State in the Interest of Z. S. J.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-86

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF

Z. S. J.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 2017-TP-21
HONORABLE JOHN C. DAVIDSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

D. KENT SAVOIE
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy Howard Ezell, and D. Kent Savoie,
Judges.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

Guy R. Lain
Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services
1721 Carter Street
Vidalia, LA 71373
(318)336-8611
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana, Department of Child and Family Services

Malcolm Xerxes Larvadain
Attorney at Law
626 8th St.
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 445-3533
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
J.M. (father)

Zebulon M. Winstead
3416 North Blvd.
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 445-1488
COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
Z.S.J. (child)

Tiffany N. Sanders
Attorney at Law
929 Johnston Street
Alexandria,, LA 71301
(318) 443-9080
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
T.J. (mother)

Jane Hogan
310 North Cherry St.
Hammond, LA 70401
(985) 542-7730
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
T.J. (mother)

SAVOIE, Judge.

The mother, T.J.,1 appeals a judgment terminating her parental rights with

respect to her biological son, Z.S.J., for failure to substantially comply with her case

plans as contemplated by La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6). Specifically, the trial court found

noncompliance with the case plans’ requirements concerning financial support,

visitation, and, as stated by the trial court, “[t]raining to care for her special needs

child.”

On appeal, T.J. argues that reversal is appropriate, focusing her arguments on

a failure to communicate on the part of the two State offices handling this matter –

the Alexandria office, who oversaw the case with respect to T.J., and the Shreveport

office, who oversaw the case with respect to Z.S.J. We agree. The record is replete

with evidence showing lack of communication and organization between these two

offices, to the detriment of T.J. and the child. Therefore, for this reason, as well as

the reasons discussed more fully herein, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and

dismiss the State’s petition for termination of parental rights against T.J.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 2009, Z.S.J. was born prematurely with hydrocephalus and other

medical complications including cerebral palsy and seizures that required

specialized treatment. Z.S.J. was T.J.’s fourth child. Following his birth, Z.S.J.

spent four months in the neonatal intensive care unit at a hospital in Alexandria and

was thereafter transferred to Holy Angels, a residential facility in Shreveport.

1
Initials of the parties are used in this matter pursuant to Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal
– Rules 5-1 and 5-2.

In October 2009, before Z.S.J. was transferred to Shreveport, the State of

Louisiana, through the Department of Social Services (“the State”), sought and

obtained an instanter order removing Z.S.J. from the care of his parents. Removal

was based upon the following allegations:

On October 14th, 2009[,] the agency received a report of medical
neglect . . . stating that [Z.S.J.] . . . is ready for discharge to Holy Angels
Residential Facility in Shreveport, Louisiana. . . . [T.J.] and [J.M.2]
want to take the child to their home, which is against medical advise
[sic]. According to Dr. Shroeder, due the child’s special needs, [Z.S.J.]
cannot be taken care of in a traditional home. . . . [T.J.] and [J.M] are
refusing placement.

A continued custody hearing was held October 22, 2009, after which the trial

court rendered an order finding that continued custody with the State was necessary

and noting the “child is medically fragile and unable to be in the parent’s home[.]”

On November 3, 2009, the State filed a petition seeking to adjudicate Z.S.J. a

child in need of care.3 An adjudication hearing was held January 7, 2010, after which

the trial court rendered a stipulated judgment adjudicating the child in need of care.

Review and/or permanency hearings were held approximately every six

months, at which time the trial court approved the case plans submitted by the State.

The case plan goal remained reunification until April 2017, and then was changed

to adoption. After each hearing, the trial court maintained Z.S.J.’s placement and

custody with the State. Z.S.J. was initially placed at Holy Angels in Shreveport until

July 2, 2012, and then he was placed into the specialized foster home of E.S., who

resided in Shreveport. In December of 2012, Z.S.J. was placed into the specialized

2
J.M. is Z.S.J.’s biological father. His parental rights were also terminated; however, he
has not appealed.
3
The entire record from the Child In Need of Care (“CINC”) proceedings, bearing trial
court docket number 09-CC-80, was accepted as evidence in connection with the instant
termination proceeding without objection.

2

foster home of Y.D., who also lived in Shreveport, and was a nurse who formerly

cared for Z.S.J. at Holy Angels. Z.S.J. remained in Y.D.’s home through the subject

termination proceedings in September 2018.

In approximately March 2010, the State’s office in Shreveport was assigned

Z.S.J.’s case, while the State’s office in Grant Parish, and then in Alexandria,

oversaw the case with respect to T.J., who lived in Alexandria. Ms. Silviera Hunt

was the caseworker in the Shreveport office beginning in March 2010 and continued

to be the caseworker through the termination hearing, with the exception of October

2013 through approximately June 2014. Ms. Shantelle Lockwood was initially

T.J.’s caseworker in the Alexandria office, followed by Ms. Ebony Simmons, Ms.

Leatrice Williams, and then Ms. Heather Carpenter. Ms. Carpenter began handling

T.J.’s case in November 2016 and did so through the September 2018 termination

hearing.

The earliest case plan in the record is dated October 5, 2010. Z.S.J. was placed

at the Holy Angels facility in Shreveport at this time. The case plan’s goal was

reunification. It required T.J. to maintain a safe and stable home, obtain employment

or demonstrate an ability to financially provide for the needs of her children, remain

in contact with the State, develop a support system, apply for appropriate financial

assistance, and provide either $10 per month or $25 per month in support depending

on whether she was employed. The case plan also indicated that the State would

transport T.J. from Alexandria to Shreveport monthly to visit Z.S.J. A similar case

plan dated March 2011 was approved by the trial court in April 2011.

A case plan dated September 2012, as well as a case plan dated March 2013,

noted T.J.’s general progress. They noted compliance with and/or completion of

case plan goals and recognized T.J.’s bond with Z.S.J. They further provided for

3

monthly visitation to alternate between Bossier City and Alexandria following

Z.S.J.’s transition from Holy Angels in July 2012, and otherwise maintained the

same general goals and action steps as the previous case plans.

In connection with the April 2013 review hearing, the trial court ordered the

State to assist T.J. with weekly counseling sessions, which, according to the State

would assist T.J. in addressing the comprehensive care needed for Z.S.J. A case

status report requested from the State by the trial court dated June 3, 2013, indicated

that T.J. began counseling with Michelle Redding on April 17, 2013, completed five

sessions, and was cooperative. It further reflected that T.J. attended medical

appointments and therapy with Z.S.J. as requested, that supervised visits were

alternated monthly between Bossier City and Alexandria, and that Z.S.J. saw his

mother weekly at therapy in addition to the monthly visits.

A September 19, 2013 case plan, which provided similar goals and action

steps as the previous plans, was approved at the October 2013 review hearing. The

plan also reflected that the State would transport T.J. every Monday to Shreveport

for visits, counseling, and physical therapy appointments. The case plan also

indicated that the State was

not pursuing termination of parental rights due to T.J.’s completion of
case plan goals and her bond with Z.S.J. Due to his medical needs
[Z.S.J.] is unable to return home at this time. . . . He will need life long
medical care. [Z.S.J.] is currently placed in a specialized home where
he is receiving 24 hour care.

