Wells Fargo Bank, Na v. Joseph L. Jones

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

23-463

WELLS FARGO BANK, NA

VERSUS

JOSEPH L. JONES

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 14-C-3234-A
HONORABLE GREGORY JAMES DOUCET, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Candyce G. Perret, and Gary J. Ortego,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Joseph L. Jones
Rebecca Mae Valmont Jones
3097 Highway 167
Opelousas, LA 70570
(337) 780-1170
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
In Proper Persons

Christopher D. Meyer
Burr & Forman, LLP
190 E. Capitol St., Suite M-100
Jackson, MS 39201
(601) 355-3434
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Elizabeth Crowell Price
Dean Morris, L.L.C.
1505 North 19th Street
Monroe, LA 71207-2867
(318) 388-1440
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

PERRET, Judge.

Joseph Jones, a/k/a Joseph Lawrence Jones, and Rebecca Mae Valmont Jones,

a/k/a Rebecca Mae Valmont, (collectively “the Defendants”) appeal a May 10, 2023

trial court judgment that granted Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s (“Wells Fargo”) Motion

to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Discovery Order and dismissed the

Defendants’ third amended reconventional demand. The judgment also denied

Wells Fargo’s request for attorney fees and costs. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 16, 2014, Wells Fargo filed a Petition to Enforce Security Interest by

Executory Process against the Defendants. According to the petition, Wells Fargo

alleged it is owed the following amounts under the Defendants’ note and mortgage:

“(a) principal of $248,585.98 with interest thereon at 9.130% per annum from July

15, 2012, until paid; (b) all expenses incurred in enforcing the note and mortgage

including reasonable attorney’s fees of not less than $2,500.00 . . . .”

On March 18, 2016, Wells Fargo filed a Petition to Convert Executory

Proceeding to Ordinary Proceeding. Thereafter, on May 6, 2016, the Defendants,

who have appeared pro se throughout these proceedings, responded to the petition

with an answer generally denying the allegations of the petition and also stating that

“[t]he property description is incorrect.”

On June 22, 2016, Wells Fargo filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,

arguing that there are no material issues to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. In support of its motion, Wells Fargo attached the following

exhibits: (1) the March 10, 2010 promissory note for $252,792.76, payable to Wells

Fargo; (2) a certified copy of act of mortgage; (3) the July 14, 2014 affidavit of David

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Hugenbruch for his attorney fees; (4) a June 14, 2016 affidavit of Annette Corbin

attesting to the fact that the Defendants “were not in the military service of the United

States;” (5) the June 7, 2016 affidavit of Vanna D. Tipton, the Vice-President Loan

Documentation for Wells Fargo Bank; (6) the June 17, 2016 memorandum in

support of the Motion for Summary Judgment; and (7) a statement of uncontested

facts. A hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment was set for July 22, 2016.

On July 20, 2016, the Defendants filed for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy in the

Western District of Louisiana. Thereafter, on September 6, 2016, a Chapter 13 Plan

was filed into the record by the United States Bankruptcy Court, Western District of

Louisiana, Lafayette Division. On January 27, 2021, the bankruptcy court dismissed

the Defendants’ case.

On April 29, 2022, Wells Fargo filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File

Amended Petition to Enforce Security Interest by Ordinary Process. The Amended

Petition was filed in lieu of a Partial Release of Mortgage that was filed on May 17,

2021.

On May 23, 2022, the Defendants filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and

Reconventional Demand that denied Wells Fargo’s allegations and asserted the

affirmative defense of prescription. The Defendants reconvened alleging, in

pertinent part:

15.

Defendant in Reconvention is liable to Petitioners in
Reconvention pursuant to La. R.S. 9:4833, in that on March 22, 2018
Petitioners in Reconvention provided written demand to Defendant in
Reconvention to remove an improperly filed lien. It wasn’t until May
17, 2021 that Defendant in Reconvention released Petitioners in
Reconvention’s property from an improperly filed lien. Petitioners in
Reconvention have sustained damages due to Defendant in
Reconvention improperly filing a lien against their property.

