Patrick Williams v. University of Lafayette

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

CA 19-753 consolidated with CW 19-711

PATRICK WILLIAMS

VERSUS

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA LAFAYETTE, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20176895
HONORABLE JULES DAVIS EDWARDS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, Phyllis M. Keaty, and Van H. Kyzar,
Judges.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

Robert A. Mahtook, Jr.
Julie I. Faulk
Mahtook & LaFleur
P. O. Box 3089
Lafayette, LA 70502-3089
(337) 266-2189
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Lafayette Consolidated Government

Andre Collins Gaudin
Scott Owen Gaspard
Burglass & Tankersley, LLC
5213 Airline Drive
Metairie, LA 70001-5602
(504) 836-0422
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
100 Black Men of Greater Lafayette, Inc.

Michael J. Remondet, Jr.
Teddy Paul Sorrells
Sarah E. Stephens
Jeansonne & Remondet
P.O. Box 91530
Lafayette, LA 70509
(337) 237-4370
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
The Cajundome Commission

Tracy Peter Curtis
Curtis Lee Hollinger, Jr.
The Glenn Armentor Law Corp.
300 Stewart St.
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 233-1471
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Patrick Williams

Sidney W. Degan, III
Travis Louis Bourgeois
Degan, Blanchard & Nash
400 Poydras St., #2600
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 529-3333
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
The Burlington Ins. Co.

Brian W. Harrell
Grant Herrin
Degan, Blanchard & Nash
5555 Hilton Ave, Ste. 620
Baton Rouge, LA 70808
(225) 610-1110
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
The Burlington Ins. Co.

Jazmine A. Torres
Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(225) 326-6300
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana, Board of Superv. for Univ. of La. System

EZELL, Judge.

Burlington Insurance Company (hereinafter BIC) appeals the decision of the

trial court below denying its petition for declaratory judgment and motion for

summary judgment and granting those motions in favor of the Cajundome

Commission. For the following reasons, we hereby reverse the decision of the trial

court and render judgment in BIC’s favor.

Though the case before us involves the interpretation of an additional

insured endorsement in an insurance policy written by BIC, the matter arises from

a slip and fall accident that occurred at the Cajundome. 100 Black Men of Greater

Lafayette (hereinafter 100 BMGL) rented the Cajundome Convention Center to

hold its Father of the Year Banquet in June of 2017. 100 BMGL’s contract with

the Cajundome required that it purchase food and beverage service through the

Cajundome, as well as housekeeping and cleaning services. The Cajundome

retained full control of those services at all times. The lease further provided that

100 BMGL must procure insurance which named the Cajundome as an additional

insured, which 100 BMGL did through BIC.

On the night of the banquet, Cajundome employees serving beverages

spilled pitchers of liquid on the floor. The Cajundome’s employees created and

knew of the hazard and, before it could be completely cleaned up, Patrick Williams

slipped on the liquid and injured himself. Mr. Williams sued the Cajundome and

100 BMGL, among others, for his injuries. The Cajundome filed a third-party suit

against BIC, alleging that it was covered under the “additional insured”

endorsement contained in the BIC policy issued to 100 BMGL. Later, as 100

BMGL had no connection with the food and beverage service and had no other

possible source of liability for the fall, it was dismissed via summary judgment

without objection.

The Cajundome filed a motion for summary judgment and petition for

declaratory judgment seeking defense, indemnity, and coverage under the BIC

policy. BIC responded with a motion for summary judgment and petition for

declaratory judgment of its own, seeking dismissal and a judgment declaring it

owed no coverage or duty to defend. The trial court below ruled that, under the

language of the endorsement, the Cajundome was acting “on behalf of” 100

BMGL when it committed its acts of negligence and, therefore, it was an additional

insured under the BIC policy and owed coverage. From that judgment, BIC

appeals.

On appeal, BIC asserts two assignments of error: that the trial court erred in

granting the Cajundome’s motion for summary judgment and petition for

declaratory judgment, and that it erred in denying its own similar motions. We

agree.

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment when it shows that there

are no genuine issues of material fact and that it “is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3). Summary judgment is favored by law and

provides a vehicle by which “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of

an action may be achieved. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2).

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the
same criteria that govern a district court’s consideration of whether
summary judgment is appropriate. Greemon v. City of Bossier City,
2010-2828 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1263, 1267; Samaha v. Rau, 2007-
1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 882; Allen v. State ex rel. Ernest N.
Morial–New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority, 2002-1072 (La.
4/9/03), 842 So.2d 373, 377. In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the judge’s role is not to evaluate the weight of the
evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to

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determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. All doubts
should be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor. Hines v. Garrett,
2004-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765. A fact is material if it
potentially ensures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate
success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine
issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if
reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need
for a trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at
765–66.

On motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof remains
with the movant. However, if the moving party will not bear the
burden of proof on the issue at trial and points out that there is an
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, then the non-moving party
must produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be
able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the opponent
of the motion fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact
and summary judgment will be granted. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1);
see also Schultz v. Guoth, 2010-0343 (La. 1/19/11), 57 So.3d 1002,
1006.

Larson v. XYZ Ins. Co., 16-745, pp. 6-7 (La. 5/3/17), 226 So.3d 412, 416.

Whether an insurance policy provides or precludes coverage is a dispute that

can be properly resolved within the framework of a motion for summary judgment.

Crosstex Energy Servs., LP v. Texas Brine Co., LLC, 17-895 (La.App. 1 Cir.

12/21/17), 240 So.3d 932, writ denied, 18-145 (La. 3/23/18), 238 So.3d 963.

“The interpretation of an insurance policy is normally a question of law.”

Armenia Coffee Corp. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 06-409, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir.

11/21/06), 946 So.2d 249, 253, writ denied, 06-2983 (La. 2/16/07), 949 So.2d 422.

Questions of law are reviewed de novo “without deference to the legal conclusions

of the courts below.” Durio v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 11-84, p. 14 (La. 10/25/11),

74 So.3d 1159, 1168. As to questions of law, “the standard of review of an

appellate court is simply whether the court’s interpretive decision is legally correct.”

Ohm Lounge, L.L.C. v. Royal St. Charles Hotel, L.L.C., 10-1303, p. 4 (La.App. 4

Cir. 9/21/11), 75 So.3d 471, 474 (citing Glass v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 02-

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412, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/6/02), 832 So.2d 403, writs denied, 02-2977, 02-3018

(La. 3/14/03) 839 So.2d 36, 37). “[I]f the decision of the trial court is based upon

an erroneous application of law rather than on a valid exercise of discretion, the

decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court.” Id. (citing Pelleteri v.

Caspian Group Inc., 02-2141 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1230).

“An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and
should be construed by using the general rules of interpretation of
contracts set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code.” Cadwallader v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 02–1637, p. 3 (La. 6/27/03), 848 So.2d 577, 580.
“Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent
of the parties.” La. C.C. art. 2045. “The parties’ intent as reflected by
the words in the policy determine the extent of coverage.” La. Ins.
Guar. Ass’n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 93–0911 (La. 1/14/94), 630
So.2d 759, 763. “When the words of a contract are clear and explicit
and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be
made in search of the parties’ intent.” La. C.C. art. 2046. The words
are “given their generally prevailing meaning.” La. C.C. art. 2047.
However, “[w]ords susceptible of different meanings must be
interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the object of
the contract.” La. C.C. art. 2048. “A provision susceptible of different
meanings must be interpreted with a meaning that renders it effective
and not with one that renders it ineffective.” La. C.C. art. 2049.

“Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the
other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the
contract as a whole.” La. C.C. art. 2050. “An insurance policy should
not be interpreted in an unreasonable or a strained manner so as to
enlarge or to restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably
contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve an absurd conclusion.”
La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 93–0911, 630 So.2d at 763.

Spencer v. Chevron Corp., 16-174, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/28/16), 202 So.3d

1055, 1058-59 (alteration in original).

The clause at issue reads (italic emphasis ours):

Section II – Who Is An Insured is amended to include as an
additional insured the person or organization shown in the Schedule
[the Cajundome] arising out of their financial interest in you but only
with respect to liability for “bodily injury”, “property damage”, or
“personal and advertising injury” caused, in whole or in part, by your
acts or omissions or the acts or omissions of those acting on your
behalf.

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The trial court below held that the Cajundome was acting on behalf of 100

BMGL; therefore, it was covered under the policy for the damages its employees

caused. We find that it would be absurd to read the endorsement language at issue

as providing the Cajundome with indemnification against its own acts of

negligence. The trial court’s reading of the clause would allow full coverage for

the Cajundome as an additional insured where it was the sole agent of fault and

where there was no longer any viable allegation of liability on behalf of the named

insured, 100 BMGL.