The State also submitted a written report from Ms. Redding recommending

that T.J. “have extended responsibilities with Z.S.J. and extended visitation times . . .

prior to his return home to ensure her ability to parent and protect [Z.S.J.] as well as

her additional children.” The report further reflected that during the sessions, T.J.

interacted well with Z.S.J., and during one session Z.S.J. was heard saying “momma.”

4

In connection with the October 2013 hearing, the State also submitted an

uncertified letter dated September 26, 2013, from Dr. Christina Notarianni, stating

that she was Z.S.J.’s pediatric neurosurgeon, that “his specific neurological

conditions cannot be handled in Alexandria, as the neurosurgeons in that city do not

treat pediatric patients,” and requesting that Z.S.J.’s residence remain in Shreveport

“so he can stay current on his therapy and receive all of the specialized medical care

that he requires for his numerous chronic medical conditions.”

In the fall of 2013, T.J. became pregnant with her fifth child and suffered

complications during the pregnancy, which affected her ability to travel to

Shreveport for visitations, counseling, and appointments. The child was born in or

around May 2014 and has developmental delays.

At the next review hearing in April 2014, the State submitted a case plan dated

March 6, 2014, with a goal of reunification and a secondary goal of alternative

permanent living arrangement (“APLA”). It further reflected that the State was not

pursuing termination of T.J.’s parental rights in light of her completion of case plan

goals and bond with Z.S.J. The March 2014 plan also noted that T.J. had space in

her home for all of her children, including Z.S.J., and that she provided for the basic

needs of her children; however, she did not attend all of Z.S.J.’s appointments in

Shreveport due to her high risk pregnancy and her doctor being in New Orleans. The

plan also stated that

Based on the decision made by Judge Johnson[4] the agency is no longer
required to provide [T.J.]’s transportation weekly to Shreveport. The
agency was instructed to provide [T.J.] with one supervised visit
monthly and she would need to prove her own transportation to the
remainder visits. The Agency will provide transportation for [T.J.] to
Shreveport on the 3rd Thursday of each month to visit with [Z.S.J.]. . . .

4
This decision does not appear in the record.

5

Ms. Jackson will need to provide her own transportation to the visit the
first of the month.

The next review hearing was held October 6, 2014. In connection therewith,

the State’s office in Alexandria filed a report dated October 2, 2014, noting that the

primary goal remained reunification, and stating as follows:

During this past 6 months, she has not been able to attend appointments
due to her own high risk pregnancy and birth of another child. This
child . . . also has special needs and is developmentally delayed. . . .
[T.J.] has kept all appointments regarding [this child]. [T.J.] and [Z.S.J.]
have not attended weekly counseling sessions with Ms. Michelle
Redding in Shreveport this past 6 months . . . . She has followed the
recommendations of our agency providers by demonstrating
appropriate parenting skills during visits with [Z.S.J.], however she has
just started visiting with [Z.S.J.] again effective August, 2014, due to
her high risk pregnancy. . . .

However, despite T.J.’s noted difficulties in progressing with respect to the

case plan goals, a case plan dated September 25, 2014, and submitted to the trial

court in connection with the October 2014 review hearing, reflected that the State

“is not pursuing termination of parental rights due to [T.J.]’s completion of case plan

goals and bond with [Z.S.J.]” The case plan goal remained as reunification with a

secondary goal of APLA. The case plan also noted that that “[s]ince giving birth to

her son in May, she has attended visit[s] set up by the agency in August and

September[,]” but T.J. had not provided any proof of child support payment over the

past 6 months. In addition, the plan stated that T.J. “will receive information from

[Z.S.J.]’s foster parent on how she might prepare for unexpected situations (e.g.

emergency situation with [Z.S.J.]” The visitation schedule remained the same as

stated in the prior case plan: “The Agency will provide transportation for [T.J.] to

Shreveport on the 3rd Thursday of each month to visit with [Z.S.J.]. . . . [T.J.] will

need to provide her own transportation to the visit the first of the month.” The visits

were to occur at Ms. Redding’s office in Shreveport.

6

In connection with the next review hearing held on April 13, 2015, the State’s

office in Alexandria submitted a report noting that within the last six months, T.J.

had maintained a safe and stable home, had supervised visits with Z.S.J., and had

developed a “healthy relationship” with him. The report further stated:

[T.J.] has completed the agency case plan goals and objectives
during this six month planning period. She has maintained safe and
stable housing, obtained medical care for her children as needed and
has attended all scheduled medical appointments, she has ensured that
the children attend school daily and has all their needed supplies. . . .
Agency recommends that [Z.S.J.] continues to remain in state’s custody
due to medical staff reporting a continued need for him to remain in
Shreveport, LA to receive on-going quality medical care.

A case plan dated March 23, 2015, was also submitted. It reflected that the

State was not pursuing termination of T.J.’s rights due to her “completion of case

plan goals and her bond with Z.S.J[.]” It further noted that T.J. has provided Z.S.J.

with clothing during family visits; she “has become very familiar with community

resources in this area and is familiar on how to access assistance and services from

other community providers if needed[;]” and “her home is always neat and clean and

she has sufficient clothing and food.” No specific visitation plan or schedule was

provided in the March 2015 case plan. However, a subsequent case plan from

September 2015 stated “at the last hearing dated April 13, 2015[, T.J.] was allowed

to have unsupervised visits with [Z.S.J.] that would be coordinated through the

agency workers. These visits would also be coordinated with the caretaker as well.”

Following the hearing, the trial court rendered a judgment approving the case

plan and further stating that T.J. was “complying with the case plan and making

significant measurable progress toward achieving its goals and correcting the

conditions requiring the child(ren) to be in care.”

7

The next review hearing was held October 12, 2015. In connection therewith,

the State submitted a report noting that T.J. was able to visit with Z.S.J. once during

the six-month reporting period, coordinated and attended a birthday party for him in

Bossier City, and attempted to visit several other times but was not able to do so

because of her contacting the State “at such a late notice.” It further reported T.J.

“has completed the agency case plan goals during this six months case planning

period[,]” exhibited proper parenting skills, and provided appropriate care for her

other special-needs son. It also stated that her children

are very bonded to one another and the mother as well . . . and they
always question their brother’s [Z.S.J.’s] return to the home and express
how much they miss him. . . . [T.J.] has matured since [Z.S.J.]’s
entrance into foster care . . . . [and] ha[s] made tremendous progress in
the area of decision making.

A case plan dated September 23, 2015, was also submitted to the trial court.

It reflected that T.J. and her other children desired to have Z.S.J. placed in their home,

T.J. has been allowed to have unsupervised visits, and T.J. has “mature[d] since

[Z.S.J.’s] entrance in foster care. . . . [S]he ha[s] made tremendous progress in the

area of decision making.” The plan also noted that T.J. “has not paid [] parental

contributions but during visits she often provides the caretaker with clothing in

which she has purchased for him. She shows agency worker items in which she has

purchased for him during monthly in home visits.” No specific visitation schedule

was provided, but rather the plan indicated that visits would be coordinated through

the State’s agency workers and the foster parent.

