Courtland Tatum, Sr. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-401 consolidated with 24-402, 24-403

COURTLAND TATUM, SR.

VERSUS

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
CO., ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 266,220
HONORABLE LOWELL C. HAZEL, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Guy E.
Bradberry, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Courtland Tatum, Sr.
IN PROPER PERSON
P.O. Box 4830
Pineville, LA 71360
IN PROPER PERSON

Paul M. Lafleur
Stafford, Stewart & Potter
3112 Jackson Street
Alexandria, LA 71301
(337) 487-4910
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Mark Kinman, III.
Cassandra Kinman

Katherine Paine Martin
Kaitlyn E. Bourg
Porteous, Hainkel & Johnson, LLP
200 Beaullieu Dr., Bldg #3A
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 291-2440
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Tereasa Doyle

Brian Thomas Carr
Attorney at Law
4636 Sanford St. Suite 100
Metairie, LA 70006
(504) 888-5030
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
James Coohoon

GREMILLION, Judge.

From the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict, the plaintiff/appellant,

Courtland Tatum, Sr., appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

The accidents

Tatum was involved in three accidents on separate dates at the intersection of

Fenner and Overton Streets in Alexandria, Louisiana. In the first accident (our

docket 42-401), which occurred on January 6, 2019, and the subject of this matter,

Tatum was in the right lane of Fenner Street facing east attempting to turn left onto

Overton, which is a one-way street flowing north. Both the left and right lanes of

Fenner are allowed to turn left onto Overton. Mark Kinman, III, was in the left lane,

also intending to turn left onto Overton. The intersection is governed by a traffic

light. Tatum alleged that when the light turned green, he began making his left turn

into the right lane of Overton. Kinman, Tatum alleges, “turned wide in his left lane

to miss a pothole, crashing into [Tatum’s] 2008 Cadillac CTS.”

In docket number 24-402, which originated in Alexandria City Court, Tatum

alleged that on June 30, 2019, he was in the right lane of Fenner intending to turn

left onto Overton. Tereasa Doyal occupied the left lane. When the light changed to

green, both cars began executing their left turns. Doyal allegedly turned too wide

and struck Tatum. Tatum later moved to have the case transferred to the Ninth

Judicial District Court based upon the amount allegedly in dispute.

The third of the accidents (docket number 24-403) involving Tatum occurred

on December 23, 2019. Tatum again occupied the right lane and was turning left

onto Overton. On this occasion, James Coohon turned too wide and struck Tatum.

Pretrial posture

In June 2021, Coohon moved to consolidate the three cases for trial. An order

consolidating the three cases for trial was signed by the court on November 3, 2021.

The trial

The jury trial of the three matters was held on January 31, 2023. Tatum

represented himself throughout the proceeding in the suits against Kinman and

Coohon. His counsel in the Doyal case withdrew shortly before the matter was

transferred from city court to district court. Tatum appeared in proper person from

that point forward.

After the trial court gave opening instructions, the jury recessed briefly to

make childcare and similar arrangements. Tatum requested that all witnesses be

sequestered. Only Tatum intended to call a non-party witness, though, so the trial

court refused to sequester the parties over Tatum’s objection. Tatum’s one witness,

Mark Anthony Hammond, Sr., was sequestered, and the trial proceeded.

Tatum played dashcam video recorded during the Coohon accident. He stated

that while he had been involved in eight accidents at the intersection, none were his

fault. “I have because there’s people like Mr. Coohon that is not paying attention at

this intersection at all.” Tatum admitted that he was involved in another accident on

January 11, 2019, five days after the Kinman collision.

Hammond testified as part of Tatum’s case. He lived on Fenner near the

intersection with Overton and witnessed the Doyal accident. He testified that Doyal

was attempting to change lanes and struck Tatum. One of the drivers was transported

from the scene by ambulance. Many accidents have occurred at this intersection,

and all happen in the same way, according to Hammond, who characterized the

intersection as dangerous. There is no striping to delineate each driver’s lane as they

turn.
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Mr. Kinman testified that he had purchased his Ford Mustang the day before

the accident and was driving it home to Jonesboro, Louisiana. He was familiar with

the intersection because he grew up in Pineville, Louisiana. Mr. Kinman described

waiting at the intersection for the light to turn green. He did not see Tatum beside

him. He described the collision as “kind of rim-to-rim.” The cars collided as both

were still turning. Mr. Kinman believed the collision occurred in his lane.

