Michelle Lewis v. Golden Nugget Lake Charles, LLC

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

23-778

MICHELLE LEWIS

VERSUS

GOLDEN NUGGET LAKE CHARLES, LLC

**********

ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2015-3773, DIVISION D
HONORABLE ROBERT L. WYATT, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

D. KENT SAVOIE
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of D. Kent Savoie, Van H. Kyzar, Candyce G. Perret, Jonathan W.
Perry, and Guy E. Bradberry, Judges.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY;
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RENDERED.

PERRET, J., dissents and would deny the writ application.

BRADBERRY, J., would deny the writ.

M. Paul Skrabanek
Pierce Skrabanek, PLLC
24 Greenway Plaza, Suite 500
Houston, TX 77046
(832) 690-7000
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
Michelle Lewis

Christopher P. Ieyoub
Jacinda L. Denison
Plauche, Smith & Nieset, LLC
1123 Pithon Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(318) 436-0522
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR:
Golden Nugget Lake Charles, LLC

SAVOIE, Judge.

Defendant-Relator, Golden Nugget Lake Charles, LLC (“Golden Nugget”),

seeks supervisory writs from the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary

judgment. On April 11, 2024, this court issued an order stating, “[i]n keeping with

La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(H), we grant this writ for the limited purpose of briefing and

oral argument.” The order further gave the parties an opportunity to submit

additional briefs and request oral argument by certain deadlines stated therein. The

parties did not request oral argument or otherwise submit additional briefing by the

stated deadlines, so we now consider the merits.

For the reasons that follow, we grant the writ on the merits, make it

peremptory, and render summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against

Golden Nugget.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case involves an alleged slip and fall that occurred on April 24, 2015, at

Saltgrass Steakhouse (“Saltgrass”) located in the Golden Nugget casino in Lake

Charles, Louisiana.

On September 18, 2015, Plaintiff, Michelle Lewis (“Lewis”), filed suit and

named Golden Nugget as a Defendant. She alleged in her petition that “[a]s [she]

was walking to the restroom, she slipped and fell on a waxy, glossy, slick substance

on the floor” and Golden Nugget is liable for her injuries and damages in accordance

with La.R.S. 9:2800.6. Golden Nugget filed a motion for summary judgment on

July 9, 2019, and the trial court denied it.

On October 2, 2023, Golden Nugget filed a second motion for summary

judgment. It argued that there was an absence of factual support establishing the

existence of an unreasonably dangerous condition, Golden Nugget’s actual or

constructive knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition, and/or Golden

Nugget’s failure to exercise reasonable care. In support of its motion, Golden

Nugget submitted Lewis’s deposition testimony taken December 23, 2015.

During her deposition, Lewis testified that on the day of the incident, she was

eating lunch at Saltgrass between noon and 1:00 p.m. with her sister and father in

celebration of her birthday. Lewis explained that they were seated at a table that was

located past the entryway of the restaurant, to the left, and approximately the second

or third table in front of the bar. Lewis stated that she and her party sat at their table

for about thirty minutes to an hour eating lunch and talking and that she did not

consume any alcoholic beverages during that time. She testified that after she

finished eating, she got up from the table to go to the restroom, which was located

outside of Saltgrass, but inside the casino’s premises. She said that as she proceeded

towards the entryway of the restaurant, she “just slipped.” Lewis explained:

I just -- I lost balance. I don’t know what happened. . . I tried to catch
myself from falling. So, I tried to put my hands down and that’s when
the two managers came and asked me was I okay and . . . they helped
me. And then . . . he himself even asked if he could look at my shoe
you know. They were looking around on the floor. And as I began to
get up, I looked and I did see the waxy, glossiness on the floor.

Lewis stated that, at the time of the incident, she was wearing a collared shirt,

jeans, and “slide-in sandals” that had wedge heels between three and four inches

high. She explained that after she got up after falling, she “still proceeded limping

on to the restroom,” and then went back to the table with her sister and father after

she left the restroom.

