State in the Interest of K. D. M.,k. J. M. & K. K. B.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-992

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF

K. D. M., K. J. M. & K. K. B.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF GRANT, NO. 3128
HONORABLE WARREN DANIEL WILLETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

D. KENT SAVOIE
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Shannon J. Gremillion, and D. Kent Savoie,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Robert L. Kennedy
Grant Parish District Defender
352 2nd Street
Colfax, LA 71417
(318) 627-3255
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
D. M. (father of K.D.M & K.J.M)

Guy R. Lain
Louisiana Dept. of Children and Family Services
Bureau of General Counsel
1721 Carter Street
Vidalia, LA 71373
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana, Dept. of Children and Family Services

Thomas Gardiner Wilson
Attorney at Law
420 Kings Drive
Pineville, LA 71360
(318) 201-2807
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
K.M. (mother)

Hon. James Patrick Lemoine
D.A., 35th JDC
P. O. Box 309
Colfax, LA 71417-0309
(318) 627-3205
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Jacqueline Chevette Williams
Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Box 838
Natchitoches, LA 71458-0838
(318) 357-2244
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEES:
K. D. M.,
K. J. M.
K. K. B.

Joseph P. Beck, III
Attorney At Law
5529 Monroe Hwy
Ball, LA 71405
(318) 640-9202
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
D. B. (father of K.K.B.)

Jerrica Wilson
Case Worker
900 Murray Street
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 487-5054
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
Grant Dept of Children and Family Svcs

SAVOIE, Judge.

D.M., 1 who is the biological father of twin children, K.D.M. and K.J.M. 2,

appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 18, 2017, the State, through the Department of Children and

Family Services (the State), sought and obtained an instanter order from the trial

court placing K.D.M. and K.J.M., and also K.K.B, who is another child with a

different father, in the temporary custody of the State. The children were placed in

foster care. K.D.M. and K.J.M. were eight years old at the time, and K.K.B. was

one. In support of the instanter order, the State alleged that the mother of the three

children provided inadequate shelter and “sells her food stamps, smokes synthetic

marijuana on a daily basis in the presence of the minor children, and the trailer in

which they lived was in bad condition, there are no working utilities in the home,

and the children looked malnourished.” In addition, the State alleged that, at the

time, school had been in session for three weeks, yet the children had not attended

during that time. The State also alleged that it eventually made contact with the

children’s mother, who provided false information concerning the whereabouts of

the children. The State further alleged that the family had previously been offered

services on two separate occasions; however, the cases were closed due to the

mother’s noncompliance.

1
Initials of the parties are used in this matter pursuant to Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal
– Rules 5-1 and 5-2.
2
We note that in the trial court and appellate counsel refer to K.J.M. as “K.C.M.” However,
for purposes of consistency with the docketing of this matter, we will use “K.J.M.”

On August 29, 2017, the State filed a Petition seeking to declare K.D.M.,

K.J.M., and K.K.B. as children in need of care. Therein it alleged that D.M. was the

father of K.D.M. and K.J.M., and that K.B. was the father of K.K.B. Given that this

appeal involves only D.M. with respect to K.D.M. and K.J.M., we will not further

discuss actions taken in the trial court with respect to K.B. and/or K.K.B.

A continued custody hearing was held August 21, 2017. The children’s

mother and her attorney were present in court. Counsel for D.M. also made an

appearance on D.M.’s behalf and noted that D.M. was incarcerated. Following the

hearing, the trial court rendered an order the same day finding that it was in the

children’s best interest for them to remain in the custody of the State. The order

further advised the parents of their rights and responsibilities, including their

responsibility to keep the State apprised of their current address, and to cooperate in

preparing a case plan and meeting the needs of their children.

The matter was heard again on September 6, 2017. Counsel for the mother,

and counsel for D.M., were present, as well as a Court Appointed Special Advocate

(CASA) on behalf of the children. An adjudication hearing was then held on October

11, 2017. D.M., through counsel, was present, as well as the mother and her counsel.

