Deanna Montgomery v. Stephen Pellessier

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-945

DEANNA MONTGOMERY

VERSUS

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET
AL.

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ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY WRITS FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 13-0027
HONORABLE EDWARD B. BROUSSARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of, Sylvia R. Cooks, Shannon J. Gremillion, and D. Kent Savoie,
Judges.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY.

Jason E. Fontenot
Attorney at Law
Post Office Drawer 52307
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 234-7355
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT:
Deanna Montgomery

Max Michael Menard
Attorney at Law
200 Church Street
P.O. Box 1196
Youngsville, LA 70592
(337) 857-6123
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT:
Deanna Montgomery

L. Bianca Chretien
Leah V. Guilbeau & Associates
Caffery Plaza, Suite 100
4023 Ambassador Caffery Parkway
Lafayettte, LA 70503
(337) 988-7240
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPLICANTS:
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Stephen Pellessier

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GREMILLION, Judge.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) and Stephen

Pellessier (Pellessier) seek writs from the grant of Deanna Montgomery’s

(Montgomery) motion for partial summary judgment on medical causation by the

trial court. For the following reasons, we grant the writ and make it peremptory.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Montgomery was involved in three automobile accidents in 2012. The first,

which is the subject of the instant litigation, occurred on January 6, 2012, when the

vehicle being driven by Pellessier rear-ended a vehicle being driven by Steve Wiltz

(Wiltz), which was stopped at a red light, and caused the Wiltz vehicle to collide

with Montgomery’s vehicle.

One week later, on January 13, 2012, Montgomery’s vehicle was side-swiped

by another vehicle. Six months later, on July 7, 2012, Montgomery’s vehicle was

hit by another vehicle, which caused her vehicle to hit a curb.

On July 24, 2013, Montgomery underwent a lumbar fusion at L3-4 and L4-5,

with a left ulnar nerve compression, performed by Dr. Louis Blanda. Dr. Blanda

performed a cervical fusion at C5-6 on Montgomery on October 12, 2015.

Montgomery alleges that both surgeries were necessitated by injuries received in the

first accident.

Montgomery filed suit against Pellessier and his insurer, State Farm. It is

unknown if there is any other litigation arising out of the three accidents. Liability

for the subject accident is not disputed. Montgomery filed a motion for partial

summary judgment on the issue of medical causation,1 which came for hearing on

October 29, 2018, and was granted. A judgment was signed on November 19, 2018.

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Montgomery introduced the following documents in support of her motion: (1) excerpts
of Montgomery’s deposition taken on May 19, 2015; (2) Dr. Blanda’s affidavit dated August 10,

State Farm timely filed a notice of intent to apply for supervisory writs, and

its writ application was timely filed in accordance with the return date set by the trial

court. Montgomery filed a brief in opposition to the writ application. Proceedings

in the trial court are stayed pending the outcome of this writ application.

SUPERVISORY RELIEF

Montgomery argues that this matter is not properly before this court on a writ

application because it is a partial judgment under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B) from

which State Farm will have an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal after a final

judgment is rendered.

It is true that we often deny writ applications involving the granting of partial

summary judgments and recommend remanding those cases to the trial court when

there is an adequate remedy through an ordinary appeal, either by obtaining a

designation that the partial summary judgment is a final judgment under La.Code

Civ.P. art. 1915(B)(1) for express reasons given or by an appeal following the

complete adjudication of the case.2 See Spears v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 14-1191

(La.App. 3 Cir. 4/1/15), 160 So.3d 631, writ denied, 15-872 (La. 6/19/15), 172 So.3d

653.

2018, with exhibits; (3) the affidavit of Dr. Ilyas Munshi dated September 6, 2018, with exhibits;
(4) certified medical records from Lafayette General Medical Center; (5) petition for damages; and
(6) answer to petition. Montgomery also introduced the report of Dr. Neil Romero, who was hired
by State Farm to conduct a records-only review IME.

In opposition to the motion, State Farm submitted the following documents: (1) certified
medical records form Lafayette General Hospital; (2) certified excerpts from the medical records
from Dr. Robert Franklin; and (3) certified excerpts from the medical records from Dr. Blanda.
2
It is generally “improper to review the merits of an uncertified partial judgment pursuant
to supervisory jurisdiction, without first considering whether the trial court has ruled on the
propriety vel non of certification” because this takes away the discretion of the trial court.
Delcambre v. Mancuso, 18-391, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/18/18) (unpublished opinion), quoting In
re Succession of Grimmett, 31,795, 32,364, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/5/99), 738 So.2d 27, 31.