A report from the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) representing

the child was also submitted to the trial court in connection with the October 12,

2015 hearing. It reflected that Z.S.J. was in first grade and doing well. It stated that

T.J.

8

continues to remain very active in her DCFS case plan work. . . . The
Caddo DCFS office now supervises [Z.S.J.]’s case plan and during the
FTC stated that their office does not concur with Rapides[’] decision to
change goal to APLA. Caddo supervisor Kamisha Bankston stated that
APLA is not an appropriate goal for a six year old[.]

Following the October 12, 2015 review hearing, the trial court rendered a

judgment approving the case plan and stating that the “child must be medically stable

for a min[imum] of 12 months before any thought of placement change.”

The next review hearing was held March 28, 2016. A case plan dated March

18, 2016, was submitted and again indicated that the State was not pursuing

termination of rights due to T.J.’s completion of case plan goals and bond with Z.S.J.

The plan indicated that T.J. had one visit with Z.S.J. during the reporting period. It

also established a visitation plan indicating that T.J. would visit on the third

Wednesday of each month at a McDonald’s in Shreveport.

The March 2016 case plan also added for the first time the following as a

specific behavioral goal: “Increase the knowledge of the care of [Z.S.J.]’s needs and

to encourage an on-going mother son relationship[.]” In connection with that goal,

the plan included the following action step, which provided responsibilities for both

T.J. and the State:

[T.J.] will attend all medical appointments involving [Z.S.J.] She will
be notified in advance of all scheduled appointments so that she can
coordinate child care arrangements for the other children in her care.
She will also be informed of any emergency related procedures in a
timely manner and will be allowed to discuss medical issues along with
the care of [Z.S.J.] through medical visits. [T.J.] will also be available
to attend scheduled visits with [Z.S.J.] If she is unable to attend any
visits agency worker will notify Caddo Parish of her inability to attend
in a timely manner.

An uncertified letter from Dr. Notarianni, Z.S.J.’s neurologist, dated March

23, 2016, was filed into the CINC record in connection with the April 2016 hearing.

It reflected that Z.S.J. had made “remarkable progress since he was last seen last

9

year and is able to talk some now . . . . He has benefited from being here in

Shreveport with physicians who know him so well. . . . and [we] request that you

leave him in his present home.”

The next review hearing was held October 14, 2016. The State’s report from

the Alexandria office reflected that T.J. had attended a majority of Z.S.J.’s medical

appointments and scheduled visits. A case plan dated September 21, 2016, was also

submitted. It stated that termination of parental rights was not being pursued and

that T.J. continued to comply with her case plan goals. The plan does not contain

any information regarding a visitation plan or schedule. While the Alexandria

office’s report stated that it was waiting for a weekly visitation agreement from the

Shreveport office, no such agreement appears in the record. The September 2016

case plan also maintained the action step stated in the prior case plan concerning

T.J.’s and the State’s responsibilities with respect to medical appointments, and it

added the following additional action step, which also provided responsibilities for

both T.J. and the State:

[T.J.] will gain medical knowledge into learning how to maintain
[Z.S.J.]’s PEG tube and demonstrate these skills learned through visits.
She will also learn [Z.S.J.]’s medical needs, daily medications, favorite
foods and daily schedule. Agency worker will discuss if current foster
parent . . . is able to provide this information to [T.J.] Agency worker
will seek out resources who are able to demonstrate additional medical
knowledge that [T.J.] may need to properly care for [Z.S.J.]

In November 2016, T.J. gave birth to her sixth child following another high

risk pregnancy. This child was born with severe respiratory disease, brain bleeding,

and associated disabilities. As a result, T.J. was placed on medical restrictions

through January 2017, which hindered her ability to visit with Z.S.J. or otherwise

attend his medical appointments.

10

The next review hearing was held April 10, 2017, after which the case plan

goal was changed from reunification to adoption. A case plan dated March 16, 2017,

was submitted and approved by the trial court. The case plan reflected the new goal

of adoption. It stated that during the previous six-month period, during which T.J.

was on medical restrictions for her high risk pregnancy, T.J. visited with Z.S.J. once

and

there was another attempt to, but Shreveport DCFS worker did not have
him available to do so. [T]here were 9 total visits to have.[ 5 ] The
agency provided transportation on several dates. Most visits were
cancelled by mother, due to her other children being sick or having a
medical appointment, employment reasons or miscommunication.
[T.J.] gave birth to her sixth child . . . who is special needs and remained
in NICU for several weeks following birth. She was then placed on
travel restriction, that was lifted and she was released by her doctor to
travel in early January 2017. Visits between [T.J.] and her son, [Z.S.J.]
began again January 12, 2017, and every Thursday thereafter.

The March 2017 plan also stated that T.J. was “invited to attend a number of

[Z.S.J.]’s medical appointments, as well as his IEP update meeting” but that she did

“not make herself available for these appointments or meetings, except for the one

attempt she made to attend a pre-op appointment that she was several hours late for.”

It is unclear whether these appointments or meetings took place before or after her

medical release in January 2017. The plan also noted that T.J. wanted to be able to

directly contact the foster parent, Y.D, but that Y.D. would not allow her to do so,

and that T.J. wanted “to be updated better on her son’s care, and be notified in

advance of his medical appointments so she can make appropriate arrangements.”

5
We note that the previous case plan from September 2016 case plan did not contain a
specific visitation schedule. While the Alexandria office’s report noted it was awaiting a weekly
visitation contract, no such contract is in the record or otherwise appears to have been approved
by the trial court. Therefore, it is unclear when the referenced nine visits were to have taken place,
or what efforts the State made in coordinating them, as required by the case plan.

11

Three somewhat conflicting visitation plans were attached to the multiple

March 2017 case plans filed in the record. One stated that the State and foster parents

provide transportation to the family visits and T.J. “continues to visit with [Z.S.J.]

when she can.” Another stated that weekly visits would occur on Thursdays at the

Shreveport office and that the State or T.J. would provide transportation to and from

the visits. The other visitation plan stated that weekly visits would occur on

Thursdays for one hour at the Shreveport office, the State would provide

transportation if given 72-hours notice, and T.J. “is encouraged to attend all medical

appointments . . . as well as any other meeting that occurs regarding her son’s care

and educational needs . . . in addition to weekly scheduled visits.” It further stated

that the foster parent, Y.D., was “to be present to update [T.J.] of [Z.S.J.’s] medical,

educational, and every day needs and his overall well-being. [Y.D.] is to be

supportive of reunification[,]” but she “is not comfortable being in direct contact

with [T.J.]”