Lewis testified that the flooring in the area where she fell was “wooden

laminate.” She said she did not recall any liquid on the floor in the area where she

fell and that she did not notice any wax or liquid of any type on her clothing when

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she stood up. When asked if there “was any residue or any type of liquid or element

that [she] could find on [her] clothes or on the bottom of [her] shoes that indicated

there was something on the floor that caused [her] to fall[,]” Lewis responded, “No[.]”

Lewis also said that she did not find any kind of substance on the floor that caused

her to fall. Lewis’s deposition also contains the following:

Q. Tell me what you felt when you put your hand on the floor as [you
were] trying to get up.

....

A. Because I used my hands to help me up. It was kind of like the floor
looked glossy and slippery.

Q. And tell me what that felt like on your hand.

A. Just slimy, like soft.

....

Q. Ms. Lewis, when you said you – what you felt on the floor, was it a
substance on the floor or was it just the way that your hand moved on
that was –

A. The way that my hand moved.

Q. So, was there any residue or . . . anything that you felt in your hands
itself that indicated . . . that there was something on the floor?

A. I did not notice that at the time because I was just in shock . . . .

....

Q. Like for example, did you notice if there was any kind of like a wax
or something like a liquid or a cleaner that you would have felt on the
floor itself as opposed to just the floor being able to have your hand
move across? Was there anything that you felt on your hand itself that
indicated wax or a liquid or something to that effect?

A. I guess being slippery. Because honestly, if I could have prevented
myself from falling with my hands or without hitting the floor totally,
then I probably could have done that. But like I said, because of, I guess

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based upon [what] the waitress said[1] as well [as] it being glossy and,
you know, she said it’s the way they make the floor. So, with my
impression, I’m assuming because it’s laminate and it’s wood that it
was probably buffed and overwaxed maybe.

....

Q. . . . Did you find any wax or any kind of thing to indicate that it had
been overwaxed on your clothing at any point in time?

A. I cannot recall if I did. I cannot.

Lewis also testified that after she went to the restroom, she returned to the

table inside of Saltgrass “more than likely” utilizing the same path as when she left

to go the restroom, and that she did not have any problems walking on the floor. She

also stated that she did not have any problems walking on the floor when she initially

walked to the table when her party was seated, or when she and her party left the

restaurant after paying their bill. Lewis also said she did not notice anyone else

having problems walking on the floor in the area where she fell.

In opposition to Golden Nugget’s motion, Lewis relied upon her own

deposition testimony and also submitted the January 8, 2020 deposition of Jon

Ramirez (“Ramirez”). Ramirez was the general manager of Saltgrass at the time of

the incident. Ramirez testified that Lewis fell:

[R]ight next to where the wine case and the carpet[,] kind of where that
threshold is . . . she was exiting the building, she was heading back out
to the casino. . . . As she was stepping from the carpet onto the wood,
I can’t speak to any certainty if it was right there, she took another step,
but that’s were we noticed her falling and everybody kind of called to
attention in that area.

Ramirez testified that after the incident, he remembered “taking note of the

area, taking note of the conditions of the area, things like that, just to make sure . . .

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Lewis testified in her deposition that a waitress told her sister and father that she saw
Lewis fall and that the waitress said, “That’s the way the floors are made.” However, there is no
testimony in the record from any waitress, Lewis’s father, or Lewis’s sister.

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you know the first thing you look at is could we have prevented anything as a

business.” When asked by Lewis’s counsel about his personal observations of the

area where Lewis says she fell, Ramirez stated, “everything looked to be normal,

dry, clean, free of debris, nothing that stood out.” He also explained that the floor

was made of real wood, it was “brand new,” and had “a good finish on [it]. It was

nice.”

Ramirez was also questioned by Golden Nugget’s counsel regarding his

personal observations of the floor at the time of incident. Ramierz said that when he

inspected the floor both prior to the incident in accordance with a checklist, as well

as after the incident, the floor was clean and dry, and “[t]he condition of the area was

consistent with the normal condition of the area.” Ramirez also indicated that he did

not see anything that he thought was a hazardous or dangerous condition.

