State of Louisiana in the Interest of H.R., B.R., B.S.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

15-136

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF H. R., B. R., B. S.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. J-6910
HONORABLE JOHN LARRY VIDRINE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, John E. Conery, and David Kent Savoie,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

L. R. (father)
Pointe Coupee Parish Prison
Post Office Box 248
New Roads, Louisiana 70760
PRO-SE APPELLANT

L. Antoinette Beard
825 Kaliste Saloom Road
Brandywine 3, Room 150
Lafayette, Louisiana 70508
(337) 262-1555
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana, Department of Children & Family Services

Trent Brignac
District Attorney
Julhelene E. Jackson
Assistant District Attorney
13th Judicial District
Post Office Drawer 780
Ville Platte, Louisiana 70586
(337) 363-3438
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Mahogany Watkins
Acadiana Legal Services Corporation
620 Murray Street
Alexandria, Louisiana 71301
(318) 442-6240
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:
H. R. (child)
B. R. (child)
B. S. (child)

CONERY, Judge.

The State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services (State)

filed a motion for termination of parental rights approximately two and one half

years before a final hearing. The trial court terminated the parental rights of the

mother J.S. and the father L.R, with respect to their minor daughters H.R., B.R.,

and B.S. 1 Only the father, L.R., appeals the trial court’s denial of a further

continuance of the termination proceedings and the October 14, 2014 judgment

terminating his parental rights.2 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCDURAL HISTORY

On October 1, 2010, by virtue of a written instanter order, the three minors,

H.R. (born December 5, 2002), B.R. (born February 1, 2005), and B.S. (born

February 1, 2006), came into the custody of the Louisiana Department of Children

and Family Services (formerly the Department of Social Services). The October 1,

2010 order was based on allegations that, J.S., the mother, was in treatment for

drug addiction and L.R., the unmarried father, was in treatment for a gambling

addiction. Consequently, the State claimed that there was no one, including J.S’s

parents, available to care for the three minors. J.S. had requested that the State

take custody of the three children. At a hearing on October 4, 2010, the trial court

signed an order of continued custody, which provided that the children were to

remain in the custody of the State.

1
Pursuant to Uniform Rules–Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-1 and 5-2, the initials of the
parties will be used to protect and maintain the privacy of the minor children involved in the
proceeding.
2
The trial court’s judgment signed October 14, 2014 terminated the parental rights of
both L.R. and J.S. However, J.S. did not appeal, thus, the termination of her parental rights is
not presently before this court.

A petition was filed on October 18, 2010 alleging that the children should be

adjudicated “Children In Need of Care.” On November 10, 2010, an adjudication

and disposition hearing was conducted. The trial court found that the three minors

were “Children in Need of Care,” adjudicated them as such, and placed custody of

the children with the State. A case plan dated October 29, 2010, was also made

part of the record of the proceedings.

At the first review hearing on April 15, 2011, the permanent plan ordered by

the trial court was reunification of the parents with their children. As of the April

15, 2011 review hearing, J.S. was in partial compliance with her case plan, and L.R.

was deemed uncooperative, having failed to provide an accurate address. The case

review hearing order stated, “L.R. does not accept responsibility for the children

entering into the state’s custody.” The parents were ordered to comply with the

case plan dated October 29, 2010, with reunification of the family as the permanent

plan. The trial court scheduled the next review hearing for October 31, 2011.

However, prior to the scheduled October hearing, allegations of sexual abuse

of the three minors by both J.S. and L.R. were validated. On October 21, 2011,

both parents were appointed legal representation, and for all subsequent legal

proceedings, each had been represented by separate legal counsel. At the review

hearing held on October 31, 2011, the record reflects that, as of that date, L.R. had

not completed any components of his case plan. Likewise, J.S. had “done very

little on her case plan.” After the hearing on October 31, 2011, the permanent plan

ordered by the trial court was changed to adoption. Both parents were ordered by

the trial court to comply with the case plan dated October 20, 2011.