Cassandra Kinman was a passenger in her husband’s car. She testified that

she did not see a vehicle in the lane next to her. As the vehicle was turning, Mrs.

Kinman felt the collision. She did not see the collision because she was looking at

her phone.

Tereasa Doyal is a resident of Kinder, Louisiana. She was driving a vehicle

that was involved in a collision with that driven by Tatum on June 30, 2019. Doyal’s

husband was a passenger in her car. She testified that she could not see any markings

to delineate the lanes. She described the collision:

Like I said, as I came up to the intersection the light turned red. I
proceeded to stop and while I was stopped I noticed a vehicle pull up
into the right hand lane and that was you [Tatum], which the car was so
close to mine that it could have been touched from inside my vehicle. . . .
I was making the left hand turn and the vehicle which was you that was
beside me on—in the right hand lane, which was also a left turn lane
proceeded to track my vehicle as we were turning. And as we were
turning it seemed like suddenly your vehicle turned more left than mine
turned and that’s whenever the vehicles impacted.

Tatum testified. He stated that in the January 6, 2019, collision, Mr. Kinman

was looking over his shoulder when the accident occurred. The force of the collision

caused Tatum to lose control of his car and come to rest on the side of the road after

jumping the curb.

About the June 30, 2019 collision, Tatum testified that Doyal turned too wide

and struck his vehicle. He described the collision as “more like a T-bone situation.”

He could not get out of the vehicle on his own. Hammond assisted him. “When the
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ambulance and the firefighters did show up I was too weak to stand so I had to sit

down.”

Tatum said that Coohon turned too wide in the December 23, 2019, collision.

His twenty-month-old son was transported from the scene by ambulance.

In each accident, Tatum claimed to be completely free from any fault. He

attributed the accidents to drivers in the left hand lane turning too wide.

After Tatum concluded his testimony, the following colloquy occurred:

BY THE COURT:

Okay. All right. You’re – you’re done with your testimony?

BY MR. TATUM:

Sure.

BY THE COURT:

Okay. Now, you have to -- you get -- you’re subject to cross
examine by the other attorneys.

BY MR. TATUM:

That’s fine.

BY THE COURT:

Okay. Did y’all -- do y’all want to reserve your cross or do you
want to ..

BY MS. MARTIN:

We’ll reserve ..

BY MR. CARR:

Yes, we’ll reserve.

BY MS. MARTIN:

.. our cross.

BY THE COURT:

Okay. All right. Okay. They’re okay, you may step down
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BY MR. TATUM:

Okay.

BY THE COURT:

Thank you. The attorneys have preserved their right to come
back to this later. And you can return to your seat. Mr. Tatum,
do you have another witness?

BY MR. TATUM:

No, sir, that’s it.

BY THE COURT:

Okay. Is that -- do you rest or is that -- is that your case -in -
chief, the end of it?

BY MR. TATUM:

Uh, I may have another question for one or two of the witnesses
later.

BY THE COURT:

But, for your case -in -chief, if they’re called upon -- if they’re
called as witnesses you’re entitled to cross them.

BY MR. TATUM:

Okay. That’s fine.

BY THE COURT:

But, what I’m asking you is that, is this all -- is this -- is this your
case that you’d like to submit to the jury?

BY MR. TATUM:

Yes, that’s it.

PLAINTIFF RESTS

....

BY MR. LAFLEUR:

We have motions to make, Your Honor.

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BY THE COURT

Okay.

BY MR. LAFLEUR:

And they need to be outside the presence of the jury.

BY THE COURT:

Yes. No, we have to do that.

At this point, the jury exited the courtroom, and counsel for all defendants

joined in a motion for directed verdict, because Tatum introduced no evidence on

the issue of damages, either in the form of special damages or testimony about his

alleged injuries.

DEFENDANTS MOVE FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

BY MS. MARTIN:

At this time, Your Honor, the defendants would move for a
directed verdict on the grounds that although there was some
evidence regarding liability dispute there was no evidence
whatsoever regarding damages sustained in terms of not a single
medical bill, not a single medical record, not a single medical
opinion. There was no evidence whatso -- so, even if they found
in his favor in terms of liability he’s still would not be entitled to
any reward – award.

