Jason Vidrine v. United Fire and Casualty Company, Alfred Milton, Jr., and Acadiana Lighting & Signs, LLC

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CM 25-51

JASON VIDRINE

VERSUS

ACADIANA LIGHTING & SIGNS, LLC,
ALFRED MILTON, JR., AND
UNITED FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20220079
HONORABLE MICHELLE M. BREAUX, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION

JUDGE

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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Jonathan W. Perry, and Clayton Davis,
Judges.

MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED.

Kraig Thomas Strenge
P. O. Box 52292
Lafayette, LA 70505-2292
(337) 261-9722
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPLICANT:
United Fire & Casualty Company
Alfred Milton, Jr.
Acadiana Lighting & Signs, LLC

Scott F. Higgins
LaBorde Earles
P. O. Box 80098
Lafayette, LA 70598
(337) 261-2617
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT:
Jason Vidrine

GREMILLION, Judge.

This matter comes before this court on the motion of Defendants, Acadiana

Lighting & Signs, LLC, Alfred Milton, Jr., and United Fire and Casualty Company,

to dismiss as untimely an application for supervisory writs filed by Plaintiff, Jason

Vidrine. For the following reasons, the motion is denied.

In dispute is the date of the “ruling at issue” under Rule 4–3 of the Uniform

Rules of the Courts of Appeal for the purpose of calculating the thirty-day period

for applying for supervisory writs. Parties have thirty days from the date of a trial

court’s ruling to file a writ application with the appellate court. Uniform Rules—

Courts of Appeal, Rule 4–3. “There is no requirement that an interlocutory

judgment be in writing so long as it is entered in the minutes of the court.” Owens

v. Jackson, 550 So.2d 359, 363 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989). However, where a written

judgment is “clearly contemplated at all times by the trial court and all parties, the

date of the ‘ruling at issue’ for purposes of Rule 4–3” is the date of the signing of

the judgment. Kosmitis v. Bailey, 96-573, p.1 (La. 10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1167, 1168.

The delay for seeking writs under Rule 4–3 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of

Appeal commences from the date of notice of the written judgment where one is

clearly contemplated. Glob. Mktg. Sols., L.L.C. v. Blue Mill Farms, Inc., 19-1402

(La. 1/28/20), 288 So.3d 124. A party under a court order to prepare a judgment

cannot reasonably be expected to seek review before the judgment is actually

prepared. Kosmitis, 680 So.2d 1167.

On November 12, 2024, the trial court ruled, in open court, denying

Plaintiff’s motion in limine regarding evidence of the force of the impact in the

underlying auto accident case. Defendants assert that the running of the time to

seek supervisory writs from that decision began the day of the oral ruling.

However, the transcript of the hearing clearly indicates that the trial court

contemplated a written ruling being prepared in the matter. The trial court

specifically asked the parties “who is going to prepare either the Judgment or

Judgments?” When Plaintiff’s counsel indicated he would, the trial court answered

(emphasis ours): “Please circulate for signature, submit to me for signing.”1 A

written judgment in accordance with that order was submitted December 5, 2024,

and that judgment signed the following day, December 6, 2024. Plaintiff filed his

notice of intent to seek supervisory writs on December 16, 2024, well within thirty

days of the signing of the judgment at issue. Whatever the merits of the

application may ultimately be, it was timely filed. Accordingly, the motion to

dismiss the application is hereby denied. 2

MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules―Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

1
Defendants assert that this language is not an order by the court to submit the written
judgment, but rather the trial court leaving the matter “up to the parties.” A plain reading of the
discussion indicates that assertion is devoid of merit.
2
Along with their motion to dismiss the application, Defendants also assert an opposition
to Plaintiff’s motion for an extension filed January 6, 2025, claiming it was also untimely.
However, as noted above, Plaintiff had thirty days from December 6, 2024, to file for an
extension under Rule 4–3 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal. As January 5, 2025,
thirty days from that date, was a Sunday, the motion for extension was timely filed the next day.
Moreover, said motion for extension was already properly granted by this court January 6, 2025,
the same day it was filed.

2