In the permanency and case review hearings held from October 31, 2011

forward, including April 24, 2012, October 24, 2012, May 13, 2013, and October

2

29, 2013, the trial court continued to order adoption as the permanent case plan for

the three minors. From October 1, 2010 to date, H.R., B.R., and B.S. have

remained together in their initial placement in a foster home and in the custody of

the State. The trial court maintained this custody plan on its docket from its

inception in October 2010.

On March 5, 2012, the State filed a formal “Petition for Termination of

Parental Rights and Certificate of Adoption” (State’s Petition) seeking to terminate

the parental rights of both J.S. and L.R. to clear the way for the foster parents to

adopt the three minors. Trial on the petition was originally scheduled for May 4,

2012. However, at the trial on the State’s Petition held on October 24, 2012, the

trial court expressed its reluctance to proceed on the termination of L.R.’s rights

until resolution of the criminal proceedings pending against him in Point Coupee

Parish.

The State’s Petition was rescheduled an additional four times to

accommodate L.R.’s criminal proceedings, November 30, 2012, March 5, 2013,

July 19, 2013, and September 25, 2013. The additional continuances of the trial on

the State’s Petition set for April 9, 2014, June 25, 2014, and August 6, 2014, were

due to the absence of a parent and or counsel. The State’s Petition was finally set,

noticed, and heard by the trial court on October 8, 2014.

At the conclusion of the case review hearing on October 8, 2014, the trial

court denied L.R.’s motion for another continuance of the trial on the termination

of his parental rights for reasons stated on the record. The State’s Petition against

both J.S. and L.R then proceeded. The trial court, for reasons stated on the record

in open court, terminated the parental rights of J.S. and L.R. to their minor

daughters H.R., B.R., and B.S. The trial court based its decision on two of the

3

three of the State’s alleged grounds for termination of J.S. and L.R.’s parental

rights, La.Ch.Code arts. 1015 (4)(b) and 1015(5).3

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1015(4)(b) provides:

The grounds for termination of parental rights are:

(4) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody
of a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him under
circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid
parental responsibility by any of the following:

(b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to provide
significant contributions to the child’s care and support for any period
of six consecutive months.

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1015(5) provides:

The grounds for termination of parental rights are:

5) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed
since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant to a
court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a
case plan for services which has been previously filed by the
department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return
of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or
conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for
a safe, stable, and permanent home.

The judgment rendered in open court on October 8, 2014 was formally

signed by the trial court in a judgment rendered on October 14, 2014. The October

14, 2014 judgment was timely appealed only by L.R., pro se.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

L.R. only asserts one assignment of error on appeal:

3
The trial court did not base its judgment on La.Ch.Code art.1015(3). Louisiana Children’s
Code Article 1015(3) contains provisions pertaining to the sexual abuse of a minor by a parent.
The record reflects that the trial court specifically limited any testimony at the trial concerning
this aspect of the case.

4

The Trial Court Erred by Rescinding its previously imposed court
order on the morning of the Termination Hearing without granting a
Continuance to Allow [Appellant] to Properly Prepare a Defense.

L.R. also requests that this court review the entire record in order to insure

“Fairness and Due Process,” and that this court review the entire record based on a

claim in his briefing to this court that “he has been Denied his Constitutional

Rights to Due Process.” L.R. further requests that this court set aside the trial

court’s October 14, 2014 judgment.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error One-Denial of the Continuance Requested by L.R.

L.R. contends that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to

grant his motion for a continuance of the trial scheduled for October 8, 2014 on

termination of his parental rights. L.R. contends that the trial court “issued an

Order that No Action would be taken against [L.R.] until the Criminal Charges in

Point Coupee Parish were Resolved.” The record reflects that no such order exists,

however, the minute entry of October 24, 2012 states, “The court . . . found that it

is not ready to terminate L.R.’s rights until further action of Pointe Coupee Parish

Court.”

The record demonstrates the trial court’s futile attempts to accommodate

L.R., as trial of the State’s Petition, filed on March 5, 2012, was fixed on seven

different occasions before finally being heard on October 8, 2014. Four of the trial

fixings were continued to accommodate L.R.’s pending criminal charges in Point

Coupee Parish. The additional three trial fixings were due to absence of counsel or

of a parent. However, the record is also clear that L.R.’s prior trial dates had been

continued without an end in sight. At the October 8, 2014 hearing, the trial court

became concerned that a further continuance would be detrimental to the best

5

interests of the children. The State contends and the record reflects that at the

previous hearing on August 6, 2004, L.R. had been informed by the trial court that

no further continuances would be entertained and that the trial would proceed on

October 8, 2014.