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16.

Defendant in Reconvention is liable to Petitioners in
Reconvention pursuant to La. R.S. 51:2254, et seq., in that it unlawfully
discriminated against Petitioners in Reconvention because of their: race
and/or age in not granting, extending, modifying, or renewing of rates,
terms, conditions, privileges, or other provisions of the mortgage.
Additionally, Defendant in Reconvention unlawfully discriminated
against Petitioners in Reconvention by charging higher rates, charges
or fees for or collateral required to secure the mortgage because
Petitioners in Reconvention are African-American.

On June 14, 2022, Wells Fargo responded by filing an Answer and

Affirmative Defenses to Reconventional Demand and Exceptions of Vagueness and

No Cause of Action. Thereafter, the Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Wells

Fargo to Produce Request for Records and Documents.

After a hearing, the trial court issued the following ruling on August 5, 2022,

(alteration added):

This matter came before the Court on July 15, 2022 on the
Answer with Exceptions of Vagueness and No Cause of Action filed
by Plaintiff and Defendant-in-Reconvention, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
and the Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Produce Request for Records and
Documents filed by Defendants . . . .

....

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Exception of Vagueness as to La. R.S. 9:48333 is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the Exception of Vagueness as to 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601
and 3617 [the Fair Housing Act] is SUSTAINED and the claims are
prescribed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the Exception of No Cause of Action as to any claims
of discrimination as asserted in the Reconventional Demand is
SUSTAINED. Further, the Defendants shall have leave of Court to
amend the Reconventional Demand within fifteen (15) days from July
15, 2022, on or before July 30, 2022.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJDUGED AND
DECREED that the Exception of No Cause of Action as to La. R.S.

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41:1401, et seq. is SUSTAINED. Further, the Defendants shall have
leave of Court to amend the Reconventional Demand within fifteen (15)
days from July 15, 2022, on or before July 30, 2022.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the Motion to Compel is DENIED.

On July 29, 2022, the Defendants filed a Second Supplement to Answer to

Wells Fargo’s Amended Petition and Defendant[s’] Petition for Reconventional

Demand. In response, on August 15, 2022, Wells Fargo filed Exceptions of

Prescription, No Cause of Action, and Vagueness and Nonconformity.

After a hearing, the trial judge rendered the following judgment on September

26, 2022:

This matter came before the Court on September 9, 2022 on the
Exceptions of Prescription, No Cause of Action, and Vagueness and
Nonconformity filed by Plaintiff and Defendant-in-Reconvention,
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in response to the Reconventional Demand
filed on July 29, 2022 by Defendants . . . .

....

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Peremptory Exception of Prescription as to an improper lien and/or
partial release of the Mortgage asserted by the Defendants pursuant to
the Fair Housing Act as codified by 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., is
SUSTAINED and the claims are prescribed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the Peremptory Exception of Prescription as to claims
asserted by the Defendants pursuant to the Fair Housing Act under 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3613 and 3617 is SUSTAINED and the claims are
prescribed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the Peremptory Exception of Prescription as to claims
asserted by the Defendants pursuant to the La. R.S. 51:2254 is
SUSTAINED and the claims are prescribed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action as
to claims asserted by the Defendants pursuant to La. R.S. 51:2254 and
the Fair Housing Act as codified by 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., is
SUSTAINED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJDUGED AND
DECREED that the Dilatory Exception of Vagueness and
Nonconformity as to claims of damages regarding an improper lien
asserted by the Defendants in the Reconventional Demand is
SUSTAINED. Further, the Defendants shall have leave of Court to
amend the Reconventional Demand within twenty (20) days from
September 9, 2022, or on or before September 29, 2022.

On September 27, 2022, the Defendants filed their Amended Reconventional

Demand to Include Damages, which only addressed Wells Fargo’s improper lien on

their property and requested damages in the amount of $368,595.00.

