Javeed Khan v. Reshma Azeez

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-68

JAVEED KHAN

VERSUS

RESHMA AZEEZ

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 2023-1212-B
HONORABLE WILLIAM BENNETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, D. Kent Savoie, and Candyce G. Perret,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Angelo J. Piazza, III
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 429
Marksville, LA 71351
(318) 253-6423
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Javeed Khan

Douglas L. Bryan
The Bryan Law Firm, LLC
P. O. Box 707
Marksville, La 71351-0707
(318) 240-8282
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Reshma Azeez

Derek P. Manuel
Attorney at Law, PLLC
115 East Ogden Street
Marksville, LA 71351
(318) 717-1199
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

GREMILLION, Judge.

Javeed Khan appeals the trial court’s judgment granting res judicata in favor

of Reshma Azeez giving full faith and credit to a divorce judgment rendered in

Illinois. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Khan and Azeez are citizens of India and were married there in 2003 but have

resided in the United States since 2007. They first lived in Maryland, then moved

to Quincy, Illinois in 2017. They are the parents of two teenaged children, one born

in 2005 and the other in 2008. Khan and Azeez traveled to India in November 2018,

whereupon Khan deserted his wife taking her passport with him. He was then

unilaterally granted a divorce under Islamic law by uttering of the word “talaq”

(divorce) three times, a practice which India declared illegal and unconstitutional on

July 31, 2019, retroactive to September 19, 2018, under the Muslim Women

(Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act. It states that a declaration of triple talaq is

void and illegal and “any pronouncement of talaq by a Muslim husband upon his

wife, by words, either spoken or written or in electronic form or in any other manner

whatsoever, shall be void and illegal” and subjects the husband to a three year prison

term and a fine. Upon her eventual return to the United States in March 2019, Azeez

immediately filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in an Adams County, Illinois

court on March 13, 2019.

Khan objected to the Illinois court’s jurisdiction arguing he had been divorced

via the talaq method. In March 2019, he filed a special limited pleading to question

the jurisdiction of the court. Following a full hearing in April 2019, the Illinois trial

court denied Khan’s exception finding that the UCCJEA (Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act) and basic principles of human rights required a

finding that the divorce by talaq and any subsequent child custody determinations

were invalid. The trial court found that the United States was the country of habitual

residence of the children and Illinois their home state. An order rendered on April

4, 2019, by the Illinois trial court denied Khan’s limited pleading to question

jurisdiction of the court and stated in part:

The parties and their children have resided in the United States since
2007. One child was born in the United States. In 2017 the family
relocated to Quincy, Adams County, Illinois. Under the UCCJEA, a
state court must treat a judgment rendered in a foreign country as if it
were rendered in another state of the United States. A child custody
determination made in a foreign country must be recognized and
enforced if made under circumstances in substantial conformity with
the jurisdictional standards of the Act. Finally, an Illinois court is not
required to apply the Act internationally if the law of a foreign country
violates fundamental principles of human rights.

In this case, in November of 2018, the parties traveled together to India,
leaving the children in the State of Illinois. Once there, Dr. Khan made
the first pronouncement of a divorce, called “Talak,” based on Islamic
law. He then returned to the United States two or three days later.
Specifically he returned to Illinois where the children had remained.
He then made the second and third pronouncements of “Talak.” He
testified that none of these three pronouncements were made in the
presence of Azeez. Azeez testified that once Dr. Khan left India, she
was without her Indian Passport and her Visa. She was unable to return
to Illinois until she obtained replacements for these documents. Upon
her return to Illinois in March, she immediately sought counsel and
filed this action.

Any divorce action that results in a judgment, that includes child
custody, based simply on a pronouncement of divorce by a husband
violates fundamental principles of the wife’s rights to dispute the
divorce action and be heard with regard to division of assets and debts
as well as custody of the parties’ minor children. According to the
testimony of Dr. Khan, the only right afforded under this
pronouncement of divorce is the right of the wife to make efforts of
reconciliation. As such, the Court declines to give international
application to the “Talak” as it applies to parental responsibility/custody
of the parties’ minor children. Only an Illinois court-not an Indian
court-can grant complete relief to the parties, since only Illinois has the
jurisdiction to decide parenting and custody matters. Under the
UCCJEA, Illinois is the children’s home state.

