State in the Interest of K. L. A.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-153

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF

K. L. A.

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 24670
HONORABLE GUY ERNEST BRADBERRY, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********
ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE
**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Billy Howard Ezell,
and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.

Ezell, J., concurs.

AFFIRMED.

Emma J. DeVillier
Assistant Attorney General
Colin Clark
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney General’s Office
P. O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
Telephone: (225) 326-6200
COUNSEL FOR:
Appellant – State of Louisiana

John F. DeRosier
District Attorney – 14th Judicial District
Carla Sue Sigler
Assistant District Attorney – 14th Judicial District
James Kenneth Yelverton
Assistant District Attorney – 14th Judicial District
Karen McClellan
Assistant District Attorney – 14th Judicial District
Cynthia Lea Guillory
Assistant District Attorney – 14th Judicial District
P. O. Box 3206
Lake Charles, LA 70602
Telephone: (337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR:
Appellant – State of Louisiana

Mike K. Stratton
Public Defender’s Office
901 Lakeshore Drive – Suite 700
Lake Charles, LA 70601
Telephone: (337) 436-1718
COUNSEL FOR:
Appellee – K. L. A.

Harry Pierre Fontenot, Jr.
1000 South Huntington Street – Suite D
Sulphur, LA 70663
Telephone: (337) 527-3000
COUNSEL FOR:
Appellee – K. L. A.

Dalonshia Thomas-Jordan
Assistant District Attorney – 14th Judicial District
901 Lakeshore Drive
Lake Charles, LA 70601
Telephone: (337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR:
Appellant – State of Louisiana

Edward King Alexander, Jr.
Necole M. Williams
P. O. Box 3757
Lake Charles, LA 70602
(337) 436-1718
COUNSEL FOR:
Appellee – K.L.A.

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

A juvenile adjudicated delinquent of aggravated incest filed a Motion

for Injunction/Cease and Desist Order/Stay Order, asserting that juveniles are not

subject to the sex offender registration requirements under La.R.S. 32:412(I) and

La.R.S. 40:1321(J), which require sex offenders to obtain driver’s licenses and

identification cards denoting their sex offender status. The trial court granted the

juvenile’s motion, reasoning that the requirements of La.R.S. 32:412(I) and

La.R.S. 40:1321(J) directly conflict with the community notification exemptions

afforded to juveniles under La.R.S. 15:542.1(C). For the following reasons, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.

ISSUE

We shall consider whether a juvenile that is required to register as a

sex offender under La.R.S. 15:542 et seq. is also required under La.R.S. 32:412(I)

and La.R.S. 40:1321(J) to obtain a driver’s license and identification card that

identifies the juvenile as a sex offender.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 21, 2012, the juvenile, K.L.A., was adjudicated delinquent on

the charge of aggravated incest, a violation of La.R.S. 14:78.1. The trial judge

ordered that K.L.A. be committed to the custody of the Louisiana Department of

Public Safety and Corrections for a period of two years. The trial judge

subsequently modified the order and released K.L.A. to parental custody from the

Office of Juvenile Justice, with the requirement that he update his sex offender

registration every ninety days from the date of initial registration. On July 19,

2013, Detective Sutherland of the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office informed

K.L.A. that he must obtain a driver’s license and/or an identification card

containing the words “sex offender” by July 22, 2013 in order to comply with

La.R.S. 32:412(I) and La.R.S. 40:1321(J). In response, K.L.A. filed a Motion for

Injunction/Cease and Desist Order/Stay Order. He argued that La.R.S. 32:412(I)

and La.R.S. 40:1321(J) do not explicitly include juveniles and are in direct conflict

with the community notification exemptions afforded to juveniles under La.R.S.

15:542.1(C). In addition, K.L.A. argued that La.R.S. 32:412(I) and La.R.S.

40:1321(J) are unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, overinclusive, and amount to

cruel and unusual punishment when applied to juveniles. After a hearing, the trial

judge granted K.L.A.’s Motion for Injunction/Cease and Desist Order/Stay Order,

reasoning that since the requirements of La.R.S. 32:412(I) and La.R.S. 40:1321(J)

amount to community notifications, they do not apply to adjudicated juveniles who

are required to register as sex offenders but are exempt from community

notifications under La.R.S. 15:542.1(C). The State of Louisiana now appeals the

trial court’s judgment.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case involves the interplay between the sex offender registration

and notification requirements under La.R.S. 15:542 et seq. and the sex offender

driver’s license and identification card requirements under La.R.S. 32:412(I) and

La.R.S. 40:1321(J). As this is an issue of statutory interpretation, it is a question of

2

law subject to a de novo standard of review. La. Mun. Ass’n v. State, 04-227 (La.

