Tensas Poppadoc, Inc. v. Chevron USA, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-1266

TENSAS POPPADOC, INC.

VERSUS

CHEVRON USA, INC., ET AL

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WRIT OF MANDAMUS FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CONCORDIA, NO. 40,769
HONORABLE LEO BOOTHE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ON REMAND FROM THE
LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

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J. DAVID PAINTER
JUDGE

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Court composed of Michael G. Sullivan, Billy Howard Ezell, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY.

John A. Jeansonne, Jr.
Donovan J. O’Pry, II
200 West Congress Street, Suite 100
Post Office Box 91530
Lafayette, Louisiana 70509-1530
Telephone: (337) 237-4370
Facsimile: (337) 235-2011
Counsel for Applicants:
McGowan Working Partners, Inc., Spokane Oil & Gas, L.L.C., and
Sunset Oil and Gas, L.L.C.

The Honorable Leo Boothe
Judge, Division B
4001 Carter Street, Suite 5
Vidalia, LA 71373
Respondent

Donald T. Carmouche
Victor L. Marcello
John H. Carmouche
William R. Coenen, III
John S. DuPont, III
Brian T. Carmouche
Post Office Box 759
Gonzales, LA 70707-0759
Counsel for Respondent:
Tensas Poppadoc, Inc.

Jerold Edward Knoll
P.O. Box 426
Marksville, LA 71351
Counsel for Respondent:
Tensas Poppadoc, Inc.

James E. Paxton
P.O. Box 97
St. Joseph, LA 71366
Counsel for Respondent:
Tensas Poppadoc, Inc.

Wade N. Kelly
P.O. Box 2065
Lake Charles, LA 70602-2065
Counsel for Respondent:
Tensas Poppadoc, Inc.

F. John Reeks, Jr.
Sarah A. Kirkpatrick
Stephen E. Fortson
10th Floor, Louisiana Tower
401 Edwards Street
Shreveport, LA 71101
Counsel for Applicants:
Merit Energy Company, L.P., Merit Management Partners I,
L.P., Merit Energy Partners III, L.P., Merit Energy Partners
D-III, L.P., and Devon Energy Production Company, L.P.

Albert M Hand, Jr.
333 Texas St., Ste. 1700
Shreveport , LA 71101
Counsel for Applicants:
Merit Energy Company, L.P., Merit Management Partners I,
L.P., Merit Energy Partners III, L.P., Merit Energy Partners
D-III, L.P., and Devon Energy Production Company, L.P.

Patrick A. Talley, Jr.
Michael R. Phillips
Louis M. Grossman
3600 Energy Centre
1100 Poydras St.
New Orleans, LA 70163
Counsel for Respondents:
Chevron U,S.A., Inc

D. Russell Holwadel
601 Poydras Street, Suite 2490
New Orleans, LA 70130
Counsel for Applicants:
Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., LSJ Exploration, L.L.C., and Oil & Ale LSJ,
L.L.C.

PAINTER, Judge.

This case is before us again on remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Defendants-Applicants, McGowan Working Partners, Inc., Spokane Oil & Gas,

L.L.C., Sunset Oil and Gas L.L.C., Merit Energy Company, L.P., Merit Management

Partners I, L.P., Merit Energy Partners III, L.P., Merit Energy Partners D-III, L.P.,

Devon Energy Production Company, L.P., Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., LSJ

Exploration, L.L.C., and Oil & Ale LSJ, L.L.C. (the non-Chevron Defendants), seek

a writ of mandamus ordering the Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia,

the Honorable Leo Boothe, presiding, to sign a final judgment in accordance with the

jury’s verdict in this matter.

FACTS

This case arises from a suit for property damages allegedly arising from oil and

gas operations on the property of Plaintiff, Tensas Poppadoc, Inc. The matter was

tried, and the jury rendered a verdict on June 3, 2008. The jury’s verdict found that

Chevron breached its surface lease and awarded Plaintiff damages in the amount of

one million dollars for remediation. The jury further found no liability for remediation

on the part of any of the non-Chevron Defendants, including Applicants herein.

On June 15, 2008, Chevron submitted a partial judgment for the trial court’s

consideration. On June 16, 2008, Plaintiff submitted a proposed order to the trial

court. On June 25, 2008, Plaintiff submitted an additional order.

On July 31, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on the form of the judgment.

