Kathleen Margavio Mitchell v. Succession of Alice S. Margavio

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-185

KATHLEEN MARGAVIO MITCHELL

VERSUS

SUCCESSION OF ALICE S. MARGAVIO

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20224935
HONORABLE MARILYN CARR CASTLE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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GARY J. ORTEGO
JUDGE

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Court composed of Gary J. Ortego, Ledricka J. Thierry, and Wilbur L. Stiles, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Calvin Theodore Guidry
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 53722
Lafayette, La 70505
(337) 232-6183
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Kathleen Margavio Mitchell

Vincent Joseph Saitta
Colomb & Saitta
113 Oil Center Drive
Lafayette, LA 70503
(337) 231-5150
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Kathleen Margavio Mitchell

David Michael Kaufman
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 4604
Lafayette, LA 70502-4604
(337) 233-5150
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Cynthia Margavio Fox as Admin S/N of Alice Margavio

ORTEGO, Judge.
This case involves whether a usufruct under La.Civ. Code art. 890 granted to

a surviving spouse, via testament, attaches to proceeds from the sale of former

community immovable property sold by both the naked owners and usufructuary.

Also, at issue is whether a naked owner is entitled to the value of a vehicle traded

towards the purchase of another vehicle by the usufructuary.

The trial court found that the usufruct did not attach to the proceeds of the sale

and that the value of the vehicle was zero based on usual wear and tear, thereby

dismissing the plaintiff/naked owner’s proof of claim for her share of the proceeds of

the sale and value of the vehicle upon the usufructuary’s death. The plaintiff/naked

owner appeals. For the reasons herein, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Joseph Charles Margavio was married to Alice Scallan Margavio of which four

children were born: Kathleen Margavio Mitchell (Kathy); Cynthia Margavio Fox

(Cindy); Debra Margavio (Debbie); and Charles Margavio (Charles). On May 4,

1981, Joseph Charles Margavio died, and by judgment dated March 28, 1984, his

four children were placed into possession of his estate, as the naked owners, subject

to a usufruct in favor of his widow, their mother, Alice Scallan Margavio (Alice).

Over the course of the years, Alice and her children alienated multiple

properties. Relevant to this proceeding, Alice traded in a 1978 Mercury Marquis as

payment to purchase another vehicle, a Peugeot, the date of which this transaction is

not in the record. Further, in December of 1998, Alice and her children, as the naked

owners, agreed and sold a certain former community immovable property, known as

the Quincy Street Property.

Thereafter, on March 23, 2007, Alice died. Alice’s succession proceedings

were opened in August of 2010 by her daughter and succession representative, Cindy.

On November 15, 2010, Kathy submitted a proof of claim to Alice’s succession

which included a claim for an extra portion of Alice’s estate, specifically claiming

her share of the 1978 Mercury Marquis with an alleged value of $2,500.00 and a

claim for her alleged share of the proceeds from the Quincy Street Property sale,

previously sold, with an alleged value of $19,908.53. This proof of claim was denied

by Alice’s succession and sat dormant while Alice’s succession remained open.

On September 14, 2022, Kathy filed this civil action against Alice’s succession

for satisfaction of the proof of claim she submitted, and which was denied in

November of 2010. A trial on the merits was held on November 6, 2023, wherein

the trial court reached a judgment, which in part granted Kathy $3,422.62 against

Alice’s succession, with said amount reflecting Kathy’s interest in certain assets

inherited from Joseph Charles Margavio, which is not at issue in this appeal. The

trial court’s judgment further denied Kathy’s claim for an accounting of all other

assets and/or items claimed in the proceedings, including Kathy’s claim for her share

of the 1978 Mercury Marquis and of the proceeds from the Quincy Street Property

sale, previously sold by all parties.

Kathy filed this appeal before us and presents two assignments of error for

review.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. The trial court erred in finding that the usufruct of immovable
property, awarded to Alice Scallan Margavio by the Judgment (of
Possession) rendered in Succession of Joseph Charles Margavio, ended
with the sale of property subject thereto, despite clear caselaw to the
contrary from this Honorable Court and clear statement of law.

II. The trial court erred in considering that Alice Scallan Margavio
received no compensation for the sale of a 1978 Mercury Marquis for
which her estate must account.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

When the issue in an assignment of error involves statutory interpretation, it

is a question of law, and is reviewed by this court under a de novo standard of review.

Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 09-449, (La. 10/20/09), 24 So.3d 813. However,

a review of factual determinations is done under the manifest error standard, when

there is a conflict in testimony, wherein reasonable evaluations of credibility and

reasonable inferences of fact are not disturbed on review, even though the appellate

court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Rosell v.

ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989).

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Kathy asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the usufruct over the

Quincy Street property ended with the sale of that property and did not transfer to

Kathy’s share of the proceeds from the sale. We must determine whether that finding

was in error.