With respect to the flooring inside of Saltgrass, Ramirez testified that there

was wooden flooring in the entryway and bar area of the restaurant, as well as carpet

in some areas. He explained that Saltgrass’s employees would dust and damp-mop

to clean the wooden area of the floor inside the restaurant. He also explained that

either Golden Nugget’s employees or third-party contractors, rather than Saltgrass’s

employees, would come in overnight and clean the wood floors at the entryway.

When asked whether either Golden Nugget and/or the third-party contractors buffed

or waxed the wood floor in the Saltgrass entryway, Ramirez stated, “I don’t believe

so because of the material, there’s special care that has to go into it. Primarily it’s

dusting and . . . some kind of just damp mop to get everything off.” He also said

that he did not personally observe anyone doing the overnight cleaning.

Ramirez also said that he believed the flooring outside of Saltgrass was “some

kind of Travertine material as well as carpet there in the center.” He said he had

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seen Golden Nugget’s employees and/or contractors cleaning that area using “a large

carpet cleaner or . . . some kind of cleaning for the stone[,]” but he did not know

exactly what was used. He described the cleaning equipment as “large” and what

“appeared to be a large buffing system,” but indicated that he was uncertain as to

what exactly was used because he did not “know that profession.” He also explained

that when he saw the floors outside of Saltgrass being cleaned, he saw wooden signs

saying “caution” placed in the area, and he said that the signs were removed when

the work was finished.

Ramierz’s deposition also contains the following colloquy with Lewis’s

counsel:

Q. Let’s just assume for a second that Ms. Lewis is right, that it had
been buffed or it had been waxed beforehand, that could present a
dangerous condition. Right?

MR. IEYOUB: Object to form.

Q. (By Mr. Skrabanek) You can answer.

....

A. Okay. If it had just been waxed, possibly, but I would assume, and
this is just my personal opinion on the matter, that if we’re cleaning and
buffing a floor that we make sure that it’s walkable since we are in a
high traffic area.

Q. Well, you all wouldn’t have been buffing the floor in the first place.
Right? You only use damp mop and a broom?

A. Correct. Dust mop and damp mop.

Ramierz also made clear that he never saw the wood floors inside of Saltgrass

being buffed or waxed, and he suggested that given the size of the buffing machine

and location of the wooden flooring inside of Saltgrass, he was not certain the floor

had been buffed. He also indicated that only Golden Nugget would know if its

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employees and/or third-party contractors had buffed the area of the Saltgrass floor

at issue.2 Ramierz’s deposition also contains the following:

Q. And to the extent that Ms. Lewis is to be believed, had they buffed
the area and had there been some kind of waxy sheen or slippery sheen,
that can present a dangerous slip-and-fall condition of which they
should warn people, even you even?

MR. IEYOUB: Object to form.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. IEYOUB: You can answer.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. So, yes, if a hazard had presented itself
we would probably be warned.

Q. (By Mr. Skrabanek) Would the only way a waxy sheen or floor wax
get on that floor would be for someone like the Golden Nugget or its
contractors to have buffed that floor? You don’t have like random
customers coming through there dumping floor wax on there, do you?

A. No, we do not.

Q. . . . [W]ell, assume I believe Ms. Lewis for a second that it was waxy
and it had a sheen on it and it was slippery, well, I don’t know where
that came from, but you would say my best estimate at that point would
be that it came from someone buffing the floors from Golden Nugget.

MR. IEYOUB: Object to the form.

You can answer.

Q. (By Mr. Skrabanek) If it was there?

A. Yes, that would be my best assumption.

Ultimately, the trial court denied Golden Nugget’s motion, and Golden

Nugget filed an application for supervisory writs with this court. Therein, it asserted

the following assignments of error:

1. The District Court erred in finding a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether a hazardous condition was present which
presented an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff, where Plaintiff

2
There is no testimony from any Golden Nugget employee or contractor in the record.

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produced no evidence in support of this essential element of her claim
other than mere speculation, conclusory allegations, and self-serving
statements.