On October 10, 2022, Wells Fargo propounded written discovery on the

Defendants, including eight requests for admission on information directly related,

and relevant, to the Defendants’ third reconventional demand.

On October 19, 2022, Wells Fargo filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses

to the Amended Reconventional Demand.

Thereafter, on December 13, 2022, Wells Fargo filed a Plaintiff’s Motion to

Deem Matters Admitted and Incorporated Memorandum, alleging that the

Defendants failed to submit any responses to its October 10, 2022 written requests

for discovery. In support of its motion, Wells Fargo attached a copy of its First Set

of Requests for Admission, Interrogatories and Requests for Production of

Documents. After a hearing on January 27, 2023, the trial court orally granted Wells

Fargo’s Motion to Deem Matter Admitted and Incorporated Memorandum and

subsequently signed the judgment on February 15, 2023.

In February 2023, Wells Fargo filed a Motion to Compel the Defendants to

respond to its discovery requests. Following a hearing, the trial court orally granted

Wells Fargo’s motion and ordered the Defendants to respond to Wells Fargo’s

discovery within “(15) days from February 3, 2023[.]” The signed judgment,

rendered on February 23, 2023, further ordered, as follows: “[the Defendants] are to

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pay reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $860.00 and costs in the amount of

$340.00 incurred in connection with the Motion to Compel[;]” and “the Defendants’

Request to Amend Reconventional Demand is hereby DENIED and Plaintiff’s oral

Motion to Strike the Defendants’ claims of discrimination pursuant to the Fair House

Act . . . is hereby GRANTED with said claims herein shall be and are STRICKEN

from the record in this matter.”

On March 15, 2023, Wells Fargo filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

Comply with Discovery Order, alleging that “[f]ifteen (15) days have now passed

since the Court ordered [the] Defendants to respond to the discovery, and [the]

Defendants failed to comply with the order compelling them to respond in full to the

discovery.” The trial court set a hearing on this motion for April 23, 2023.

On April 3, 2023, the Defendants filed a Motion for Recusal of Judge, alleging

that the trial judge “showed bias” throughout the course of these proceedings. In

response to the motion to recuse, the trial judge denied the Defendants’ motion in a

per curiam, signed on April 13, 2023.

On April 21, 2023, a hearing was held on Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss

for Failure to Comply with Discovery Order. At the hearing, the trial judge and pro

se defendant, Mr. Jones, discussed the history of the case as well as the discovery

requests, as follows:

THE COURT: It’s -- you have to respond to discovery and I told
you that the last time, you have to be specific in your response and you
went to law school so you know how to handle discovery.

MR. JONES: Well, I failed the bar so –

THE COURT: And I’ve been giving you a lot, a lot of lead way.

MR. JONES: So I didn’t know, but my point is –

8

THE COURT: Failing the bar and going to law school are two
totally different things.

MR. JONES: Well, but what I am saying is and -- and the only
discovery I got was from Wells Fargo Announcement from the
President of it saying that they had engaged in rinse repeat type
discriminatory action and they paid three point seven billion dollars and
so if I had the file, I had a list of people I could subpoena or depose and
have witnesses, but I don’t have access to the files, all I have is an
announcement by Wells Fargo President that yes, we did it.

MS. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor, to relevance.

THE COURT: Sustained.

All right, I mean, again I’ve looked at all the facts in this case,
I’ve looked at all the responses in discovery, we’ve been going back
and forth this [case] has been pending since 2014, granted no action
could be taken until January of 2021 when the bankruptcy court
released it. We are now of April of 2023, and we still going back and
forth on the same allegations in the Reconventional Demand which uh
I’ve ruled on most of them and now today we are at a Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Reconventional Demand to include damages which was
filed September 27th, 2022. The Court -- plaintiff has specifically
asked for responses to support defendant’s claims in that
Reconventional Demand and defendant has failed to respond after
being specifically told to respond with specificity and to provide
documents. The Court has evaluated the two Supreme Court Cases,
[Hutchinson v. Westport Ins. Corp., 04-1592 (La.11/08/04), 886 So.2d
438, where the suit of a pro se plaintiff was dismissed for violating
discovery orders] and [Horton v. McCary, 93-2315 (La. 4/11/94), 635
So.2d 199] and the Court finds that all the factors apply in this matter
and accordingly, the Court is going to dismiss the Amended
Reconventional Demand and Included Damages filed by defendants on
September 27th 2022 for failure to comply or respond to discovery
under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article [1471](A)(3), where
the Court has the authority to dismiss the action or proceedings. The
Court has also looked at the cost, the request for attorney’s fees and the
Court is going to find that those fees are not gonna [sic] be awarded for
the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, but the dismissal will be granted.