On the morning of October 8, 2014, it appeared that L.R.’s criminal trial had

once again been continued to February 23, 2015, and L.R. once again moved for a

continuance. The trial court, in its colloquy with counsel and L.R. on the record at

the hearing, denied L.R.’s request for a continuance:

BY MS. WATKINS:

Is this termination hearing in just regards to [J.S.] or is it in regards to
[L.R.]?

BY THE COURT:

I assumed it was both.

BY MS. BEARD:

Oh yes, yes sir.

BY MR. PUCHEU:

Your Honor are you rescinding the order that you stated earlier that
until he was finished with his criminal trial we would not have a
hearing?

BY THE COURT:

I’m rescinding it yes.

BY MR. PUCHEU:

Okay.

BY L.R.:

Well we didn’t have time to prepare. I mean I didn’t have time to
prepare. You had an order for two years Your Honor.

BY THE COURT:

6

Pardon.

BY MR. PUCHEU:

He’s stating that he did not have time to prepare for this because he
did not think we would have such a hearing until his trial.

BY THE COURT:

Well let me think. You know this thing will stay in limbo forever
because I have the advantage of having heard this thing four or five
times already.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Yes sir.

BY THE COURT:

In two and a half months I’m leaving the bench and headed for the
happy fields of retirement where I don’t have to listen to such painful
things anymore. Then you gonna come in with some new judge who
doesn’t have the slightest clue what this case is all about.

BY L.R.:

And Your Honor that’s understandable but I at least ask for time to
prepare a defense. I mean…

BY MR. PUCHEU:

Request a continuance.

BY MS. BEARD:

Your [Honor] we would object. I believe at the last hearing…

BY THE COURT:

Well it might be reversible error but I’m going to say we’re going
forward with it.

....

BY MS. BEARD:

Yes Your Honor. The State would call Ms. Carla Bollich to the stand
and Your Honor for the record I would note that at the pre…at the last

7

hearing Your Honor did indicate that we were going to proceed with
regard to [L.R.] whether or not he had completed, had finalized his
uh…criminal charges.

BY THE COURT:

Alright, Swear her in.

Standard of Review

In Walsh v. Morris, 07-579, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 970 So.2d 94,

96-97, writ denied, 09-478 (La. 4/17/09), 6 So.3d 795, a panel of this circuit stated

the standard of review and factors that should be considered by the trial court in

granting or denying a motion for continuance:

“[A] continuance may be granted in any case there is good
ground therefor.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 1601. The trial court has great
discretion in granting or denying a motion for a continuance, and
denial of a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the trial
court is shown to have abused its discretion. Jackson v. Royal Ins.
Co., 97-723 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/17/97), 704 So.2d 424. Whether a
trial court should grant or deny a continuance depends on the
particular facts of each case.

Some factors to consider in denying or granting a continuance
are diligence, good faith, and reasonable grounds. Demopulos v.
Jackson, 33,560 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/21/00), 765 So.2d 480. Fairness to
both parties and the need for orderly administration of justice are
additional considerations in deciding whether to grant or deny a
continuance. Gilcrease v. Bacarisse, 26,318 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/7/94),
647 So.2d 1219, writ denied, 95-421 (La.3/30/95), 651 So.2d 845.

Based on the record before us, we find that the trial court had more than

sufficient grounds to deny L.R.’s motion for continuance and proceed with the trial

for termination of L.R.’s parental rights scheduled on October 8, 2014. The minor

children had been in the care of the State for some four years after their mother,

J.S., surrendered them to the custody of the State on October 1, 2010.

The evaluations of the minor children reflect that they had continued to

make progress emotionally, socially, and in their educational pursuits while living

8

with their foster parents. Both the foster parents and the State were anxious to

make the situation of the minor children permanent. As of the October 8, 2014

hearing, the foster parents stood ready and were willing to adopt the three minor

children, thus keeping them together as a family unit.

