Peter Miller and Devan Miller v. Succession of Carol J. Aymond, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-226

PETER MILLER AND DEVAN MILLER

VERSUS

SUCCESSION OF CAROL J. AYMOND, JR., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 80,881
HONORABLE MARCUS L. FONTENOT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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CHARLES G. FITZGERALD
JUDGE

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Court composed of Candyce G. Perret, Jonathan W. Perry, and Charles G. Fitzgerald,
Judges.

REVERSED.

Jeffrey K. Coreil
Karly K. Dorr
Neuner Pate
One Petroleum Center, Suite 200
1001 West Pinhook Road
Lafayette, LA 70503
Tel: 337-237-7000
Fax: 337-233-9450
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant:
Chantel Aymond, Executrix of the
Succession of Carol J. Aymond, Jr.

Christopher M. Ludeau
Ludeau Law, LLC
P.O. Box 526
Ville Platte, LA 70586
Tel: 337-363-2388
Fax: 337-363-2390
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees:
Peter Miller and Devan Miller

FITZGERALD, Judge.

This is an appeal of a sanction award imposed against Chantel G. Aymond, a

pro se defendant, under La.Code Civ.P. art. 863.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying dispute stems from an alleged 2018 verbal, unrecorded

agricultural lease between Chantel’s father, Carol J. Aymond Jr., and the plaintiffs,

Peter Miller and Devan Miller. In simple terms, the lease allowed the Millers to

farm approximately 180 acres of Mr. Aymond’s land in Evangeline Parish.

Mr. Aymond died in February 2021. Chantel began serving as the executrix

of her father’s succession in September 2021. She is not a lawyer.

In November 2022, the leased property was sold by Mr. Aymond’s succession.

Ten months later, on September 8, 2023, the Millers filed a petition for damages

against the succession, claiming, among other things, breach of contract. The

Millers also named the buyer of the property as a co-defendant.

Six weeks later, on October 24, 2023, Chantel, in her capacity as executrix,

responded to the lawsuit by filing a pro se peremptory exception of no cause of

action. The exception questioned the legal basis of the claims against the succession,

particularly since (1) the property was sold nearly one year earlier, and (2) the buyer

of the property was notified of the Millers’ farming operations in an addendum to

the purchase agreement.

Nine days after filing the exception, Chantel, again as executrix, filed a pro se

motion to recuse Judge Marcus Fontenot, who is the trial judge assigned to preside

over the Millers’ lawsuit. The motion alleged that counsel for the Millers was the

former law partner of Judge Fontenot.

In response, on November 6, 2023, the Millers filed a motion for sanctions.

The motion sought sanctions against Chantel, as executrix, for her “improper

Exception of No Cause of Action and Motion to Recuse in violation of Louisiana

Code of Civil Procedure article 863[.]”

Five weeks later, on December 12, 2023, Chantel formally retained counsel

to represent the succession. Two days after that, the hearing on the motion to recuse

was presided over by Judge Ad Hoc John E. Conery. Although Judge Conery

ultimately denied the motion, he specifically stated:

I don’t blame [Chantel] for bringing the motion. I don’t find it
frivolous. I think she had a right to be a little nervous when she saw
who the judge assigned to the case would be and that he was the former
partner of, uh, his former partner was handling . . . the case.

Judge Conery found no basis to impose sanctions on Chantel for the motion

to recuse. In fact, the written judgment signed by Judge Conery on December 22,

2023, expressly denied sanctions.

Two weeks later, on January 5, 2024, Judge Fontenot signed an order refixing

both the trial of the peremptory exception and the hearing on the motion for

sanctions. The same day, counsel for the succession sent a letter to the clerk of court

purporting to withdraw the exception. Five weeks after that, on February 9, 2024,

the succession filed its answer to the petition for damages.

On February 20, 2024, the hearing on the Millers’ motion for sanctions was

held before Judge Fontenot. Ultimately, Judge Fontenot imposed sanctions against

Chantel, personally, in the amount of $1,500.00. In doing so, Judge Fontenot

explained that “there is no legal justification for filing” the exception, and that “the

exception was filed merely to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and to increase the

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cost of litigation.” Judge Fontenot’s ruling was reduced to a written judgment signed

on March 6, 2024. Chantel now appeals this judgment.

