Noel W. Yates v. Lisa J. Yates

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-287

NOEL W. YATES

VERSUS

LISA J. YATES

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 98,623
HONORABLE C. ANTHONY EAVES, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Candyce G. Perret, Jonathan W. Perry, and Sharon Darville
Wilson, Judges.

REVERSED, IN PART; AFFIRMED, IN PART;
AND RENDERED.

E. Grey Burnes Talley
Post Office Box 3187
Pineville, LA 71360
(318) 442-5231
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Lisa J. Yates

Elvin Clemence Fontenot, Jr.
110 East Texas Street
Leesville, LA 71446
(337) 239-2684
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Noel W. Yates

PERRET, Judge.

This community property partition returns to this court following the trial

court’s judgment post-remand. On appeal, Appellant, Lisa J. Yates, asserts the

judgment contains numerous errors and fails to follow the directive from this court.

After review, we agree.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

This court’s prior opinion, Yates v. Yates, 22-741 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/23), 375

So.3d 548, sets forth the facts and procedural background of this case in more detail.

However, we will briefly reiterate several facts. Appellant, Lisa J. Yates, (“Lisa”)

and Appellee, Noel W. Yates, (“Noel”) married in June 1989. The parties separated

in July 2019, and filed for divorce on February 27, 2020, pursuant to La.Civ.Code

art. 102. Noel sought to have their property separated on February 24, 2021. A

judgment of divorce was granted on June 23, 2021, terminating the community

property retroactive to February 27, 2020. Noel then filed a petition to partition

community property. The hearing on the partition was held on May 24, 2022, and

an oral ruling was provided at a hearing on June 1, 2022. A judgment of partition

was signed on July 13, 2022.

Lisa appealed, assigning twelve assignments of error, most regarding specific

reimbursement claims awarded to Noel. After a thorough review, this court affirmed

as amended, reversed in part, and remanded the suit for proceedings consistent with

the opinion as follows:

We affirm the trial court’s rulings relating to Lisa’s MidAmerica
retirement plan; the home appraisal value of $590,000.00; the
reimbursement award to Lisa for insurance premium payments in the
amount of $9,224.26; the reimbursement award to Lisa for the Montana
tractor in the amount of $4,500.00; the award of $77.00 in
reimbursement to Noel for transcript costs; the award of $250.00 in
reimbursement for the appraisal fee; the reimbursement award of

$12,920.08 to Noel for health, vision, and dental insurance payments;
the reimbursement award to Noel for $7,795.00 [sic][1] in mortgage
payments; and the reimbursement to Noel of $41,400.00 for rental
reimbursement.

We find the trial court manifestly erred in the following awards
and amend as follows: the reimbursement award to Lisa for car loan
payments is amended to $17,550.62; for credit card payments to
$8,376.00; the award to Noel for property taxes is amended to $429.67;
the award to Noel for “deposits into joint account” to $27,000.00.

We find no manifest error in the trial court’s ruling relating to the
Schamerhorn debt but order the trial court to amend the judgment to
reflect same.

We amend the trial court’s ruling to reflect that Lisa is entitled to
one half of the community funds existing in the former joint accounts
at the time of termination, in the amount of $2,442.63.

We reverse the reimbursement award of $2,030.02 for payments
on children’s “insurance premiums,” and the award for “Yates estate”
in the amount of $39,262.38. This case is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are assessed equally
between the parties, Noel W. Yates and Lisa J. Yates.

Yates, 375 So.3d at 585. Despite this court’s efforts to reconcile the math between

the judgment and the partition hearing, a remand was ultimately necessary. This

court specified that the parties were to “recalculate assets, liabilities, and

reimbursements with attention given to halving as required by law, taking into

consideration the findings above and with the input of both Lisa and Noel’s counsel.”

Id.2

1
The mortgage reimbursement award provided by the trial court was $7,975.00. This
amount was affirmed on appeal, but incorrectly stated in the court’s conclusion. In its review, this
court stated: “[W]e find the trial court did not manifestly err in awarding Noel $7,975.00 in
reimbursement for mortgage payments. Noel is entitled to one-half of the payments of $7,795.00.”
Yates, 375 So.3d at 572. After confirming the evidence and prior judgment, we use $7,975.00 in
the calculations herein.
2
Lisa had asserted, at the time, that the judgment was prepared without her input by Noel’s
counsel.