On October 8, 2014, L.R.’s situation remained virtually unchanged since the

trial court’s initial continuance on October 24, 2012. The initial continuance was

based on the trial court’s reluctance to terminate L.R.’s parental rights until after

the resolution of the pending criminal charges lodged against him in Point Coupee

Parish. However, on October 8, 2014, some two years later and two and a half

years from the filing of the State’s Petition, L.R.’s criminal proceedings remained

unresolved. In weighing the equities and in the face of his eminent retirement, the

trial judge denied L.R.’s request for continuance in order to resolve the issue of

termination of L.R.’s parental rights and provide for stability for the children.

In light of the multiple continuances of L.R.’s criminal proceedings, and

faced with yet another continuance of those proceedings to February 23, 2015, the

trial court, which had handled the case from its inception, chose to proceed with

the termination proceedings as scheduled, thus, resolving the issue of L.R.’s

parental rights and providing permanency and stability for three minor children and

their potential adoptive parents. The alternative would have continued to leave

three children and their foster parents in “limbo” indefinitely. In the judgment of

the trial court, such a ruling would not have been in the children’s best interests, as

their need for permanency and stability far outweighed L.R.’s wish to have his

criminal proceeding resolved.

Considering the trial court’s considerable discretion in granting a

continuance, we find the trial court did not abuse its vast discretion in denying

9

L.R.’s motion for a further continuance. Walsh, 970 So.2d at 96-97; La.Code

Civ.P. art. 1061. We therefore find that L.R.’s assignment of error is without

merit.

Request for Review of the Record Relating to L.R.’s Due Process Rights

L.R. did not assign as an error on appeal that “he has been Denied his

Constitutional Rights to Due Process.” Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article

2129 does not require an assignment of errors on appeal and states, “An

assignment of errors is not necessary in any appeal.” However, Uniform Rules-

Courts of Appeal, Rules 1-3 provide for review of “only issues which were

submitted to the trial court and which are contained in specifications or

assignments of error, unless the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise.” The

record does not indicate that L.R. made any objection to the trial court in relation

to his “due process rights.” However in an abundance of caution and in an effort to

resolve all issues raised by L.R. in his pro se capacity, we review the record for due

process violations.

Our review of the record, stated in the facts and procedural history portion of

this opinion, reflect that L.R. was granted and received the constitutional

protections to which he was entitled. L.R. received notice of the hearing dates of

both the review hearing and termination proceedings. L.R. was represented by

counsel throughout the entire period of the termination proceedings for his minor

daughters, H.R., B.R., and B.S. L.R. was given some two and one half years in

order to work his case plan. He had two years to prepare for the termination

proceedings, which were timely noticed and finally heard by the trial court on

October 8, 2014.

10

During the trial, L.R. requested and was granted the right to question the

witnesses in the case in place of his attorney of record, who was present and

prepared to assist him, as he had been throughout these proceedings for over a two

year period. L.R. called two witnesses on his own behalf, the parents of J. S., who

are also the grandparents of the minors, H.R., B.R., and B.S. Therefore, we find no

support in the record for L.R.’s claim that he was denied his right to due process in

connection with the trial held by the trial court terminating his parental rights to

H.R., B.R., and B.S.

L.R.’s Request to Set Aside the Trial Court’s October 14, 2014 Judgment

L.R. asks this court to reverse the trial court’s October 14, 2014 judgment

and that he “be given the opportunity to comply with a Case Plan once released

from custody and charges in Pointe Coupee Parish concerning his children be

resolved.” The standard of review applicable to L.R.’s request was recently stated

in State in the Interest of J.K.G. and J.L.G, 11-908, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/11/12),

118 So.3d 10, 14, “A trial court’s findings on whether or not parental rights should

be terminated are subject to the manifest error standard of review.”

The trial court ruled in favor of the State, finding clear and convincing

evidence to support the termination of L.R.’s parental rights under the provisions

of both La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4)(b) and 1015(5). See State ex. rel J.A., 99-2905

(La. 1/12/00), 752 So.2d 806 (citing La.Ch.Code art. 1035(A)).4 The trial court

further found that the termination of L.R.’s parental rights to H.R., B.R., and B.S.

was in the children’s best interest. See State ex rel. G.J.L., 00-3278 (La. 6/29/01),

791 So.2d 80.

4
Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1035(A) states, “The petitioner bears the burden of
establishing each element of a ground for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing
evidence.”

