Kelly Doucet, Michael Ceasar and Brittany Lacombe v. Hornet Service Company

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-241

KELLY DOUCET, MICHAEL CEASAR AND BRITTANY LACOMBE

VERSUS

HORNET SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL.

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SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. C-010714
HONORABLE C. STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, John E. Conery, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.

WRIT DENIED.

Kenneth Alfred Doggett
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 13498
Alexandria, LA 71315-3498
(318) 487-4251
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/RESPONDENTS:
Kelly Doucet
Brittany LaCombe

Michael J. Remondet, Jr.
Juliette Busby Wade
Jeansonne & Remondet
P.O Box 91530
Lafayette, LA 70509
(337) 237-4370
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS:
Colony Insurance Company
Kenneth DeMary
Hornet Service Company

Patrick Daniel
Rachel Martin Deckelmann
Daniel & Associates
7941 Katy Freeway, Box 791
Houston, TX 77024
(713) 589-3539
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT:
Michael Ceasar

SAUNDERS, Judge.

Relator, Michael Ceasar, seeks supervisory writs from the judgment of the

Thirty-First Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson Davis, the Honorable C.

Steve Gunnel, presiding, which denied Relator’s motion for reduction of estimated

appeal costs.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on March 5,

2013, in a parking lot at a pawn shop in Jennings, Louisiana. Relator and his co-

plaintiffs, Kelly Doucet (“Doucet”) and Brittany Lacombe (“Lacombe”), filed the

instant personal injury lawsuit against Kenneth DeMary (“DeMary”); his employer,

Hornet Service Company, L.L.C. (“Hornet”); and Hornet’s insurer, Colony

Insurance Company. At the time of the accident, Relator was a passenger in a

vehicle being driven by Doucet when that vehicle collided with a vehicle that

DeMary was driving and backing out of a parking space. Relator’s claims were tried

by a jury on August 20-24, 2018. Simultaneous with Relator’s jury trial, a joint

bench trial was held for the claims of Doucet and Lacombe. With regard to the jury

trial of Relator’s claims, the jury returned a verdict finding no negligence on the part

of either driver and awarding no damages to Relator. With regard to the bench trial

of the claims of Doucet and Lacombe, the trial judge found: 1) that the two drivers

(Doucet and DeMary) were each 50 percent at fault for the accident; 2) that Doucet

and Lacombe had not suffered any damages as a result of the accident; and 3) that

DeMary was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time

of the accident.

Relator filed several post-trial motions, including a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, motion for new trial, and motion to vacate judgment.

The trial court denied those motions. Also, Defendants filed a motion to tax costs

pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 970. Additionally, Defendants filed a motion to

traverse Relator’s pauper status on the ground that Relator had abused the integrity

of the judicial process with excessive frivolous pleadings which had resulted in

excessive court costs and defense costs. The trial court granted that motion to

traverse, and Relator’s pauper status was revoked. Doucet and Lacombe retained

their pauper status. Relator filed a motion for reconsideration of the ruling revoking

his pauper status and that matter was scheduled to be heard on April 9, 2019.

However, on April 8, 2019, Relator withdrew his motion for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, with regard to the final judgments which had been rendered on

the merits of the case, Relator filed a motion for appeal and his co-plaintiffs (Doucet

and Lacombe) also filed a joint motion for appeal.

By the instant writ application, Relator seeks to have this court reverse a

judgment denying a motion for reduction of appeal costs which Relator had filed

pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 2126(C). The estimated appeal costs total $56,225.50.

“The proper procedural vehicle to seek review of an interlocutory judgment

that is not immediately appealable is an application for supervisory writ.” Johno v.

Doe, 16-0200, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/17/16), 198 So.3d 1216, 1218 (citations

omitted).

ON THE MERITS
With regard to the payment of appeal costs, La.Code Civ.P. art. 2126 provides

as follows:

A. The clerk of the trial court, immediately after the order of appeal has
been granted, shall estimate the cost of the preparation of the record
on appeal, including the fee of the court reporter for preparing the
transcript and the filing fee required by the appellate court. The
clerk shall send notices of the estimated costs by certified mail to
the appellant and by first class mail to the appellee.

B. Within twenty days of the mailing of notice, the appellant shall pay
the amount of the estimated costs to the clerk. The trial court may

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grant one extension of the period for paying the amount of the
estimated costs for not more than an additional twenty days upon
written motion showing good cause for the extension.

C. The appellant may question the excessiveness of the estimated
costs by filing a written application for reduction in the trial
court within the first twenty day time limit, and the trial court
may order reduction of the estimate upon proper showing. If an
application for reduction has been timely filed, the appellant shall
have twenty days to pay the costs beginning from the date of the
action by the trial court on application for reduction.

D. After the preparation of the record on appeal has been completed,
the clerk of the trial court shall, as the situation may require, either
refund to the appellant the difference between the estimated costs
and the actual costs if the estimated costs exceed the actual costs, or
send a notice by certified mail to the appellant of the amount of
additional costs due, if the actual costs exceed the estimated costs.
If the payment of additional costs is required, the appellant shall pay
the amount of additional costs within twenty days of the mailing of
the notice.

E. If the appellant fails to pay the estimated costs, or the difference
between the estimated costs and the actual costs, within the time
specified, the trial judge, on his own motion or upon motion by the
clerk or by any party, and after a hearing, shall:

(1) Enter a formal order of dismissal on the grounds of
abandonment; or

(2) Grant a ten day period within which costs must be paid in full,
in default of which the appeal is dismissed as abandoned.