D.M.’s counsel again indicated that D.M. was incarcerated. During the October 11,

2017 hearing, a Case Plan dated September 13, 2017, was offered and accepted by

the trial court.

The September 2017 Case Plan reflected that D.M. participated by phone. It

stated that the primary goal with respect to K.D.M. and K.J.M. was reunification,

with a secondary goal of adoption. The plan stated that D.M. “will support his

children in foster care and agree to pay $10.00 per month per child . . . when not

working and $25.00 per month per child if working.” It further provided that

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visitation would occur on the second and fourth Thursdays, and included specific

action steps to be taken by D.M., including maintaining safe housing, participating

in a substance abuse assessment and screenings, and attending visitation. The plan

further stated that D.M. “will maintain contact with the Agency, report all changes

in situation such as: employment, address change, telephone number, etc. He will

attend all court hearings, FTC’s and any other meetings or functions concerning the

children.”

D.M. was incarcerated at the time of the September 2017 case plan, and his

case worker, Ms. Jerrica Wilson, provided a copy of the plan to him when she visited

with him in jail in October 2017.

Following the October 11, 2017 hearing, the trial court rendered a Judgment

finding that it was in K.D.M.’s and K.J.M.’s best interests to remain in the State’s

custody. The Judgment also advised the parents of their rights and responsibilities,

adjudicated the children in need of care, and set a case plan review hearing for

February 7, 2018.

On January 31, 2018, the State filed with the court a report dated January 22,

2018. Therein, the State noted that “[D.M.’s] whereabouts are unknown. [D.M.]

was released from jail on November 1, 2017. [D.M.] has contacted this worker one

time since being out of jail. He has not had any more contact with the agency.” The

report further noted that D.M.’s employment status was unknown and that he had

not completed the case plan’s required substance abuse assessment, parenting

education, or financial contributions.

Also on January 31, 2018, the State filed a Case Plan dated January 23, 2018.

The plan reflected that all three children had been placed with the same foster family

and K.D.M. and K.J.M. had changed schools due to this placement. It also reflected

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that D.M. had not fulfilled any of the required obligations and further stated that

D.M.:

was incarcerated . . . until November 1, 2017. The worker visited with
him once while he was in jail. Worker had contact with him one time
in November when he was released and notified of a family visit. He
did not show up and has not been in contact with the Agency since
November 2017.

A case plan review hearing was held February 7, 2018. Counsel for D.M.

made an appearance on his behalf. Thereafter, the trial court entered a Judgment

ordering the children to remain in the State’s custody and approving the January 23,

2018 case plan.

On July 20, 2018, the State submitted a report dated July 25, 2018, to the trial

court, which stated as follows with respect to D.M.:

[D.M.]’s whereabouts are unknown. [D.M.] was released from jail on
November 1, 2017. [D.M.] has contacted this worker one time in
November 2017. He has not had any more contact with the Agency.
Clear searches have been completed but did not turn up any information
on his whereabouts. The Grant Parish Child Support office contacted
this worker in June 2018. They located [D.M.] in Richland
Correctional Center for a misdemeanor and resisting an officer. The
office had pursued child support for [D.M.] Once located and brought
forth in front of your Honor, he denied being the father of [K.D.M.] and
[K.J.M.] and requested a DNA test. The test was completed and results
showed that he is the father of the twins. [D.M.] was released from jail
on June 29, 2018.

The July 25, 2018 report further reflected that D.M.’s employment status was

unknown, he had not provided any financial support for the children, and he had not

completed the requisite substance abuse assessment or parenting education. It also

stated that D.M. “has never visited the children since they have been in foster care.”

Also on July 30, 2018, the State submitted a Case Plan dated July 2, 2018, to

the trial court. This plan similarly noted that D.M. had not provided financial support

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for the children, his whereabouts were unknown, and he had not completed any of

the plan’s action steps.

