Herbert and Martha Dalme v. Leah Dalme

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-524

HERBERT AND MARTHA DALME

VERSUS

LEAH DALME, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. C-77,213, DIV. B
HONORABLE DEE A. HAWTHORNE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Jimmie C. Peters, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

Peters, J., dissents with written reasons.

AFFIRMED.

Henry Howard Lemoine Jr.
Howell D. Jones
Lemoine & Wampler
607 Main St.
Pineville, LA 71360
(318) 473-4220
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Eric Stoker

Richard Emile deVargas
Attorney At Law
506 Front St.
Natchitoches, LA 71457
(318) 354-8222
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Leah Dalme

Richard Bray Williams
Williams Family Law Firm, L.L.C.
P. O. Box 15
Natchitoches, LA 71458-0015
(318) 352-6695
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees:
Herbert and Martha Dalme

SAUNDERS, Judge.

This is a custody case in which the defendant, Eric Stoker (hereinafter

“Appellant”), appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for a change in custody of

his minor child pursuant to a rule for modification of custody and visitation after two

consent custody decrees.

For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the request for

modification of custody.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 30, 2004, Herbert and Martha Dalme (hereinafter “Appellees”) sought

custody of their ten-month-old grandchild, Bayli Rechelle Dalme Stoker (hereinafter

“Bayli”). Immediate temporary custody was granted to Appellees by way of an ex

parte order, with a hearing set for August 20, 2004.

At the August 20, 2004 hearing, the parties entered into a consent custody

agreement. Joint custody of Bayli was awarded to Appellees and Appellant with the

Appellees being granted domiciliary custody. Appellant was granted reasonable,

supervised visitation on alternating weekends and holidays.

Appellant and the minor child’s mother, Leah Dalme (hereinafter “Leah”), were

subsequently married in October of 2004, establishing a matrimonial domicile in

Sabine Parish. They separated in November of 2005 and were granted a divorce in

Avoyelles Parish in August of 2006. Custody of Bayli was not an issue in the divorce

proceeding.

On November 2, 2006, Appellant filed a rule to modify custody in Avoyelles

Parish, seeking to be named domiciliary custodian. Appellees and Leah were named

as defendants. After a successful declinatory exception of improper venue by the

Appellees, the case was transferred to Natchitoches Parish. A second consent custody

agreement was reached on August 29, 2007, with a consent custody judgment signed

on October 3, 2007.

The October 3, 2007 judgment again awarded joint custody of the minor child

to Appellees and Appellant. Appellees retained their status as domiciliary custodians,

while Appellant was now given additional reasonable, liberal, and unsupervised

visitation rights.

Nearly six months later, on March 24, 2008, Appellant again filed a rule for

modification of custody and visitation seeking to be named domiciliary custodian.

The Appellant’s request for modification of custody was denied by the trial court.

FACTS

Bayli was born on September 3, 2003, and has primarily resided with

Appellees, her maternal grandparents, since her birth. Leah lived with Appellees after

the birth of Bayli and until such time as her arrest on drug charges in 2004. Bayli

continued to live with Appellees even after the marriage of her parents, Appellant and

Leah, in August of 2004.

Appellant pled guilty to simple burglary in 2001 and was placed on three years

supervised probation. He violated his probation in March of 2002, thus resulting in

his probation being extended. The most recent of numerous other charges against

Appellant resulted in a September 2005 conviction for possession with intent to

distribute a Schedule II drug. He was sentenced to five years suspended sentence

with three years supervised probation. In March of 2005, Appellant entered into the

Teen Challenge faith-based drug rehabilitation program, which he successfully

completed. He has not obtained any drug counseling or attended any rehabilitation

meetings since completing Teen Challenge.

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Appellees have encouraged a continuing relationship between Bayli and

Appellant and have not done anything to discourage such a relationship.

Appellant has appealed the trial court’s denial of modification of custody and

has alleged the following assignment of error:

APPELLANT’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

The Trial Court erred by failing to find a change in circumstances and by

granting custody of Bayli to her grandparents instead of a parent.

LAW AND DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS:

We have been asked to review the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s request to

modify a consent custody agreement pertaining to a minor child. It is significant that

there have been two custody decrees on this matter and that both of them have been

consented to by Appellant. This court has noted that such agreements may only be

modified when there is a showing that there has been a material change in

circumstances and that the modification would be in the best interest of the minor

child.

If a prior award of custody has been made by consent decree, the
proponent for change must show that a material change in circumstances
affecting the child’s welfare has occurred since the last custody
judgment before the court will consider a change in custody. Bergeron
v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193, 1200 (La.1986); Millet v. Andrasko, 93-
0520, p. 5-6 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/11/94), 640 So.2d 368, 370-71. If a
nonparent has been awarded custody, the parent moving for a change or
modification must show a change in circumstances and that the change
in custody would be in the best interest of the child. Millet, 93-0520, at
p. 5-6, 640 So.2d at 371.