F. If the appellant pays the costs required by this Article, the appeal
may not be dismissed because of the passage of the return day
without an extension being obtained or because of an untimely
lodging of the record on appeal.

(Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, Relator argues that the estimated appeal costs of

$56,225.50, including a record charge of nearly $50,000.00 at the cost of $5.00 per

page, are excessive. Relator notes that he had initially sought to file a suspensive

appeal and that at that point, the estimated appeal costs for the suspensive appeal

were $47,956.50. However, Relator contends that when he changed his appeal to a

devolutive appeal, the estimated appeal costs went up to $56,225.50. Relator notes

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that while the invoice for the suspensive appeal charged $5.00 per page for some

parts of the record and $2.00 per page for other parts of the record, the invoice

pertaining to the devolutive appeal charges $5.00 per page for the entire record.

Relator contends that the reason for the distinction in those charges in unclear. At

any rate, Relator argues that the $5.00 per page charge is excessive and will

unreasonably hinder him from appealing the jury verdict rendered in this case.

Relator asserts that the trial court failed to take into consideration the excessiveness

of the $5.00 per page charge for a copy of the record because the trial court was only

concerned with insuring that the clerk of court’s office gets paid for the work that it

has done.

Relator notes that at the hearing on the motion to reduce excessive appeal

costs, the trial court did not hear any testimony or receive any briefing from the clerk

of court’s office. However, Relator contends that the trial court did consider

Defendants’ position on the motion to reduce excessive estimated appeal costs.

Relator argues that the trial court erred when it considered Defendants’ position

because Defendants do not have standing to object to a reduction of the estimated

appeal costs. In that regard, Relator points out that Defendants will not be

responsible for preparing the appeal record and that they are not the ones to whom

appeal costs are owed. Also, Relator contends that Defendants will not be harmed

or prejudiced if Relator’s appeal costs are reduced and that Defendants will not

benefit if the instant writ application is denied. Relator accuses Defendants of using

exorbitant appeal costs charged by the clerk of court to their advantage to prevent

Relator from appealing an unfavorable verdict against him. Relator asserts that the

excessive appeal costs are hindering his constitutional right of access to the courts.

Additionally, Relator notes that he amended his motion for reduction of

estimated appeal costs. Relator contends that by that amended motion, he sought to
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have the trial court allocate the estimated appeal costs in a fair and equitable manner

among the three co-plaintiff-appellants. In that regard, Relator maintains that the

trial court should have required each of the three co-plaintiffs to pay one-third of the

appeal costs. Instead, Relator contends that the trial court determined that Relator

should pay all the costs of the appeal. Meanwhile, Relator notes that because his co-

plaintiffs (Doucet and Lacombe) maintain their pauper status, they are able to pursue

their appeal without paying a penny in appeal costs. Relator argues that because he

is unable to bear the burden of the entire appeal, the allocation of all the estimated

appeal costs to Relator violates his constitutional right to access to the appellate court.

In their opposition to the instant writ application, Defendants take the position

that the trial court did not err when it denied Relator’s motion for a reduction of

estimated appeal costs. Defendants contend that the $5.00 per page fee for an appeal

record is reasonable, and they note that such a fee has previously been upheld by this

court in Thornton v. Wolf, 07-135 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/30/07), 958 So.2d 131. Also,

Defendants assert that Relator’s motion should not be granted because Relator took

a low-impact parking lot fender bender case and turned it into a major litigation,

raising a variety of issues that had no basis in law or fact, such as intoxication

allegations and Federal Motor Carrier Act claims. Defendants argue that these issues

and others created by Relator required an extensive motion practice and caused the

record to be much larger than it would have been without all the extraneous issues

that Relator raised. Defendants contend that after creating a bloated record, Relator

chose not to designate the appeal record to exclude his frivolous filings, reduce the

amount of work required by the clerk of court’s office, trim the record for an efficient

appeal, and reduce his appeal costs. Defendants argue that other than his claim that

the appeal costs are excessive, Relator does not provide any support for a reduction

in estimated appeal costs.
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Also, Defendants contend that if Relator is allowed to pay only one-third of

the appeal costs, then the clerk’s office for the district court runs the risk of losing

the other two-thirds of the estimated appeal costs, plus the $18,557.00 that Relator

already owes to the clerk’s office. According to Defendants, the issue is not about

denying Relator access to the appellate court, but rather, the issue is about making

Relator responsible for the risks and costs of appealing. Further, Defendants point

out that the trial court previously found that Relator abused the system by filing

frivolous and unnecessary motions and revoked his pauper status because of it.

Additionally, Defendants assert that they have standing to oppose Relator’s

motion to reduce estimated appeal costs because they are materially affected by

Relator’s continued pursuit of this action. Defendants argue that even if it is

determined that Defendants do not have standing, their brief should be considered

as an amicus brief.

We find that there is merit to Defendants’ argument that Relator, who has had

his pauper status revoked due to abuse of the legal process, is responsible for a

voluminous trial record resulting from his excessive filings, including some

frivolous filings that resulted in sanctions against Relator. Although Relator objects

to the $5.00 per page charge, this court noted in Thornton, 958 So.2d 131, that

La.R.S. 13:841(A)(10) permits the district court clerks to charge up to $5.00 per

page for the preparation of the appeal record. Importantly, as noted by the trial court

in the instant case, Relator chose not to exercise the option of designating the appeal

record in order to reduce his appeal costs. Accordingly, we find no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s ruling.

WRIT DENIED.

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