11

The trial court’s judgment signed on October 14, 2014 stated in pertinent

part:

After consideration of the pleadings, argument of counsel and
evidence presented, and the court having found, for reasons orally
assigned: That the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and
Family Services has met its burden of proof under Louisiana
Children’s Code Articles 1015(4) and 1015(5), in regard to the
parents, J.S and L.R.; That said parents have failed to provide
significant contributions to their children’s care and support for a
period of six consecutive months; that said parents have failed to
substantially comply with their case plans; that there is no reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in said parents’ condition or
conduct in the near future; and that termination of parental rights is in
the best interests of the minor children, as the children are placed
together in an adoptive placement, where they have been for four (4)
years[.]

(Emphasis in original.)

L.R. claims that he was unable to complete his case plan and pay child

support due to his incarceration. However, the record reflects that L.R. made no

attempt, even when he was released from custody on three occasions during the

four years the minors were in the State’s custody, to cooperate with the case

workers or comply with the case plan ordered by the trial court, which included

payment of a parental contribution of only ten dollars per child per month.

L.R.’s failure to cooperate from the beginning of the State’s involvement

with the three minors is clearly documented in the record of the first “CASE

REVIEW HEARING,” held on April 15, 2011. As of the date of the initial hearing,

the children had been in the State’s custody for approximately six months. The

trial court set the second review hearing for October 31, 2011 and ordered the

parents to comply with the October 29, 2010 case plan of reunification of the

family as the permanent plan.

12

However, just prior to the scheduled October hearing, the allegations of

sexual abuse were validated against J.S. and L.R., which prompted the

appointment of separate counsel for both parents and a revision of the case plan on

October 20, 2011, with adoption as the permanent plan for all three children.

L.R. testified at the termination proceedings when questioned why he failed

to comply with the case plan as follows:

Q. Okay. And uh...at the time of your release uh...was it ordered
that you remain under house arrest during that time?

A. Yes it was.

Q. And was that a reason that you could not cooperate with your
case plan that was provided to you by the State?

A. That...that was a reason but the overwhelming reason was the
fact that the case plan changed from reunification to adoption and
terminating parental rights. So I’m thinking why would I agree to
comply with this if they’re gonna continue to try to terminate my
parental rights regardless if I do everything they say or if I don’t do
everything they say. I mean I just, to me that just doesn’t make sense
but the overwhelming thing was the fact that I’ve been incarcerated
for the latter part of the past four years.

As previously indicated, the State’s Petition also contained allegations of

sexual abuse of the three minors by L.R., pursuant to La.Ch.Code art. 1015(3).

L.R. is presently incarcerated and awaiting trial on criminal charges stemming

from the State’s allegations. However, the trial court did not base its judgment on

La.Ch.Code art. 1015(3) and very carefully avoided any testimony on this issue at

the termination proceedings. L.R. testified that, on advice of his attorney, he did

not intend to work on any of the components of the case plan until after his trial.

Based on the trial court’s judgment, it is clear that L.R.’s decision not to cooperate

with the State after criminal charges were filed played no part in the trial court’s

judgment.

13

Despite L.R.’s claim, incarceration is not a defense to termination of

parental rights for failure to pay child support, La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4)(b), or for

failure to comply with the court ordered case plan, La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5). A

panel of this court in State in Interest of J.K.G., 118 So.3d at 15 discussed the

claim of incarceration by a parent as a defense in a termination of parental rights

proceeding and affirmed the termination of the parent’s rights:

S.K.G. was given an opportunity to present evidence of “just
cause” for his failure to provide for his children’s care and support,
but did not do so. “ ‘[J]ust cause’ is an affirmative defense which
allows a parent, after the state has proved abandonment for failure to
provide for the children’s care and support, to prevent termination by
proving that the failure was with just cause and excusable.” Id. at 92,
(citing State in the Interest of M.L., 95–45 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 830).
“Incarceration is not a just cause defense to failure to support children
or maintain contact with them in a termination of parental rights case
if the parent is incarcerated as a result of his own actions.” Id. (citing
State in the Interest of J.T.C., 04–1096 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/15/05), 895
So.2d 607).