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The Illinois court rendered a judgment on November 6, 2019, finding the India

judgment invalid, dissolving the marriage, setting forth child custody, and awarding

spousal and child support in accordance with Illinois laws. That same day, it filed

an addendum to the judgment for dissolution of marriage which stated:

The Court specifically finds that the Respondent intended to proceed
without the benefit of counsel as evidenced by his filing of letters and
documents purported to be his Pretrial Affidavit.

The Court finds that the Respondent’s resignation from his position at
Blessing Physicians, Inc. was not done in good faith and was done for
the purpose of avoiding his responsibility of support due to Petitioner
and the parties’ minor children, both temporarily and permanently.

The Court further finds based on the aforementioned filings that the
Respondent was aware of the date and time of the hearing and did not
intend to personally appear. As such, the Judgment for Dissolution of
Marriage and this Addendum is entered on an ex parte basis.

Khan did not appeal the Illinois judgment.

On June 15, 2023, Khan filed a petition for recognition and to make executory

a foreign divorce decree, for declaratory relief, and an alternative rule for custody in

Louisiana seeking to have his India divorce judgment recognized pursuant to

La.Code Civ.P. art. 2541. Azeez filed an exception of res judicata on August 7, 2023.

Khan filed an amending and supplemental petition on August 21, 2023, with

supplemental documents from India declaring his three talaq pronouncements valid.

Following an August 21, 2023 hearing on the exception of res judicata, the

trial court granted Azeez’s exception and dismissed Khan’s claims. The trial court,

in its reasons for ruling dated August 29, 2023, stated in part:

After a review of all documents and information, it is absolutely clear
to this Court that all of the matters pending in this Court concerning the
validity or invalidity of the India Divorce Judgment have already been
decided by the Illinois Court. Actually, more evidence was submitted
to the Illinois Court concerning the India Judgment than in this Court.
Very simply, the Court lacks standing and/or jurisdiction to issue any
further Ruling concerning the India Divorce Judgment as it has already

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been decided by the Illinois Court. It is a matter already decided and it
is clearly Res Judicata. That being said, the actual Divorce rendered in
India, may, after a review of all evidence, be valid as to the dissolution
of the marriage. However, as to the issue of custody, it is abundantly
clear that the Illinois Court has heard all evidence and has issued a
specific Ruling finding that the Illinois Court need not give full faith
and credit to a Judgment which did not provide fundamental rights and
principles of law in favor of a mother. Once again, a matter has already
been decided and therefore cannot be decided by this Court.

On September 5, 2023, Azeez filed a petition to make judgments rendered in

the circuit court of the eighth judicial circuit court of Illinois, Adams County,

executory. The trial court ordered the judgments of the Illinois court be made

executory on September 7, 2023. On September 25, 2023, Khan filed a motion to

vacate the September 7, 2023 judgment and order. The trial court’s judgment

granting Azeez’s exception of res judicata was filed on September 25, 2023. It is

from this judgment that Khan now appeals assigning as error:

The trial court erred as a matter of law in violation of LSA-C.C.P.
2541, by granting the defendant’s Exception of Res Judicata and for
dismissing the plaintiff[’s] case by relying upon a Foreign Judgment
that had not been previously made executory or properly recognized as
required pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. 2541.

DISCUSSION

Khan argues the Illinois proceeding was never made executory, and the

divorce decree admitted by the Louisiana court was incompetent and inadmissible

evidence because it was not admitted via an ordinary proceeding which would allow

Khan to present evidence. The recognition of foreign judgments in Louisiana is

governed by La.Code Civ.P. art. 254, which states:

A. A party seeking recognition or execution by a Louisiana court
of a judgment or decree of a court of the United States or a territory
thereof, or of any other state, or of any foreign country may bring an
ordinary proceeding against the judgment debtor in the proper
Louisiana court, to have the judgment or decree recognized and made
the judgment of the Louisiana court.

