Bruce Lloyd v. Darlene Elaire

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-578

BRUCE LLOYD

VERSUS

DARLENE ELAIRE

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2023-2019
HONORABLE CYNTHIA SPADONI, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

CHARLES G. FITZGERALD
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Charles G. Fitzgerald, Ledricka J. Thierry, and Wilbur L. Stiles,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Lawrence C. Billeaud
706 West University Avenue
Lafayette, Louisiana 70506
(337) 266-2055
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Bruce Lloyd

Afif Jebara
1001 West Pinhook Road
Building 3, Suite 104
Lafayette, Louisiana 70503
(337) 232-0055
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Darlene Elaire

FITZGERALD, Judge.

In this appeal, we are asked to review the trial court’s judgment dismissing

Plaintiff’s nullity action.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Bruce Lloyd, and Defendant, Darlene Elaire, were married in

Louisiana in 2001. They physically separated in 2012. Many years later, in April

2023, Bruce filed a petition for divorce.

Importantly, on May 30, 2023, Bruce and Darlene filed a Joint Motion to

Establish Interim and Final Periodic Spousal Support. In conjunction with the joint

motion, they executed a Consent Judgment of spousal support.1 The Consent

Judgment was signed by the trial court on May 31, 2023.

In relevant part, the Consent Judgment provides that Bruce will pay Darlene

interim spousal support in the amount of $500.00 per week until that obligation

terminates by law. Bruce has been paying this weekly sum to Darlene since they

separated in 2012.

As to final spousal support, the Consent Judgment provides that the $500.00

weekly payments shall continue until Darlene’s death. The judgment further

provides “that the obligation to pay final periodic support . . . as ordered herein shall

be deemed contractual in nature and shall not be modified or waived regardless of

any material change in the circumstances of either party whether such change is

financial or otherwise.”

Then, on August 3, 2023, Bruce filed a petition to annul the Consent Judgment

for fraud or ill practices. A bench trial was held in June 2024. The trial court

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They also executed at that time an Act of Donation, whereby Bruce donated to Darlene
his undivided one-half ownership interest in the former marital residence.

ultimately dismissed the nullity action. A final judgment to this effect was signed

on July 17, 2024. Bruce now appeals this judgment.

On appeal, Bruce asserts the following assignments of error:

1. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN
ITS REFUSAL TO NULLIFY THE SPOUSAL SUPPORT
JUDGMENT BASED UPON FRAUD AND ILL PRACTICES.

a. BRUCE LLOYD WAS NEVER TIMELY ADVISED OF
THE NATURE OF THE DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY
COUNSEL FOR DARLENE ELAIRE.

b. BRUCE LLOYD’S LIMITED ABILITY TO READ AND
WRITE IS ALSO A BASIS TO SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT.

c. THE FACTUAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AND
INTENTIONAL FAILURE TO PRESENT RELEVANT
MATERIAL FACTS TO [JUDGE] MARILYN CASTLE
CONSTITUTE “FRAUD” OR “ILL PRACTICES[”] AS
DEFINED BY THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT
IN KEM SEARCH, INC. V. SHEFFIELD, 434 SO.2D 1067
(LA. 1983).

d. [DARLENE] ELAIRE AND [BRUCE] LLOYD DID NOT
HAVE THE REQUISITE “MEETING OF THE MINDS”
TO CREATE A BINDING CONTRACTUAL, UN-
MODIFIABLE SPOUSAL SUPPORT OBLIGATION.

e. THE INCOME AWARD ORDERED HEREIN IS IN
EXCESS OF THE STATUTORY LIMITATIONS FOR
IMPOSITION OF A SPOUSAL SUPPORT AWARD AS
DICTATED BY LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTICLE
112.

f. COUNSEL FOR [DARLENE] ELAINE [sic]
VIOLATED LOUISIANA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, RULE 4.3[.]

2. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN
ITS FAILURE TO AWARD ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT
COSTS AGAINST [DARLENE] ELAIRE AND HER
ATTORNEY FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY
OBTAINED THIS SPOUSAL SUPPORT AWARD AND
DONATION OF LLOYD’S INTEREST IN THE FAMILY
HOME[.]