The March 2017 case plan’s behavior goals and action steps differ from the

March 2016 and September 2016 case plans in that it did not provide the specific

paragraphs defining T.J.’s and the State’s responsibilities with respect to medical

appointments or T.J.’s obtaining medical knowledge. Rather it added new action

steps or rephrased others in general terms. The case plan reflected that T.J. was

required to, and had successfully, maintained a suitable home, obtained employment

or otherwise showed an ability to financially provide for her children, applied for

appropriate financial assistance, provided $10 or $25 per month in support

depending on employment, and demonstrated appropriate anger management skills.

An action step marked incomplete required T.J. to “develop a support

system . . . to request help as necessary to provide for her child’s safety, medical,

12

physical, emotional, and educational needs.” However, the plan also stated that T.J.

“appears to be resourceful, in that she knows who her community resources are and

how to use them. [T.J.] has . . . expressed defeat because of not being given a chance

to raise [Z.S.J.] She is capable of expressing these emotions in a healthy way, and

has learned to be more mature in nature.”

Another action step noted as incomplete generally required T.J. to “continue

to exhibit appropriate parenting skills,” with no further explanation or direction.

With respect thereto, the plan reported that T.J.

Demonstrates the ability to love and nurture her children. . . . She
is very protective of the children and has knowledge in the area of child
development. She provides appropriate care for [her sixth child] which
is a special needs child. . . . The children are very bonded to another
and the mother as well as during monthly visits they always question
their brother’s [Z.S.J.]’s return to the home. The oldest child . . . is very
helpful to the mother. . . . [T.J.] has matured since [Z.S.J.]’s entrance
in foster care. . . .

. . . . She has presented items she wants to give to the child, but
has not been successful in this. . . . [T.J.] appears to have a full plate
with raising five children in her home, two with special needs, the other
active in counseling. She has added to this plate throughout the case
planning processes, and does not understand what is fully needed to
accurately provide 24 hour care to [Z.S.J.] She does express care and
concern toward her son, but has not demonstrated this in actions, just
words. [T.J.] has not attended his medical appointments, surgeries, or
family visits with [Z.S.J.], on a consistent basis.

The March 2017 case plan also reported the following comments were made

by T.J.:

[T.J.] does not feel she has been given adequate and appropriate
opportunities to learn how to properly care for [Z.S.J.]’s medical needs.
Although she has been invited to medical appointments to learn, (she
has not attended on a consistent basis) and feels she has not been given
the opportunity to provide that kind of care in a realistic situation. . . .
She admits to being immature in the beginning, but believes she has
matured in many ways and is very capable of raising her son . . . . [T.J.]
does not feel supported by DCFS, especially the worker for [Z.S.J.],
and is unwilling to voluntarily surrender her rights to him, because she
does not want to do so. She loves her son and does express that.

13

On August 31, 2017, the State instituted the termination proceeding at issue

here, which was separate from the CINC proceeding. The State’s Petition seeking

termination alleged that T.J. “failed and/or refused to adequately participate in the

services provided to [her]; and/or ha[s] failed/refused to substantially comply with

the case plans for services . . . and there is no reasonable expectation of significant

improvement in the parents’ condition or conduct in the near future[.]” The Petition

also alleged that T.J. failed to provide significant financial contributions and has not

had significant contact with him by for a period of six consecutive months.

The next review hearing was held October 10, 2017. A case plan finalized

September 20, 2017, was filed in connection therewith. The attached visitation plan

stated that visitation was once per month at the Shreveport office, “as per the goal

of adoption[,]” and that T.J. was encouraged to reach out to the foster parent

regarding Z.S.J.’s care. The visitation plan also noted that transportation was

available upon 72-hour notice, but T.J. was expected to use her own transportation

when State transportation was not available to transport her to medical appointments

and visits. It further stated that T.J. and the foster parent “are encouraged to

communicate between each other, via telephone, social media, and U.S. mail, as

much as possible.”

The September 2017 case plan also reported that there were no face-to-face

visits in May, June, or July, but that T.J. had visited with Z.S.J. in April 2017 at the

hospital when he was undergoing rehabilitation services following a surgery. It also

indicated that T.J. visited with Z.S.J. in August 2017, and on the way to the visit,

made phone calls to Z.S.J.’s doctors and obtained two future appointments. The

14

plan reflected that interaction between Z.S.J. and T.J. was appropriate and went well.

It stated

She was attentive to his needs. . . . She laughed with him and assisted
him with coloring . . . . Mother spoke to him about his siblings and
other family members. [Z.S.J.] blew kisses and gave hugs to his mother.
Mother suggested they facetime/call [Z.S.J.’s] grandmother. [Z.S.J.]
appeared to recognize this family member as he called her by name.

The plan also reported that during the August 2017 visit, T.J. and the foster parent

discussed some areas regarding Z.S.J., and that T.J. provided a school book bag,

lunch box, and tennis shoes for Z.S.J.

The September 2017 case plan reinserted the action step pertaining to T.J.’s

and the State’s responsibilities regarding medical appointments, which was included

in March 2016 and September 2016 case plans. It stated that T.J. was required to

participate in one family visit per month, which would be scheduled by the

Shreveport office and that transportation would be provided. The plan also

reinserted the action step regarding T.J.’s and the State’s responsibilities regarding

medical knowledge and training concerning Z.S.J.’s PEG tube and other needs,

which were included in the September 2016 case plan. It further reported that T.J.

had not paid any child support, been available to meet with the agency worker

monthly, attended all of Z.S.J.’s medical appointments and visitations, or gained

medical knowledge involving the daily care of her son. Specific information

concerning the visitations and appointments missed was not provided.

The next review hearing was April 9, 2018. The State’s office in Shreveport

submitted a report noting Z.S.J. was in third grade in an adaptive classroom and

doing well, and he “is very alert and capable of holding a conversation and retaining

information.” The State’s office in Alexandria also filed a report with the trial court

stating:

15

During this last 6 month reporting period there were 6 scheduled
family visits. Of those 6 visits, 4 were attempted by [T.J.] and the child
was not available, per Shreveport DCFS. . . . The Alexandria office
provided transportation for [T.J.] a number of times this period; she
utilized them all; however on four separate occasions, [Z.S.J.] was not
available for scheduled visits.

....

During the visit in August and November 2017, [T.J.] provided
attention towards her son, as well as affection. . . . [Z.S.J.] appeared to
enjoy these activities, as well as his mother’s company. During the
months of Sept., Oct., Dec., and before court in February 2018,
attempts were made to visit with [Z.S.J.]; however, he was not
made available.

(emphasis added).

The report also indicated that the Alexandria office was made aware of a

medical appointment that occurred during the reporting period, but that notice was

received on the same day of the appointment, which was also the date of a family

team meeting. In addition, the report stated:

During this reporting period, this agency worker has had better
contact with [T.J.] . . . [T.J.] states she loves her son and wants to fight
for custody of him. [T.J.] states she is not being informed in adequate
time to prepare to attend appointments and this has been quite
frustrating to her.

....