Thereafter, on May 10, 2023, the trial court signed a judgment granting Wells

Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Discovery Order.

On appeal, the Defendants allege that the following three issues are before

this court:

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1. The District Court committed reversible error when it denied
Appellants[’] Motion for Recusal.

2. The District Court committed reversible error when it granted
Appellees[’] Motion to Dismiss.

3. The District Court committed reversible error when it colluded with
Well[s] Fargo and the Law Firm of Dean Morris to deny Appellants
their Due Process and Equal Protection rights and Fair Housing rights,
under the 14th Amendment and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601
etc.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The appellate standard of review for a trial court’s sanction against a party

that fails to produce discovery is whether the trial court abused its great discretion.

Acadiana Renal Physicians v. Our Lady of Lourdes Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 23-372

(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/28/23), 368 So.3d 745. As this court recently stated in Acadiana

Renal Physicians, 368 So.3d at 752:

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1471 grants the trial
court the power to impose sanctions on a party or his attorney for the
unjustified failure to obey a discovery order. “The trial court has much
discretion when choosing the appropriate sanctions, under La.Code
Civ.P. art. 1471, for a party’s failure to comply with a discovery order,
and we will not reverse its choice absent a clear showing that it abused
its discretion.” In re Wiley, 03-793, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/23/03), 862
So.2d 1243, 1246-47; see also Rice v. Sagrera, 95-155 (La.App. 3 Cir.
5/31/95), 657 So.2d 419, writ denied, 95-1657 (La. 10/6/95), 661 So.2d
470.

Before addressing the merits of the case, we again note that the Defendants

are appearing pro se in this matter and their brief does not comply with Uniform

Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–12.4(A). However, “[i]n the interest of justice

this court will read pro se filings indulgently and attempt to discern the thrust of the

appellant[s]’ position on appeal and the relief [they] seek[].” Magee v. Williams,

50,726, p. 5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So.3d 265, 268.

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DISCUSSION

The Defendants’ Motion to Recuse:

In their appellate brief, the Defendants contend the trial judge erred “in failing

to recuse himself when [he] found that ‘said motion is untimely based on La. C.C.P[.]

154.’” The Defendants argue that the trial judge “made a considered effort to

misrepresent the facts to rush this case to dismissal” and that he “conveniently

skipped over his Order dated March 17, 2023[,]” when determining that the February

3, 2023 ruling was the last decision in this matter prior to the Motion for Recusal.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 151 provides the grounds for a

judge’s recusal, and states, in pertinent part:

A. A judge of any trial or appellate court shall be recused upon
any of the following grounds:

(1) The judge is a witness in the cause.

(2) The judge has been employed or consulted as an attorney in
the cause or has previously been associated with an attorney during the
latter’s employment in the cause, and the judge participated in
representation in the cause.

(3) The judge is the spouse of a party, or of an attorney employed
in the cause or the judge’s parent, child, or immediate family member
is a party or attorney employed in the cause.

(4) The judge is biased, prejudiced, or interested in the cause or
its outcome or biased or prejudiced toward or against the parties or the
parties’ attorneys or any witness to such an extent that the judge would
be unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings.

B. A judge of any trial or appellate court shall also be recused
when there exists a substantial and objective basis that would
reasonably be expected to prevent the judge from conducting any aspect
of the cause in a fair and impartial manner.