1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809; Stewart v. Estate of Stewart, 07-333 (La.App. 3 Cir.

10/3/07), 966 So.2d 1241.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

On appeal, the State argues that the driver’s license and identification

requirements under La.R.S. 32:412(I) and La.R.S. 40:1321(J) explicitly apply to

adjudicated juveniles given that the requirements apply to all sex offenders

required to register under La.R.S. 15:542 et seq. We disagree.

In interpreting these statutes, we are bound by long-standing rules of

statutory interpretation:

The starting point in the interpretation of any
statute is the language of the statute itself. [State v.
Johnson, 03-2993, p. 11 (La. 10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568,
575; Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 95-2895, p. 3 (La.
5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184, 186]. “When a law is clear and
unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no
further interpretation may be made in search of the intent
of the legislature.” La. Civ.Code. art. 9; Johnson, 884
So.2d at 575. However, “when the language of the law is
susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted
as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose
of the law.” La. Civ.Code art. 10; Fontenot v. Reddell
Vidrine Water Dist., 02–0439 (La.1/14/03), 836 So.2d
14, 20. Moreover, “when the words of a law are
ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining
the context in which they occur and the text of the law as
a whole.” La. Civ.Code art. 12.

It is also well established that the Legislature is
presumed to enact each statute with deliberation and with
full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject.
Johnson, 884 So.2d at 576; State v. Campbell, 03–3035
(La.7/6/04), 877 So.2d 112, 117. Thus, legislative
language will be interpreted on the assumption the
Legislature was aware of existing statutes, well

3

established principles of statutory construction and with
knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in
view. Johnson, 884 So.2d at 576–77; Campbell, 877
So.2d at 117. It is equally well settled under our rules of
statutory construction, where it is possible, courts have a
duty in the interpretation of a statute to adopt a
construction which harmonizes and reconciles it with
other provisions dealing with the same subject matter.
La. Civ.Code art. 13; City of New Orleans v. Louisiana
Assessors’ Retirement and Relief Fund, 05–2548,
[(La.10/1/07), 986 So.2d 1].

M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, pp. 13-14 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d

16, 27.

Following the rules of statutory interpretation, we must first examine

the plain language of the statutes in question. Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:412(I)

states, in pertinent part:

I. (1) The Louisiana driver’s license, regardless of
its class, issued to any person who is required to register
as a sex offender pursuant to R.S. 15:542 and R.S.
15:542.1 shall contain a restriction code which declares
that the license holder is a sex offender. The secretary of
the Department of Public Safety and Corrections shall
comply with the provisions of this Subsection and the
driver’s license shall include the words “sex offender”
which shall be orange in color.

....

(5) The provisions of this Subsection shall apply to
all registered sex offenders regardless of the date of
conviction.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1321(J) provides similar requirements in regards to

mandatory identification cards for registered sex offenders:

J. (1) Any person required to register as a sex
offender with the Louisiana Bureau of Criminal
Identification and Information, as required by R.S.
15:542 et seq., shall obtain a special identification card
issued by the Department of Public Safety and
Corrections which shall contain a restriction code
declaring that the holder is a sex offender.

4

....

(3) The provisions of this Subsection shall apply to
all sex offenders required to register pursuant to R.S.
15:542 et seq., regardless of the date of conviction.
As K.L.A. was adjudicated delinquent of aggravated incest, a violation of La.R.S.

14:78.1, he is required to register as a sex offender under La.R.S. 15:542(A)(3)(f).

As La.R.S. 32:412(I)(1) and La.R.S. 40:1321(J)(1) both state that any person

required to register as a sex offender under La.R.S. 15:542 et seq. shall be required

to comply with the driver’s license and identification card requirements, one could

reasonably interpret the statute to apply to adjudicated juveniles like K.L.A.