BY MR. CARR:

And I would add that there was no testimony as to any injury
itself. He said. . .

BY MS. MARTIN:

Exactly.

BY MR. CARR:

.. ambulances came but there was no testimony as to any injury,
Your Honor. And as this Court’s aware, in my case I’ve had a
ruling already that he can’t present any evidence anyway. So, he
hasn’t . . .

BY MS. MARTIN:

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He hasn’t.

BY MR. CARR

.. as far as documentation, he has no way to prove damages. So,
even if he proved liability, there’s nothing for him to recover.
There’s nothing to present to the jury as far as any damages

BY MR. LAFLEUR:

Your Honor, the Kinmans and State Farm join in this motion.
This -- these are suits for personal injuries not just suits to
establish liability. There is absolutely no evidence before the
Court to establish any injury or damage resulting therefrom.

BY MR. CARR:

And so the record is clear, James Coohon as counselor for James
Coohon I make the same motion, Your Honor

BY MS. MARTIN:

And Tereasa Doyal and State Farm do as well

BY THE COURT:

Okay. All right. I tell you what, I’m going to stand in recess for
about I’m going to stand in recess for a few minutes.

BY MS. MARTIN:

Sure

BY MR. CARR:

Yes, Your Honor

BY MR. TATUM ;

Can I say something on the record?

BY THE COURT:

Sure, yes.

BY MR. TATUM:

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To those motions, I ask that you deny them because I have sent
all medical bills to them and they have those medical bills. Paul
Lafleur has medical bills.

BY THE COURT:

What they’re saying -- not to cut you off, Mr. Tatum, what
they’re saying is, in your case -in -chief, I think, what the -- not
to speak for the defense but, I think, what the attorneys are saying
is that what’s something that’s discoverable, what’s something
that you send to someone or even if you did or didn’t, it wasn’t
presented in Court. Does that ..

BY MR. TATUM:

I haven’t ..

BY THE COURT:

.. make sense to you?

BY MR. TATUM:

.. -- I haven’t gotten a chance to present my evidence for the
medical bills.

BY MS. MARTIN:

You already rested your case.

BY MR. CARR:

You rested your case. He asked if you had anything else.

BY MR. TATUM:

Y’all playing games.

BY THE COURT:

No, there’s no games here.

BY MR. CARR:

It’s the same standards.

BY MR. TATUM:

So, you mean to tell me ..

BY THE COURT:
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Yes.

BY MR. TATUM:

.. that there’s no, what Katie said, there’s no evidentiary hearing,
is what she said earlier.

BY THE COURT:

There’s -- there’s -- you have to speak up, please.

BY MR. TATUM:

There’s no evidentiary hearing.

....

BY MR. CARR:

There’s no evidence to have a hearing on at this point.

BY MS. MARTIN:

There’s no evidence ..

BY MR. TATUM:

It is evidence to have a hearing on

BY THE COURT:

It wasn’t submitted, is what they’re trying to say is that if you --
I go to Dr. McBride, he’s one of my physicians, I go to Dr.
McBride. When I finish he gives me a piece of paper that shows
what I did there, it shows what – it shows what I paid, it shows
what my blood pressure was, what my – whatever it is I went to
go see Dr. McBride, he kicks me back something and I could go
and -- I could demonstrate that to someone or -- does that make
sense to you?

BY MR. TATUM:

I can demonstrate that today or tomorrow.

BY THE COURT:

But you didn’t choose to do that. I can’t try your case for you.
I’m sorry ..

BY MR. TATUM:

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I didn’t -- I didn’t ..

BY THE COURT:

.. -- I’m sorry that I can not.

BY MR. TATUM:

What I took in is, you saying that I rest my case for today because
you was discussing ..

BY THE COURT:

No.

BY MR. TATUM:

.. with them about ..

BY :THE COURT

No, no, I did not say that.

BY MR. TATUM:

No, no, no . .

BY THE COURT:

Don’t make aspirations[sic] . .

BY MR. TATUM:

.. that’s what I took ..

BY THE BAILIFF:

One at a time -- one at a time.

