Hornby’s share was $8,300.00. Mr. Reggie conducted a

simple bidding process which allowed the heirs to select property they wished to

keep, or opt for the cash value of their share of the property. This process clearly fits

the Civil Code’s definition of a partition, which is “the division of the effects of

which the succession is composed, among all the coheirs, according to their

respective rights.” La.Civ.Code art. 1293.

As discussed in the previous section, we find that Ms. Hornsby consented to

the bidding process, and thus court approval was not required. Therefore, we find

that the trial court did not manifestly err in finding that a partition occurred.

Regarding the jewelry sold to Lafayette Coin and Treasure, Ms. Hornsby

similarly states that the jewelry was improperly sold without her consent.

Pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 3261, “[a] succession representative may sell

succession property in order to pay debts and legacies, or for any other purpose,

when authorized by the court as provided in this Chapter.”

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At trial, Mr. Reggie testified that the jewelry sold to Lafayette Coin and

Treasure consisted of “what no one would buy at any reduced price, and no one

would take for free.” In other words, the jewelry at issue was jewelry that no heir

wanted or would even volunteer to dispose of. At this point, Mr. Reggie, as executor,

had to decide whether to throw the jewelry away, donate the jewelry, or sell for scrap

value.

Mr. Reggie testified:

What I chose to do was not throw it away and not give it away. I chose
to try to put some money in the pocket of the heirs. And so I went to
Lafayette – whatever it was called – Coin and Treasure. And I got
money for them, instead of me throwing it away.

Mr. Reggie’s testimony is consistent with the bidding process outlined in the

January 12, 2020 email. He stated in that email, in relevant part: “In the end, any

items not selected will be given away—to you, or to charity, or tossed out. We will

try to use as little money as possible to dispose of unclaimed items.” Ms. Hornsby

agreed to the terms of this email and thus agreed that any unclaimed household

movable items would be either given away or thrown away.

We find that pursuant to both the January 12, 2020 email, to which Ms.

Hornsby does not dispute she agreed to, and the authority granted executors under

La.Code Civ.P. art. 3261, Mr. Reggie had the authority to dispose of the unwanted

property of the estate. We find that his decision to sell the scrap jewelry, rather than

throw the pieces away, was more than reasonable and did not constitute an illegal

sale.

Assignment of Error Number Three

The third assignment of error deals with the trial court’s denial of Ms.

Hornsby’s motion to compel discovery. On February 12, 2021, Ms. Hornsby served

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Mr. Reggie’s attorney with Interrogatories and Requests for Production of

Documents. The information sought in discovery deals with identifying to whom the

movable property items went to, so they can be appraised for purposes of a judicial

partition. On October 7, 2021, Mr. Reggie submitted responses to these requests.

However, Ms. Hornsby alleged that those responses were incomplete and/or not

answered. After counsel for both parties participated in a Rule 10.1 Conference on

February 14, 2022, Ms. Hornsby filed a Motion to Compel Mr. Reggie to make “full

and complete” responses to her discovery requests.

The trial court denied Ms. Hornsby’s motion to compel. The denial predicated

on its decision to grant the request for the legatees to be placed in partial possession

and found the discovery to be unnecessary in light of the trial court’s ruling on

possession. Because we find that the trial court correctly ruled on the judgment of

possession, we find the motion to compel and information sought in the discovery

requests to not be relevant to the current matter. We affirm the trial court’s denial of

the motion to compel.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. All

costs of this appeal are assessed against Appellant, Barbara Reggie Hornsby.

AFFIRMED.

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