[T.J.] has maintained her visits in the home with the agency
worker. She is requesting the agency refer her for an educational class
to be better informed of [Z.S.J.]’s medical needs. The Alexandria office
has spoken with [Z.S.J.]’s pediatrician . . . regarding an “educational”
session for [T.J.], but was informed that the required “education” that
she will need to care for [Z.S.J.] 24/7 would entail: managing his
daily/nightly toileting accidents, seizure care and recognition, peg tube
care with feeding and medication implementation, ongoing physical
therapy, and wheel chair management; and required more than just an
“education meeting, but more of a day to day practice of.

....

During this period, contact with [T.J.] has improved and more
home visits have been completed . . . . [T.J.] is doing her best with

16

managing being a single mother to five children. She has learned to
utilize her support team more[.]

....

[T.J.] expresses love and wants to care for her son, [Z.S.J];
however, she has never had him in her immediate care or reach to
provide the daily practice and be educated on what it takes to care
for his medical needs. This is of great concern, as [T.J.]’s ability to be
able to provide a safe and adequate home to him has not been accurately
represented thus far.

(emphasis added).

A case plan dated February 23, 2018, was also submitted to the trial court. It

noted that T.J. “came into the meeting feeling encouraged, but left the meeting

discouraged, and stated she was fighting a losing battle.” It reported that T.J. visited

once during the reporting period, but on four other occasions, Z.S.J. was not made

available for visits. It also noted T.J. was behind in support, but also that she brought

items for [Z.S.J.] during the scheduled visits but was not able to give them to him

since he was not made available. The plan also reported that T.J. attended family

team meetings and hearings and kept the State aware of her whereabouts and

significant changes. The attached monthly visitation plan was similar to the

visitation plan submitted with the previous period’s case plan.

The February 2018 case plan reflected that action steps regarding providing

support, attending and coordinating medical appointments, and gaining medical

knowledge concerning Z.S.J.’s care were incomplete. The case plan also stated:

T.J. has not made any medical appointments for [Z.S.J.] this period, as
we were notified none occurred . . . . [T.J.] has, on her own, attempted
to gain access to Z.S.J.’s medical records and updates of his medical
care, but has not been able to receive the information. She has also tried
to enroll in some sort of education class regarding caring for a PEG
tube, but has not had much success of this.

(emphasis added).

17

A hearing on the State’s petition seeking the termination of T.J.’s parental

rights was held August 27, 2018, and September 7, 2018. The entire CINC record

was accepted into evidence without objection, and the trial court heard testimony

from T.J., Ms. Hunt, and Ms. Carpenter. No medical evidence was submitted

concerning Z.S.J.’s medical condition or medical needs at the time of the hearing.

Following the hearing, the trial court signed an order terminating T.J.’s

parental rights and certifying Z.S.J. as eligible for adoption. In its written reasons

for ruling, the trial court found that T.J. “completed some components of her case

plan, specifically, housing, income and domestic violence training” and also the

mental health assessment; however, T.J. “did not complete” parental support,

visitation, or “[t]raining to care for her special needs child.” Therefore, according

to the trial court, the State “proved by a clear and convincing standard that [T.J.] did

not substantially comply with her case plan. The case is nine years old. There is no

reasonable expectation for improvement.”

The trial court also noted Z.S.J.’s attorney’s position was “in favor of

termination if the grounds were proved by [the State],” and the trial court ultimately

concluded that “[i]t is in [Z.S.J.]’s best interest to remain in his current stable, living

environment and that [T.J.]’s parental rights be terminated. [T.J.] has not

demonstrated that she can provide the care [Z.S.J.] requires to live and thrive. . . .

Termination is in [Z.S.J.’s] best interest so that he can establish secure, stable, long-

term and continuous relationships found in a home with proper parental care.”

T.J. appeals. On appeal, she asserts the following as assignments of error:

1. The juvenile court manifestly erred by finding clear and convincing
evidence that T.J. had not substantially complied with her case plan,
that DCFS provided reasonable efforts to assist T.J. to complete her
case plan, and that there was no reasonable expectation of T.J.’s
significant improvement in the near future.

18

2. The juvenile court manifestly erred by finding that the State proved
by clear and convincing evidence that termination of T.J.’s parental
rights was in the best interest of Z.[S.]J.

ANALYSIS

“The liberty interest in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody,

and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty

interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054,

2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). “In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be

doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the

fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and

control of their children.” Id.

The State’s parens patriae power allows intervention in the parent-
child relationship only under serious circumstances, such as where the
State seeks the permanent severance of that relationship in an
involuntary termination proceeding. The fundamental purpose of
involuntary termination proceedings is to provide the greatest possible
protection to a child whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide
adequate care for his physical, emotional, and mental health needs and
adequate rearing by providing an expeditious judicial process for the
termination of all parental rights and responsibilities and to achieve
permanency and stability for the child. The focus of an involuntary
termination proceeding is not whether the parent should be
deprived of custody, but whether it would be in the best interest of
the child for all legal relations with the parents to be terminated.
LA. CHILD. CODE art. 1001. As such, the primary concern of the
courts and the State remains to secure the best interest for the child,
including termination of parental rights if justifiable grounds exist and
are proven. Nonetheless, courts must proceed with care and caution as
the permanent termination of the legal relationship existing between
natural parents and the child is one of the most drastic actions the State
can take against its citizens. The potential loss to the parent is grievous,
perhaps more so than the loss of personal freedom caused by
incarceration.

State ex rel. J.A., 99-2905 (La.1/12/00), 752 So.2d 806, 811-12 (cites

omitted)(emphasis added).

19

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1015 provides various grounds for the

termination of parental rights, including the following, upon which T.J.’s rights were

terminated:

(6) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has
elapsed since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant
to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with
a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the
department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return
of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or
conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for
a safe, stable, and permanent home.

With respect to a parent’s failure to substantially comply with a case plan as

contemplated by La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6), La.Ch.Code art. 1036(C) states:

C. Under Article 1015(6), lack of parental compliance with a
case plan may be evidenced by one or more of the following:

(1) The parent’s failure to attend court-approved scheduled
visitations with the child.

(2) The parent’s failure to communicate with the child.

(3) The parent’s failure to keep the department apprised of the
parent’s whereabouts and significant changes affecting the parent’s
ability to comply with the case plan for services.

(4) The parent’s failure to contribute to the costs of the child’s
foster care, if ordered to do so by the court when approving the case
plan.

(5) The parent’s repeated failure to comply with the required
program of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in the case
plan.

(6) The parent’s lack of substantial improvement in redressing
the problems preventing reunification.

(7) The persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar
potentially harmful conditions.

(8)(a) The parent’s failure to provide a negative test result for all
synthetic or other controlled dangerous substances, except for any drug

20

for which the parent has lawfully received a prescription, at the
completion of a reasonable case plan.
The State is only required to establish one of these statutory grounds. State

ex. rel. ML, 95-45 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d. 830.