The Cajundome retained exclusive control over food, beverage, and

housekeeping services. Its staff was acting on behalf of the Cajundome itself in

providing catering services for profit, not acting in any way as agents or otherwise

on behalf of 100 BMGL. The Cajundome’s staff merely rendered catering services

as contracted. While the accident at issue arose out of 100 BMGL’s rental of the

Cajundome’s premises, the accident was not caused by any fault on 100 BMGL’s

part. That 100 BMGL was free from fault in this matter is not contested in any

way. There is no allegation that any liability of the Cajundome to the Plaintiff

comes through 100 BMGL, and the accident was caused by the Cajundome alone.

100 BMGL was dismissed on summary judgment without objection, ensuring that

the Cajundome cannot be held liable for any acts or omissions relating to the group.

As the Cajundome can have no exposure to liability for any acts of 100 BMGL, it

has no “financial interest” in 100 BMGL under the policy language, preventing the

policy from providing coverage.

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Our view is bolstered by the reasoning behind a similar case, Maldonado v.

Kiewit Louisiana Co., 13-756, 13-757 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/14), 146 So.3d 210.1

Though the language of the policies are not exact matches, we find the language of

the policy at issue mirrored the language in Maldonado enough to guide our

thinking.

There, the language of the additional insured endorsement read:

A. Section II—Who is an Insured is amended to include as an
additional insured the person(s) or organization(s) shown in the
Schedule above with whom you agreed in a written contract or written
agreement to provide insurance such as is afforded under this policy,
but only to the extent that such person or organization is liable for
“bodily injury”, “property damage” or “personal and advertising
injury” caused by your acts or omissions or the acts or omissions of
those acting on your behalf[.]

Maldonado, 146 So.3d at 219 (alterations inserting party names omitted)(italic

emphasis ours).

The Maldonado court found that the plain wording of the endorsement

showed that the policy applied only when liability was sought to be imposed upon

the additional insured because of something the named insured was alleged to have

done or failed to do, despite similar “on your behalf” language as the policy here.

Thus, for the additional insured to have coverage under the policy, the Maldonado

court ruled the petition at issue must allege that the additional insured’s liability

was caused by the named insured’s negligence. Similarly, we find that it is clear

from the policy language that the parties only intended the Cajundome to be

covered if it could be cast in liability, vicariously, for the fault of 100 BMGL or its

1
Maldonado did not deal with coverage specifically, but rather a duty to defend.
However, because the policy language is so similar, we find that the reasoning holds, especially
since the duty to defend is even broader than the duty to indemnify under Louisiana law. Henly v.
Phillips Abita Lumber Co., 06-1856 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/3/07), 971 So.2d 1104.

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other agents. Again, the Cajundome did not act as an agent for 100 BMGL by

providing them contracted food services.

The Maldonado court further ruled that when plaintiffs amended their

petition, deleting any allegations of fault against the named insured, the petition

ceased to allege any claim that could be covered by the additional insured policy

endorsement. This is also like the matter at hand in that, when 100 BMGL was

dismissed on summary judgment, there could no longer be any claim against that

group that the Cajundome could be liable for. Absent any allegations of fault on

100 BMGL’s part, there can be no coverage for the Cajundome as an additional

insured under the endorsement especially here, especially for its own acts of

negligence.

Finally, “[i]n the absence of an express and unequivocal statement that a

party is to be indemnified for that party’s own negligence, the contract of

indemnification will not be construed to create such an obligation.” Boykin v. PPG

Indus., Inc., 08-117, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/18/08), 987 So.2d 838, 843, writs

denied, 08-1635, 08-1640 (La. 10/31/08), 994 So.2d 537 (citing Perkins v. Rubicon,

Inc., 563 So.2d 258 (La.1990)). We can find no policy language allowing

coverage for claims against the Cajundome for its own negligence or intentional

acts as the endorsement at question contains no such statement. Thus, under the

express and unequivocal language of that agreement, BIC’s indemnification

obligation extended only to those situations where the Cajundome’s liability to a

third party was caused by 100 BMGL’s negligence or that of another actor acting

on behalf of the group, not that of the Cajundome itself. Accordingly, the trial

court erred in finding coverage for the Cajundome’s own negligence under the

additional insured policy endorsement.

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For the above reasons, we hereby reverse the decision of the trial court

granting declaratory and summary judgments in favor of the Cajundome. We

further render judgment granting declaratory and summary judgment in favor of

BIC, holding it owes no defense, indemnity, or insurance coverage to the

Cajundome under the policy at issue under the facts of this case. All claims

against BIC are hereby dismissed. Costs of this appeal are hereby assessed against

the Cajundome.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

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