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Darlene, on the other hand, timely answered the appeal and now requests

damages against Bruce for a frivolous appeal.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Fraud or Ill Practices

Bruce initially asserts that the Consent Judgment of spousal support is null

and void because it was obtained through fraud or ill practices. Louisiana Code of

Civil Procedure Article 2004(A) states that “[a] final judgment obtained by fraud or

ill practices may be annulled.”

To this end, our jurisprudence has established a two-step analysis for

determining if a final judgment should be annulled on this basis: (1) whether the

party seeking the annulment was deprived of a legal right, such as the right to appear

and assert a defense; and (2) whether enforcement of the judgment would be

unconscionable and inequitable. Kem Search, Inc. v. Sheffield, 434 So.2d 1067

(La.1983).

In Kem Search, 434 So.2d at 1070, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed

the scope of La.Code Civ.P. art. 2004, explaining:

[T]he article is not limited to cases of actual fraud or intentional
wrongdoing, but is sufficiently broad to encompass all situations
wherein a judgment is rendered through some improper practice or
procedure which operates, even innocently, to deprive the party cast in
judgment of some legal right, and where the enforcement of the
judgment would be unconscionable and inequitable.

Put differently, “the action provided by article 2004 is a distinct remedy

designed to afford relief against a judgment procured by methods viewed with

disdain by the judiciary.” Power Marketing Direct, Inc. v. Foster, 05-2023, p. 13

(La. 9/6/06), 938 So.2d 662, 671.

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As to the standard of review, “trial courts are permitted discretion in deciding

when a judgment should be annulled because of fraud or ill practices, to which

discretion reviewing courts will defer.” Id. at 670. Hence, the appropriate standard

of appellate review is abuse of discretion.

Now to the record evidence in the case before us. To summarize, Darlene

testified that she and Bruce married in July 2001. At that time, they were both

employed at Langlinais Bakery. But in 2003, Darlene was forced to quit that job

when she developed carpel tunnel syndrome in both hands. She had surgery the

following year.

Darlene then developed reflex sympathetic dystrophy. When asked about the

symptoms of this condition, she explained: “RSD is like your hands are burning in

a fireplace. My hand[s] cramp up. I also—it messes with the depressive nerve.”

She further explained that her condition is not curable and that she takes pain

medication and muscle relaxers to address the symptoms.

After her employment with Langlinais Bakery, Darlene remained out of the

workforce for many years. She then worked as a sitter in 2020. And most recently,

Darlene worked part time for a business that rents flowers. By contrast, Bruce

continues to work for Langlinais Bakery: he has been there thirty years. Bruce also

earns cash income from various side jobs.

Darlene testified that in 2003, her health condition affected her relationship

with Bruce: she was moody and aggravated, and sometimes she did not want Bruce

to hold her. Then, on March 3, 2012, while Darlene was unemployed, Bruce told

her that he had a girlfriend and that his girlfriend was pregnant. Bruce moved in

with his girlfriend that same day.

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According to Darlene, she was terrified by Bruce’s decision to leave her. She

was terrified about her ability to survive financially. As she put it: “I told him—I

said, ‘Well, how I’m gonna make it?’ And he said, ‘I’m a still take care of you.’”

When asked whether Bruce said how long he would do that, Darlene responded:

“For life. For—not to even worry about it.”

After Bruce moved out of the marital residence, he immediately began paying

Darlene $500.00 per week in cash. It is undisputed that Bruce voluntarily paid this

weekly sum to Darlene for twelve years. He never missed a single payment. Then,

on May 31, 2023, the Consent Judgment of spousal support was signed by the trial

court. Bruce has complied with this support judgment ever since.

Darlene was then asked about her relationship with Bruce after their physical

separation. She explained that it remained very cordial. For example, they have

exchanged holiday greetings and birthday wishes. Bruce has fixed Darlene’s car and

taken care of odd jobs for her. And on occasion, Bruce has spent the night at the

former marital residence, always using the spare bedroom.

Then, in June 2023, Bruce filed for divorce. Darlene testified that she learned

of the divorce suit when Bruce called her from his girlfriend’s cellphone. A few

days later, Darlene met Bruce in front of Langlinais Bakery. The parties’ testimony

differs about what was discussed during this meeting. According to Darlene, she

asked Bruce about his intentions for both spousal support and the former marital

residence. As she recalled, Bruce told her that he would continue paying her support

for life and that she should not worry about it. Bruce also said he would give her the

house. Darlene insisted that they put this agreement “on paper,” or she would file

for spousal support. Darlene then asked Bruce if he wanted to hire a lawyer to draft

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the paperwork. Bruce said no. So Darlene said she would take care of it. Bruce

then gave her $1,500.00 in cash to assist with the legal fees.