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B. A duly authenticated copy of the judgment or decree must be
annexed to the petition.

C. A judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or
any other court that is entitled to full faith and credit in this state may
also be enforced pursuant to R.S. 13:4241.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4241 provides that foreign judgments are

entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana.1

A Louisiana court can only deny full faith and credit to a judgment of another

court if that court lacked jurisdiction. Lepard v. Lepard, 31,351 (La.App. 2 Cir.

12/9/98), 722 So.2d 367.

In Succession of Aguilera, 07-77, pp. 3–4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/07), 956 So.2d

718, 720–21, writ denied, 07-1090 (La. 9/14/07), 963 So.2d 998, a panel of this court

set forth the full faith and credit due a valid foreign judgment:

Louisiana courts are required to give full faith and credit to
judgments of courts of other states. U.S. Const. art. 4, § 1.

The constitutional command of full faith and credit,
as implemented by Congress, requires that “judicial
proceedings * * * shall have the same full faith and credit
in every court within the United States * * * as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State * * * from
which they are taken.” Full faith and credit thus generally
requires every State to give to a judgment at least the res
judicata effect which the judgment would be accorded in
the State which rendered it. “By the Constitutional
provision for full faith and credit, the local doctrines of res
judicata, speaking generally, become a part of national
1
Louisiana Revised Statutes13:4242 provides the procedure for filing a foreign judgment

in Louisiana:

A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an act of
congress or the statutes of this state may be annexed to and filed with an ex parte
petition complying with Code of Civil Procedure Article 891 and praying that the
judgment be made executory in a court of this state. The foreign judgment shall be
treated in the same manner as a judgment of a court of this state. It shall have the
same effect and be subject to the same procedures, and defenses, for reopening,
vacating, or staying as a judgment of a court of this state and may be enforced in
the same manner.

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jurisprudence, and therefore federal questions cognizable
here.”

Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109, 84 S.Ct. 242, 244, 11 L.Ed.2d 186
(1963)(quoting Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349, 62 S.Ct.
608, 612, 86 L.Ed. 885 (1942))(footnote omitted).

Unless the foreign forum lacked jurisdiction over the litigants or
the subject matter involved in the controversy, Louisiana courts cannot
deny full faith and credit to a foreign judgment. Ponderosa Assocs., Ltd.
v. Verret, 97-1184 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/1/98), 714 So.2d 956, writ denied,
98-2368 (La.11/20/98), 728 So.2d 1290. One seeking to escape the
operation of a judgment rendered in another state has the burden of
proof. Esenwein v. Commonwealth of Penn., 325 U.S. 279, 65 S.Ct.
1118, 89 L.Ed. 1608 (1945); Andries v. Andries, 398 So.2d 123
(La.App. 3 Cir.1981).

Moreover, UCCJEA provisions relating to the enforcement and modification

of child custody determinations, as the more specific law, are applicable to foreign

judgments and do not require “registration” before they can be recognized, enforced

or modified. See La.R.S. 13:1827. In Guzman v. Sartin, 09-1677 (La.App. 1 Cir.

12/23/09), 31 So.3d 426, the wife set forth the same argument as Khan-that her ex-

husband failed to make a Venezuelan custody judgment executory in Louisiana in

accordance with La.Code Civ.P. art 2541 or La.R.S. 13:4242. The appellate court

found (emphasis added):

However, out-of-state child custody determinations are specifically
governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act (hereinafter referred to as the UCCJEA) found in Louisiana
Revised Statute 13:1801–1842, which sets forth specific rules
regarding the recognition, modification, and enforcement of child
custody determinations. This statute applies to international cases as
well as domestic cases. The purpose of the UCCJEA is to “provide
clearer standards for which States can exercise original jurisdiction
over a child custody determination.”