Another case review hearing was held on August 15, 2018. Counsel for D.M.

made an appearance on his behalf but noted “he has been absent.” Following the

hearing, the trial court found that it was in the children’s best interest to remain in

the State’s custody, and it approved the July 2, 2018 case plan, as amended on July

25, 2018, to change the case plan goal to adoption.

On August 31, 2018, the State filed a Petition for Termination of Parental

Rights and Certification of Minor Children for Adoption, naming D.M. and the

mother as Defendants. Therein, the State alleged that D.M. and the mother have

failed to substantially comply with their case plans, provide significant contributions

to the care of their children well in excess of six consecutive months, and have not

had significant contact with the children. The trial court signed an order on

September 4, 2018, appointing a Curator Ad Hoc for D.M., and set the matter for

hearing.

A hearing on the State’s Petition was held November 14, 2018. D.M. was

transferred from the Richland Parish Detention Center pursuant to a motion filed by

appointed counsel and was present for the hearing. Thereafter, the trial court

rendered a judgment terminating D.M.’s parental rights with respect to K.D.M. and

K.J.M. and certified the children as available for adoption.

D.M. appealed. On appeal, D.M. asserts the following as assignments of error:

(1) The [trial] [c]ourt erred in finding that [D.M.] violated any
provision of Article 1015 of the Louisiana Children’s Code
sufficient to warrant the termination of his parental rights with
regard to K.D.M. and K.[J].M.

(2) The [trial] [c]ourt erred in finding that [D.M.] did not communicate
with [the State].

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(3) The [trial] [c]ourt erred in failing to recognize that the time period
from when [D.M.] actually had knowledge that he was the father
of the children K.D.M. and K.[J].M. as a result of DNA testing
which was in June 2018 until the termination hearing on November
14, 2018[,] was insufficient to address his reconciliation issues and
in violation of Article 1015 of the Louisiana Children’s Code.

(4) The [trial] [c]ourt erred in failing to consider that the [State’s]
contention that during the many proceedings at which [D.M.] was
not present it . . . was alleged that [D.M.]’s whereabouts were
unknown was incorrect because much of the time he was
incarcerated[, and] when he was free his whereabouts were known
to his parole officer, and to Child Support Services.

ANALYSIS

Louisiana Children’s Code art. 1015 provides various grounds for the

termination of parental rights, including:

(5) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical
custody of a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him
under circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid
parental responsibility by any of the following:

....

(b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to
provide significant contributions to the child’s care and support for any
period of six consecutive months.

(c) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to
maintain significant contact with the child by visiting him or
communicating with him for any period of six consecutive months.

(6) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has
elapsed since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant
to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with
a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the
department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return
of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or
conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for
a safe, stable, and permanent home.

With respect to a parent’s failure to substantially comply with a case plan as

contemplated by La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6), La.Ch.Code art. 1036(C) states:

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C. Under Article 1015(6), lack of parental compliance with a
case plan may be evidenced by one or more of the following:
(1) The parent’s failure to attend court-approved scheduled
visitations with the child.

(2) The parent’s failure to communicate with the child.

(3) The parent’s failure to keep the department apprised of the
parent’s whereabouts and significant changes affecting the parent’s
ability to comply with the case plan for services.

(4) The parent’s failure to contribute to the costs of the child’s
foster care, if ordered to do so by the court when approving the case
plan.

(5) The parent’s repeated failure to comply with the required
program of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in the case
plan.

(6) The parent’s lack of substantial improvement in redressing
the problems preventing reunification.

(7) The persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar
potentially harmful conditions.

(8)(a) The parent’s failure to provide a negative test result for all
synthetic or other controlled dangerous substances, except for any drug
for which the parent has lawfully received a prescription, at the
completion of a reasonable case plan.