“If the deceased spouse is survived by descendants, the surviving spouse shall

have a usufruct over the decedent’s share of the community property to the extent

that the decedent has not disposed of it by testament. This usufruct terminates when

the surviving spouse dies or remarries, whichever occurs first.” La.Civ.Code art.

890. Here, Alice, as surviving spouse of Joseph Charles Margavio, was granted a

usufruct over his half of their former community property by judgment in Joseph

Charles Margavio’s succession. There is nothing in that judgment indicating that

his intent was to create a testamentary and not a legal usufruct under La.Civ.Code

art. 890.

Louisiana Civil Code art. 616 (emphasis added) states:

When property subject to usufruct is sold or exchanged, whether in an
action for partition or by agreement between the usufructuary and the
naked owner or by a usufructuary who has the power to dispose of
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nonconsumable property, the usufruct terminates as to the
nonconsumable property sold or exchanged, but as provided in Article
568.1, the usufruct attaches to the money or other property received by
the usufructuary, unless the parties agree otherwise. Any tax or
expense incurred as the result of the sale or exchange of property
subject to usufruct shall be paid from the proceeds of the sale or
exchange and shall be deducted from the amount due by the
usufructuary to the naked owner at the termination of the usufruct.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 568.1 (emphasis added) states:

If a thing subject to the usufruct is donated inter vivos by the
usufructuary, he is obligated to pay to the naked owner at the
termination of the usufruct the value of the thing as of the time of the
donation. If a thing subject to the usufruct is otherwise alienated by the
usufructuary, the usufruct attaches to any money or other property
received by the usufructuary. The property received shall be classified
as consumable or nonconsumable in accordance with the provisions of
this Title, and the usufruct shall be governed by those provisions subject
to the terms of the act establishing the original usufruct. If, at the time
of the alienation, the value of the property received by the usufructuary
is less than the value of the thing alienated, the usufructuary is bound
to pay the difference to the naked owner at the termination of the
usufruct.

In this case, Kathy first argues that under La.Civ.Code arts. 616 and 568.1,

Alice’s usufruct survived and attached to Kathy’s share of the proceeds from the sale

of the Quincy Street property by operation of law. Therefore, according to Kathy,

upon Alice’s death, Alice’s newly created usufruct by operation of law was

terminated, and, as such, Kathy is entitled to receive her share of the proceeds,

$19,908.53, from Alice’s succession.

We find Kathy’s argument regarding application of article 616’s invocation

of article 568.1 is misguided. At the outset, we find pursuant to article 616’s plain

language and, alternatively, considered with the language of La.Civ.Code art. 622,

it is clear that Alice’s article 890 usufruct was terminated over Kathy’s share of the

proceeds from the sale of the Quincy Street property. Thus, pursuant to article 616,

Alice’s article 890 usufruct terminated when Kathy, along with the other naked

owners, and Alice, the usufructuary, agreed to sell and actually sold the property.

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Moreover, under La.Civ.Code art. 622, “[a] usufruct terminates by confusion

when the usufruct and the naked ownership are united in the same person.” Here,

we find that Kathy received the proceeds, and, as such, had usus, fructus, and abusus,

i.e., perfect ownership, over those proceeds prior to giving them to Alice. As such,

and without dispute, Alice’s article 890 usufruct was terminated at the time of the

sale, by all parties, of the Quincy Street property.

Given this termination, it is incumbent on Kathy to prove that a new usufruct

was formed. Kathy contends that article 616’s language invoking article 568.1

occurred in this case, and, therefore, a new usufruct attached to the proceeds by

operation of law.

The plain language of article 616 invoking article 568.1 requires that the

proceeds from the sale be “received by the usufructuary” in order for a new usufruct

to be formed. Likewise, article 568.1 applies, and a new usufruct attaches to any

proceeds when those proceeds are “received by the usufructuary.”

Here, it is clear from the record that Kathy failed to prove Alice received

Kathy’s share of the proceeds as opposed to Kathy receiving those proceeds, and

thereafter, giving them to Alice. We note the conflicting testimony as to whether

Kathy physically received a check at the 1998 closing, endorsed the check, and gave

it to Alice. Kathy asserted that she did not receive a check at that closing. Contrarily,

Charles testified that Kathy did get a check at the 1998 closing, stating that he

specifically remembered Kathy endorsing her check, pushing it to Alice, and

asserting that Alice needed it more than she did. Additionally, Charles’ testimony

that Kathy received a check was corroborated by Debbie, their sister who was also

present at the closing.

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Regardless of this disputed testimony, Kathy acknowledged in her testimony

that she “had the power to decide where the money went,” and had “complete control”

over her share prior to determining whether Alice could use it. Here, Kathy’s own

testimony supports a finding that Kathy received her share of the proceeds, and thus

perfect ownership, prior to giving the proceeds back to Alice. Thus, we find that it

was Kathy’s burden to prove the facts necessary for existence/continuation of a

usufruct by operation of law over her share of the proceeds of the Quincy Street

property, and she has failed to do so.