2

Following this court’s remand, Lisa filed a Motion for Amended Judgment on

Remand, requesting a contradictory hearing to address the matter. A hearing was set

for February 22, 2024, wherein the parties requested time to prepare a judgment

incorporating the changes by the third circuit.

Both parties submitted a judgment to the trial court. Lisa’s was denied on

March 12, 2024, with a notation that it failed to “comply with [the] Ruling of Court

and Third Circuit Ruling. Court wants to only deal with issues remanded by Third

Circuit Ruling. All other matters are final unless taken by Appeal or Writ to Supreme

Court.” Noel’s Judgment on Remand, on the other hand, was accepted and signed

by the trial court on March 20, 2024. Thereafter, Lisa appealed both the denial of

her Partition Judgment on Remand and the signed Judgment on Remand.

On appeal Lisa asserts eight assignments of error as follows:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 1 and 2:

It was error for the Trial Court to change allocations in a
judgment over which it has no such jurisdiction. It was legal error for
the Trial Court to leave the matrimonial domicile undivided.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 3:

It was error for the Trial Court to sign a judgment with internal
inconsistencies and factual and math errors.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 4 and 5:

It was error for the Trial Court to change assignment of a
community debt in a judgment over which it has no such jurisdiction.
It was error for the Trial Court to assign a community debt equally to
the parties.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 6:

It was error for the Trial Court to award some of the
reimbursements at full, rather than one-half the value of the costs paid.

3

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 7:

It was error for the Trial Court to sign the judgment on remand
which deals with some matters only, leaving condition about ownership
and obligations.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 8:

It was error for the Trial Court to not provide security for a huge
equalizing payment.

DISCUSSION:

As previously noted in Yates, 375 So.3d at 557 (alterations in original):

Appellate review of a trial court’s factual determinations relating
to the partition of community property is as follows:

The trial court’s findings of fact are subject to the manifest
error/clearly wrong standard of review. David [v. David,
12-1051, (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/10/13)], 117 So.3d 148, [writ
denied, 13–1541 (La. 10/4/13), 122 So.3d 1023].
However, the trial court is accorded broad discretion in
resolving community property disputes. Williams v.
Williams, 07-541 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 968 So.2d
1234.

Keenan v. Keenan, 15-828 p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/16), 186 So.3d 289,
295–96, writ denied, 16-418 (La. 4/15/16), 191 So.3d 590. Legal errors
are always reviewed de novo. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840
(La.1989).

In partitioning community property, the trial court is governed by La.R.S.

9:2801. The portion reproduced below guides the court in partitioning the

community assets and liabilities:

(a) The court shall value the assets as of the time of trial on the
merits, determine the liabilities, and adjudicate the claims of the parties.

(b) The court shall divide the community assets and liabilities so
that each spouse receives property of an equal net value.

(c) The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses all
of the community assets and liabilities. In allocating assets and
liabilities, the court may divide a particular asset or liability equally or
unequally or may allocate it in its entirety to one of the spouses. The
court shall consider the nature and source of the asset or liability, the

4

economic condition of each spouse, and any other circumstances that
the court deems relevant. As between the spouses, the allocation of a
liability to a spouse obligates that spouse to extinguish that liability.
The allocation in no way affects the rights of creditors.

(d) In the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities
results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order the
payment of an equalizing sum of money, either cash or deferred,
secured or unsecured, upon such terms and conditions as the court
shall direct. The court may order the execution of notes, mortgages, or
other documents as it deems necessary, or may impose a mortgage or
lien on either community or separate property, movable or immovable,
as security.

(e) In the event that the allocation of an asset, in whole or in part,
would be inequitable to a party, the court may order the parties to draw
lots for the asset or may order the private sale of the asset on such terms
and conditions as the court deems proper, including the minimum price,
the terms of sale, the execution of realtor listing agreements, and the
period of time during which the asset shall be offered for private sale.

(f) Only in the event that an asset cannot be allocated to a party,
assigned by the drawing of lots, or sold at private sale, shall the court
order a partition thereof by licitation. The court may fix the minimum
bids and other terms and conditions upon which the property is offered
at public sale. In the event of a partition by licitation, the court shall
expressly state the reasons why the asset cannot be allocated, assigned
by the drawing of lots, or sold at private sale.