In In re Eleanor Pierce (Marshall) Stevens Living Tr., 17-111, p. 13 (La.App.

3 Cir. 10/4/17), 229 So.3d 36, 47, writ denied, 17-1868 (La. 1/29/18), 233 So. 3d

11

613, this court addressed La.Code Civ.P. art 151 in regard to the assertion of bias

and/or prejudice, and explained as follows:

Significantly, Article 151 “do[es] not include a ‘substantial appearance
of the possibility of bias’ or even a ‘mere appearance of impropriety’
as causes for removing a judge from presiding over a given action.”
Slaughter [v. Board of Sup’rs of Southern Univ., 10-1114 (La.App. 1
Cir. 8/2/11), 76 So.3d 465, 471, writ denied, 11-2112 (La. 1/13/12), 77
So.3d 970.] It instead requires a finding of actual bias or prejudice that
is of a substantial nature, and not one based on merely conclusory
allegations. Covington v. McNeese State Univ., 10-0250 (La. 4/5/10),
32 So.3d 223. Furthermore, and as a foundational point, it is important
to recall that “[a] judge is presumed to be impartial.” Slaughter, 76
So.3d at 471.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 154 provides the procedure for the

recusal of a trial judge and states, in pertinent part (emphasis added):

A. A party desiring to recuse a judge of a district court shall file
a written motion therefor assigning the ground for recusal under Article
151. This motion shall be filed no later than thirty days after
discovery of the facts constituting the ground upon which the
motion is based, but in all cases prior to the scheduling of the
matter for trial. In the event that the facts constituting the ground
upon which the motion to recuse is based occur after the matter is
scheduled for trial or the party moving for recusal could not, in the
exercise of due diligence, have discovered such facts, the motion to
recuse shall be filed immediately after such facts occur or are
discovered.

B. If the motion to recuse sets forth a ground for recusal under
Article 151, not later than seven days after the judge’s receipt of the
motion from the clerk of court, the judge shall either recuse himself or
make a written request to the supreme court for the appointment of an
ad hoc judge as provided in Article 155.

C. If the motion to recuse is not timely filed in accordance with
Paragraph A of this Article or fails to set forth a ground for recusal
under Article 151, the judge may deny the motion without the
appointment of an ad hoc judge or a hearing but shall provide written
reasons for the denial.

Again, it is worth reiterating that “a judge is presumed to be impartial.” City

of Baton Rouge v. Douglas, 16-655, p. 11 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17); 218 So.3d 158,

166. On appeal, a trial judge’s ruling that denies a motion to recuse will not be

12

reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Menard v. Menard, 19-580 (La.App. 3 Cir.

3/11/20), 297 So.3d 82.

In this case, the trial judge issued a well-reasoned per curiam for finding the

Motion to Recuse untimely and without merit. The per curiam, signed on April 11,

2023, stated, in pertinent part (emphasis added):

JONES [the Defendants] filed a Motion for Recusal of Judge on
April 3, 2023 alleging the undersigned is biased, impartial, acting in
collusion with the opposing party, denying them of their legal rights,
and attempting to punish and intimidate them. All of the allegations are
adamantly denied by the undersigned. The allegations are derived from
several unfavorable rulings made by the undersigned against JONES
on their claims under the Fair Housing Act: 42 U.S.C. 3601, et seq.;
Trade and Commerce: La.R.S. 51:2254; and various discovery matters.
Hearings were held on July 15, 2022 and September 9, 2022 on those
matters with rulings made by the undersigned on said dates. Judgments
signed August 5, 2022 and September 26, 2022, respectively.
Subsequent hearings were had on other motions on January 27, 2023
and February 3, 2023 with rulings made on said dates. Judgments were
signed on February 15, 2023. No notice of intent to file applications
for supervisory writs have been filed by JONES from any of the
interlocutory judgments signed.

La. C.C.P. Art. 1914, in part, states “. . . rendition of an
interlocutory judgment in open court constitutes notice to all
parties.” . . . .