2

In Terrell v. Town of LeCompte, 18-1087, p. 1 (La. 9/28/18), 253 So.3d 134,

135, the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court “for a

determination of whether or not this partial summary judgment is a final judgment.

If it is certified as a final judgment, then it can be appealed, provided the appellate

requirements are met. If this partial summary judgment is not designated as a final

judgment, then there is an adequate remedy on appeal.” The Louisiana Supreme

Court made no allowance for this court to consider the matter on a writ application.

However, if this matter proceeds to trial without review of this partial

summary judgment, it creates the possibility that a second trial would be necessitated

by the reversal of the summary judgment on appeal. Montgomery points out that

the necessity of a retrial is not an irreparable injury and cites Miller v. Tassin, 02-

2383 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/4/03), 849 So.2d 782. Miller is distinguishable because it

addressed the plaintiff’s attempt to devolutively appeal a partial summary judgment

on coverage in favor of an insurer. The plaintiff argued that irreparable injury would

result from having to try his case against a party who was uninsured and had not

participated in the litigation. The court disagreed and dismissed the appeal as having

been taken from a partial judgment that had not been designated as final.3

When the grant of a partial summary judgment came before it on a writ

application, the fourth circuit stated:

Since a court of appeal has plenary power to exercise supervisory
jurisdiction over district courts and may do so at any time, the issue of
whether this Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to review
such judgments appears to be left to the sound discretion of the court.
Herlitz Const. Co., Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d
878 (La.1981).

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The plaintiff won at trial and then appealed the partial summary judgment on coverage.
The court of appeal reversed and found that there was coverage. Miller v. Tassin, 04-2115
(La.App. 4 Cir. 5/25/05), 905 So.2d 365.
3

Christiana v. S. Baptist Hosp., 03-1880, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/4/04), 867 So.2d 809,

812.

In Trapp v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance. Co., 18-544, p. 1

(La.App. 3 Cir. 9/19/18), 255 So.3d 639, 640 (footnote omitted), just prior to the

Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in Terrell, 253 So.3d 134, this court granted a

rehearing to consider a writ application on its merits and issued a written opinion

noting that it determined “that the [granted] partial summary judgment on liability

did not constitute an appealable judgment because it was not certified as a final

judgment by the trial court pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B).”

We will consider the merits of this writ application to avoid the possibilities

of a potentially useless trial, fragmented and multiple appeals, and additional appeal

delays in a suit where the accident occurred in 2012.

ON THE MERITS

“A reviewing court considers a trial court’s judgment on a motion for

summary judgment pursuant to the de novo standard.” Schroeder v. Hanover Ins.

Co., 18-294, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/19/18), 255 So.3d 1123, 1125.

The documents submitted by the mover must be “sufficient to resolve all

material factual issues.” Gilbert v. Gottsegen, 14-593, p. 8 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/21/15),

171 So.3d 289, 294, writ denied, 15-1406 (La. 10/2/15), 178 So.3d 993. “[F]actual

inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must be construed in favor of the

party opposing the motion, and all doubt must be resolved in the opponent’s favor.”

Bowdoin v. WHC Maint. Servs., Inc., 17-150, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/25/17), 230

So.3d 232, 236 (citations omitted).

On the day of the first accident, Montgomery stated that she went to work

immediately afterwards but left to go to the emergency room at Lafayette General

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Medical Center. She complained of neck and back pain and was diagnosed with

cervical and lumbar strains.

After the second accident, Montgomery immediately returned to work and did

not seek medical treatment until January 20, 2012, when she saw Dr. Franklin at the

request of her attorney. Dr. Franklin prepared two different reports for the one visit,

one addressing the January 6 accident and one addressing the January 13 accident.

He noted pain of “possibly several etiologies.”

Montgomery first saw Dr. Blanda on April 5, 2012. She filled out a patient

information sheet and answered the inquiry, “If your symptoms were because of an

accident or injury, please explain” as follows: “pain & stiffness to neck & back,

elevated BP, ringing to both ears, muscle spasms.” On the history of previous

injuries form, Montgomery wrote that her “neck aches, muscle tension to neck &

shoulders, lower back pain” relative to the January 6 accident and wrote that her

“neck still aches, back hurts, ears constant ringing, miserable” relative to the January

13 accident.

After the July 7, 2012 accident, Montgomery was taken by ambulance to the

hospital, with a new complaint of right arm pain.

Montgomery saw Dr. Blanda on October 11, 2012. On the history of previous

injuries form, Montgomery wrote the following:

January 7 accident: “have low back pain, ears ringing, arm left
weakness fingers tingle[.]”