By contrast, Bruce testified that he and Darlene never discussed spousal

support when they met in front of Langlinais Bakery. He testified that they discussed

the division of their community property. He acknowledged agreeing to give

Darlene his one-half interest in the marital residence. But he emphasized that they

did not discuss spousal support during this meeting.

After that meeting, Darlene hired a lawyer. And her lawyer ultimately drafted

three documents: (1) Joint Motion to Establish Interim and Final Periodic Spousal

Support, (2) Consent Judgment of spousal support, and (3) Act of Donation. The

validity of the donation is not at issue in this appeal.

Once the documents were ready for signing, Darlene telephoned Bruce.

Darlene testified that she asked Bruce to have the documents reviewed by his lawyer.

She recalled telling him that “he can have his lawyer do it,” referring to the

notarization of Bruce’s signature on the original documents, to which he responded

that “he did not need a lawyer[.]” According to Darlene, Bruce did not ask to see

the documents in advance of signing. Nor did he say much of anything about them.

Bruce, on the other hand, admitted that Darlene had informed him that the

documents were ready about one week before they were signed. He also admitted

not asking to see the documents in advance. But Bruce denied that Darlene said

anything to him about having his lawyer review the documents. Yet Bruce admitted

that he could have done so without much effort.

According to Darlene, about four days after notifying Bruce about the

documents, she drove to Dr. Joe Abendroth’s house. Bruce was working there that

morning. Darlene asked Bruce if he would meet her at a notary public’s office later

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that day to sign the documents. Bruce agreed. The notary public was Barbara

Williams. Bruce met Darlene at Ms. Willaims’s office that afternoon. Bruce

testified that when he walked into the notary’s office, the documents were already

on the table, and “the lady” slid the documents to him, asked him to sign, and he

complied.

In contrast, Darlene testified that when she arrived at Ms. Williams’s office,

Bruce was already in the parking lot waiting in his truck. According to Darlene, she

and Bruce walked into Ms. Williams’s office together. Darlene introduced herself

and then introduced Bruce as “my husband.” Next, Darlene told Ms. Williams that

she and Bruce had some legal documents to sign, one about spousal support and the

other about transferring the house to her. Darlene removed the documents from an

envelope, and she handed them to Bruce. Bruce, in turn, reviewed the documents

and ultimately signed them in the presence of Ms. Williams.

Similarly, Ms. Williams testified that Darlene handed the documents to Bruce,

that Bruce reviewed the documents, and that Bruce voluntarily signed the documents

after reviewing them. According to Ms. Williams, Bruce did not ask for assistance

in reviewing the documents. Nor did he express any confusion or a lack of

understanding about what he was reading. Ms. Williams explained that she “would

not have proceeded” if Bruce had expressed that he was confused or could not read.

But this transaction, according to Ms. Williams, appeared as normal as any other.

Turning now to Bruce’s six specific arguments in support of his first

assignment of error.

Bruce’s first argument is that he was not timely advised of the nature of the

Joint Motion to Establish Interim and Final Periodic Spousal Support. Nor was he

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timely advised of the nature of the accompanying Consent Judgment of spousal

support. He argues that this amounts to fraud or ill practice. We disagree.

Very simply, Darlene testified that Bruce verbally agreed to continue paying

her $500.00 each week for the rest of her life. Darlene then insisted that they reduce

this agreement to writing, especially since Bruce was moving forward with the

divorce. Bruce agreed, and he gave her $1,500.00 in cash to hire a lawyer to draft

the legal documents. According to Bruce, Darlene notified him that the documents

were ready seven days before he voluntarily signed them at the notary’s office. He

admitted to knowing the documents carried legal weight and to knowing he could

have reviewed the documents or had a lawyer review them before signing. The

documents are clearly titled and plainly written. And both Darlene and Ms. Williams

testified that Bruce reviewed the documents at the time of signing. Hence, there is

no basis for Bruce’s argument that he was not timely advised of the nature of the

Consent Judgment of spousal support.

Bruce’s second argument is that his limited ability to read and write is also a

basis to set aside the Consent Judgment. In support, Bruce points to his struggle to

read while on the witness stand, to the misspellings in his petition for divorce, and

to his need for Darlene to handle the bills during their marriage.