JONES alleges that the undersigned is biased, impartial, acting
in collusion with the opposing party, denying them of their legal rights,
and attempting to punish and intimidate them. Bias or prejudice are
grounds for a judge to recuse himself from the matter as per La. C.C.P.
Art. 151 (4). La. C.C.P. Art. 154 (A) states “A party desiring to recuse
a judge of a district court shall file a written motion assigning the
ground for recusal under Article 151. This motion shall be filed no later
than thirty days after discovery of the facts constituting the ground upon
which the motion is based, . . .”. JONES were put on notice of the
alleged grounds in 2022 when judgments were rendered/signed. The
last decision in this matter was made February 3, 2023 with the
judgment being signed on February 15, 2023, over 30 days from the
filing of the motion for recusal which was filed on April 3, 2023.

Canon 3 [C] states “A judge should disqualify himself or herself
in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned and shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in

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which disqualification is required by law or applicable Supreme Court
rule[.”] The undersigned adamantly denies all allegations set forth by
JONES and further maintains that all proceedings herein were
conducted in a fair and impartial manner. All decisions were based
upon the law and the facts presented. At no time did bias, prejudice or
any of the other allegations influence any of the decisions made by the
undersigned. The undersigned further demonstrates that the said
allegations made by JONES have absolutely no merit and further, any
future decisions in this matter will again be made solely on the facts
presented and the law applied thereto.

The allegations made by JONES against the undersigned are the
results of unfavorable rulings made against JONES. Rather than file
the Motion for Recusal of Judge, JONES’ avenue was to file
supervisory writs to the Louisiana Court of Appeals which should have
been done 30 days from the notice of the judgments. No notice of intent
has been filed and said right is prescribed. Further, JONES was put on
notice of the alleged grounds for recusal beginning in 2022 and failed
to take any actions at such time. Said motion is untimely based on La.
C.C.P. Art. 154.

Accordingly, the Motion for Recusal of Judge is hereby DENIED
for the reasons stated herein.

After reviewing the record, jurisprudence, and the Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure, we agree with the trial judge’s finding that the Defendants’ Motion for

Recusal was untimely. The Defendants based their April 3, 2023 Motion for Recusal

on several trial court orders that were entered into prior to March 4, 2023.

Specifically, the record evidences the following trial court rulings:

• On August 5, 2022, the trial judge: (1) denied the Defendants’
Motion to Compel Plaintiffs to Produce Request for Records and
Documents; (2) sustained Wells Fargo’s Exception of Vagueness
as to 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 and 3617 [the Fair Housing Act] and
dismissed these claims as prescribed, and (3) sustained Wells
Fargo’s Exception of No Cause of Action as to La.R.S 51:1401,
Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law.

• On September 26, 2022, the trial judge: (1) sustained Wells
Fargo’s Peremptory Exception of Prescription as to an improper
lien and/or partial release of the Mortgage asserted by the
Defendants pursuant to the Fair Housing Act and dismissed these
claims as prescribed; (2) sustained Wells Fargo’s Peremptory
Exception of Prescription as to claims asserted by the Defendants

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pursuant to the Fair Housing Act under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3613
and 3617, finding that the claims are prescribed; (3) sustained
Wells Fargo’s Peremptory Exception of Prescription as to claims
asserted by the Defendants pursuant to the La. R.S. 51:2254,
finding that the claims prescribed; (4) sustained Wells Fargo’s
Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action as to claims
asserted by the Defendants pursuant to La. R.S. 51:2254 and the
Fair Housing Act as codified by 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.; and
(5) sustained the Dilatory Exception of Vagueness and
Nonconformity as to claims of damages regarding an improper
lien asserted by the Defendants in the Reconventional Demand.

• On January 27, 2023, the trial judge orally granted Wells Fargo’s
Motion to Deem Matters Admitted and signed the judgment on
February 15, 2023.