La.R.S. 9:2801(4) (emphasis added). The parties are also permitted to seek

reimbursement during the partition pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 2365 (emphasis

added):

If separate property of a spouse has been used either during the
existence of the community property regime or thereafter to satisfy a
community obligation, that spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-
half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was used.

If the community obligation was incurred to acquire ownership
or use of a community corporeal movable required by law to be
registered, and separate property of a spouse has been used after
termination to satisfy that obligation, the reimbursement claim
shall be reduced in proportion to the value of the claimant’s use
after termination of the community property regime. The value of
that use and the amount of the claim for reimbursement accrued
during the use are presumed to be equal.

5

The liability of a spouse who owes reimbursement is limited to
the value of his share of all community property after deduction of all
community obligations. Nevertheless, if the community obligation was
incurred for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage, or
for the support, maintenance, or education of children of either spouse
in keeping with the economic condition of the spouses, the spouse is
entitled to reimbursement from the other spouse regardless of the value
of that spouse’s share of all community property.

The trial court’s original factual determinations regarding the assets,

liabilities, and reimbursements due to the parties were reviewed by this court in

Yates, 375 So.3d 548. The trial court was instructed to amend several numbers,

delete some reimbursements awarded, recalculate the reimbursements owed, and,

ultimately, recalculate the equalizing payment awarded. Upon reviewing this court’s

prior opinion and the judgment now on appeal, it is clear this court’s directive was

not followed on remand. Multiple errors in the Judgment on Remand are apparent

and are assigned as errors by Lisa.

Assignment of the matrimonial domicile and mortgage:

Lisa’s assignments of error numbers one, two, four, and five allege that it was

error for the trial court to change the original allocation of the matrimonial domicile

and associated mortgage in the Judgment on Remand.

The assignment of the matrimonial domicile, an asset, to Noel, was not altered

on appeal. Instead, the $590,000.00 value was affirmed. The corresponding

$198,203.00 mortgage, a community debt, was also assigned to Noel and not altered

on appeal. Specifically, the July 13, 2022 Judgment stated:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that NOEL W. YATES shall be awarded ownership of the matrimonial
domicile and all structures on property of the property located at 212
Hwy. 121, Leesville, Louisiana, valued at $590,000.00, to be refinanced
or the current mortgage modified to remove LISA J. YATES’ name from
the debt thereon and NOEL W. YATES shall be solely responsible for
the debt thereon, valued at $198,203.00, leaving equity in the amount
of $391,797.00, and in exchange, LISA J. YATES shall sign any

6

documents necessary to transfer her interest in the home to NOEL W.
YATES.

However, the Judgment on Remand awards both parties this asset and this

debt:

LISA J. Yates was awarded the total of $295,000.00 in
immovable assets . . . less one half of the mortgage balance in the
amount of $99,101.50. . . . Noel W. Yates was awarded the total of
$295,000.00 in immovable assets . . . less one half of the mortgage
balance in the amount of $99,101.50[.]

The change of awarding this asset and this liability from Noel to both parties will

affect the calculation of the final equalizing payment. See La.R.S. 9:2801(4)(d) (“In

the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net

distribution, the court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of money, either

cash or deferred, secured or unsecured”). As these allocations were not amended on

appeal, we find the trial court erred in changing the allocation of both the

matrimonial domicile and associated mortgage in the Judgment on Remand. We

reverse this portion of the judgment to reflect the language as stated in the July 13,

2022 Judgment.

Internal inconsistencies and factual errors:

We note two inconsistencies in the Judgment on Remand that must be

corrected. First, on the first page of the Judgment on Remand Noel is ordered to

receive $105,551.75 as reimbursements, but on the second page of the judgment

Noel’s reimbursements are input as $127,659.13. However, this amount will be

amended as further described in this opinion as it is apparent the Judgment on

Remand does not give attention to halving according to law.

Second, item 16 under Lisa’s reimbursements is input as $17,560.52, but the

opinion from this court amended that number to $17,550.62.

7

Lisa also asserts in her third assignment of error that the Judgment on Remand

differs in its calculation of moveables assigned to both parties from the record. We

note that those numbers that appear in the Judgment on Remand were the same as

those in the July 13, 2022 Judgment reviewed by this court. The items listed in these

categories in the July 13, 2022 Judgment were not altered by the court on appeal.