At the hearing, the court ordered that all parties submit a proposed judgment for

consideration. On August 1, 2008, the non-Chevron Defendants submitted a judgment

to the trial court. On September 10, 2008, the trial court signed an order, which does

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not dismiss the non-Chevron defendants. Pursuant La.R.S. 30:29, the order sent the

matter to the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LDNR) for consideration

of remediation plans. The order also stated that the trial court retained jurisdiction

pending approval and completion of an approved remediation plan. Finally, the order

set forth that it did not constitute a final judgment.

Applicants filed a notice of intent to seek a writ of mandamus on September

10, 2008, and the trial court set a return date of October 31, 2008. Applicants filed

an additional notice of intent to seek a writ of mandamus on October 6, 2008, after

the order was signed. An application for writ of mandamus was thereafter filed with

this court. This court denied the application, and Applicants filed an application for

supervisory or remedial writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which granted the writ

and remanded the matter to this court for briefing, argument, and opinion.

DISCUSSION

Applicants assert that because they were relieved of responsibility by the jury

verdict, they are entitled to a judgment dismissing the claims against them, pursuant

to La.Code Civ.P. art 1916. Respondents assert that La.R.S. 30:29 requires that the

matter be sent to the LDNR before any judgment is rendered and that only after a

remediation plan is approved by the LDNR may the trial court render a judgment.

Specifically, Respondents cite La.R.S. 30:29(C), which provides that:

(1) If at any time during the proceeding a party admits liability for
environmental damage or the finder of fact determines that
environmental damage exists and determines the party or parties who
caused the damage or who are otherwise legally responsible therefor, the
court shall order the party or parties who admit responsibility or whom
the court finds legally responsible for the damage to develop a plan or
submittal for the evaluation or remediation to applicable standards of the
contamination that resulted in the environmental damage. The court
shall order that the plan be developed and submitted to the department
and the court within a time that the court determines is reasonable and

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shall allow the plaintiff or any other party at least thirty days from the
date each plan or submittal was made to the department and the court to
review the plan or submittal and provide to the department and the court
a plan, comment, or input in response thereto. The department shall
consider any plan, comment, or response provided timely by any party.
The department shall submit to the court a schedule of estimated costs
for review of the plans or submittals of the parties by the department and
the court shall require the party admitting responsibility or the party
found legally responsible by the court to deposit in the registry of the
court sufficient funds to pay the cost of the department’s review of the
plans or submittals. Any plan or submittal shall include an estimation
of cost to implement the plan.

(2) Within sixty days from the last day on which any party may
provide the department with a plan, comment, or response to a plan as
provided in Paragraph (C)(1) of this Section, the department shall
conduct a public hearing on the plan or plans submitted. Within sixty
days of the conclusion of the hearing, the department shall approve or
structure a plan based on the evidence submitted which the department
determines to be the most feasible plan to evaluate or remediate the
environmental damage and protect the health, safety, and welfare of the
people. The department shall issue written reasons for the plan it
approves or structures. On motion of the department, for good cause
shown, the court may grant the department additional time, not to
exceed sixty days, within which to either conduct the hearing or approve
a plan with reasons.

(3) The department shall use and apply the applicable standards
in approving or structuring a plan that the department determines to be
the most feasible plan to evaluate or remediate the environmental
damage.

(4) The plan approved by the department for submission to the
court shall not be considered to be an adjudication subject to appellate
review pursuant to R.S. 49:964 or R.S. 30:12.

(5) The court shall adopt the plan approved by the department,
unless a party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that another
plan is a more feasible plan to adequately protect the environment and
the public health, safety, and welfare. The court shall enter a judgment
adopting a plan with written reasons assigned. Upon adoption of a plan,
the court shall order the party or parties admitting responsibility or the
party or parties found legally responsible by the court to fund the
implementation of the plan.

(6)(a) Any judgment adopting a plan of evaluation or remediation
pursuant to this Section and ordering the party or parties admitting
responsibility or the party or parties found legally responsible by the

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court to deposit funds for the implementation thereof into the registry of
the court pursuant to this Section shall be considered a final judgment
pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure Article 2081 et seq., for
purposes of appeal.

(b) Any appeal under this Section shall be a de novo review and
shall be heard with preference and on an expedited basis.

(c) The appellate court may affirm the trial court’s adoption of a
plan or may adopt a feasible plan in conformity with this Section and
shall issue written reasons for its decision.

