May Yen v. Avoyelles Parish Police Jury

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

03-603

MAY YEN, ET AL.

VERSUS

AVOYELLES PARISH POLICE JURY, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 2002-4312-A
HONORABLE MARK A. JEANSONNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Glenn B. Gremillion, and Elizabeth A.
Pickett, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John Albert Ellis
Monique Freeman Rauls
Louisiana Department of Justice
Division of Risk Litigation
P. O. Box 1710
Alexandria, LA 71309
Telephone: (318) 487-5944
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Applicant - State of Louisiana through the Department
of Public Safety
Karen H. Freese

Jeffrey Allen Mitchell
Darryl M. Phillips
1580 LL&E Tower
909 Poydras Street
New Orleans, LA 70112
Telephone: (504) 588-1580
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiffs/Respondents - May Yen, As Legal and Natural Tutrix of
Her Minor Children, Lainee Yen and Elijah Yen and Chantell
Moten, As Legal and Natural Tutrix of Her Minor Children, Lenard
Moten and Lentrell Moten

THIBODEAUX, Judge.

This case involves a medical malpractice claim filed against the State of

Louisiana by the heirs of a state prisoner. The state prisoner died from a sickle cell

crisis while incarcerated. His statutory heirs, the plaintiffs, allege the failure of the

State to respond appropriately to his crisis. The plaintiffs did not go through a

medical review panel. The State argues that the plaintiffs were required to go through

a medical review panel because the exemption for a state prisoner under La.R.S.

40:1299.39.1(A)(1) only applies if the prisoner brought the suit. The trial court ruled

against the State and dismissed its exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and

prematurity. We agree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

ISSUE

We must decide whether the heirs of a deceased state prisoner are exempted

under La.R.S. 40:1299.39.1(A)(1) from going through a medical review panel before

bringing suit.

II.

FACTS

Mr. Leonard Robinson was a state prisoner incarcerated at the Avoyelles

Correctional Center, a state facility under the Department of Public Safety and

Corrections. Mr. Robinson died in state custody due to illness caused by sickle cell

anemia. During his incarceration, Mr. Robinson did not file a claim against the state

facility alleging medical malpractice. After his death, plaintiffs, the heirs of Mr.

Robinson, filed a wrongful death and survival action. The suit alleged that the State

committed medical malpractice and, thus, caused Mr. Robinson’s death. The State

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excepted to the suit on the basis of prematurity and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The district court denied the exceptions. Thereafter, this appeal was filed.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In this case we are called on to interpret a provision of the Medical

Liability for State Services Act (MLSSA). “The interpretation of a statute . . . is a

question of law which mandates a de novo review.” Comeaux v. City of Crowley, 00-

928, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/00), 773 So.2d 899, 901-02, affirmed, 01-0032 (La.

7/3/01), 793 So.2d 1215.

Section 12:99.39.1(A)(1) of MLSSA provides in pertinent part:

A. (1) All malpractice claims against the state, its
agencies, or other persons covered by this Part,
other than claims wherein the patients are
prisoners and claims compromised or settled by the
claimant and the division of administration with the
concurrence of designated legal counsel for the state,
shall be reviewed by a state medical review panel
established as provided in this Section, to be
administered by the commissioner of administration,
hereinafter referred to as commissioner.

(Emphasis added).

The State argues that the phrase “other than claims wherein the patients

are prisoners” should be interpreted to mean that only claims brought by the prisoner

himself are exempt from going through a medical review panel before bringing suit.

The State argues that, in cases where prisoners are patients, the rationale is one of

avoiding redundance. An administrative procedure not available to private

unincarcerated persons is available to state prisoners and, thus, the administrative

guard on frivolous claims is already in place for prisoners.