The only items this court appears to have examined on appeal were the Barksdale

checking and savings accounts, which were determined to have community property

funds. This court stated: “[T]he existing community funds prior to the two

inheritance deposits were community funds that were not properly allocated between

the parties under community assets. Thus, Lisa is entitled to reimbursement for one-

half of the community funds existing at the time which amounts to $2,442.63.”

Yates, 375 So.3d at 559 (footnote omitted). This court later stated: “We amend the

trial court’s ruling to reflect that Lisa is entitled to one half of the community funds

existing in the former joint accounts at the time of termination, in the amount of

$2,442.63.” Id. at 585. The Judgment on Remand does not include this amount as

an asset to Lisa, but does include this amount as a reimbursement owed to Lisa

pursuant to this court’s prior opinion. While this court did order the trial court to

recalculate the assets, liabilities, and reimbursements, it did not amend or alter the

value assessed to the remaining moveables from the July 13, 2022 Judgment.

Therefore, we find no error in the total moveables allocated to each party in the

Judgment on Remand and the reimbursement awarded to Lisa for the Barksdale

community funds.

Improper calculation of reimbursements:

In her sixth assignment of error, Lisa asserts that some reimbursements were

not properly halved during the trial court’s final calculation on remand. In this

8

court’s prior opinion, the court ordered the trial court to calculate the reimbursements

on remand “with attention given to halving as required by law[.]” Yates, 375 So.3d

at 585. The concern that existed in the prior appeal still exists following the

Judgment on Remand. This court previously noted one problem in trying to

reconcile the math was “that Noel requested $65,800.00 in reimbursement but was

awarded $158,298.82. . . . Of notable concern is the possibility that the

reimbursement claims were not properly halved.” Id. Despite this court amending

some reimbursements to lower amounts, and deleting several claims altogether,

Noel’s total reimbursements amount to $105,551.75 in the Judgment on Remand

despite Noel only requesting $65,800.00 in reimbursements. The problem is

particularly evident in Noel’s reimbursements where some of the items are halved,

such as Items 5 and 6, but the remainder appear to be the full amounts. Additionally,

Item 1 under Lisa’s reimbursements is halved, but the remainder appear to be left

whole. Lisa also asserts that three of her reimbursement items, Items 3, 5, and 6,

should not be halved, citing La.Civ.Code arts. 2363 and 2367.3. Thus, it is apparent

there still exist issues with halving both Lisa and Noel’s reimbursement claims, and

the trial court erred in determining the parties’ reimbursement claims.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2365 provides that a spouse who uses separate

funds to satisfy community obligations is entitled to a reimbursement of one-half of

the amount. However, “if a spouse uses separate property during the existence of

the community property regime to satisfy the separate obligation of the other spouse,

the spouse whose property was used is entitled to reimbursement for the amount or

value the property had at the time it was used.” La.Civ.Code art. 2367.3.

In determining the reimbursement amount each party is entitled to, we will

half each amount according to law, if applicable, and then add those amounts to

9

reach a total. We also reiterate this court’s prior note that “numerous items of

reimbursement were discussed very little at trial and/or little or no documentary

evidence was provided[.]” Yates, 375 So.3d at 567.

Noel’s reimbursement claims:

We will address Noel’s reimbursement requests first, as most were touched

on previously by this court. The Judgment on Remand awards Noel $105,551.75 in

reimbursement claims, but, as previously noted, is incorrectly transcribed on the

second page of the judgment as $127,659.13.

The trial court awarded Noel $15,500.00 for attorney fees. “An obligation

incurred before the date of a judgment of divorce for attorney fees and costs in an

action for divorce and in incidental actions is deemed to be a community obligation.”

La.Civ.Code art. 2362.1. 3 Thus, Noel is entitled to half that amount as a

reimbursement, $7,750.00 for his payment of attorney fees.