By contrast, Darlene notes that most of the evidence contradicts Bruce’s claim

of near illiteracy. For example, Bruce admitted graduating from high school. He

even described himself as a good student. Dr. Abendroth also described Bruce as

very intelligent. In addition, numerous text messages to and from Bruce were

admitted into evidence, and these messages demonstrate his ability to read and write.

In Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So.2d 133 (La.1983), the plaintiffs sought to

rescind three acts of donation, which they signed, on the basis that they could not

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read and thought they were signing wills, not donations. In rejecting their argument,

the Louisiana Supreme Court provided the following statement of law:

“[S]ignatures to obligations are not mere ornaments.” Boullt v.
Sarpy, 30 La.Ann. 494 at 495 [(La.1878)]. Additionally, the courts of
our state have long held that “[i]f a party can read, it behooves him to
examine an instrument before signing it; and if he cannot read, it
behooves him to have the instrument read to him and listen attentively
whilst this is being done.” Snell v. Union Sawmill Company, 159 La.
604 at 608, 105 So. 728 at 730 (1925). Bagneris v. Oddo, 2 Pelt. 278
(La.App. 1919) held:

“The presumption is that parties are aware of the contents
of writings to which they have affixed their signatures . . .
The burden of proof is upon them to establish with
reasonable certainty that they have been deceived.” 2 Pelt.
at 285.

Id. at 137.

Like Tweedle, the only evidence of Bruce’s alleged illiteracy is his own

testimony. The record here shows no evidence of deception, whether by fraud, ill

practices, or otherwise. There is simply no merit to this argument.

Bruce’s third argument is that Darlene’s lawyer engaged in fraud or ill

practices by misrepresenting material facts to the trial court. Again, we disagree.

The basis for Bruce’s argument is the introductory language of the parties’

Joint Motion to Establish Interim and Final Periodic Spousal Support. That language

is reproduced as follows:

NOW INTO COURT, comes the plaintiff, Bruce Lloyd, a
person of the full age of majority and domiciled in Lafayette Parish,
State of Louisiana, appearing herein in proper person, who represents
to the Court that after consulting with his attorney or after being
provided with an ample opportunity and time to consult with his
attorney before signing this motion and the accompanying judgment,
and also appearing herein the defendant, Darlene Elaire, a person of the
full age of majority, domiciled in St. Martin Parish, through
undersigned counsel, they jointly move this Honorable court for a
judgment adopting the parties’ agreement, stipulations, and
compromise concerning interim and final periodic support as the
judgment of the Court. [Second emphasis added.]

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Even though the above language speaks for itself, Bruce asserts in his brief

that he “was never provided a copy of this pleading in advance of signing as

represented to the Court” and that he “did not get the benefit of counsel or literate

adult review of the document as represented to the Court[.]” (Emphasis added). Yet

in both instances, the “as represented to the Court” language is troubling because

Darlene’s lawyer never made those representations; the only representations were

those on the face of the joint motion.2 In any event, the record evidence shows that

Bruce was “provided with an ample opportunity and time to consult with his attorney

before signing th[e] motion and the accompanying judgment[.]” Thus, there is no

basis for this argument.

Bruce’s fourth argument is that he and Darlene did not have the requisite

meeting of the minds to create a binding, unmodifiable spousal support obligation.

We again disagree.

The subject of Bruce’s nullity action is the Consent Judgment of spousal

support. The essence of a consent judgment was addressed in M.P.W. v. L.P.W., 13-

366 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/1/13), 136 So.3d 37. There, the first circuit explained:

A consent or a stipulated judgment is a bilateral contract by which the
parties adjust their differences by mutual consent, with each party
balancing his hope of gain against his fear of loss. Its binding force
arises from the voluntary acquiescence of the parties rather than the
adjudication by the court.

Id. at 43–44 (citations omitted).

Here, Darlene testified that Bruce agreed to continue paying her $500.00 each

week—as he has done since 2012—for the remainder of her life. Bruce, in turn,

2
Bruce also argues that Darlene’s lawyer failed to disclose material facts to the trial court.
But again, there is nothing in the record to support this contention, especially considering that the
only statements of fact are those on the face of the joint motion.

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continued paying her this amount after signing the joint motion and accompanying

Consent Judgment, reflecting his understanding and acceptance of their agreement.