In State ex rel. D.H.L., 08-39, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/08), 981 So.2d 906,

910 (footnotes omitted), we discussed the State’s burden of proof and our standard

of review in connection with termination of parental rights proceedings as follows:

Our supreme court has recognized that the gravity of terminating
parental rights requires our courts to impose a stricter standard of proof
than the preponderance of the evidence standard; rather, the State must
prove by clear and convincing evidence at least one of the statutory
grounds contained in La.Ch.Code art. 1015 in order to terminate a
parent’s rights. See State ex rel. J.M., 02-2089 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d
1247; La.Ch.Code art. 1035(A). “Further, even upon finding that
the State has met its evidentiary burden, a court still should not
terminate parental rights unless it determines that to do so is in the
child’s best interests.” State ex. rel. J.M., 837 So.2d at 1253; see also
La.Ch.Code art. 1037(B).

An appellate court cannot set aside a juvenile court’s findings of
fact regarding the termination of parental rights unless it is manifestly
erroneous or unless those findings are clearly wrong. In re A.J.F., 00-
948 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 47; Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840
(La.1989).

(emphasis added.)

In In the Interest of CLS, 94-531, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/94), 649 So.2d

532, 536 (internal citations omitted), we explained:

Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a party to
persuade the trier of fact that the fact or causation sought to be proved
is highly probable, i.e. much more probable than its non-existence. This
burden is an intermediate one between the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence and the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires
more than a “preponderance” of the evidence, the traditional measure
of persuasion, but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the stringent
criminal standard.

Thus, for termination of parental rights under La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6), the

State was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Z.S.J. was in

21

the State’s custody for at least a year; (2) T.J. did not substantially comply with the

court-approved case plans; and (3) there is no reasonable expectation of T.J.’s

significant improvement in the future. In addition, even if the State met this burden,

termination of T.J’s parental rights must be in Z.S.J.’s best interest.

Substantial Compliance with the Case Plan:

In her first assignment of error, T.J. argues that the trial court erred in finding

clear and convincing evidence establishing she failed to substantially comply with

her case plan. We agree.

We first note that all case plans in the record through October 2016, which

were submitted in connection with the six-month review hearings, expressly stated

that T.J. had completed and/or was in compliance with her case plan goals and she

had developed a bond with Z.S.J. It was not until April 2017 that the trial court

changed the case plan goal to adoption. This came immediately after T.J.’s high risk

pregnancy and birth of her sixth child, who was born with disabilities, and T.J.’s

associated medical restrictions through January of 2017, which hindered her ability

to travel from Alexandria to Shreveport to visit with Z.S.J. and attend his medical

appointments.

Parental Support:

The trial court concluded that T.J. failed to provide support as ordered by the

court-approved case plans. It found that she had paid a total of $85 over nine years,

and that T.J.’s purchases of gifts or supplies for Z.S.J. were irrelevant because “she

was aware of this requirement of the case plan.” This finding is not supported by

the record.

A majority of the case plans through March 2017, including the March 2017

case plan, expressly reflected that while T.J. had not directly submitted a monthly

22

support payment, she had provided, or attempted to provide food, clothing, and other

supplies to Z.S.J. or his caretaker; and again, each of the plans through September

2016 reflected T.J’s general compliance with case plan goals. Further, the March

2017 case plan expressly indicated that the support obligation was “completed.”

Therefore, there is not clear and convincing evidence in the record to support a

finding that T.J. did not comply with the parental support obligation through March

2017.

The March 2017 case plan, which was approved by the trial court at the review

hearing in April 2017, required T.J. to provide support to Z.S.J. “in the form [of]

monetary contributions, that will be need to be verified, and other daily needed

items.” (emphasis added). At the time of the termination hearing, she had paid a

total of $85. In addition, the September 2017 case plan documented that T.J. had

supplied Z.S.J. with a book bag, lunch box, and tennis shoes during the August 2017

visit. The February 2018 case plan also documented that T.J. had brought supplies

for Z.S.J. to scheduled visits, but because the Shreveport office failed to make the

child available for the visits, she was unable to provide the supplies to him.

Therefore, according to the March 2017 case plan, which was not approved

until April 2017, T.J. owed a total of seven months of parental support, or $170

through the termination hearing in September 2018, and that was to be in the form

of monetary payments and supplies. Given that she paid half of that amount, as well

as provided, or attempted to provide, supplies to Z.S.J., we find that the record lacks

clear and convincing evidence of T.J.’s “failure to contribute to the costs of the

child’s foster care, if ordered to do so by the court when approving the case plan[,]”

as required by La.Ch.Code art. 1036(C)(4). Therefore, the trial court was manifestly

23

erroneous in finding that T.J. failed to substantially comply with her case plan by

failing to provide financial support.

Visitations:

Clear and convincing evidence of a “parent’s failure to attend court-approved

scheduled visitations with the child” is also a ground upon which a court may find

that a parent failed to substantially comply with a case plan and terminate parental

rights. La.Ch.Code. art. 1036(C)(1); see also, La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6). The trial

court found T.J. did not comply with the visitation component of her case plans,

noting her inconsistency over the years, and stating “as a result, no evidence was

presented to the [c]ourt that she has a strong enough bond with [Z.S.J.] to be reunited

with him at this time.”

At trial, Ms. Carpenter, who was not Z.S.J.’s caseworker until November 2016,

testified that over the nine years Z.S.J. had been in the State’s custody, T.J. had 177

opportunities to visit with Z.S.J., and only did so 39 times. According to Ms.

Carpenter, her calculations were based upon her notes that are not otherwise in the

record, and the State’s policies that allow bi-monthly visitations when the case plan

goal was reunification, and monthly visitations when the goal was adoption.

However, this testimony is inconsistent with the court approved scheduled

visitations and case plans in the record.

The October 2010 case plan provided for monthly visitations at Holy Angels

in Shreveport, with the State transporting T.J. to the visitations. The September 2012

case plan following Z.S.J.’s transition to a foster home stated that visitations were

monthly and would alternate between Bossier City and Alexandria. Per the

September 2013 case plan, visitations were changed to weekly, and took place on

Mondays in Shreveport. The March 2014 case plan reflected that the State would

24

no longer provide weekly transportation, and provided that the State would transport

T.J. on the third Thursday of each month, and T.J. would transport herself on the

first Monday of each month. This schedule remained the same in the September

2014 case plan.

Beginning with the March 2015 case plan, which was approved in April 2015,

no specific court approved visitation schedule was in place. While the September

2015 case plan suggested that during the April 2015 hearing, T.J. was allowed to

have unsupervised visits that would be coordinated through the case workers and

caretaker, no such order appears in the record. The September 2015 case plan also

reflected that visitation was to be coordinated through the State’s caseworkers and

Z.S.J.’s caretaker, but no specific court-approved schedule is in the record.

Then, pursuant to the March 2016 case plan, approved in April 2016,

visitation was to take place on the third Wednesday of each month at a McDonald’s

in Shreveport. This remained in place until the September 2016 case plan was

approved by the trial court in October 2016.

We note, again, that the State’s case plans through September 2016 reflected

T.J.’s general completion of case plan requirements, despite any missed visitations

that may have occurred during this time. Ms. Carpenter’s unsubstantiated testimony

directly conflicts with the State’s case plans that are in the record through this date

and cannot constitute clear and convincing evidence establishing T.J.’s failure to

comply with visitation through September 2016.

