Roger Walker v. Benjamin Howell

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CW 04-246

ROGER WALKER

VERSUS

BENJAMIN HOWELL

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 214,831
HONORABLE WILLIAM ROSS FOOTE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Billie Colombaro Woodard, Marc T. Amy, and Billy Howard
Ezell, Judges.

WRIT DENIED.
Amy, J., concurs and assigns additional reasons

Gregory Engelsman W. Jay Luneau
Bolen, Parker & Brenner Luneau Law Office
Post Office Box 11590 1239 Jackson Street
Alexandria, LA 71315-1590 Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 445-8236 (318) 767-1161
Counsel for: Plaintiff/Respondent Counsel for: Defendant/Applicant
Roger Walker Benjamin Howell

Thomas D. Davenport, Jr.
Attorney at Law
1239 Jackson St.
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 767-1161
Counsel for: Defendant/Applicant
Benjamin Howell

WOODARD, Judge.

Mr. Walker asks this court to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction to overturn
the trial court’s denial of his exceptions of res judicata and no right of action. We
deny the writ.

*****

These proceedings originated when Mr. Roger Walker sued Mr. Benjamin
Howell in Justice of the Peace Court. Mr. Walker orally contracted with Mr. Howell
to make certain improvements to Mr. Howell’s mobile home, including building a
porch, adding a room, and re-roofing it. Mr. Walker claimed that Mr. Howell did not
pay him in full for the work he performed. Accordingly, he sued him for $2,920.00.
Mr. Howell defended the suit, asserting that “a large amount of the work already done
by plaintiff will have to be redone by another contractor due to poor workmanship and
failure to perform up to standards, specifications, satisfaction, and code,” but did not
reconvene. The Justice of the Peace Court rendered judgment in Mr. Walker’s favor
for this amount. Mr. Howell appealed the judgment to Ninth Judicial District Court
and, for the first time, asserted a reconventional demand, requesting $5,500.00, in
additional costs he alleged he had incurred because of Mr. Walker’s failure to abide
by the original agreement.
Mr. Walker filed peremptory exceptions of no right of action and res judicata,
concerning Mr. Howell’s reconventional demand. The trial court denied the
exceptions, and Mr. Walker asks this court to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction to
overturn that ruling.
Thus, we are concerned, only, with whether Mr. Howell may assert, for the first
time, a reconventional demand on appeal to the district court.

*****

J USTICE OF THE P EACE C OURT J URISDICTION
Justice of the Peace Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.1 Written pleadings

1
La.Code Civ.P. art. 4911.

1

are not required, and the amount in dispute cannot exceed three thousand dollars.2 A
party may appeal a judgment a Justice of the Peace Court renders but must do so in
the Parish Court.3 If, as in the instant case, there is no Parish Court, the party must
appeal in the district court in the parish.4 The district court’s judgment is final, and
the parties may not appeal it further.5 However, we may exercise supervisory
jurisdiction over the district court’s rulings.6
As far as practicable, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure’s provisions govern
proceedings in Justice of the Peace courts.7 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article
1061(B) states:

The defendant in the principal action . . . shall assert in a
reconventional demand all causes of action that he may have against the
plaintiff that arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the principal action.

Furthermore, La.Code Civ.P. art. 425(A) provides: “A party shall assert all
causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the litigation.”
Accordingly, Mr. Walker argues that Mr. Howell may not assert a
reconventional demand in the district court because he failed to reconvene in the
Justice of the Peace Court.
Both Articles 425 and 1061 prevent claim-splitting. In other words, they direct
a party to assert all causes of action that arise from the same subject matter in one suit
rather than bringing multiple lawsuits on each claim. However, in the instant case,
Mr. Howell is not attempting to raise a new cause of action in a separate lawsuit.
Rather, he is asserting a new cause of action on appeal in the same lawsuit.
Furthermore, the flaw in Mr. Walker’s argument is apparent when we examine

2
La.Code Civ.P. art. 4917(A); La.Code Civ.P. art. 4911(A).
3
La.Code Civ.P. art. 4924(A).
4
Id.
5
La.Code Civ.P. art. 4924(C).
6
La.Code Civ.P. art. 4924(D).
7
La.Code Civ.P. art. 4831.