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The State points to § 1299.39(E)(1) to support this argument. Section

(E)(1) provides:

Unless the medical malpractice claim is first
compromised and settled in accordance with Subsection H
of this Section or unless the state, through the concurrence
of the office of risk management and the legal counsel
representing the state against such claim, waive the medical
review panel procedure, all medical malpractice claims by
their patients or their representatives arising from the
right created and granted by Subsections C and D of this
Section shall be submitted to administrative review in
accordance with this Subsection before such right in
individual claims can become sufficiently existent to be
susceptible of judicial recognition or adjudication. The
medical malpractice claims of prisoners arising under
this Part shall be submitted to correctional administrative
review procedures established for administrative hearings
in the correctional environment or established in
accordance with express law, including R.S. 15:1171 et
seq., R.S. 49:964, and the administrative rules and
regulations pertaining thereto. All other medical
malpractice claims arising under this Part shall be
submitted to a medical review panel in accordance with
R.S. 40:1299.39.1.

(Emphasis added).

The State contends that the first part of this provision refers to claims of patients and

their representatives while the second part of the provision mentions only claims of

prisoners and not representatives. The State then infers that, because of the omission

of “representatives” from the second part, which requires submission to a Corrections

Administrative Review Procedure (CARP) as required by La.R.S. 15:1177,1 rather

than a medical review panel, representatives must use the medical review panel. The

State concludes that the plain language of the statute does not exempt representatives

from the medical review panel process, notwithstanding the term being clearly defined

in the statute, but in fact exempts only prisoners.

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CARP was declared unconstitutional by Pope v. State, 99-2559 (La. 6/29/01), 792 So.2d
713.

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A statute that grants immunities or advantages to a special class in

derogation of general rights available to tort victims must be strictly construed against

limiting the tort claimants' rights against the wrongdoer. Touchard v. Williams, 617

So.2d 885 (La.1993); Galloway v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 602 So.2d 1003

(La.1992). Because both the Public and Private Medical Malpractice Acts limit the

liability of health care providers in derogation of the general rights of tort victims, any

ambiguities in these Acts should be strictly construed against coverage. See Lange v.

Earl K. Long Med. Ctr., 97-1661 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1195, writ

denied, 98-2061 (La. 11/13/98), 730 So.2d 935; Kelty v. Brumfield, 93-1142 (La.

2/25/94), 633 So.2d 1210. Thus, La.R.S. 40:1299.39.1(A)(1) cannot be interpreted

to expand and extend the requirements for submission to a medical review panel when

the specific wording of the statute does not provide for coverage.

“When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead

to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further

interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” La.Civ.Code

art. 9. “[O]ther than claims wherein the patients are prisoners” is the phrase in dispute

in this case. A clear interpretation of this phrase is that claims, where the patient is a

prisoner, are exempted from going through a medical review panel. The statute does

not make any reference to a situation where the claimant or plaintiff is a prisoner. It

refers specifically to “claims” wherein the patients are prisoners.

In addition, the definition of “patient” in the statute helps in interpreting

this provision. “Patient” is defined in § 1299.39(A)(3) as follows:

"Patient" means a natural person who receives, or
should have received, health care from a person covered by
this Part and any other natural person or persons who
would or may have a claim or claims for damages under
applicable law arising out of, or directly related to, the
claim or claims of the natural person who receives, or

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should have received, health care from a person covered by
this Part.

This definition of “patient” includes claims by persons other than the person who

received health care. Thus, the phrase “other than claims wherein patients are

prisoners” would exclude claims by patients who are prisoners and claims of a person

that arose from the claim of the prison patient.

In this case, the wording of the statute is clear and unambiguous and no

further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. Further

speculation of the intent of the legislature by the State was unnecessary. The statute

excludes claims where the patient is a prisoner and claims by persons other than the

prisoner himself. To hold otherwise would place us in the anomalous position that,

if a prisoner survived, the claims would not have to be submitted to a panel; however,

if the prisoner died, as in this case, his heirs’ procedural hurdles become more

onerous. The heirs of the prisoner in this case should not be required to go through

a medical review panel when the specific wording of the statute excludes them from

this process.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are

assessed to appellant.

AFFIRMED.

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