But even more to the point, the argument being advanced by Bruce does not

fit under La.Code Civ.P. art. 2004: Bruce is not arguing that the Consent Judgment

of spousal support was obtained through fraud or ill practices; he is arguing that he

signed the judgment in error. In his brief, he claims that he thought he was signing

community property documents, as opposed to a support judgment. If true, this

would be an error of fact. “[A] stipulated judgment (as opposed to other final

judgments rendered against a party without their consent), being a bilateral contract,

may also be annulled pursuant to La. C.C. art.1948 for vices of consent, i.e.: (a) error

of fact or of the principal cause of the agreement[.]” M.P.W., 136 So.3d at 45

(citations omitted).

However, “[e]rror vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without

which the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause was known or

should have been known to the other party.” La.Civ.Code art. 1949. Put another

way, “one party can be mistaken and that mistake will vitiate consent if the other

party knows or should have known.” Peironnet v. Matador Resources Co., 12-2292,

p. 20 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So.3d 791, 807.

In this case, the evidence demonstrates that Bruce understood what he was

signing. But even if Bruce was in error, there is no evidence that Darlene knew or

should have known of his mistake. Hence, his fourth argument is misplaced.

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Bruce’s fifth argument is that the Consent Judgment should be annulled

because the amount of final support exceeds the one-third limitation contained in

La.Civ.Code art. 112.3 This argument is legally flawed.

Unlike interim spousal support, “permanent alimony [now final spousal

support] is not a law enacted for the public interest. Rather, it was enacted to protect

individuals, i.e., not-at-fault divorced spouses in need. Thus, the prohibition found

in article 7 of the Civil Code does not apply.” McAlpine v. McAlpine, 94-1594, p. 16

(La. 9/5/96), 679 So.2d 85, 93.

Additionally, La.Civ.Code art. 116 states that “[t]he obligation of final

spousal support may be modified, waived, or extinguished by judgment of a court of

competent jurisdiction or by authentic act or act under private signature duly

acknowledged by the obligee.” The revision comments to La.Civ.Code art. 116 then

provide: “This Article recognizes that final spousal support is not a matter of public

order about which couples are forbidden to contract under Civil Code Article 7.

Instead, spouses are permitted to contract concerning final spousal support at any

time before or during marriage, or after divorce.”

And here, Darlene and Bruce did just that: they entered into a contract about

the amount and duration of final spousal support. The Consent Judgment reflects

their agreement. The one-third limitation on final spousal support in La.Civ.Code

art. 112(E) has no application to contractual support, which is what we have here.

Simply put, Bruce bargained away his right to have the trial court adjudicate final

spousal support in accordance with Article 112.

3
La.Civ.Code art. 112(E) states in part: “The sum awarded under this Article shall not
exceed one-third of the obligor’s net income.”

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One more thing: the record evidence shows that Bruce has many sources of

income, most of which were begrudgingly disclosed during cross-examination. So

even if the one-third limitation did apply (which it does not), the evidence does not

support Bruce’s argument that the amount of final spousal support ($500.00 per

week) exceeds one-third of his net income.

Bruce’s sixth and final argument is that Darlene’s lawyer committed fraud or

ill practices by violating Rule 4.3 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct.

This argument is problematic for two reasons. First, there is no evidence to support

it. And second, the argument reflects a misunderstanding of Rule 4.3.

La.Rules Prof.Conduct, Rule 4.3 states:

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer
is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in a
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an
unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the
interests of the client.

Thus, Rule 4.3 protects unrepresented persons, like Bruce, from lawyer

overreaching (1) by prohibiting the lawyer from stating or implying

disinterestedness, (2) by imposing a disclosure requirement when the unrepresented

person misunderstands a lawyer’s role, and (3) by limiting the legal advice that can

be given.

In our case, Darlene’s lawyer did not have any communication with Bruce.

The joint motion and accompanying Consent Judgment plainly stated that Darlene

was represented by counsel and that Bruce was not. And at no time did Darlene’s

lawyer give Bruce any legal advice.