January 13 accident: “occasional jaw pain[,] Back pain w/
shooting pain down left leg[.]”

July 7 accident: “still having head throb pain & mid back pain.”

For each accident, she circled “no” in response to the question, “DID SYMPTOMS

RESOLVE?”

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Dr. Blanda diagnosed Montgomery with: (1) cervical disc displacement; (2)

lumbar disc displacement; (3) spondylosis in the lumbar region; and (4) chronic pain

syndrome. It is Dr. Blanda’s opinion that Montgomery’s pain in her neck and back

is chronic and lifelong and will require medical treatment for the rest of her life. He

further stated that “based on Deanna Montgomery’s history, more probable than not,

[her] pain in her neck and back with radiating symptoms, headaches, and left

hand/wrist pain was caused by the January 6, 2012 accident.”

Dr. Blanda’s affidavit stated that Montgomery reported that the increased pain

from the January 13 accident lasted one day and that the increased pain from the July

7 accident was of “a limited duration.” State Farm asserts that these statements

directly contradict what Montgomery wrote on the forms in Dr. Blanda’s medical

records. State Farm asserts that the medical records, Dr. Blanda’s affidavit, and

Montgomery’s deposition are conflicting. Montgomery accuses State Farm of

“cherry picking” medical records to make arguments and unreasonable inferences in

an attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact.

“The test for determining the causal relationship between the accident and

subsequent injury is whether the plaintiff proved through medical testimony that it

is more probable than not that the subsequent injuries were caused by the accident.”

Maranto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 94-2603, 94-2615, p. 3 (La. 2/20/95), 650

So.2d 757, 759 (citations omitted). But, “[i]f a plaintiff receives an injury through

the negligent act of another and the injury is subsequently aggravated by other acts,

then the tortfeasor is only liable for the original injury and not the subsequent one.”

Swan v. Vernon Milling Co., 517 So.2d 1161, 1163 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1987), writ

denied, 521 So.2d 1171 (La.1988). It is the plaintiff’s burden to prove “that the

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subsequent injuries were not the result of a separate, independent, and intervening

act for which the defendant was in no way responsible.” Id.

Montgomery admits that the medical “records are silent as to how long the

aggravation lasted[,]” but asserts that her deposition testimony established that,

although her pain was increased by the second accident, by the next day her pain

returned to what it was. State Farm asserts that Montgomery recognizes that there

is a contradiction between her medical records and her testimony that cannot be

explained away by her counsel’s statement that by the time of her deposition, she

had time for “the dust to settle” and better evaluate her injuries.

Montgomery asserts that Dr. Blanda’s testimony as to causation is

uncontroverted and that State Farm’s failure to introduce Dr. Romero’s report

establishes that there is nothing to contradict Dr. Blanda’s opinion. Montgomery

introduced Dr. Romero’s IME report into evidence. The report stated that “[b]ased

on a review of all of these records and imaging studies and her deposition, I am

unable to determine which motor vehicle collision bears causation with regards to

her need for treatment.” Dr. Romero further stated: “Numerous medical records

document increasing symptoms with the second motor vehicle collision and further

worsening of her condition with the third motor vehicle collision.” We find that

contrary to Montgomery’s assertion, Dr. Romero’s report establishes that there is a

genuine issue of material fact regarding causation.

The trial court stated that Montgomery’s injuries “certainly may have been

aggravated by the subsequent two accidents, but . . . I believe it’s uncontroverted[,]

and I don’t think that plaintiff’s deposition testimony and her medical records – her

medical record history that she has given [] – is contradictory.” State Farm asserts

that the trial court made a credibility determination, evaluated testimony, and

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weighed evidence in finding that there was no conflict.4 We find there are genuine

issues of material fact concerning what effect the two subsequent accidents had on

Montgomery’s alleged injuries.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the writ and reverse the trial court’s grant

of partial summary judgment on medical causation. Accordingly, we reverse the

trial court’s ruling that granted the motion for partial summary judgment on the issue

of medical causation in favor of Montgomery.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY.

4
State Farm cites Dejean v. Burget, 18-238 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/17/18), 258 So.3d 872,
wherein this court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing the
plaintiff’s claims against him based on a defense of justification, where the plaintiff was the only
one of several witnesses who testified that the defendant was the sole aggressor. This court found
that the plaintiff’s testimony alone was enough to defeat summary judgment because “[t]o find
otherwise would entail considering the merits via making credibility determinations, evaluating
testimony, or weighing evidence, which are impermissible when using the summary judgment
procedure.” Id. at 874.

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