We note that Noel’s attorney fees are not a document contained in evidence in our record.
3

However, this court previously stated:

Lisa appealed all of the reimbursement awards except for the $15,500.00 award
for attorney fees. . . . However, all of Noel’s claims, save the children’s
insurance premiums, were listed in his Detailed Descriptive List. Regardless of
whether documentary or testimonial evidence was presented at trial, Lisa had
the opportunity to cross-examine Noel regarding any of the claims he listed in
his Detailed Descriptive List, but did not do so. Lisa cannot now claim there
was absolutely no proof of certain reimbursement claims when she did not avail
herself of the opportunity to cross-examine Noel as to items specifically listed
on his Detailed Descriptive List.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801(A)(1)(a) specifically provides that a
party’s sworn detailed descriptive list is a judicial determination of the
community assets and liabilities when one spouse fails to file their own detailed
descriptive list. While that is not the case here since Lisa did file her own and
a traversal, the same principle holds true when a party fails to produce any
contrary evidence at trial of the spouse’s valuation of reimbursement claims.

Yates, 375 So.3d at 567. As previously noted, our review of the record indicates that the trial court
only halved items 5 and 6 of Noel’s reimbursement items and failed to halve the others. Thus, our
review indicates that the attorney fees of $15,000.00 should be halved.

10

Noel put in evidence of $7,975.00 in payments to Rocket Mortgage. This

amount was reviewed by the court on appeal, wherein it stated: “[W]e find the trial

court did not manifestly err in awarding Noel $7,975.00 in reimbursement for

mortgage payments. Noel is entitled to one-half of the payments of $7,795.00 [sic].”

Id. at 572 (emphasis added). The Judgment on Remand lists the reimbursement in

the amount of $7,975.00. Thus, in calculating Noel’s reimbursement, he is entitled

to $3,987.50 for his payments to Rocket Mortgage.

The trial court awarded Noel reimbursement for his payment of “transcripts”

in the amount of $77.00. This court previously reviewed this item and stated, “We

are unable to determine from the record how the trial court arrived at $77.00

reimbursement for a transcript. Nevertheless, Noel’s Detailed Descriptive List

asserts far more than $77.00 in transcript costs.” Id. at 570–71. As there is no

indication of whether this number has been halved, and evidence submitted by Noel

is not reflective of $77.00, we take this number as the pre-halved number, as seemed

to be the manner in which the July 13, 2022 Judgment listed reimbursement items.

Thus, Noel is entitled to $38.50 in reimbursement for transcripts.

Noel’s Item 4, the Judgment on Remand lists the rental reimbursement in the

amount of $41,400.00 due to Noel. However, this court stated: “Noel is entitled to

reimbursement for one half of the value of rental reimbursement of $41,400.00.” Id.

at 574 (emphasis added). Thus, one half of the rental reimbursement equates to

$20,700.00.

The Judgment on Remand awards Noel $429.67 for the payment of property

taxes. We find no error in that calculation. That amount is one-half of the total

property taxes Noel paid, as amended by this court. On appeal, this court found the

trial court erred in awarding Noel $2,607.34 for the payment of property taxes in the

11

July 13, 2022 Judgment. That award was amended to $859.34. This court then

stated: “Noel is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of $859.34 which equals

$429.67.” Yates, 375 So.3d at 575. The halved number, $429.67, properly appears

as Item 5 in the Judgment on Remand.

Regarding the appraisal, the Judgment on Remand awards Noel $250.00.

According to our prior opinion, this is the halved amount: “The trial court obviously

concluded that Noel paid the $500.00 appraisal fee and was due reimbursement for

half. . . . [W]e find no manifest error in the trial court’s award of $250.00

reimbursement to Noel for the payment of the appraisal fee.” Id. at 571.

For his payment of health and vision insurance premiums, the Judgment on

Remand awards Noel $12,920.08. However, this amount has not been halved

pursuant to our prior opinion. On appeal, this court stated: “Noel is entitled to one-

half of $12,920.08.” Id. at 571. Thus, the judgment should award Noel $6,460.04

in reimbursement for the health and vision insurance premiums.

Finally, the Judgment on Remand also fails to halve the mortgage payments

paid by Noel for which he is due reimbursement. While the Judgment on Remand

correctly uses the amended total as ordered by this court ($27,000.00), this court

further explained: “Noel is therefore entitled to one-half of that amount in

reimbursement, $13,500.00.” Id. at 584. Thus, Noel is awarded $13,500.00 for his

payments towards the parties’ mortgage.

Therefore, our calculation indicates that Noel is entitled to a total of

$53,115.71 in reimbursements. The trial court erred in its award of $105,551.75 in

reimbursement claims to Noel.