BY THE COURT:

. . -- don’t sit -- no, don’t -- don’t the Court has not done that, no,
sir.

BY MR. TATUM:

I didn’t say the Court did that.

BY THE COURT:

That’s not acceptable.
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BY MR. TATUM:

I didn’t say you did it.

BY THE COURT:

No, I did not do that. I asked you ..

BY MR. TATUM:

I didn’t say -- I said . .

BY THE COURT:

.. multiple times, I asked you. And finally, Mr. Carr even said,
does that mean that he has rested and I said yes you said yes.

BY MR. TATUM:

You mentioned something about two days for a trial, so, I’m
thinking ..

BY THE COURT:

Yes, that’s the possibility that a trial may extend that long. It
goes like this, you, the plaintiff gets to present a case. When the
plaintiff is finished if they’ve made a case-in-chief then the
defense will make a case. And if they will make a case then if
they make a case then you can -- you can add other things called
rebuttal, does that make sense to you? But, you rested though.
You can not put anymore -- now, if they were to continue and if
they – when they call witnesses then you would -- you’re entitled
to cross examine them and then they can redirect and you can
recross and it can go back and forth, like ping pong, like tennis
back and forth. But, it’s not -- but -- but, you chose to rest. You
said you were finished. Is that true?

BY MR. TATUM:

I said I was finished but I’m thinking that it was for just today
because you was discussing about leaving from 4 to 4:30.

BY THE COURT:

Yes.

BY MR. TATUM:

And I agreed to that. I’m not agreeing to rest on my case like
that. Nobody is coming in here like that, not even me.

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BY THE COURT:

You did though, sir. Unfortunately, you did. Okay. All right.
You finished? Now, I’m going to take a recess. Is there
something else that you would like to add, sir, Mr. Tatum?

)NO RESPONSE FROM MR. TATUM)

The trial court then stood in recess. When court reconvened, the trial court

ruled:

BY THE COURT:

Okay. All right. At this stage, I’ve kind of vacillated back and
forth. I’m going to deny the motion. I think it’s stretching it a
little bit but there’s still a material issue of – of liability.
Obviously, damages is that’s not on the table but, I’m just going
to -- I’m going to deny the motion. Obviously, y’all can re -urge
the motion but, I’m going to have let’s -- if y’all put on a case,
let’s see how -- let’s see how it goes before if y’all want to re -
urge the motion after you might have felt like you’re at that spot.
I think you’re pretty close but I just -- I think, it’d be a little
cleaner just, I think, we’re at a good segue right now. We can
release the jury. Did you get their contact information, Mrs.
Donna? Excellent. Thank you. We can bring them in.

All counsel then queried how they were to proceed without waiving their

clients’ rights. They argued that absent a showing of damages, even had defendants

stipulated to liability, a plaintiff who has proven no damages cannot prevail. The

trial court then turned to Tatum, who pleaded that he did not understand that by

resting he forfeited his right to put on other evidence. All medical had been supplied

to the defendants in discovery. When the trial court referenced his “case in chief,”

Tatum argued, he did not understand what that meant. Tatum was asked by the trial

court when he thought he was going to present his medical evidence. He responded,

“I figured it was -- they trying to whatever they needed to do and then I could come

back and do that.” Because counsel for Doyal mentioned medical evidence in her

opening, Tatum was “thinking, it’s her turn to do some or one of them’s turn to do

some. . .and then I can come back. . .and present the rest of my case.” He pleaded

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ignorance of court procedure throughout the hearing on defendants’ motions. The

trial court then reversed course and granted the motions for directed verdict.

Judgment was signed on February 15, 2023. This appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Tatum assigns the following as errors:

1. Whether trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous:
appellant asserts there were not proper instructions, or a detailed
description of appellant’s case provided to jury by trial court.

2. Whether trial court erred in not placing witnesses under
sequestration:
appellant contends that trial court erred in not placing defendants and
witnesses under La. C.E. art. 615 Exclusion of Witnesses in a
consolidated case. Article 615 states, as a matter of right: The court may,
on its own motion, and shall, on request of a party, order that witnesses
be excluded from the courtroom or from a place where they can see or
hear the proceedings. Witnesses are also required to refrain from
discussing the facts of the case with anyone other than counsel in the
case. In the interests of justice, the court may exempt any witness from
its order of exclusion.