2

the procedural mechanisms he attempts to use to prevent Mr. Howell from asserting
his reconventional demand on appeal to the district court; namely, exceptions of res
judicata and no right of action.

E XCEPTION OF R ES J UDICATA
Res judicata is an issue and claim preclusion device which prohibits relitigation
of matters which were litigated or could have been litigated in a prior suit.8 Louisiana
Revised Statute 13:4231 enumerates the specific circumstances under which a valid
and final judgment will preclude a party from raising a claim or issue in a subsequent
proceeding. However, La.R.S. 13:4231 explicitly states that res judicata does not
apply “on appeal or other direct review[.]” 9 Thus, the district court may not apply res
judicata to the Justice of the Peace Court’s judgment in the instant case because it is
the same judgment that the district court is reviewing on appeal.
Moreover, La.Code Civ.P. arts. 1061 and 425 operate in tandem with the res
judicata rules. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1061’s comments reference
res judiciata, and the legislature amended La.Code Civ.P. art. 425 in 1990 to its
current form to reflect changes it made, simultaneously, in the res judicata rules.10
Thus, we must read them in para materia. Accordingly, an exception of res judicata
is the proper procedural vehicle to enforce the articles’ mandates by barring claims
that were or could have been litigated in a previous lawsuit. Again, however, res
judicata cannot apply to bar Mr. Howell’s reconventional demand because
proceedings in the Justice of Peace Court do not constitute a previous suit in the
district court; rather it is a direct appeal of the same suit.
We recognize that, unless the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise,
courts of appeal, generally, will not review a claim or issue unless the party raised it
in the trial court. However, this practice is predicated on Uniform Rules, Courts of
Appeal, Rule 1-3. Obviously, the rule is inapplicable to Justice of the Peace Courts.
In fact, we find no rule or jurisprudence which addresses the district court’s discretion
to review a claim or issue not raised in the Justice of the Peace Court. Accordingly,
Mr. Howell may assert his reconventional demand in the district court proceedings,
as we find no procedural mechanism in our law which prevents him from doing so.

Williams v. City of Marksville, 02-1130 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d
8

1129. See also La.Code Civ.P. art. 425.
9
La.R.S. 13:4231.
10
La.Code Civ.P. art. 425 (cmt. 1990).

3

E XCEPTION OF N O R IGHT OF A CTION
Mr. Walker also appeals the trial court’s denial of this exception. However, the
transcript reveals that he made no independent argument concerning the no right of
action exception; rather, he based it, solely, on his res judicata theory. Thus, our
previous finding pretermits a need to discuss this issue.

CONCLUSION
Finding no procedural mechanism which will provide Mr. Walker with the
relief he seeks, we deny the writ. The trial court properly denied Mr. Walker’s
exceptions of res judicata and no right of action. Mr. Howell may file his
reconventional demand in the district court proceedings. We assess the costs of this
appeal to Mr. Walker.

WRIT DENIED.

4

NUMBER CW04-246

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ROGER WALKER

VERSUS

BENJAMIN HOWELL

AMY, J., concurring and assigning additional reasons.

I subscribe to the majority opinion as I agree that principles of res judicata do

not preclude the defendant’s assertion of the reconventional demand for the first time

before the district court. I write separately to point out that, additionally, an appeal

from the judgment of a justice of the peace court proceeds to the district court for a

trial de novo. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 4924(B). In my opinion, this procedure in the

context of a justice of the peace court judgment indicates that new claims may be

brought in the district court. In fact, Section B further explains that the trial de novo

“is not subject to the jurisdictional limit of the justice of the peace court.” Certainly

a provision that additional damages may be sought must provide an opposing party

with the opportunity to defend against such a claim and would anticipate the

advancement of arguments and evidence previously unnecessary. Furthermore, to

require that the parties are limited to claims brought before the justice of the peace

court is problematic in that such courts do not maintain records and related transcripts

which are suitable for a review on the record as is necessary in the appeal of district

court judgments. For these reasons, I find no error in the trial court’s ruling.