(b) For purposes of this Article, “controlled dangerous substance”
shall have the meaning ascribed in R.S. 40:961.

The State is only required to establish one of these statutory grounds. State

ex. rel. ML, 95-45 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d. 830.

In State ex rel. D.H.L., 08-39, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/08), 981 So.2d 906,

910 (footnotes omitted), we discussed the State’s burden of proof and our standard

of review in connection with termination of parental rights proceedings as follows:

Our supreme court has recognized that the gravity of terminating
parental rights requires our courts to impose a stricter standard of proof
than the preponderance of the evidence standard; rather, the State must
prove by clear and convincing evidence at least one of the statutory
grounds contained in La.Ch.Code art. 1015 in order to terminate a
parent’s rights. See State ex rel. J.M., 02-2089 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d

7

1247; La.Ch.Code art. 1035(A). “Further, even upon finding that the
State has met its evidentiary burden, a court still should not terminate
parental rights unless it determines that to do so is in the child’s best
interests.” State ex. rel. J.M., 837 So.2d at 1253; see also La.Ch.Code
art. 1037(B).

An appellate court cannot set aside a juvenile court’s findings of
fact regarding the termination of parental rights unless it is manifestly
erroneous or unless those findings are clearly wrong. In re A.J.F., 00-
948 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 47; Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840
(La.1989).

In Interest of CLS, 94-531, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/94), 649 So.2d 532,

536 (internal citations omitted), we explained:

Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a party to
persuade the trier of fact that the fact or causation sought to be proved
is highly probable, i.e. much more probable than its non-existence. This
burden is an intermediate one between the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence and the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires
more than a “preponderance” of the evidence, the traditional measure
of persuasion, but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the stringent
criminal standard.

We further keep in the mind the following, as recognized by the Louisiana

Supreme Court in State ex rel. J.A., 99-2905, pp. 7-8 (La. 1/12/00), 752 So.2d 806,

810-811:

In any case to involuntarily terminate parental rights, there are
two private interests involved: those of the parents and those of the
child. The parents have a natural, fundamental liberty interest to the
continuing companionship, care, custody and management of their
children warranting great deference and vigilant protection under the
law, Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153,
68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981), and due process requires that a fundamentally
fair procedure be followed when the state seeks to terminate the parent-
child legal relationship, State in Interest of Delcuze, 407 So.2d 707
(La.1981). However, the child has a profound interest, often at odds
with those of his parents, in terminating parental rights that prevent
adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, and
continuous relationships found in a home with proper parental care.
Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv.’s Agency, 458 U.S. 502,
102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982); see also State in the Interest of
S.M., 98-0922 (La. 10/20/98), 719 So.2d 445, 452. In balancing these
interests, the courts of this state have consistently found the interest of

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the child to be paramount over that of the parent. See, e.g., State in the
Interest of S.M., 719 So.2d at 452; State in the Interest of A.E., 448
So.2d 183, 186 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984); State in the Interest of Driscoll,
410 So.2d 255, 258 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1982).

In its oral reasoning for terminating D.M.’s parental rights, the trial court

stated as follows:

[D.M.] had um, a requirement to provide housing for the children. Um,
Ms. Wilson [the case worker] testified that in October of 2017, that
[D.M.] identified his sister as a possible relative . . . placement. I don’t
think Ms. Wilson testified as to why that placement was not attempted,
uh, but [D.M.] did offer that apparently his sister . . . was going through
some issues at that time, that he was unaware of, and that possibly that
was a reason the children weren’t placed there.

. . . Ms. Wilson testified that in November of 2017, that [D.M.]
was released. Um, both Ms. Wilson and [D.M.] testified that there was
a telephone communication at some point in November of 2017. Um,
the substance of that telephone conversation was not really discussed.
I believe Ms. Wilson testified that she was having difficulty hearing
[D.M.] on the telephone call. Um, but Ms. Wilson testified that after
that brief telephone call, that she had no other contact with [D.M.]