Matter of Landrum, 97-826, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/10/97), 704 So.2d 872, 874

(quoting Robert v. Gaudet, 96-2506, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 780,

783).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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This court has previously held in Gremillion v. Gremillion, 07-492 (La.App.

3 Cir. 10/03/07), 966 So.2d 1228, that a trial court’s determination in a child custody

case is entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed absent a showing that

there was a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.

The standard of review in child custody matters has been clearly stated
by this court:

The trial court is in a better position to evaluate the best
interest of the child from its observances of the parties and
witnesses; thus, a trial court’s determination in a child
custody case is entitled to great weight on appeal and will
not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.
Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 96-89, p. 12 (La. App. 3 Cir.
5/22/96), 676 So.2d 619, 625, writ denied, 96-1650 (La.
10/25/96), 681 So.2d 365.

Id. at 1231-1232 (quoting Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 96-89, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir.

5/22/96), 676 So.2d 619, writ denied, 96-1650 (La. 10/25/96), 681 So.2d 365).

DISCUSSION OF APPLICABLE LAW

Appellant has urged that a material change in circumstances has occurred in

that he has completed substance abuse treatment through the Teen Challenge

program. He asserts that he has been sober for three years and has now become a

worthy father as a reformed man.

While this court commends Appellant’s efforts at bettering his health and

livelihood and encourages Appellant to remain motivated in continuing on this

brighter path, it must acknowledge that this absence of illegal activity falls short of

the requirements this court has demanded to satisfy a material change in

circumstances.

We note that at the time of the second consent decree in October of 2007,

Appellant had already been two years removed from the treatment that he claims

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cured him of his addictions. The next step in the logical progression is to ask what

material change in circumstance has occurred since that time. It appears that

Appellant has merely tacked additional time onto his continued sobriety. He is asking

us to consider the dearth of a stumble on his part as a material change in

circumstances.

Appellant argues that the holding set forth in Richardson v. Richardson, 07-

0430 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/28/07), 974 So.2d 761, applies to this case. The court in

Richardson held that a material change in circumstances existed when a father

engaged in the continued use of cocaine over a one and a half year period. Appellant

contends that this principle applies by analogy–that his abstention from drug use for

a period of time similarly amounts to a material change in circumstances. We do not

agree. Appellant has merely acted in conformity with the expectations placed on him

by society and the legal system.

While it is evident that Mr. Stoker has made changes in his own life since his

last arrest, there have been no material changes in circumstances since the time of the

last consent judgment that would justify a modification of custody, as the changes

referred to do not have an effect on the welfare of the child. All that has transpired

is Mr. Stoker’s continued disuse of drugs. While Appellant should be proud of his

achievement and while a longer period of compliance may ultimately be adequate to

meet his burden of proof, his mere obedience to the law for a period of six months

since the last adjudication is not enough to lead us to find that the trial court abused

its considerable discretion in determining whether there was a material change of

circumstances in this matter.

It has been argued that the jurisprudence applied in this case stands in contrast

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to Louisiana Civil Code Article 133:

If an award of joint custody or of sole custody to either parent
would result in substantial harm to the child, the court shall award
custody to another person with whom the child has been living in a
wholesome and stable environment, or otherwise to any other person
able to provide an adequate and stable environment.

The article recognizes the parent’s paramount right to custody of the child and

applies a heavier burden than that required in modifying a consent decree–thus

presenting two distinct standards that could be applied in the present matter. We find,

however, that the same result should be reached under both tests. So long as

awarding custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child and awarding

custody to the non-parent would serve the child’s best interests, an award of custody

to the Appellees would be appropriate in this case. Creed v. Creed, 94-268, (La.App.

3 Cir. 12/21/94), 647 So.2d 1362. We find that it is. At the time of the first consent

decree, it was clear that it would have been to Bayli’s detriment to have been placed

in the custody of the Appellant–considering his drug use and other illegal behavior.

The Appellant has taken steps to rehabilitate himself. Rehabilitation could be

considered a material change in circumstances which would allow him to meet his

burden of proof. The question of whether the Appellant’s rehabilitation has

progressed to a point that it may be considered a material change in circumstances is

a fact driven inquiry. We read the trial court opinion to be a finding that his

rehabilitation has not yet reached that point. For these reasons, we find that there was

no clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

CONCLUSION:

Appellant has been unable to show that there was a clear abuse of discretion

on the part of the trial court in determining that there was no material change in

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circumstances since the time of the last consent judgment in this matter. Therefore,

we affirm the underlying judgment with a reservation of the right of the Appellant to

seek modification of the present custodial arrangement upon satisfactory proof, with

competent evidence, of his successful rehabilitation and ability to regain parental

custody of his child. All costs of this proceeding are to be paid by Appellant.