On appeal, Chantel asserts the following assignments of error:

The trial court erred and abused its discretion when imposing
sanctions on Appellant, Chantel Aymond, the independent executrix of
the Succession of Carol J. Aymond, Jr., because [she] did not violate
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 863 through the pro se filing
of an exception of no cause of action, which was not opposed and was
voluntarily withdrawn prior to hearing, and the filing of a motion to
recuse, which was deemed not frivolous by the ad hoc judge.

Alternatively, to the extent sanctions were warranted, which is
disputed, the trial court abused its discretion in assessing $1,500.00 in
sanctions against the Appellant.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A trial court’s judgment awarding sanctions under La.Code Civ.P. art. 863 is

reviewed on appeal using a mixed standard of review. In other words, the trial

court’s factual finding that La.Code Civ.P. art. 863 has been violated is reviewed for

manifest error. Acosta v. B&B Oilfield Servs., Inc., 12-122 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12),

91 So.3d 1263. By contrast, the type or amount of the sanction that is imposed by

the trial court is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 863 is the law at the center of this

controversy. In relevant part, La.Code Civ.P. art. 863 states:

B. Pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit or
certificate, except as otherwise provided by law, but the signature of an
attorney or party shall constitute a certification by him that he has read
the pleading, and that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry, he certifies all of the following:

(1) The pleading is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation.

(2) Each claim, defense, or other legal assertion in the pleading
is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

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(3) Each allegation or other factual assertion in the pleading has
evidentiary support or, for a specifically identified allegation or factual
assertion, is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

(4) Each denial in the pleading of a factual assertion is warranted
by the evidence or, for a specifically identified denial, is reasonably
based on a lack of information or belief.

....

D. If, upon motion of any party or upon its own motion, the court
determines that a certification has been made in violation of the
provisions of this Article, the court shall impose upon the person who
made the certification or the represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction which may include an order to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, including reasonable attorney fees.

Before awarding sanctions under La.Code Civ.P. art. 863, a trial court must

find that at least one of the affirmative duties of paragraph (B) has been violated.

However, as cautioned by this court in Cooks v. Rodenbeck, 97-1389, p. 8 (La.App.

3 Cir. 4/29/98), 711 So.2d 444, 449, “La.Code Civ.P. art. 863 sanctions are intended

for only exceptional circumstances and are not to be used simply because the parties

disagree about the correct resolution of a legal matter. . . . The slightest justification

for the exercise of a legal right precludes the imposition of sanctions.”

Importantly, La.Code Civ.P. art. 863 applies to the signing of pleadings, and

the affirmative duties contained in that article are imposed on the attorney or litigant

signing the pleading as of the date the document is signed. Murphy v. Boeing

Petroleum Servs., Inc., 600 So.2d 823 (La.App 3 Cir. 1992). So “[i]n determining a

violation, the trial court should avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test

the signer’s conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the

document was signed.” Id. at 826.

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Here, the Millers argued that Chantel should be sanctioned because both of

her pleadings—the exception of no cause of action and the motion to recuse—

violated La.Code Civ.P. art. 863. However, Judge Fontenot did not directly consider

the motion to recuse as a basis for sanctions. He acknowledged that Judge Conery

had disposed of that issue. Instead, Judge Fontenot’s decision to impose sanctions

focused on Chantel’s peremptory exception. By way of explanation for his ruling,

Judge Fontenot reasoned:

[T]he court does find that there is no legal justification for filing [the
exception of no cause of action]. Um, because I said the basis for that
pleading was the premise that the plaintiff was suing the defendant for
rescinding a lease. In reality, the petition states for breach of-of the
lease. Two entirely different things. So the court finds and-and given
totality, given this time, given . . . we’re five months into it. The
Exception was not withdrawn until two and a half months later, long
after the Recusal Hearing. Uh, I find that these . . . this . . . the exception
was filed merely to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and to increase the
cost of litigation. Accordingly, uh, the court hereby sanctions [Chantel]
and awards attorney’s fees in the amount of $1500. I’m knocking off
some of that because some of that was related to the Recusal. Uh, plus
any expense and/or court cost to be paid by [Chantel] for this matter.

To summarize, Judge Fontenot found that Chantel’s signing of the exception

of no cause of action violated the certification requirements set forth in La.Code

Civ.P. art. 863(B)(2), because the objections asserted in that pleading were not well

grounded in law. Judge Fontenot also found that the exception violated

subparagraph (B)(1), because the pleading was presented for the improper purpose

of harassment, unnecessary delay, or increased cost of litigation. The discussion

below addresses both findings by the trial court.