The Venezuelan judgment determined the custody of the two
children, awarding Ms. Sartin custody while Mr. Guzman was to enjoy
an open visitation schedule to conform to his military duties. Mr.
Guzman now seeks to modify that custody determination to provide for
more structured visitation. The UCCJEA does not require that an out of
state custody determination be made executory to be enforceable. See

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La. R.S. 13:1825. Thus, the UCCJEA, as the more specific law on this
issue, applies to the instant case.

Ms. Sartin further avers that Mr. Guzman failed to register the
Venezuelan custody determination in accordance with the UCCJEA.
The UCCJEA permits registration of an out of state custody
determination. Louisiana Revised Statute 13:1827 provides in
pertinent part that “[a] child custody determination issued by a court of
another state may be registered in this state, with or without a
simultaneous request for enforcement ...” This statute also applies to
child custody determinations made in foreign countries.

However, a clear reading of the UCCJEA demonstrates that the
legislature did not intend to mandate that parties register their out-of-
state child custody determination for the determination to be
recognized, enforced, and modified under the laws of this state. The use
of the word may in the statute indicates that registration of the judgment
is permissive, not mandatory. In accordance with the UCCJEA, a court
of this state has a duty to recognize and enforce an out-of-state child
custody determination if the other state exercised jurisdiction in
compliance with the UCCJEA or the determination was made under
factual circumstances complying with the jurisdictional standards of
this Act and the determination has not been modified in accordance
with the Act. La. R.S. 13:1825(A).

Id. at 429–30.

Khan argues that every foreign judgment afforded full faith and credit by this

state must first have a full evidentiary hearing in order to make the judgment

“executory.” We disagree.

In In re Succession of Aguilera, 956 So.2d at 720, we noted that, “The effect

of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution is to preserve the conclusiveness

of the foreign judgment as evidence, not to preserve its executory character.” In

Aguilera, the executor challenged a Florida judgment probating a will. The executor

advanced the same arguments made by Khan-that decedent’s sister had to institute

proceedings to make the Florida judgment executory in Louisiana. A panel of this

court affirmed the trial court’s grant of res judicata finding that the executor failed

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to put on any evidence that the Florida court did not have jurisdiction over the

decedent.

Khan is the party who sought full faith and credit of his India divorce

judgment in Louisiana, despite the Illinois judgment invalidating it and setting forth

child custody determinations in accordance with the UCCJEA. He did not appeal

the valid Illinois judgment. Moreover, as the moving party, he bore the burden of

proving the validity of the India judgment. “Because there is the general

presumption that a judgment of a sister state is valid, the burden of undermining such

a judgment rests heavily upon the party attacking the judgment to show by clear and

positive proof that the rendering court lacked jurisdiction.” McMillan v. Noble, 538

So.2d 714, 717 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1989), citing American Standard Leasing v. Plant

Specialties, Inc., 427 So.2d 555 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1983). Azeez was not seeking to

execute the Illinois judgment, nor was she required to make the Illinois judgment

executory in Khan’s action to have his India judgment recognized. Thus, the only

question before us is whether the trial court’s finding that the Illinois judgment was

entitled to full faith and credit was erroneous.

The Illinois court exercised its jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to 750

ILCS 36/201, which authorizes a court in the state of Illinois to make an initial child

custody determination if Illinois is the home state of the children, or was the home

state of the children in the six months prior to the commencement of the action and

the parent continues to live in Illinois. This article specifically provides for the

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of the court relating to child-custody matters. It is

undisputed that Illinois was the home state of the children and Azeez. Khan

challenged the jurisdiction of the Illinois court over him in Illinois, asserted the

validity of the India judgment, and did not appeal the trial court’s judgment. Khan’s

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second attempt to validate his India judgment in Louisiana amounts to nothing more

than forum shopping.

Azeez successfully proved that a valid judgment was executed in Illinois;

thus, res judicata applied to prohibit litigation of the same issues arising out of the

same facts (i.e. divorce, custody, and support awards). La.R.S. 13:4231; Newburger

v. Orkin, L.L.C., 20-534 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/21), 320 So.3d 465, writ denied, 21-782

(La. 10/01/21), 324 So.3d 1061. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting

full faith and credit to the Illinois judgment.