• On February 3, 2023, the trial court orally: (1) granted Wells
Fargo’s Motion to Compel; (2) ordered the Defendants to pay
$860.00 in attorney fees and $340.00 in costs; and (3) granted
Wells Fargo’s Motion to Strike the Defendants’ claims of
discrimination pursuant to the Fair Housing Act. This judgment
was signed on February 23, 2023.

As the trial judge properly stated in his per curiam, the Defendants did not file

a Motion for Recusal or a supervisory writ within thirty days of any of these trial

court rulings. Further, “adverse rulings alone do not show bias or prejudice.” Earles

v. Ahlstedt, 591 So.2d 741, 746 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991). We also find no merit in the

Defendants’ argument that the trial court failed to consider the March 17, 2023 order

setting Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Discovery

Order in considering their Motion for Recusal. As Wells Fargo correctly stated in

its brief, the Defendants “fail to explain in either their Motion for Recusal or

Appellate Brief how an order setting a motion for hearing is evidence of bias, let

alone how it would be grounds for recusal.” After a review of the record, we find

no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that denied the Motion to Recuse as

the Defendants failed to timely file their motion and failed to identify any basis on

which their motion should have been granted.

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Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss:

The Defendants next argue that the trial court committed reversible error when

it granted Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Discovery

Order. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1471(A) sets forth the sanctions

a trial court may impose against a party for failure to comply with discovery orders

and provides, in pertinent part:

A. If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery . . . the court in which the action is pending may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just, including any of the following:

....

(3) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action
or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a default judgment
against the disobedient party . . . .

In Gordon v. Sonic of Jennings, 04-1105 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05), 893 So.2d

158, this court addressed a similar situation and affirmed a trial court judgment that

dismissed a pro se plaintiff’s complaint as a sanction for violating an order

compelling discovery.1 In addressing the applicable jurisprudence, this court stated:

The Louisiana Supreme Court very recently addressed the issue
of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery in Hutchinson v.
Westport Ins. Co., 04-1592, p. 2 (La.11/08/04), 886 So.2d 438, 440:

The trial court has much discretion in imposing sanctions
for failure to comply with discovery orders, and its ruling
should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
Lirette v. Babin Farms, Inc., 02-1402, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir.
4/2/03), 843 So.2d 1141, 1143; Garza v. Int’l. Maint.
Corp., 97-317, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97), 702 So.2d
1021, 1023. Dismissal, however, is a draconian penalty
which should be applied only in extreme circumstances.
Horton v. McCary, 93-2315, p. 10 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d

1
In Gordon, a worker compensation claimant, representing himself, willfully failed to comply with
a discovery order and be deposed. Claimant had several months to respond to discovery but simply ignored
the defendant’s request and a court order. This court held that the Workers’ Compensation Judge did not
abuse his discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with his
discovery order.

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199, 203. Dismissal is a sanction of last resort only to be
imposed where a party has failed to comply with a court
order of discovery and only after an opportunity to be
heard has been afforded the litigant. Garza, 97-317 at p.
5, 702 So.2d at 1024.

In Horton, we adopted from the federal courts four factors
to consider before taking the drastic action of dismissal.
These factors are: (1) whether the violation was willful or
resulted from inability to comply; (2) whether less drastic
sanctions would be effective; (3) whether the violations
prejudiced the opposing party's trial preparation; and, (4)
whether the client participated in the violation or simply
misunderstood a court order or innocently hired a derelict
attorney. Horton, 93-2315 at pp. 10–11, 635 So.2d at 203.

Id. at 160. In applying these principles, this court concluded that “the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal for Mr. Gordon’s

[Plaintiff’s] failure to comply with its discovery order.” Specifically, this court

stated (second alteration in original):

Gordon [Plaintiff] chose to represent himself. “[He] is directly and
solely responsible for his failure to comply with the discovery order
which led to the dismissal” of his case. Hutchinson, 886 So.2d 438,
440. Without cause or justification, despite court order, Gordon
willfully failed to comply with discovery and be deposed. He had
several months to respond to discovery and refused. Much of the
discovery was easily answerable; however, Gordon simply ignored the
Defendant’s requests and court order. Further, Gordon knowingly and
willfully thwarted the judicial process by refusing acceptance of an
official court notice concerning his case, and now attempts to cast
blame on the court for his own neglect and avoidable failures.