2. The District Court erred in denying Golden Nugget’s motion
for summary judgment, because Plaintiff did not meet her burden under
La.[Code Civ.P. art.] 966(C)(2) to produce factual support sufficient to
establish that she will be able to satisfy her evidentiary burden of proof
at trial.

ANALYSIS

When an appellate court reviews a district court judgment on a
motion for summary judgment, it applies the de novo standard of review,
“using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of
whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact and whether the mover is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Supreme Serv. & Specialty Co., Inc. v.
Sonny Greer, 06-1827, p. 4 (La. 5/22/07), 958 So.2d 634, 638.

Gray v. Am. Nat’l. Prop. & Cas. Co., 07-1670, p. 6 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 839,

844.

“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to

material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code

Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3).

The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the
mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before
the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden on
the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the
court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential
to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the
adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1).

It is well-settled that a plaintiff opposing summary judgment
cannot rest on the mere allegations of her pleadings, but must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. La. C.C.P.
art. 967(B); Darr v. Marine Electronics Solutions, Inc., 11-908, p. 9

8

(La.App. 5 Cir. 5/22/12), 96 So.3d 527, 533, writ denied, 12-1442 (La.
10/8/12), 98 So.3d 860; Peralta v. Perazzo, 06-343, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir.
10/31/06), 942 So.2d 64, 68, writ denied, 06-3028 (La. 2/16/07), 949
So.2d 415. Mere conclusory allegations and unsupported speculation
will not support the finding of a genuine issue of material fact; such
allegations and speculation are insufficient to satisfy the opponent’s
burden of proof. Sears v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 06-201, p. 12
(La.App. 4 Cir. 10/18/06), 943 So.2d 1219, 1228, writ denied, 06-2747
(La. 1/26/07), 948 So.2d 168.

Trench v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, LLC, 14-152, p. 8 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/24/14), 150

So.3d 472, 476.

This case involves Lewis’s claims for merchant liability under La.R.S.

9:2800.6 as a result of her alleged slip and fall:

In order to prove merchant liability in a slip and fall case, the
plaintiff must prove, in addition to the usual negligence requirements
(duty, breach, cause in fact, and damages), those elements found in
La.R.S. 9:2800.6(B):

(1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the
claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.

(2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive
notice of the condition which caused the damage, prior to the
occurrence.

(3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. In
determining reasonable care, the absence of a written or verbal uniform
cleanup or safety procedure is insufficient, alone, to prove failure to
exercise reasonable care.

Dotson v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 04-83, pp. 1–2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/12/04), 872

So.2d 1283, 1285.

“Because a plaintiff must prove each of these elements, the failure to prove

any element is fatal to the claimant’s cause of action.” Trench, 150 So.3d at 476.

“Although the owner of a commercial establishment has an affirmative duty to keep

the premises in a safe condition, he is not the insurer of the safety of his patrons. A

store owner is not liable every time an accident happens.” Id. (citation omitted).

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Golden Nugget argues that summary judgment dismissal is required because

there is an absence of factual support establishing the existence of a hazardous

condition that presented an unreasonable risk of harm. Golden Nugget asserts that

while Lewis said the floor was shiny and speculated that the floor was slippery due

to it being buffed with wax, there is no factual support for her conclusion. It argues

that the mere existence of a shiny floor, without additional evidence of an

unreasonably dangerous condition, is insufficient to establish liability under La.R.S.

9:2800.6.

Golden Nugget also argues that, contrary to Lewis’s representation of

Ramierz’s testimony to the trial court, Ramierz did not testify that a hazardous

condition actually existed. Instead, as Golden Nugget suggests, the only appropriate

inference that can be drawn from Ramierz’s responses to questions that required

assumptions and speculation is that if Golden Nugget had actually buffed the area at

issue, and if that caused the floor to be slippery, then that could be an unreasonably

dangerous condition.