12

Lisa’s reimbursement claims:

As with Noel’s reimbursement claims, the Judgment on Remand does not

indicate whether Lisa’s reimbursements have been halved prior to calculation. The

Judgment on Remand awards Lisa $127,659.13 in reimbursement claims. Most of

Lisa’s reimbursement claims were not reviewed in the prior appeal, but we will make

particular note of those that were. Lisa also admits that her reimbursement claims

have not been halved in the Judgment on Remand, the exceptions being her claim

for the Montana tractor and the reimbursement for funds existing in the former joint

accounts, Item 17.

The Montana tractor, an asset allocated to Noel, was established to have a

value of $9,000.00, and the July 13, 2022 Judgment awarded Lisa a $4,500.00

reimbursement claim for the tractor. This court affirmed that award on appeal.

Therefore, this award is already halved.

Item 17, $2,442.63 for reimbursement for funds existing in the former joint

accounts, already appears halved in the Judgment on Remand and requires no further

determination. On appeal, Lisa asserts that this is an asset rather than a

reimbursement. However, we note that our prior opinion specifically indicates that

Lisa is due a “reimbursement for one-half of the community funds existing at that

time which amounts to $2,442.63.” Id. at 559.

Lisa also asserts that her reimbursement for Items 3, 5, and 6, should be left

whole because she is entitled to full reimbursement for the insurance premiums she

paid. To this end, she asserts that the policies insure their son, Marshall, and name

Noel as the beneficiary (Item 3), or insure Noel and do not name Lisa as the

beneficiary (Items 5 and 6). The supreme court in Fowler v. Fowler, 03-590, p. 8

(La. 12/12/03), 861 So.2d 181, 186, did not determine any reimbursement claims

13

owed, but concluded that life insurance proceeds “are the separate property of the

named beneficiary spouse.” In Fowler, three life insurance policies on the parties’

son were issued during the parties’ marriage. The wife was listed as the primary

beneficiary of all three policies. The son died during the marriage and the proceeds

were paid to the wife, who then deposited same into accounts in her name. Eight

years later, the parties divorced, and the community was partitioned via written

stipulation. However, the parties reserved for the court the question of whether the

insurance proceeds were community or the wife’s separate property. The Fowler

court stated that “the right to life insurance proceeds are sui generis and not governed

by the codal principles. Accordingly, life insurance proceeds go to the named

beneficiary in accordance with the provisions of the life insurance contract, without

regard to community claims[.]” Id.

Applying the same to the current case, we agree that Items 5 and 6 are the

separate obligation of Noel and do not benefit Lisa; thus, as she expended her

separate property to pay the premiums on Noel’s separate obligations, she is entitled

to reimbursement for the amount she paid at the time it was used. La.Civ.Code art.

2367.3. Therefore, Lisa is entitled to $62.00 reimbursement for the Protective Life

Insurance premiums and $440.00 for the West Coast Life Insurance premiums she

paid.

As for the Boston Mutual Life Insurance payments for Marshall’s life

insurance premiums, the trial court awarded Lisa $156.00 in reimbursement. The

insurance contract is on Marshall’s life and allegedly names Noel as the beneficiary.

While those proceeds are the separate property of Noel if they are paid out as in

Fowler, that is not the current scenario in this case. However, Noel has not appealed

the reimbursement award. Thus, based on the record before us and because it is

14

unclear whether this amount was halved in the trial court’s calculations, we find Lisa

is entitled to the full $156.00 reimbursement for the Boston Mutual Life Insurance

payments.

Considering the above, the reimbursements due to Lisa, with attention paid to

the laws of halving, are as follows:

1. Montana tractor $4,500.00
2. 2020 property taxes $218.00
3. Boston Mutual Life Insurance $156.00
premiums (Marshall)
4. State Farm insurance premiums $4,612.13
5. Protective Life insurance (Noel) $62.00
6. West Coast life insurance (Noel) $440.00
7. Aaron Guinn $2873.00
8. Aaron Guinn $190.00
9. Aaron Guinn $1458.50
10.Aaron Guinn $50.00
11.Garage window repair $295.00
12.Home repairs $400.00
13.Attorney fees $18,163.75
14.Pre-divorce litigation $688.61
15.Barksdale Federal Credit Union $4,188.00
credit card payments, act 0509
16.Bayou Federal Credit Union BMW $8,775.31
payments
17.Funds existing in the former joint $2,442.63
account
18.Rocket Mortgage payments $16,083.50
19.TD Auto Finance for Lincoln MKZ $2,028.50
TOTAL: $67,624.93

Our calculation indicates that Lisa is entitled to a total of $67,468.93 in

reimbursements. The trial court erred in its award of $127,659.13 in reimbursement

claims to Lisa.