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Based on our review of the record, there is no evidence—none—that

Darlene’s lawyer violated La.Rules Prof.Conduct, Rule 4.3. Bruce’s sixth argument

is therefore without merit. 4

In the end, the trial court was presented with two different versions of events:

one from Darlene; the other from Bruce. The trial court observed Darlene and Bruce

as they testified under oath and subject to cross examination. “[O]nly the fact finder

can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on

the listener’s understanding and belief in what is said.” Powell v. Craft, 48,004, p. 5

(La.App. 2 Cir. 6/26/13), 117 So.3d. 298, 301. The trial court ultimately chose to

believe Darlene’s version of events. Her testimony is also supported by other

evidence adduced at trial; Bruce’s testimony is not.

All in all, our review of the record shows that the Consent Judgment of spousal

support was not procured by some improper practice or procedure, that Bruce was

not deprived of a legal right, and that enforcement of the Consent Judgment would

not be unconscionable and inequitable. Hence, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in dismissing Bruce’s nullity action.

II. Attorney Fees

In his second assignment of error, Bruce asserts that the trial court erred by

not awarding him attorney fees under La.Code Civ.P. art. 2004(C), which states:

“The court may award reasonable attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party in

an action to annul a judgment on these grounds.”

4
Also, the cases cited by Bruce—In re: Guilbeau, 09-2202 (La. 3/16/10), 35 So.3d 207;
and In Re: Daniel James Stanford & John Kevin Stockstill, 10-670 (La. 10/19/10), 48 So.3d 224—
have no application to the matter before us. The lawyer in Guilbeau failed to clarify his role after
communicating with the unrepresented party. And the lawyers in Stanford had the victim in a
criminal proceeding sign a confidentiality agreement, causing the victim to believe that she was
barred from testifying at trial.

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Put simply, Bruce’s nullity action was dismissed by the trial court. Because

that judgment is being affirmed in this appeal, Bruce’s second assignment is also

without merit.

III. Frivolous Appeal

In her answer to Bruce’s appeal, Darlene requested damages for a frivolous

appeal under La.Code Civ.P. art. 2164.

In relevant part, La.Code Civ.P. art. 2164 states that the appellate “court may

award damages, including attorney fees, for frivolous appeal or application for writs,

and may tax the costs of the lower or appellate court, or any part thereof, against any

party to the suit, as in its judgment may be considered equitable.”

The fourth circuit addressed this issue in Alexander v. Louisiana State Bd. of

Priv. Investigator Examiners, 19-778 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/1/20), 293 So.3d 1243, writ

denied, 20-1072 (La. 11/10/20), 303 So.3d 1039. In denying the request for

damages, the appellate court explained:

“Appeals are always favored and, unless the appeal is
unquestionably frivolous, damages will not be granted.” Tillmon v.
Thrasher Waterproofing, 00-0395, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/28/01), 786 So.
2d 131, 137. This Court further stated that “[a]n appeal is frivolous if it
does not present a substantial legal question, if the sole purpose of the
appeal is delay, or if the appealing counsel does not seriously believe the
view of the law that he advocates.” Id. However, “[t]his court is reluctant
to grant frivolous appeal damages because of the chilling effect it may
have on the appellate process.” Id.

Damages for a frivolous appeal will be awarded if the appellant is
attempting to delay the action, if the appellant does not believe what he is
advocating, or if the appeal presents no “‘substantial legal question.’”
Hunter v. Maximum Grp. Behavioral Servs., Inc., 10-0930, p. 6 (La. App.
4 Cir. 3/16/11), 61 So. 3d 735, 739 (quoting Tillmon, 00-0395, p. 8, 786
So. 2d at 137). “Damages for frivolous appeal are properly awarded only
when the proposition advocated is so ridiculous or so opposed to rational
thinking that it is evident beyond any doubt that it is being deliberately
professed for ulterior purposes.” Bottle Poetry, LLC v. Doyle Rest. Grp.
Co., LLC, 13-0406, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/15/14), 133 So. 3d 60, 67.

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Id. at 1256–57.

Indeed, “[t]he slightest justification for an appeal precludes damages for a

frivolous appeal.” Collins v. Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System,

Inc., 19-0577, p. 11 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/21/20), 298 So.3d 191, 198, writ denied, 20-

480 (La. 6/22/20), 297 So.3d 773.

In our view, Bruce’s appeal is not unquestionably frivolous. There is no

evidence that Bruce filed this appeal in bad faith or for delay purposes. Darlene’s

request for damages is therefore denied.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s judgment of May 31, 2023, is affirmed. The costs of this

appeal are assessed to Plaintiff, Bruce Lloyd.

AFFIRMED.

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