After a careful review of this statute, we cannot say that it demonstrates an

intention on the part of the legislature to deny a final judgment to parties absolved of

fault by the trial court. Therefore, we must consider the act in light of the well-

established rules of statutory interpretation.

The function of statutory interpretation and the construction given
to legislative acts rests with the judicial branch of the government.
Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 95-2895 (La.5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184,
186. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and
enforce the intent of the Legislature. Succession of Boyter, 99-0761
(La.1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122, 1128; State v. Piazza, 596 So.2d 817, 819
(La.1992). Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and,
thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the
legislative intent. Boyter, 756 So.2d at 1128; Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City
of New Orleans through Dep’t of Fin., 98-0601 (La.10/20/98), 720
So.2d 1186, 1198. We have often noted the paramount consideration in
statutory interpretation is ascertainment of the legislative intent and the
reason or reasons which prompted the Legislature to enact the law.
State v. Johnson, 03-2993 (La.10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568, 575; Theriot,
694 So.2d at 186.

The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the
language of the statute itself. Johnson, 884 So.2d at 575; Theriot, 694
So.2d at 186. “When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application
does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written
and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislature.” La. Civ.Code. art. 9; Johnson, 884 So.2d at 575. However,
“when the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it
must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the
purpose of the law.” La. Civ.Code art. 10; Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine
Water Dist., 02-0439 (La.1/14/03), 836 So.2d 14, 20. Moreover, “when
the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by

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examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a
whole.” La. Civ.Code art. 12.

It is also well established that the Legislature is presumed to enact
each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing
laws on the same subject. Johnson, 884 So.2d at 576; State v. Campbell,
03-3035 (La.7/6/04), 877 So.2d 112, 117. Thus, legislative language
will be interpreted on the assumption the Legislature was aware of
existing statutes, well established principles of statutory construction
and with knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in view.
Johnson, 884 So.2d at 576-77; Campbell, 877 So.2d at 117. It is equally
well settled under our rules of statutory construction, where it is
possible, courts have a duty in the interpretation of a statute to adopt a
construction which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions
dealing with the same subject matter. La. Civ.Code art. 13; City of New
Orleans v. Louisiana Assessors’ Retirement and Relief Fund, 05-2548,
986 So.2d 1 (La.10/1/07).

M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, pp. 12-14 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d

16, 26-27.
As this court stated in a previous appeal of this matter, Tensas Poppadoc, Inc.

v. Chevron, Inc., 07-927 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/21/08), 984 So.2d 223, La.R.S. 30:29 was

enacted as a response to a concern that under the law that existed prior to its

enactment “private landowners may or may not use the money from the judgment to

restore land” because the law “did not implement a procedure to ensure that the

landowners will in fact use the money to clean the property.” Id. at 226, quoting

Corbello v. Iowa Production, 02-826, (La. 2/25/03), 850 So.2d 686, 699. Louisiana

Revised Statute 30:29 “sets forth procedures to be followed in oilfield remediation

cases to insure that the funds awarded by the courts for damages to property will in

fact be used to remediate the subject property.” Id. However, as this court further

stated: “[La.R.S. 30:29] contains no language that suggest[s] that the legislature

intended to change the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to oilfield contamination

cases.” Id. at 225 (second alteration in original).

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Therefore, we find no reason to conclude that the Legislature did not intend

La.Code Proc. art. 1916(A) to apply to cases to which La.R.S. 30:29 applies:

After a trial by jury, the court shall prepare and sign a judgment
in accordance with the verdict of the jury within ten days of the
rendition of the verdict, or the court may order counsel for a party in the
case to prepare and submit a judgment to the court for signature within
ten days of the rendition of the verdict, in accordance with the rules for
Louisiana district courts.

Respondents assert that the interest of judicial economy requires that all parties

remain in the matter while the LDNR considers remediation plans and that all issues

be appealed in one proceeding. To the contrary, we find that the interest of judicial

economy is not harmed by rendering a partial final judgment as to parties found not

to be responsible. In this way, any appeal with regard to their responsibility can be

had before the LDNR proceedings, so that all responsible parties may be ordered to

prepare remediation plans.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the writ of mandamus sought by Applicants is granted and made

peremptory. The trial court is ordered to prepare and sign partial final judgment with

regard to Applicants in accordance with jury’s verdict in this matter.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY.

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