Khan further argues that the Illinois judgment could not be used as a defense

by Azeez “until it was validly recognized.” He claims the Illinois judgment was

“successfully attacked for lack of Jurisdiction in the LASES case herein. Despite

the discussion in the trial court’s ruling on the LASES case, that Judgment remains

valid and final. It is not material or probative in this case, except as persuasive.” We

disagree.

The State of Illinois referred the Illinois judgment to the State of Louisiana,

Support Enforcement Services (LASES) to register and enforce the judgment in

Louisiana. The Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services filed a

petition to register a foreign support order for enforcement and modification under

the provisions of La.Ch.Code arts. 1306.1, et seq. in October 2022, to which Khan

objected, filing an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction in November 2022.

At that time Khan owed arrearages of $162,716.15. A hearing followed on March

22, 2023. Azeez was unaware of these proceedings and had not received notice of

any kind. The trial court found that Illinois did not have jurisdiction over Khan;

however, because Azeez had received no notice of the LASES hearing, she was

unable to defend Khan’s claims, and the State had no evidence to dispute Khan’s

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claims that he did not receive notice relating to the Illinois hearings. Thus, the trial

court rendered a judgment in Khan’s favor prohibiting the Department of Children

and Family Services from enforcing the LASES order. The Department of Children

and Family Services filed a motion for new trial or to annul an order denying and

vacating registration in June 2023. In the motion, DCFS noted that the exhibits show

that Khan:

testified falsely in this matter, at the very least, with regard to his
supposed lack of notice in the Illinois proceedings. It would be a
miscarriage of justice to deny JAVEED KHAN’S children support
based on his false testimony. The State avers that the order denying and
vacating registration was obtained by fraud or ill practices, and moves
this Honorable Court to annul [] the order denying registration pursuant
to La. C.C.P. Art. 2004.

In the current matter, the trial court took notice of its error in the LASES

matter (which is not consolidated with this matter) stating that it was clear that it did

not know at the time it ruled that Khan had been fully aware of and participated in

the Illinois judgment. The trial court noted its erroneous ruling in the LASES case

at the hearing on the exception of res judicata:

[A]ctually the basis upon which this Court denied enforcement of the
Illinois Order, was based upon information that this Court had at that
time indicating that Javeed Khan did not have notice of the November
5, 2019, Hearing. However, not only did Javeed Khan have notice of
this Hearing, he also wrote an apology letter in advance of the Hearing,
dated November 1, 2019, wherein he apologizes for not showing up for
the November 5, 2019, Hearing. Also attached was a form of an
Affidavit and/or information including various financial information
and property information of the parties. The Illinois Court issued a
Ruling on November 5, 2019, and once again, based on this Court’s
belief that Javeed Khan did not have notice, this Court refused to make
the Illinois Judgment executory. The information supplied to the Court
at the Hearing in the LASES case clearly was incomplete. As a result,
the Ruling of the Court’s finding that Javeed Khan did not have notice
of the November 5, 2019 Hearing was clearly wrong.

While a final judgment relating to the LASES matter was signed by the trial

court on March 24, 2023, Azeez filed a petition in intervention seeking to have the

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judgment annulled or, in the alternative, a new trial granted. Khan filed a motion to

stay the proceedings relating to the LASES matter pending the outcome of this

appeal. We agree with the trial court that its decision in the LASES matter was

clearly wrong and, therefore, there is a substantial likelihood that the nullity will be

granted.

We note that Khan’s actions relating to this matter approach an abuse of

judicial process, and we will find him in contempt of court for frivolous appeal

should he assert another false claim that he did not have notice of the Illinois hearings

that he clearly participated in. La.Code Civ.P. art. 2164.

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment granting Azeez’s exception of res judicata is

affirmed as Louisiana must give full faith and credit to the Illinois judgment

dissolving the marriage and setting forth custody and support awards. All costs of

this appeal are assessed to Javeed Khan.

AFFIRMED.

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