For starters, in complying with the certification requirements of La.Code

Civ.P. art. 863(B)(2), Chantel had an affirmative duty to make an objectively

reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law prior to signing the pleading. Marks v.

Marks, 21-741 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/28/22), 349 So.3d 1071. And here, neither the trial

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court nor the Millers suggest that Chantel incorrectly stated the facts in her

exception. Rather, both the trial court and the Millers assert that Chantel’s exception

misstates the legal grounds and theories in the petition for damages by classifying

the claim against the succession as one for “recission of a lease” rather than “breach

of a lease.” So did Chantel make an objectively reasonable inquiry into the law prior

to signing the exception?

To this end, the factors that are considered when determining whether a

reasonable inquiry into the law was made include (1) the time available to the

attorney or litigant to prepare the pleading, (2) the plausibility of the legal view

contained in the pleading, (3) the pro se status of a litigant, and (4) the complexity

of the legal and factual issues raised. Brown v. Sanders, 06-1171 (La.App. 1 Cir.

3/23/07), 960 So.2d 931.

As to the first factor, Chantel was under some degree of time pressure as a

responsive pleading was due within twenty-one days of service of the lawsuit. The

record shows that suit was filed on September 8, 2023. The record also shows that

Chantel’s exception was filed on October 24, 2023. But nothing in the record shows

when Chantel was served with process.

Now to the second factor. The Millers allege in their petition that the leased

property was sold by the succession in November 2022, that the purchasers of the

property then evicted them (the Millers) from the premises, and that the succession

therefore breached its lease obligation to warrant peaceful possession. In contrast,

the basis for Chantel’s exception is that the Millers had no cause of action against

the succession because the succession no longer owned the property when the

eviction occurred. This is factually accurate and a plausible legal position. On the

other hand, arguments about Chantel confusing the words “rescind” and “breach”

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carry little weight in that her legal position remained clear, and there was no evidence

of Chantel’s intent to deceive or intentionally misstate her position to the court or to

the Millers.

As to the third factor, Chantel was a pro se litigant when she filed her

exception. We have recognized that “unrepresented parties are generally allotted

more latitude than parties represented by counsel as they lack formal training in the

law and its rules of procedure.” Magnon v. Magnon, 23-299, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir.

12/6/23), 375 So.3d 1053, 1061. Although this does not automatically absolve a pro

se litigant from suffering the consequences of their mistakes in all cases, Chantel’s

mistakes here do not affect the basis for her exception nor do they cause the Millers

any prejudice.

Turning now to the fourth and final factor, the Millers contend that there is no

complexity behind the legal and factual issues that are presented. We disagree. This

is not a simple breach of contract and eviction case; there are more complicated legal

theories and issues in play, such as the unrecorded, verbal lease of agricultural

property; a third-party sale; and a post-sale eviction without the involvement of the

seller. Chantel correctly notes that, at a minimum, this case involves contract

formation, laws involving agricultural leases, the public records doctrine, third-party

laws, and the rights of both lessees and buyers.

Based on our review of the record, the evidence clearly shows that Chantel

satisfied her obligation to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law. There

is simply no evidence to the contrary.

At this point, we need to circle back to Judge Fontenot’s second finding: that

the exception violated La.Code Civ.P. art. 863(B)(2), because the pleading was

presented for the improper purpose of harassment, unnecessary delay, or increased

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cost of litigation. As stated above, Article 863 applies to the signing of pleadings

and imposed an affirmative duty on Chantel at the time the exception was signed.

So the question is simple: Is there any evidence showing that Chantel intended to

file the exception for an improper purpose at the time she signed the pleading? The

answer is no.

In the end, there is no record evidence to support the trial court’s finding that

the peremptory exception was not well grounded in law. Nor is there any evidence

that the pleading was presented for an improper purpose. Indeed, the only evidence

adduced at the hearing was a fee statement from the Millers’ lawyer. The trial court

manifestly erred in imposing sanctions on Chantel.1

DISPOSITION

For the above reasons, the trial court’s judgment of March 6, 2024, is reversed.

All costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiffs, Peter Miller and Devan Miller.

REVERSED.

1
Based on this disposition, we pretermit any discussion of Chantel’s alternative assignment
of error.

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