3. Whether trial court erred in excluding key evidence presented by
appellant: appellant argues that trial court’s exclusion of critical
evidence was an abuse of discretion and prejudiced appellant’s ability to
present a full and fair case.

4. Whether trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of
appellee: appellant contends that trial court improperly granted a
directed verdict by allowing conclusory statements by appellees’
attorney to outweigh previously submitted evidence, not allowing
appellant to present all evidence in his case fully.

5. Whether trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor
of appellee: appellant contends that trial court improperly granted
summary judgment by failing to consider material facts in dispute and
by misapplying relevant law.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

We will first discuss assignments of error 1, 2, and 5, as these assignments are

most expeditious to address.

In his first assignment of error, Tatum argues that the trial court, in its opening

instructions, failed to instruct the jury on the duties of left-turning motorists, as set
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forth in La.R.S. 32:101. He also argues that the trial court should have used the

phrase “case in chief” in those opening remarks to adequately put him on notice of

the effect resting would have on his ability to present further evidence.

“At any time during the trial, the court may instruct the jury on the law

applicable to any issue in the case.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 1792(A). The trial court,

then, was under no obligation to charge the jury before the presentation of evidence

on the duties of left turning motorists. Our review of the trial court’s pre-evidence

soliloquy demonstrates that the trial court explained to the jury how the trial would

proceed and who bore the burden of proof.

With regard to Tatum’s complaint that the trial court did not use the phrase

“case in chief,” we do note that the trial court told the jury (emphasis added):

Mr. Tatum is allowed to make his opening statement. Once again,
opening statements -- and after those opening statements the plaintiff,
Mr. Tatum, he will call witnesses and present evidence. Okay. When
the plaintiff finishes or rests, as we say in the law, if you rest your case
that means you finish.

We find that this statement, among the brief remarks the trial court made before the

opening statements of the parties, adequately explained the concept of resting one’s

case.

We are also convinced that the trial court gave Tatum plenty of opportunity

before the close of his case to put on his evidence. For example, the trial court

pointedly asked him, “But, what I’m asking you is that, is this all -- is this -- is this

your case that you’d like to submit to the jury?” Tatum replied, “Yes, that’s it.”

Because the trial court did not instruct the jury on the applicable law

governing the case, because the trial court was not required to instruct the jury before

the presentation of evidence, and— most importantly— because the trial court took

the case out of the jury’s hands by granting a directed verdict, we find no merit in

assignment of error 1.
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In his second assignment of error, Tatum complains that all witnesses should

have been subject to the rule of sequestration. Sequestration is governed by La.Code

Evid. art. 615, which reads, in pertinent part:

A. As a matter of right. On its own motion the court may, and
on request of a party the court shall, order that the witnesses be
excluded from the courtroom or from a place where they can see or hear
the proceedings, and refrain from discussing the facts of the case with
anyone other than counsel in the case. In the interests of justice, the
court may exempt any witness from its order of exclusion.

B. Exceptions. This Article does not authorize exclusion of any
of the following:

(1) A party who is a natural person.

Parties who are natural persons, such as Doyal and Mr. and Mrs. Kinman, are not

subject to the rule of sequestration. The only other witness besides Tatum himself

was Hammond, who was called by Tatum as the first witness to testify. Hammond

was the only witness to whom the rule could apply. Hammon d was then sequestered.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

Tatum’s fifth assignment of error addresses the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment. The trial court did not grant summary judgment. Summary judgments

“pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine

need for trial.” Hines v. Garrett, 04-806, p. 7 (La. 1/20/04), 876 So.2d 764, 769

(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587,106

S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986)). In the present matter, of course, there was a trial. There

is quite a difference between a summary judgment and a directed verdict. Tatum’s

fifth assignment of error lacks merit.

We turn now to Tatum’s third and fourth assignments of error. We begin the

analysis with the recognition that Tatum is a pro se litigant.

Judges in matters litigated pro se face a quandary. On the one hand,

unrepresented parties, because they are unversed in law and procedure, are allowed
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latitude not afforded represented parties. Hoffpauir v. Hoffpauir, 21-473 (La.App.