Golden Nugget cites to Trench, 150 So.3d 472, Kinchen v. J.C. Penney Co.,

Inc., 426 So.2d 681 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1982), writ denied, 431 So.2d 774 (La.1983),

and Burnett v. Lucky Nails, LLC, 14-1577 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/5/15) (unpublished

opinion), in support of its argument that summary judgment dismissal is appropriate.

In Trench, 150 So.3d 472, the plaintiff fell while walking in the meat

department area of a grocery store. In affirming the trial court’s summary judgment

dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims under La.R.S. 9:2800.6, the court stated:

Winn–Dixie submitted the deposition of Ms. Trench [the plaintiff], in
which she testified that it was slippery in the area where she fell, but
she admitted that she does not know why it was slippery or what caused
her to fall. Although she claims that a manager said the floor had just
been waxed and they had put too much wax on the floor, it is undisputed

10

that no one saw anything on the floor that could have caused Ms.
Trench to slip and fall, including any excess wax or wax buildup. We
note that the surveillance video of the incident shows that the floor was
shiny, but it does not show that the condition of the floor presented an
unreasonable risk of harm or that any other customer had a problem
walking on the floor before or after the incident.

....

In opposition to Winn–Dixie’s motion for summary judgment,
Ms. Trench failed to provide any factual support for her claim that the
condition of the floor presented an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of
harm. Rather, she merely speculated that she slipped due to wax on the
floor. Ms. Trench admitted that she did not know what she fell on. She
claims that the manager of Winn–Dixie said there was too much wax
on the floor, which he denies. Regardless, even if the manager stated
that the floor had just been waxed and speculated that wax could have
caused her fall, there is no evidence that anyone actually saw any wax
buildup or any other foreign substance was on the floor. Ms. Trench’s
factually unsupported and speculative allegation of too much wax on
the floor is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Trench, 150 So.3d at 476–77.

Kinchen, 426 So.2d 681, also cited by Golden Nugget, involved a plaintiff

who allegedly fell in a department store. The appellate court reversed the trial

court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff and found that the plaintiff failed to

sufficiently prove either the existence of the alleged premises hazard (water on the

floor), or that the polished tile floor was unreasonably slippery. The court stated,

“The mere fact that a floor has a ‘high shine’ is not sufficient to establish liability on

the part of the storekeeper. The plaintiff must prove the floor is in fact unreasonably

slippery, perhaps as a result of an excessive or uneven application of wax or from

the application of an improper wax.” Id. at 683–84 (citation omitted).” “The fact of

the fall alone does not establish the floor was so slippery as to make it unreasonably

dangerous.” Id. at 684.

Golden Nugget also cites to Burnett, 14-1577, where the court affirmed the

trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s claims involving an alleged

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slip and fall at a nail salon, finding that the plaintiff’s speculative and unsupported

allegations were insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The Burnett court noted

that there was no evidence establishing the presence of any hazardous substance on

the floor, and that, “while plaintiff, who was wearing 3 and 7/8–inch heels at the

time of her slip and fall, testified that on this particular day, the floor ‘felt slippery,’

she acknowledged that she did not notice anything unusual about the floor.” Id. at

p. 3. The Burnett court further stated:

In her deposition, plaintiff testified that she felt the floor as she got up
after the fall and that it was “slippery” and “felt differently,” “like wax.”
However, she acknowledged that she did not know what made the floor
slippery. She speculated that the floor may have been slippery from
whatever substance the employees used to clean the floor or wipe their
work areas after pedicures. Other than when she placed her hand on the
floor to get herself up, plaintiff did not rub the floor with her hands or
feet to inspect it. Other than her own speculation, plaintiff did not offer
any factual evidence to establish that excessive wax or a cleaning
solution was present on the floor that day.

Id.

In opposition to Golden Nugget’s writ application, Lewis argues that she

satisfied the first prong of La.R.S. 9:2800.6 because she “slipped and fell on [Golden

Nugget’s] waxy floor, which presented an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff and

that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.” She further argues that Golden

Nugget had knowledge of the floor’s condition because it was the only entity that

controlled the cleaning and buffing of the floor and also that Golden Nugget had a

“history of failing to leave after cleaning, warning signs about slippery floors.”