However, both La.R.S. 32:412(I)(5) and La.R.S. 40:1321(J)(3) also state that sex

offenders required to register under La.R.S. 15:542 et seq. must comply with the

driver’s license and identification requirements “regardless of the date of

conviction.” Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the driver’s license and

identification requirements only apply to registered sex offenders who have been

convicted of a crime. Given that the Louisiana Supreme Court has explicitly stated

that juvenile adjudications are not convictions, one could just as easily find that the

registration requirements under La.R.S. 32:412(I) and La.R.S. 40:1321(J) do not

apply to adjudicated juveniles like K.L.A.

As the statutory language of La.R.S. 32:412(I) and La.R.S. 40:1321(J)

gives rise to two conflicting interpretations in regards to whether their

requirements apply to adjudicated juveniles, the statutes are ambiguous on their

face. As such, we must look beyond the plain language to find the interpretation

that best conforms to the purpose of the laws. Considering criminal statutes are

interpreted with lenity in favor of the accused and “should be so interpreted as to

be in harmony with, preserve, and effectuate the manifest intent of the

5

legislature[,]” we reason that La.R.S. 32:412(I) and La.R.S. 40:1321(J) should not

apply to juveniles adjudicated delinquent. State v. Brown, 03-2788, p. 6 (La.

7/6/04), 879 So.2d 1276, 1280.

First, the legislature never intended for juveniles to be subject to these

requirements. Louisiana Children’s Code Article 884.1(A)(6) states that when a

child is adjudicated delinquent of aggravated incest, the court shall provide the

child with written notice of the sex offender registration requirements. Louisiana

Children’s Code Article 884.1(B) provides the actual form for the notice, which

outlines all of the registration requirements for adjudicated juveniles. Notably,

La.Ch.Code art. 884.1, which was enacted in 2010, does not include the driver’s

license or identification card registration requirements of La.R.S. 32:412(I) and

La.R.S. 40:1321(J), which were enacted in 2006. See 2006 La. Sess. Law Serv.

Act 663 (S.B. 612) (La. 2006); 2010 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 594 (H.B. 702) (La.

2010). Considering legislative language is interpreted with the assumption that the

legislature is aware of existing statutes, it is assumed that the legislature was aware

of the registration requirements under La.R.S. 32:412(I) and La.R.S. 40:1321(J)

when it drafted La.Ch.Code art. 884.1. Thus, the explicit exclusion of these

requirements from adjudicated juveniles under La.Ch.Code art. 884.1 must be

considered purposeful.

Beyond legislative intent, applying the requirements of La.R.S.

32:412(I) and La.R.S. 40:1321(J) to adjudicated juveniles creates inherent discord

with the other statutory provisions regarding juvenile sex offender registration and

notification. Louisiana Children’s Code Article 412(A) stipulates that “[r]ecords

and reports concerning all matters or proceedings before the juvenile court, except

traffic violations, are confidential and shall not be disclosed except as expressly

6

authorized by this Code.” This mandate of confidentiality under Article 412

applies equally to the sex offender registration requirements for juveniles.

Specifically, La.R.S. 15:542.1(C) states that “[a]ny juvenile required to register in

accordance with the provisions of this Chapter shall be exempt from any

notification requirements of this Section” unless they provide recreational

instruction to persons under the age of seventeen. Considering the driver’s license

and/or identification card is the primary means of identification in the community

and is oftentimes a necessity to perform everyday acts such as purchasing goods,

opening financial accounts, or buying or leasing real estate, to require juveniles to

have the status of sex offender written on their driver’s license or identification

card would completely undermine the confidentiality requirements and notification

exemptions mandated by the Louisiana Children’s Code and the Louisiana Revised

Statutes. In order to resolve this discord in the law and preserve the manifest intent

of the legislature, it follows that the registration requirements of La.R.S. 32:412(I)

and La.R.S. 40:1321(J) cannot apply to juveniles adjudicated delinquent. As such,

the trial court did not err in finding that K.L.A., as a juvenile adjudicated

delinquent of aggravated incest, was not required to obtain a driver’s license or

State ID that designates his status as a sex offender. We need not consider the

constitutional arguments raised by K.L.A. because all issues have been disposed of

on non-constitutional grounds. La. Mun. Ass’n, 893 So.2d 809.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

7