Id.

Similarly, in this case, the Defendants failed to respond to Wells Fargo’s

October 10, 2022 First Set of Requests for Admission, Interrogatories and Requests

for Production of Documents. On November 29, 2022, Wells Fargo granted the

Defendants an additional two weeks, or until December 9, 2022, to respond to the

discovery. However, having received no response, Wells Fargo filed a Motion to

Compel on December 20, 2022. A hearing on the Motion to Compel was held on

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February 3, 2023, wherein the trial judge granted the motion and ordered the

Defendants to respond within fifteen days. When the Defendants failed to comply

with the court order compelling them to respond in full to the discovery, Wells Fargo

filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Discovery on March 15, 2023.

In consideration of the Horton factors, we find there is sufficient evidence in

the record to support the conclusion that the Defendants failure to comply with

discovery was willful and warranted the harsh remedy imposed by the trial court.

Accordingly, trial judge was within his discretion in dismissing the Defendants’ third

reconventional demand.

Due Process and Equal Protection Rights and Fair Housing Rights:

The last issue raised by the Defendants is whether the trial court “committed

reversible error when it colluded with Well[s] Fargo and the Law Firm of Dean

Morris to deny Appellants their Due Process and Equal Protection rights and Fair

Housing rights, under the 14th Amendment and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.

§3601 etc.”

The Defendants supplemented and amended their reconventional demand

multiple times, 2 asserting claims based on the following statutes: La.R.S. 9:4833,

titled “Request to cancel the inscription of claims and privileges; cancellation; notice

of pendency of action”; La.R.S. 51:2254, titled “Unlawful financial practices”; 42

U.S.C. §3601 titled “Declaration of policy [for fair housing throughout the United

2
On May 23, 2022, the Defendants filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and
Reconventional Demand. Also on that date, the Defendants filed a Supplement to Reconventional
Demand, which added that Wells Fargo’s actions violated their rights under the Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3601. On July 29, 2022, the Defendants filed a 2nd Supplement to Answer to Wells
Fargo’s Amended Petition and Defendant[s’] Petition for Reconventional Demand, alleging the
same causes of action as in their previous filings. On September 27, 2022, the Defendants filed
an Amended Reconventional Demand, which addressed Wells Fargo’s improper lien on the
Defendants’ property and requested damages in the amount of $368,595.00.

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States]”; 42 U.S.C. §3613, titled “Enforcement by private persons”; and 42 U.S.C.

§3617, titled “Interference, coercion, or intimidation.” However, on September 26,

2022, the trial court ruled that these claims had prescribed and no appeal was taken

from these rulings.

Although the Defendants filed their last Amended Reconventional Demand

on September 27, 2022, the only claim raised at that time involved the improper lien

on the Defendants’ property back in 2014. Specifically, the amended reconventional

demand stated, in pertinent part (footnotes omitted):

This Court has denied/dismissed all of Petitioners’ defenses and
Reconventional Claims to retain Petitioners’ Home. Therefore,
Petitioners have lost Petitioners Home. But for Wells Fargo improper
lien on Petitioners’ property at 3097 Hwy 167, Opelousas, Louisiana,
Petitioners could have sold or refinanced the 3097 Property and paid
the monthly mortgage notes and thus retained Petitioners’ Home.

However, as previously stated, we find that the trial court acted within his

great discretion in dismissing this sole claim because of the Defendants failure to

comply with the trial court’s discovery order.

For these reasons, we affirm the May 10, 2023 judgment granting Wells

Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Discovery Order. The costs

of this appeal are assessed to the Defendants, Joseph Jones a/k/a Joseph Lawrence

Jones and Rebecca Mae Valmont Jones a/k/a Rebecca Mae Valmont.

AFFIRMED.

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