AFFIRMED.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-0524

HEBERT AND MARTHA DALME

VERSUS

LEAH DALME, ET AL.

PETERS, J., dissenting.

If the dispute in this matter were between the mother and father of the minor

child at issue, I would be in complete agreement with the majority opinion. However,

the effect of the majority opinion is to elevate the non-parent litigants to the status of

parents and effectively preclude the natural father from ever being able to reclaim

custody of his minor child. For the reasons that follow, I find that the trial court

erred, not only in maintaining the grandparents as custodial parents, but in its initial

award of domiciliary custody to the grandparents as well.

The whole problem with non-parents initiating proceedings to obtain custody

of a minor child is that there exists no procedural authority under Louisiana law for

such a direct challenge by a non-parent to the long recognized paramount right of a

parent to custody of his or her child. In this case, the grandparents, not the parents,

instituted the custody litigation.

Custody of minor children is first addressed in Section 3 of Title V of the

Louisiana Civil Code. That Section begins with La.Civ.Code art. 131, which simply

provides that “[i]n a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court shall award

custody of a child in accordance with the best interest of the child.” It is only when

parental custody “would result in substantial harm to the child” that non-parent

custody is even considered. La.Code Civ.P. art. 133. Custody of illegitimate children

is governed by the same rules. La.Code Civ.P. art. 245.

Thus, the Louisiana Civil Code provides that the only instance where a non-

parent may become involved in a custody matter is by application of La.Civ.Code art.

133. Pursuant to this article, a non-parent’s involvement is contingent on the parents

raising the issue in a prior custody proceeding. Even then, the non-parent’s right

arises only if the trial court determines that parental custody would result in

substantial harm to the child and that it is in the best interest of the child that custody

be granted to a non-parent.

The fact that non-parents, and specifically grandparents, do not have the right

to institute custody proceedings does not leave them powerless to protect minor

children in whom they have an interest. In fact the Child in Need of Care provisions

of the Louisiana Children’s Code directly provide the relief that was needed in July

of 2004, and does so without elevating a non-parent to parent status. Louisiana

Children’s Code Article 601 provides in pertinent part:

The purpose of this Title is to protect children whose physical or
mental health and welfare is substantially at risk of harm by physical
abuse, neglect, or exploitation and who may be further threatened by the
conduct of others, by providing for the reporting of suspected cases of
abuse, exploitation, or neglect of children; by providing for the
investigation of such complaints; and by providing, if necessary, for the
resolution of child in need of care proceedings in the courts.

The Article further states that proceedings under the Child in Need of Care provisions

“shall be conducted expeditiously to avoid delays in achieving permanency for

children.” Id. (Emphasis added). This is clearly the better alternative to a judicially

created right of action to non-parents for physical custody. In fact, in the matter

before us, it would have eliminated the very delays and roadblocks built into this

litigation that deprive a parent of the right to receive consideration of rehabilitation

efforts that might not change a prior order of custody to the other parent, but certainly

should have more weight in a dispute between the parent and a non-parent.

2

I would dispose of this matter, pursuant to the authority found in La.Code

Civ.P. art. 927(B), by finding that the non-parent plaintiffs had no right to bring this

action in the first place.1 If the grandparents felt a need to continue to pursue a means

of protecting their grandchild, the provisions of the Louisiana Children’s Code would

be immediately available. If, as the grandmother testified, the real purpose of

maintaining custody is to effect an ultimate transfer of custody to her daughter, this

dismissal would also have the effect of placing the mother and father on equal footing

and eliminate the current advantage of the mother.

Even assuming that a non-parent has a right to bring a custody action against

the parents of a child, I disagree with the majority’s affirmation of the trial court’s

judgment continuing domiciliary custody in the grandparents. The trial court found

that because the first two times the custody issue was addressed resulted in consent

decrees, the father was required to establish a material change of circumstances and

that the transfer of domiciliary custody to him was in the best interest of the child

before the trial court could change the consent decree. In other words, the father was

relegated to the same burden in a proceeding against a non-parent as he would have

had against the mother of the child. As previously stated, this elevates the non-parent

to the status of parent. Such a holding flies in the face of the parental preference rule.

It is axiomatic that a parent has a paramount right to the custody of his or her

child. Creed v. Creed, 94-286 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/21/94), 647 So.2d 1362. As stated

in that opinion,

[T]he party moving that someone other than the parent have custody has
the burden of proving that the parent or parents are unfit and that
substantial harm would result to the children. Secondly, Louisiana Civil
Code article 131 (formerly La.Civ.Code art. 146) and the jurisprudence

1
I recognize that many reported cases involve non-parents as the initial plaintiffs in custody
disputes. However, in the vast majority of these cases, the right of action issue never arose. (But
see the dissent in Williams v. Boone, 99-106 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/19/99), 733 So.2d 1257).