There was testimony that in October of 2017, Ms. Wilson
discussed and provided a case plan to [D.M.] that outlined the
requirements of his case plan which, according to her testimony,
consisted of stable housing . . . parental contributions. She testified that
she was requiring substance abuse treatment due to a history of drug
convictions.

Maintaining visits with the children, and maintaining contact
with her. Ms. Wilson testified that after the November 17 th phone
conversation, she had no contact therefore, according to her testimony,
there has been no provision of stable housing, no parental contributions,
no visits with the children, no substance abuse treatment, uh, by [D.M.]

....

Given the time that has passed, and the improvements that are being
made by the children in their foster home, um, the Court does not belief
that there is a likelihood that . . . [D.M.] would substantially comply
with the case plan in the near future[.]

On appeal, D.M. argues that the State failed to sufficiently establish that: (1)

D.M. failed to provide significant financial contributions for six consecutive months,

9

as contemplated by La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5)(b); (2) D.M. failed to maintain contact

with the children by visiting or communicating with them for six consecutive months,

as contemplated by La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5)(c); and (3) D.M. failed to substantially

comply with the case plan for more than a year after the children were removed, as

contemplated by La.Ch.Code art. 1016(6). In support of his arguments, D.M.

primarily relies on the fact that the termination hearing was held only six months

after his positive DNA test in June 2018; therefore, according to D.M., he has not

been provided with an adequate amount of time to comply with the case plan.3

In response, the State notes that it sought termination of D.M.’s parental rights

due to his alleged failure to comply with the court-ordered case plan, and

abandonment by failing to financially support the children and/or have significant

contact with them. It argues there is no support for D.M.’s position that he had no

obligations under the case plan or otherwise with respect to the children until he

underwent a DNA test in a separate Child Support Enforcement proceeding and

obtained the results, especially when he had not challenged paternity in connection

with the instant proceedings.

At the termination hearing, D.M.’s caseworker, Jerrica Wilson, testified that

D.M. participated by phone as the father of K.D.M. and K.J.M. in connection with

the development of the initial September 2017 case plan, noting that D.M. was

incarcerated at the time. His phone participation is also reflected on the case plan

document. Ms. Wilson further testified that she gave D.M. a copy of the case plan

when she met with him in jail in October 2017. Also according to Ms. Wilson,

3
D.M. also argues that the State failed to sufficiently prove that D.M.’s whereabouts were
unknown for at least four months, as contemplated by La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5)(a); however,
because the State did not seek, or obtain, relief on these grounds, we do not consider whether said
grounds were sufficiently proven.

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approximately a week after D.M. was released from jail in November 2017, D.M.

contacted her by phone and she advised him of a visitation scheduled that day;

however, D.M. did not attend. Ms. Wilson further testified that D.M. did not make

any further contact with her after November 2017 and failed to comply with any

component of his case plan since the children had entered into the State’s care in

August 2017. He has not had any contact with the children or contributed financially

for them since they came into the State’s care in August 2017.

D.M. did not dispute his noncompliance with the case plan at the hearing. He

admitted that he failed to contact his caseworker after November 2017. He also

testified that at the time of the November 2018 termination hearing, he was

incarcerated as a result of two misdemeanor charges and his release date was being

“work[ed] on.” He also indicated that he had a job “waiting for” him upon his release

from jail. No other details regarding this job opportunity were provided. He further

indicated that while he did not own a vehicle, he had “access” to one. When asked

about his living situation upon being released from jail, he stated that his aunt and

sister live with him, and he further testified as follows when questioned by the trial

court:

Q. [D.M.] who . . . did you list as possible family placement for
the children?

A. Uh, uh, I listed my oldest sister, . . . but I didn’t know that
she was going through trials and tribulations in her life at the time,
because . . . I did three and half (3/12) years in Tensas . . . with no
communication to the outside world whatsoever. When I left the street,
my sister had a house, she had a car, and she was doing good. Now she
got a three (3) bedroom trailer . . . . I’ve been there working on it. I
did all the plumbing for her, . . . I hooked the box up to the pole . . . .
Lights, gas all that’s on right now. And . . . that will be my residence
for me and my kids. My sister, she has a place already, but if I want to
move there, I can move there with my kids, or I can take them to
[another address] in Pineville.