3 Cir. 2/9/22), 333 So.3d 1262. On the other hand, “a judge should not give self-

represented litigants an unfair advantage or create an appearance of partiality to the

reasonable person.” La.Code Jud.Conduct, Canon 3(A)(4).

Accordingly, our jurisprudence recognizes that a pro se litigant bears “the

responsibility of familiarizing himself with applicable procedure and substantive law.

His failure to do so does not give him any greater rights than a litigant represented

by an attorney.” Hoffpauir, 333 So.3d at 1270. Because the judge must remain a

neutral arbiter, a pro se litigant is not entitled to have the trial court “intervene to

remedy the shortcomings in his presentation[.]” Magnon v. Magnon, 23-299, pp.

13-14 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/23), 375 So.3d 1053, 1061.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1632 prescribes the order in which

a trial should be conducted:

(1) The opening statements by the plaintiff and the defendant, in that
order;

(2) The presentation of the evidence of the plaintiff and of the
defendant, in that order;

(3) The presentation of the evidence of the plaintiff in rebuttal; and

(4) The argument of the plaintiff, of the defendant, and of the
plaintiff in rebuttal, in that order.

This order may be varied by the court when circumstances so justify.

It lies within the sound discretion of the trial court to reopen a case to allow

additional evidence. Franks v. State Nat’l Ins. Co., 22-169 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/25/23),

355 So.3d 1174, writ denied, 23-259 (La. 4/18/23), 359 So.3d 512. An abuse of

discretion occurs when the court acts in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Oracle

1031 Exchange, LLC v. Bourque, 11-1133 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/8/12), 85 So.3d 736.

“The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential to the trial court’s

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determination under consideration.” Patrick v. Ctr. For Restorative Breast Surgery,

LLC, 22-550, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/2/22), 348 So.3d 176, 180.

The trial court acted well within its discretion to hold plaintiff to the standards

of La Code Civ.P. art. 1632. As a neutral arbiter, the trial court is not allowed to

render significant assistance to a pro se litigant, who is charged with familiarizing

himself with the law and procedure applicable to his case.

We find that Tatum’s third assignment of error lacks merit. He rested his case.

He had been told what it meant to rest his case. The judge asked him repeatedly

whether he was resting his case. Therefore, there was no exclusion of evidence in

the matter. Documents and exhibits that have not been offered and admitted into

evidence are not evidence.

This leads to Tatum’s final assignment of error asserting that the trial court

erred in granting a directed verdict.

Tatum argues, “If there is some evidence from which jurors could find that

the party has met its burden, a trial judge must not grant a directed verdict.” He

further states, “Appellant contends that evidence introduced, submitted during

opening argument was intended for jury's consideration, as trial court did not view

appellant's evidence because courtroom monitor was oriented towards jury, away

from judge’s bench.”

Documents not admitted by the trial court into evidence may not be considered.

Medical Review Panel for Bush, 21-954 (La. 5/13/22), 339 So.3d 1118. Offering

material into evidence is a formal act, and “[e]vidence not properly and officially

offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the

record. Documents attached to memoranda do not constitute evidence[.]” Denoux

v. Vessel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 07-2143, p. 6 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88.

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Tatum did not offer any medical records into evidence. He did not testify to

any injuries from any of the three accidents. He did not submit any estimates or

receipts for damage to his vehicle(s).

The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained:

Under Louisiana jurisprudence, most negligence cases are resolved by
employing a duty/risk analysis. The determination of liability under the
duty/risk analysis usually requires proof of five separate elements: (1)
proof that the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of
the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (2) proof that the
defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the
breach element); (3) proof that the defendant had a duty to conform his
conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (4) proof that the
defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's
injuries (the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and (5)
proof of actual damages (the damages element).

Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 00-1372, p. 7 (La. 3/23/01), 782 So. 2d 606, 611. Thus,

because the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, he must prove each of the five

elements in order to prevail. That includes introducing proof of damages. Tatum

failed to testify about damages, and he failed to introduce evidence of damages.

Without introducing evidence of damages, Tatum did not carry his burden of proof.

DISPOSITION

We find no error in the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict. The judgment

of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this matter are taxed to Plaintiff/Appellant,

Courtland Tatum, Sr.

AFFIRMED.

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