L.R. was also given the opportunity to present “just cause” after the

testimony and evidence was presented by the State at the hearing. The record

before this court demonstrates that L.R., despite periods where he was not

incarcerated while the children were in the custody of the State, never took the

steps necessary to prevent the termination of his parental rights.

As affirmed in State ex .rel. D.R.B., 00-1321, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir.

12/6/2000), 777 So.2d 508, 513:

Jurisprudence holds that “[a] parent who professes an intention
to exercise his or her parental rights and responsibilities must take
some action in furtherance of the intention to avoid having those
rights terminated.” State in Interest of S.M., et al., 98-0922, p. 9
(La.10/20/98); 719 So.2d 445, 450 (quoting State in Interest of J.M.,
30,302, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/29/97); 702 So.2d 45, writ denied, 97-
2924 (La.2/6/98); 709 So.2d 736).

14

In addition, his present incarceration is “the result of his own actions.” State

in the Interest of J.T.C., 895 So.2d at 616. L.R. testified at the termination

proceeding that in December 2012 he was released on bond, but subject to house

arrest. However, he decided to travel to Aurora, Colorado without the trial court’s

permission and in violation of the conditions of his bond because he had a pre-

planned trip with round trip tickets. Subsequently, L.R.’s bond was revoked, and

he was extradited back to Louisiana from Colorado and remains incarcerated to

this date.

L.R.’s parental rights are balanced against the rights of the three minor

children and what would serve their best interests, which takes precedence over the

rights of the parents. In State in the Interest of S.M., 98-922, pp. 14-15 (La.

10/20/98), 719 So.2d 445, 452, the supreme court summed up the dynamic at play

and stated:

More than simply protecting parental rights, our judicial system
is required to protect the children’s rights to thrive and survive. State
in Interest of GA, 664 So.2d at 114 (citing State in Interest of JL, 93-
352 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/18/94), 636 So.2d 1186, 1192). Furthermore, a
child has an interest in the termination of rights that prevent adoption
and inhibit that child’s establishment of secure, stable, long term,
continuous family relationships. State in Interest of J.M., 702 So.2d at
50; State in Interest of T.S.B., 532 So.2d 866 (La.App. 4 Cir.1988),
writ denied, 536 So.2d 1239 (La.1989). While the interest of a parent
is protected in a termination proceeding by enforcing the procedural
rules enacted to insure that parental rights are not thoughtlessly
severed, those interests must ultimately yield to the paramount best
interest of the children. See State in Interest of T.S.B., supra; State in
Interest of S.A.D., 481 So.2d 191 (La.App. 1 Cir.1985); State in
Interest of A.E., 448 So.2d 183 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984); State in Interest
of Driscoll, 410 So.2d 255 (La.App. 4 Cir.1982).

At the time the termination proceedings were held on October 8, 2014, the

three minors had been in the custody of the State for four years. They were

initially placed with foster parents that had applied to adopt the three siblings, thus

15

allowing them to remain together in a secure family unit. All three minors, now

ages twelve, ten, and nine, testified at the trial. Each child expressed their wish to

be adopted by their foster parents and remain together.

The trial court delayed the termination proceedings for approximately two

years to allow L.R. to resolve his pending criminal charges, but at last moved

forward and terminated L.R.’s rights, finding that the children’s best interest would

be served by allowing them to be adopted by their foster parents. Therefore, we

find no manifest error in the trial court’s judgment dated October 14, 2014, which

terminated the parental rights of L.R. to his three minor children H.R., B.R., and

B.S.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons assigned, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dated

October 14, 2014, terminating the parental rights of L.R. to his minor daughters

H.R., B.R., and B.S. finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying L.R. a continuance of the termination proceedings or commit manifest

error in its ruling. We also find the record reflects no violation of L.R.’s right to

due process in connection with the proceedings held by the trial court terminating

L.R.’s parental rights. Costs of this appeal are assessed to L.R.

AFFIRMED.

16