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When asked by the trial court regarding his attempts to contact his caseworker

when not incarcerated, D.M. stated that he tried to call, and that he mistakenly

thought he had go to court for it to tell him what to do because he had taken his

mother’s and grandmother’s word that “they were going to get my kids back.” He

further testified that he did not fully understand the case plan due to his lack of

education.

The facts in this case are undisputed that D.M. failed to comply with the case

plan as contemplated by La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6) and that he abandoned the children

by failing to make financial contributions or have contact with them for six

consecutive months, as contemplated by La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5). Rather, D.M.

argues that his failures should be excused because he did not have an adequate

amount of time to satisfy these obligations given that his paternity was not verified

by a DNA test until June 2018 and he had a reasonable basis to challenge his

paternity.

However, we find no legal support for D.M.’s argument that he was not

required to comply with a case plan that he willingly participated in as the children’s

father from the date of the plan’s inception in September 2017 just because he waited

nine months to ask for a DNA test. He did not challenge his paternity in these

proceedings, rather he simply failed to sufficiently comply with the case plans.

In support of his position, D.M. cites to State in Interest of I.D., 11-1570

(La.App. 3 Cir. 4/4/12), 87 So.3d 351, wherein this court affirmed the termination

of the father’s parental rights, but noted in the factual and procedural background

section of the opinion that a hearing on the State’s petition was rescheduled several

times to allow the parties more time to work on their case plan. However, the I.D.

court did not hold that the State was required to provide extra time for the parties to

12

complete the case plan, but rather was merely setting forth the procedural

background of the case. Therefore, we find I.D. inapplicable to the issues present in

the instant matter.

We further note that in State ex rel. A.R., 15-497, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/15),

178 So.3d 280, 286 (alternation in original), this court addressed, and rejected, a

parent’s defense that incarceration limited the amount of time available to satisfy a

case plan, stating:

Imprisonment is not an excuse to escape parental
obligations. State ex rel. C.M.O., 04-1780 (La.App. 4 Cir.
4/13/05), 901 So.2d 1168. Incarceration is not a defense
to failure to support or maintain contact with one’s
children in a termination of parental rights case,
particularly because incarceration results from one’s
actions. State ex rel. M.H. v. K.W.H., 40,332 (La.App. 2
Cir. 9/23/05), 912 So.2d 88. 1168.

State in the Interest of O.L.R., 13-616, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13),
125 So.3d 569, 573. This court opined that incarceration of a parent is
the result of his/her own “conduct and actions” and may not be used “as
an excuse for . . . failing to substantially comply with [a] case plan.” Id.

In addition to failing to comply with a case plan under La.Ch.Code art.

1015(6), abandonment for failing to contribute financially for the support of the

children, or failing to contact the children, for six consecutive months, are also

grounds for termination of parental rights. La.Ch.Code. art. 1015(5). This is so,

even if a putative father’s paternity has not been positively established, “in order to

protect a child’s interest in terminating parental rights that prevent adoption and

inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, and continuous relationships.” State

in Interest of D.B., 16-694, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/8/16), 206 So.3d 1021, 1025.

Therefore, the date that the DNA test was completed is irrelevant to the abandonment

analysis, and we reject D.M.’s suggestion that we should not consider his failure to

13

financially support or contact the children during the time prior to the June 2018

DNA test.

We conclude that the trial court’s ruling is adequately supported by the record

and find no merit in D.M.’s assignments of error.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s ruling in this matter.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to Appellant, D.M.

AFFIRMED.

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