Considering the reasons set forth above and the trial court’s failure to follow

this court’s directive on remand, including the mathematical errors, failure to apply

the proper statutes regarding reimbursement claims, and exceeding the scope of the

15

remand by assigning the matrimonial domicile and mortgage to both parties, the

Judgment on Remand is reversed in part and affirmed in part. We then render

judgment as follows.

CONCLUSION:

With the record before us, we now render judgment as follows, resulting in

the following calculations and a final equalizing payment:

First, we note that the following portions of the July 13, 2022 Judgment were

previously unaltered on appeal and so remain:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that LISA J. YATES shall be responsible for the
payment of [the] following community debts, to-wit:

1. Barksdale Federal Credit Union credit card, account
ending 0509; and
2. Bayou Federal Credit Union loan for BMW, account
ending 860 [valued as a $15,431.00 at trial.]

....

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the retirement/pension account of NOEL W.
YATES with Schlumberger shall be divided by Qualified Domestic
Relations Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the retirement/pension account of NOEL W.
YATES with Vernon Parish Sheriff’s Office shall be divided by
Qualified Domestic Relations Order.

Furthermore, we find no error in the total moveables allocated to each party

in the Judgment on Remand, and this court previously affirmed the trial court’s

ruling relating to Lisa’s MidAmerica retirement plan. Thus, the list of assigned

assets allocated to LISA J. YATES (Items 1-86) in the July 13, 2022 Judgment

totaling $83,432.28 is affirmed. The list of assigned assets allocated to NOEL W.

YATES (Items 1-93) in the July 13, 2022 Judgment totaling $30,665.00 is affirmed.

16

Now, considering our findings above, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that NOEL W. YATES shall be awarded ownership of the matrimonial

domicile and all structures on the property located at 212 Hwy. 121, Leesville,

Louisiana, valued at $590,000.00, to be refinanced or the current mortgage modified

to remove LISA J. YATES’ name from the debt thereon and NOEL W. YATES shall

be solely responsible for the debt thereon, valued at $198,203.00, leaving equity in

the amount of $391,797.00, and in exchange, LISA J. Yates shall sign any

documents necessary to transfer her interest in the home to NOEL W. YATES.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that NOEL W.

YATES shall be responsible for the Schamerhorn community debt in the amount of

$2,000.00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that LISA J.

YATES shall receive the total of $67,624.93 in reimbursements, as specified above.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that NOEL W.

YATES shall receive the total of $53,115.71 in reimbursements, as specified above.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that NOEL W.

YATES shall make an equalizing payment to LISA J. YATES in the amount of

$190,739.58.4

4
Pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2801(4), the court must determine and allocate the assets and
liabilities of the parties and, in the event that an unequal net distribution occurs, the court shall
order an equalizing sum of money.

In determining the assets, this court calculates a total of $704,097.28 in moveable and
immovable assets (moveables allocated to each party and the marital home). Regarding liabilities,
this court calculates a total of $215,634.00 (comprised of the mortgage, Schamerhorn debt, and
BMW loan). Thus, the net value of the community is $488,463.28. In a perfect world, each party
would have received $244,231.64 in assets.

17

Costs of this appeal are assessed equally between the parties, Noel W. Yates

and Lisa J. Yates.

REVERSED, IN PART; AFFIRMED, IN PART; AND RENDERED.

In this case, Noel received a net of $420,462.00, and Lisa received a net of $68,001.28.
Therefore, Lisa is entitled to $176,230.36 more to equalize the assets. But we will factor in
reimbursement claims before determining a final equalizing payment.

In reimbursements, this court calculated that Noel is entitled to $53,115.71, while Lisa is
entitled to $67,624.93. Therefore, Noel would owe Lisa the difference in reimbursements, which
is $14,509.22.

Considering these figures, the final equalizing payment owed by Noel to Lisa is
$190,739.58 ($176,230.36 + $14,509.22).

18