Additionally, our finding that Kathy proved that Alice only later received

Kathy’s share of the proceeds from the Quincy Street sale aligns with a pattern

established by Alice and her children in other previous sales of estate/community

immovable property. Specifically, the record indicates that previously when Alice

and her children were selling multiple former community properties, the proceeds

from those sales were distributed to both Alice and her children with each party

receiving their pro-rata share from those sales, and each time Alice’s usufruct was

terminated.

Finally, regarding Kathy’s argument of article 568.1’s application, it is

required that the “thing subject to the usufruct,” the Quincy Street property, “is

otherwise alienated by the usufructuary.” In this matter, it is undisputed that the

Quincey Street property was alienated by both Alice and Kathy, along with the other

children, agreeing to sell and signing the sale documents, not just the usufructuary

unilaterally selling the property. Thus, article 568.1 does not apply to this sale.

Given the above, we find the trial court correctly found that Alice’s usufruct

over the Quincy Street property ended with the sale of that property and did not

transfer to Kathy’s share of the proceeds from the sale. Thus, this assignment of

error lacks merit.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

In her second assigned error, Kathy contends that the trial court erred by

finding that Alice received no compensation for the alienation of a 1978 Mercury

Marquis for which Alice’s estate must provide an accounting. It is undisputed that

the 1978 Mercury Marquis was partially owned by Kathy and her other siblings, as

naked owners, at the time of alienation and subject to Alice’s usufruct. It is also

undisputed that Alice traded the 1978 Mercury Marquis for another vehicle, a

Peugeot. Finally, it is undisputed that Alice later donated that Peugeot to a Peugeot

shop to use for parts.

We note that both the 1978 Mercury Marquis and the Peugeot, as vehicles, are

corporeal movables “gradually and substantially impaired by use, wear, or decay”

pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 568. As such, provided that Alice “acts as a prudent

administrator,” she may alienate them as usufructuary.

I. Trading the 1978 Mercury Marquis for the Peugeot.

Kathy contends that because Alice’s usufruct ended at that time she traded the

1978 Mercury Marquis, Kathy is entitled to the value the 1978 Mercury Marquis had

at that time, which she contends was $2,500.00.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 568.1 states, in pertinent part, the following:

If a thing subject to the usufruct is otherwise alienated by the
usufructuary, the usufruct attaches to any money or other property
received by the usufructuary. The property received shall be classified
as consumable or nonconsumable in accordance with the provisions of
this Title, and the usufruct shall be governed by those provisions subject
to the terms of the act establishing the original usufruct. If, at the time
of the alienation, the value of the property received by the usufructuary
is less than the value of the thing alienated, the usufructuary is bound
to pay the difference to the naked owner at the termination of the
usufruct.

Pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 568.1, Alice’s usufruct attached to the Peugeot

as “other property received by the usufructuary” from Alice’s alienation of the 1978

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Mercury Marquis. Thus, Kathy’s demand for the value of the 1978 Mercury

Marquis is not founded on any relevant factors as to any entitlement she may allege

to have against Alice’s succession. Rather, Kathy needed to prove what difference

existed, if any, between the value of the 1978 Mercury Marquis and the Peugeot

when Alice traded vehicles. There is no evidence in the record of a value difference

between the vehicles at the time of the alienation.

Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied Kathy’s claim for the value of the

1978 Mercury Marquis on the date of its alienation. Alice’s usufruct attached to the

Peugeot when Alice alienated the 1978 Mercury Marquis by trading it for the

Peugeot.

II. Donating the Peugeot

We note that Alice’s estate does owe Kathy, and other naked owners, for the

value of the Peugeot, if any, at the time of its alienation/donation. Specifically,

La.Civ.Code art. 568.1 states, in pertinent part: “[i]f a thing subject to the usufruct

is donated inter vivos by the usufructuary, he is obligated to pay to the naked owner

at the termination of the usufruct the value of the thing as of the time of the donation.”

Here, the uncontradicted testimony is that because the Peugeot was worn out

by normal wear and tear, Alice received no value for it upon disposition, and the

value of the Peugeot was $0.00 upon its donation. In Kathy’s testimony, she

acknowledged that the Peugeot “went kapooie” and was “worn out by normal wear

and tear.” Charles also testified that the Peugeot was “worn out by normal wear and

tear,” and that the Peugeot was donated to a repair shop, who took it for scrap parts.

Given the above, we find no error by the trial court in denying Kathy

compensation for her share of the 1978 Mercury Marquis when it was traded in by

Alice. At that time, the usufruct moved from the 1978 Mercury Marquis to the

Peugeot, and Kathy failed to prove what difference existed, if any, between their
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values. Finally, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that the Peugeot had

no value upon its donation and termination of Alice’s usufruct.

CONCLUSION

Appellant, Kathleen Margavio Mitchell, raises two assignments of error. We

find no merit to either assignment raised. As such, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment. Costs of these proceedings, including this appeal, are assessed to

Kathleen Margavio Mitchell.

AFFIRMED.

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