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interpreting it establishes a two prong test before the trial court can grant
custody to a non-parent: the trial court must find that an award of
custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child or result in
substantial harm and that the award of custody to a non-parent is
required to serve the best interests of the child. Lastly, the burden is a
“strict one” in which the non-parent seeking custody must show
“compelling reasons by convincing proof” that custody to the parent
would result in substantial harm.

Id. at 1365 (citation omitted).

This court recently reaffirmed the views expressed in Creed in Whitman v. Williams,

08-1133, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/09), 6 So.3d 852, 853:

We are mindful that the “concept of parental primacy is well
established in Louisiana law” and that a nonparent is “required to make
a very strong showing before custody should be awarded in their favor.”
Wilson v. Paul, 08-382, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/08), 997 So.2d 572,
574. Furthermore, “[i]n a conflict between parents and nonparents, the
parent enjoys the paramount right to custody of a child, and may be
deprived of such right only for compelling reasons.” Id. (quoting
Tennessee v. Campbell, 28,823, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/30/96), 682
So.2d 1274, 1278). As such, the nonparent bears the burden of proving
that “granting custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child,
and that the best interest of the child requires an award of custody to the
nonparent.” Id. (quoting Tennessee, 682 So.2d at 1278).

Thus, in order for the grandparents to gain custody of the minor child, they must

satisfy the two prong test set out in La.Civ.Code art. 133. They must prove by clear

and convincing evidence that a parent’s custody of his or her own child will cause

substantial harm and that the best interest of the child necessitates custody in their

favor. The plaintiffs in this case were far from successful in satisfying that burden.

The child’s grandmother testified initially that she and her husband intended

to maintain custody only until the parent or parents rehabilitated themselves. In other

words, there was never an attempt to obtain “permanent custody.” They were simply

trying to protect their granddaughter from her struggling parents. On the one hand,

the grandmother testified that the father has cooperated in every way possible, has

been clean of substance abuse for a significant period, and has proven himself to be

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a good and loving parent. On the other hand, she objected to allowing him the

opportunity to raise his own child solely because she believes drug addition is “for

life,” and, therefore, he “might” relapse in the future. This was the extent of the

evidence on the father’s fitness.

When recalled to the stand later in the trial, the grandparents’ true motivation

came to the surface. When questioned about her daughter’s position in this matter,2

the grandmother made it perfectly clear that she would never consent to custody by

the father because she was waiting for her daughter to seek custody and had every

intention of helping her in every way to obtain custody. This position was expressed

despite the fact that the child’s mother had the same drug addiction as did the father.

Suddenly, addiction “for life” and the fear of relapse in the future became of less

importance.

I find, as did our brethren in the first circuit in Robert v. Gaudet, 96-2506,

(La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 780, that a consent judgment does not alter the

non-parents’ obligation to establish the two-fold burden of La.Code Civ.P. art. 133.

To divest a parent of custody based only on a finding of material
change of circumstances and that an award to a nonparent was in the
best interest of the child, would circumvent the paramount right of the
parent to the child. The correct procedure for a divestiture, or a
substantive modification of parental custody, is the threshold
determination that a material change affecting the child’s welfare has
occurred. If the trial court finds in the affirmative, the court follows
with a determination of whether continued parental custody would result
in substantial harm to the child. See Rupert v. Swinford, 95-0359, at p.
3-4 [La.App. 1 Cir. 10/6/95], 671 So.2d [502,] 505.

To do otherwise would create a trap for the unwary. Nonparents
would be relieved of the burden imposed by Civil Code article 133 in all
future parent-nonparent disputes after the initial award of custody to the
parents by consent decree. Article 133 would be eviscerated.

Id. at 783 (emphasis in original).

2
The daughter has never brought any action for return of custody.

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Thus, in the hearing we are reviewing, the burden of proof remained with the

grandparents despite the two previous consent judgments between the parties. It

bears stating again that to allow the grandparents to rely on the lesser burden of proof

employed in proceedings between parents seeking modification of a non-considered

decree would effectively elevate them to the status of parents. Divestiture of a

parent’s paramount right to custody occurs only upon a showing of compelling

reasons by convincing proof. Creed, 674 So.2d 1362.

Certainly, the grandparents are to be commended for stepping in and protecting

their granddaughter in her time of need. However, we should not judicially create a

situation where parents who have made mistakes and learned from those mistakes are

precluded from raising their children. To do so destroys the long-recognized

paramount right of parents to raise their children. This case is a prime example of a

situation that starts with good intentions, and, if the non-parents are not held to the

stringent burden of proof, will result in a father losing his opportunity to raise his

child—not because of the mother’s actions, but because of a non-parent who

instituted an action not sanctioned by our procedure law. I would reverse and award

the father custody, finding that the grandparents failed in their burden of proof.

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