Lewis also suggests that this case is analogous to Choyce v. Sisters of

Incarnate Word, 25,958 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/19/94), 642 So.2d 287, writ denied, 94-

2510 (La. 12/9/94), 647 So.2d 1119, because, according to Lewis, “the area where

the fall occurred was a high-traffic area with the floor that was slippery due to it

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being highly waxed or buffed to the extent that it was slippery without visible foreign

substance on it.”

In Choyce, 642 So.2d. 287, the plaintiff slipped and fell as she was walking

along the main hallway of a medical facility toward the elevators. The trial court

rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding “that the floor ‘was highly waxed

or buffed to the extent that it was slippery[,]’” and concluding,

[t]he testimony is diverse as to exactly how the floor is
maintained, . . . the preponderance of the evidence
supports the conclusion that some type of wax or cleaner
is sprayed on the floor after which it is buffed and polished
to a bright shine. The testimony is consistent from all of
the witnesses that a tile floor such as the one on which Mrs.
Choyce [the plaintiff] fell, becomes slick or slippery when
repetitively buffed or waxed.

Id. at 289. After reviewing the conflicting testimony in the record and noting the

credibility determinations made by the trial court, the appellate court affirmed the

trial court’s judgment. It concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently established the

existence of an unreasonably slippery condition “by showing that the floor was of a

type that becomes unreasonably slippery if repeatedly waxed and buffed and that

this was how the floor was maintained, not by showing that the floor was waxed and

buffed to a bright shine.” Id. at 290.

We agree with Golden Nugget that summary judgment dismissal of Lewis’s

claims is required given the absence of evidence establishing the existence of an

unreasonably dangerous condition. Even though Lewis’s petition alleges that “she

slipped and fell on a waxy, glossy, slick substance on the floor,” her deposition

testimony does not support her allegation. While Lewis testified that the floor where

she fell looked glossy and slippery, she admitted that there was no liquid, cleaner, or

other substance on the floor and that she did not notice any waxy substance on either

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her hands or clothing after she fell. Further, Lewis’s assumption that because the

floor was wood laminate, “it was probably buffed and overwaxed maybe[,]” is an

unsupported speculation and does not satisfy her burden or otherwise create an issue

of material fact. Trench, 150 So.3d 472. The fact that Lewis fell on a floor that

appeared shiny, without evidence that there was a substance on the floor or otherwise

establishing that the floor was so slippery that it was unreasonably dangerous, is

insufficient to satisfy Lewis’s burden of proof. Kinchen, 426 So.2d 681.

In addition, and contrary to Lewis’s characterization of the evidence, there is

nothing in the record that establishes the floor in the area where Lewis fell was highly

waxed and/or excessively buffed, much less any evidence establishing that it had

ever been waxed or buffed by anyone. Therefore, Choyce, 642 So.2d. 287, is

inapplicable. Instead, Ramirez stated that Saltgrass’s employees cleaned the floor

by dusting and/or damp-mopping, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that

the floor was wet from mopping or otherwise. Ramirez suggested that if the floor

had been waxed or buffed, that would have been done by Golden Nugget’s

employees and/or contractors; however, there is no evidence in the record

establishing that Golden Nugget’s employees or contractors actually buffed or

waxed the floor where Lewis fell. Without evidence establishing the floor had been

waxed or buffed, or evidence that it had been waxed or buffed in a way that caused

an unreasonably dangerous condition, Lewis cannot satisfy her burden and summary

judgment dismissal is appropriate. Burnett, 14-1577.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby grant Golden Nugget’s writ application,

make it peremptory, and render summary judgment in favor of Golden Nugget,

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dismissing Lewis’s claims against it. Costs of this proceeding are assessed to

Plaintiff-Respondent, Michelle Lewis.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY; SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RENDERED.

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