No specific visitation plan was included in the September 2016 case plan or

otherwise approved by the trial court. While a report filed by the Alexandria office

suggested it was awaiting a weekly visitation agreement from the Shreveport office,

no such agreement appears in the record. In the months following the September

25

2016 case plan, according to the State’s records in evidence, T.J. had medical

restrictions due to a high risk pregnancy and birth of her sixth child, who also has

special needs, and T.J. was not medically released until January 2017. While the

March 2017 case plan reported that T.J. missed visitations and appointments during

this time, it is unclear how many, given the lack of any specific approved schedule

or documented appointments in the record. However, the March 2017 case plan also

reported that following T.J.’s medical release in January 2017, visitations began

every Thursday thereafter.

The record contains multiple case plans dated March 2017. Attached thereto

are three different visitation plans; one suggesting that T.J. visits when she can, and

the other two reflecting that visitation was to occur weekly. There is no indication

in the record as to which case plan or visitation schedule was approved by the trial

court.

In accordance with the March 2017 case plan, the goal was changed to

adoption by the trial court following the April 2017 hearing. Thereafter, T.J. visited

Z.S.J. in April 2017, as well as in August 2017. No visitations occurred in May,

June, or July 2017, according to the September 2017 case plan; however, the record

is unclear when those visits were scheduled and what notice was given to T.J.

Beginning with the September 2017 case plan, visitation was to take place

once per month as scheduled by the Shreveport office. According to a report filed

by the Alexandria office in connection with the April 2018 review hearing, T.J.

visited with Z.S.J. in November 2017. However, in September, October, December,

and February 2018, T.J. attempted to visit, but the Shreveport office did not make

Z.S.J. available. This was confirmed by Ms. Carpenter’s testimony during the

termination hearing.

26

Ms. Carpenter also testified that in March 2018, visitation was cancelled by

all parties because of flooding; in April 2018, visitation occurred in court and then

at McDonald’s following the review hearing; T.J. could not attend a visit on May 31,

2018, because her youngest child with special needs was in the hospital; a family

visit occurred June 28, 2018; and T.J. was not able to attend a visit in July 2018

because of an employment commitment. There is no specific evidence in the record

establishing when the Shreveport office had scheduled the visits that T.J. was unable

to attend, or when T.J. was notified of the visits.

Given the case plans’ indication that T.J. was compliant therewith through the

September 2016 case plan, the record’s lack of a specific court-approved visitation

schedules in place after September 2016, and the evidence establishing that the

Shreveport office failed to make Z.S.J. available for visitation on multiple occasions,

we find that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding clear and convincing

evidence that T.J. failed to attend court-approved scheduled visitations as

contemplated by La.Ch.Code art. 1036(C)(1), or that T.J.’s missed visitations under

the circumstances otherwise constituted a failure to substantially comply with her

case plan.

Training:

The trial court also concluded that T.J. failed to complete the case plan with

respect to “[t]raining to care for her special needs child,” stating that, “[i]n nine years,

she did not attend enough doctors[’] visits to receive the training” and “has yet to

receive the training needed to handle him safely.”

There is no question that T.J. must be able to demonstrate an ability to

properly care for Z.S.J. before he can be reunited with her. However, the issue

before us at this time is not whether reunification is appropriate, but rather whether

27

T.J. substantially complied with the various case plans’ requirements with respect to

this area. Therefore, we will begin the analysis with the related requirements of the

case plans themselves.

Beginning with the October 2010 case plan, which is the first case plan in the

record, there were no specific plan requirements regarding the “[t]raining to care for

her special needs child.” Rather, it required T.J. to maintain a safe and stable home,

financially provide for her children, remain in contact with the State, develop a

support system, apply for appropriate financial assistance, and provide financial

support. The State’s records in evidence also reflect that T.J. successfully completed

parenting classes early on in the case.

While the general goals of the October 2010 case plan remained the same

through 2013, the trial court’s judgment from the April 2013 review hearing ordered

the State to assist T.J. in obtaining counseling to address the comprehensive care

Z.S.J. needed. According to the case plans in the record, T.J. regularly attended

counseling with Ms. Redding in Shreveport through October 2013. However, T.J.,

who resided in Alexandria, thereafter became pregnant with her fifth child and

suffered a difficult high risk pregnancy. This prevented her from traveling to

Shreveport to visit with Z.S.J. or participating in therapy with Ms. Redding through

August 2014.

Meanwhile, however, according to the March 2014 case plan, the State

decided to no longer provide weekly transportation, but rather, would only transport

her once per month, and required T.J. to transport herself on the first of the month.

The September 2014 case plan similarly reflected that visitation would take place at

Ms. Redding’s office on the 3rd Thursday of the month, with the State transporting

28

T.J., and on the first Monday of the month, with T.J. responsible for transporting

herself.

Beginning with the March 2015 case plan, Ms. Redding’s office was no longer

listed as the location for visitation, and appointments with her were not specifically

required.

T.J.’s case plans did not have any specific requirements or goals regarding

attaining medical knowledge until the March 2016 case plan, which added the goal

of increasing her knowledge of care and related action step that required T.J. to

attend all of Z.S.J.’s medical appointments. This same action step also required the

State to adequately notify T.J. in advance of those appointments. The September

2016 case plan then added an additional action step requiring T.J. to learn how to

maintain Z.S.J.’s feeding tube, as well as learn his medical needs, favorite foods, and

daily schedule. However, the State was also required to seek out resources who

could demonstrate the knowledge T.J. may need.

Shortly after these additional case plan requirements were added, T.J. gave

birth to her sixth child, who has special needs, and she was placed on medical

restrictions through January 2017. Noting T.J.’s inability to attend visitations and

appointments during the sixth-month reporting period, the March 2017 case plan

changed the goal to adoption. This was approved by the trial court in April 2017.

While the March 2017 case plan indicated that T.J. was invited to attend several

appointments, there is no indication whether these appointments occurred prior to,

or after, her medical release.

The action steps regarding attending medical appointments and obtaining

training were removed from the March 2017 case plan. Instead, the behavior goal

was stated generally as “demonstrating adequate skills to fulfill the role as a

29

caregiver,” and the related action step required her to “continue to exhibit

appropriate parenting skills.” The plan also required for the foster parent to be

present to update T.J. on Z.S.J.’s medical and daily needs.

The September 2017 case plan reinserted the previous action steps related to

medical appointments and training that had been omitted from the March 2017 plan.

During the next six-month period, the Alexandria office was made aware of one

medical appointment that occurred the same day that notice was given, according to

a report filed by the Alexandria office in April 2017. The report also noted T.J.’s

significant efforts to obtain training on her own, but that her efforts were futile, and

she was told she would need day-to-day practice to learn what Z.S.J. required.

The February 2018 case plan indicated that T.J. was not informed of any

medical appointments that occurred during the six-month reporting period, and that

T.J. tried to obtain Z.S.J.’s medical records and enroll in PEG tube training classes,

but to no avail.

Based upon the record, we conclude that the trial court was manifestly

erroneous in concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence of T.J’s failure

to comply with the “[t]raining to care for her special needs child” requirement of the

case plan. We again note that every case plan through September 2016 reflected that

T.J. successfully completed and/or complied with her case plan goals, despite any

medical appointments she may have missed. Therefore, we have no reason to

conclude otherwise.

We further note there is little evidence to indicate that the State adequately

provided T.J. with advance notice of medical appointments, or sought out resources

to assist T.J. in attaining medical knowledge, as required by the 2016 case plans. Ms.

Carpenter testified that when she would contact the Shreveport office, she was not

30

always afforded the appointment dates in adequate time to notify T.J. Ms. Carpenter

also indicated that she had emailed the Shreveport office approximately six times

requesting appointment dates, but her emails went unanswered. Also according to

Ms. Carpenter, during a family team meeting, a Shreveport worker asked why T.J.

needed to know about the appointments when the goal had been changed to adoption.

Ms. Carpenter also indicated that Z.S.J. had not had any appointments in the five

months preceding the termination hearing, and that there were five appointments

over the last two years, two of which T.J. attempted to make, but was late for. There

is no further information in the record regarding when these appointments were, the

nature of the appointments, or when T.J. was notified of them.

Ms. Hunt testified generally that she would email appointment calendars to

the Alexandria office or otherwise communicate appointment dates in writing during

family team meetings. However, there are no corroborating emails in the record or

otherwise any indication in the case plans from the family team meetings that any

appointment dates were provided.

With respect to the training requirement, which was not added to the case plan

until the September 2016, we first note that the record establishes that many

obstacles have interfered with T.J.’s ability to obtain and demonstrate appropriate

care for Z.S.J., both before and after this time. T.J. has resided in Alexandria since

before Z.S.J.’s birth. However, Z.S.J. has continuously resided several hours away

in Shreveport, even after he was discharged from the Holy Angels facility. No

certified medical documentation or expert medical testimony was presented at the

termination hearing in September 2018 suggesting that maintaining Z.S.J.’s

residence in Shreveport through the time of the hearing was medically necessary,

much less what Z.S.J.’s current medical condition was, or whether addressing his

31

medical needs required specific training. The foster parent, Y.D., testified only to

Z.S.J.’s daily routine,6 and was not otherwise accepted as an expert medical witness.

We also note T.J.’s testimony that at one point she was advised by her caseworker

not to move to Shreveport because she did not have a support system there.

Further, T.J. has given birth to two other special needs children since Z.S.J.’s

birth, which resulted in medical restrictions beyond her control preventing her from

travelling to Shreveport to visit or attend appointments. Her last special needs child

was born during the time, or shortly after, the specific case plan requirements

regarding attending medical appointments and obtaining training were added for the

first time, rendering those case plan action steps nearly impossible while T.J. was

pregnant, recovering from birth, and tending to her baby’s special needs. After T.J.

was medically released, the case plan goal was changed to adoption due to her failure

to attend medical appointments and obtain training.

In addition, two separate State offices oversee this case, one in Shreveport and

one in Alexandria, and multiple caseworkers have been involved over the years. The

testimony, case plans, and reports from the two offices clearly reflect a lack of

adequate communication and organization between the offices, and especially since

2016, when the specific requirements regarding training and medical appointments

were added to the case plan.

Despite these obstacles, and despite the fact that the case plan goal had been

changed to adoption shortly after the medical appointments and training

requirements were added to the case plan, both Ms. Carpenter’s testimony and the

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Y.D. testified that Z.S.J.’s daily routine included transferring him in and out of his
wheelchair, dressing and diapering him, assisting him with physical therapy exercises and the
“stander”, giving him his medicine and occasionally feeding him through the PEG tube, assisting
him with eating by mouth, transporting him to and from school and appointments, and monitoring
him for seizures.

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Alexandria office’s reports submitted in connection with the April 2017 and April

2018 review hearings indicated significant effort on the part of T.J. to obtain training

concerning Z.S.J., even though those efforts were not successful.

We therefore conclude that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding

that T.J. failed to substantially comply with the training component or her case plan,

or otherwise failed to substantially comply with her case plan as contemplated by

La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6).

Reasonable Expectation of Improvement

The State was also required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

“there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s

condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for

a safe, stable, and permanent home.” La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6). The trial court found

that this requirement was met, stating only, “The case is nine years old. There is no

reasonable expectation for improvement.”

We find that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in concluding that the

State sufficiently proved this element of La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6). The duration of

this case, alone, is insufficient. Rather, the record is replete with evidence of T.J.’s

progress, despite the aforementioned obstacles she faced. Each case plan through

September 2016 reflected her compliance with case plan goals. In addition, the April

2015 ruling from the trial court expressly stated that T.J. was “complying with the

case plan and making significant measurable progress toward achieving its goals and

correcting the conditions requiring the child(ren) to be in care.” The State’s report

submitted in connection with the October 2015 review hearing, as well as the

September 2015 case plan, reflected T.J’s maturity since Z.S.J.’s entrance into foster

care and her “tremendous progress” in decision making.

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Despite the March 2017 case plan goal being changed to adoption, it reported

T.J.’s ability to love and nurture her children and provide appropriate care for the

five children in her home, two of whom have special needs. Thereafter, T.J. made

efforts to attend visitations and medical appointments; however, the record reflects

that the Alexandria office was not timely made aware of appointments, and the

Shreveport office did not make Z.S.J. available for visitations. In addition, T.J.

attempted to obtain Z.S.J.’s medical records and schedule training on her own, but

to no avail. Rather, she was told that the training needed for Z.S.J. was day-to-day

practice; however, she has not been given an opportunity to have this sort of practice

with Z.S.J.

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding

the State satisfied its burden of proving the elements of La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6).

Best Interest of the Child

On appeal, T.J. also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that

termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of Z.S.J. We agree. T.J.’s

case plans in the record through the October 2016 hearing specifically reflect the

bond that T.J. had established with Z.S.J. There is evidence that Z.S.J. has called

T.J. “momma” and enjoys his visits with his mother. In addition, the March 2017

case plan noted that T.J.’s other children are bonded to one another and to Z.S.J.

Also, Z.S.J. reportedly recognized his grandmother during a “facetime” call that took

place during the August 2017 visit. A report submitted by the Alexandria office also

reflected that during the November 2017 visit, Z.S.J. seemed to enjoy his time with

his mother.

We also note that while Y.D. has been Z.S.J.’s foster parent since December

2012, she did not expressly indicate that she desired or otherwise intended to

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adoption Z.S.J. when asked her intentions at the termination hearing. Rather, she

testified generally that she would care for Z.S.J. as long as he needed her.

Therefore, given the totality of the evidence in the record, we conclude that

termination of T.J.’s parental rights is not in Z.S.J.’s best interest at this time.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the ruling of the trial court, and

render judgment in favor T.J. dismissing the State’s claims against her seeking the

termination of her parental rights as to Z.S.J.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

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