State in the Interest of I. A.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

20-252

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF

I. A.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. JC2017706
HONORABLE THOMAS R. DUPLANTIER, DISTRICT JUDGE

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VAN H. KYZAR
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Van H. Kyzar,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Corrie R. Gallien

Public Defender

15th Judicial District Court

600 Jefferson Street, Suite 901

Lafayette, LA 70501

(337) 714-9077

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
In. A. (mother)

Keith A. Stutes

Lafayette Parish DA

Christian B. Landry

Assistant District Attorney

P. O. Box 3306

Lafayette, LA 70502-3306

(337) 232-5170

COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Jennifer O. Robinson

413 Lee Avenue

Lafayette, LA 70501

(337) 237-0503

COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
I. A. (child)

Leah Antoinette Beard

825 Kaliste Saloom Road

Brandywine Bldg 3, Room 150

Lafayette, LA 70508

(337) 262-1555

COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
Department of Children and FamilyServices

Lloyd Dangerfield

P. O. Box 91908

Lafayette, LA 70509-1908

(337) 232-7041

COUNSEL FOR OTHER APPELLEE:
Donald Griffen a/k/a Donald Griffin

KYZAR, Judge.

In.A.' appeals from a trial court judgment terminating her parental rights
based upon a finding that she failed to substantially comply with her case plan, that
there was no reasonable possibility of her complying with her case plan in the near
future, that it was in the best interest of her child that her parental rights be terminated,
and certifying the child as eligible for adoption. For the following reasons, we affirm
the decision of the trial court.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

The facts of this case present a tragic and extremely unfortunate circumstance.
In.A., herself a minor, is the mother of the minor child I.A., born on September 15,
2017. The core facts were set forth in a previous appeal to this court in State in
Interest of 1.A., 18-641, pp. 1-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/19), 269 So.3d 881, 882-84, as
follows:

On August 2, 2017, In.A. was placed in the custody of the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) after allegations
were made that she had been sexually abused. She was eleven years
old. She complained of stomach pain while in DCFS custody and was
taken to a nearby hospital, where personnel ascertained that In.A. was
thirty-two weeks pregnant. I.A. was born on September 15, 2017. The
trial court issued an instanter order placing I.A. into DCFS custody, and
he and In.A. were placed at Lighthouse Ministries, a shelter for
adolescent mothers and children. I.A. was adjudicated a Child in Need
of Care (CINC) in January 2018.

At Lighthouse, In.A. exhibited defiant behavior. In.A. did
receive parenting instruction at Lighthouse, but those lessons seem to
have not been absorbed. There surfaced other concerns as well, which
led the facility to request that I.A. and In.A. be placed elsewhere.
According to the testimony of In.A.’s case worker, Ms. Reneisha
Stewart, I.A. was moved to a foster home on March 20, 2018, because
of “incident reports that were happening between [I.A.] and [In.A.] and
the home felt that it was a liability on them and they didn’t want
anything to happen to [I.A.]” In.A. was also moved to a different
facility in Baker, Louisiana. Thereafter, In.A. saw I.A. every other
week during supervised visits at either the DCFS facility in Lafayette
or at a park near the Lafayette DCFS facility. I.A. was appointed a

' The initials of the children and their parents are used to protect the identity of the minor
child. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-1, 5-2.

Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer, who also
attended the bi-monthly visits.

In.A. was subject to a DCFS plan with the goal of reunifying her
with I.A., but “her behavior problems as well as her not willing to listen
to the instructors who were trying to help her parent her child” resulted
in In.A. not progressing satisfactorily in this plan, according to Ms.
Stewart. Her defiance, Ms. Stewart testified, had even progressed to
physical aggression against the staff of the home. After nine months,
DCFS sought approval to maintain I.A. in its custody but to change the
goal of the plan from reunification to adoption. This plan was
submitted on June 13, 2018.

A hearing on this change in I.A.’s plan was held on June 26, 2018.
At the hearing, Ms. Stewart testified to the above facts. Her testimony
indicated that In.A. had problems maintaining an orderly room.
According to information Ms. Stewart received from her foster
caretakers, In.A. resorts to destructive tantrums when not given her way.
Ms. Stewart also testified to difficulties In.A. had in following the
instructions of the foster caretakers regarding her own personal hygiene.
In.A.’s rough play with I.A., that resulted in a minor “bump” on his
head, was of deep concern for Ms. Stewart. Daycare workers also
reported to Ms. Stewart that, following a family visit, 1.A. presented
with scratches on his abdomen.

The report of the CASA volunteer indicated, in pertinent part:

[In.A.] has shown herself to be incapable of
properly caring for her baby for an ongoing time.
Information gathered by CASA, from the DCFS case files,
states that Dr Pappaspyrus, child psychiatrist, diagnosed
[In.A.] (at age 8) with Oppositional Defiance Disorder. In
February 2018, Dr Brennan, child psychologist, has
expressed her concerns in regard to [In.A.]’s behavior
toward [I.A.]. There have been reports from [In.A.]’s
caregivers of her behaving in violent and aggressive ways.
She has had trouble maintaining her own personal hygiene.
According to reports, [In.A.] will never be capable of
living on her own, caring for her child without a primary
caregiver, or holding a job. She attends elementary school
in a special education classroom. She is currently living
at Provisions Residential Care in Baker, LA. In a
conversation with staff members on [In.A.]’s progress, it
was reported that [In.A.] struggles with hygiene, care of
her belongings and proper interactive behavior. She does
have some good days. [In.A.] is going to summer school
to catch up on lessons, so that she will be ready for 7"
grade. Ms[.] Keisha Roberson informed CASA that [In.A.]
does have a long way to go with her progress and is very
immature for her age, also saying that some things will
never be possible for [In.A.] because of her low IQ.

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CASA has observed and/or interacted in four
different family visits (9.5). [In.A.] invariably shows brief
and intermittent interest in [I.A.] and then moves on to her
own interests. She demonstrates that she is not aware of
[I.A.]’s needs and wants at any given moment and is only
concemed with her own interests. She does not show any
ability or even desire to care for him for more than a few
moments at any given time. [In.A.] gives most of her
attention to her mother, [V.A.], to her phone, and to photos
or other belongings brought to visits. She often defers to
another adult when someone indicates that [I.A.] is in need
of some attention. When she does have him, she
demonstrates lack of understanding of basic care for him.
At one visit, she wanted to give [I.A.] a french fry
“because he has three teeth”. No family member objected,
so CASA advised her that he was too young for this food
and that it could cause him to choke. According to
Reneisha, DCFS caseworker, she later ‘snuck’ the french
fry to him anyway. When family visits are set at the park,
CASA must interact when necessary, such as when [In.A.}
or the 8-year-old half sister brings [I.A.] to a baby swing
or when someone is trying to feed him things not meant
for a baby. No family member has ever brought an age
appropriate toy for [1.A.] to a visit.

The CASA volunteer recommended that DCFS change the goal
for I.A. from reunification to adoption. The CASA volunteer, however,
did not testify at the hearing.

At the close of testimony, In.A.’s attorney argued that DCFS had
not made reasonable efforts at reunification. Specifically, he argued
that In.A. had not been given parenting classes since I.A. was separated
from her. He also argued that In.A. had not been given reasonable
assistance to manage her trauma and improve her behavior. The trial
court found that In.A. was “a twelve (12) year old child trying to be a
mother, and that she does not possess the ability to be a mother, based
on it’s not going to change with parenting skills or anything else.” The
trial court noted the lamentable situation this posed but found that
adoption was the appropriate disposition to correct it.

An order was entered by the trial court on June 25, 2018. The
order did not contain language finding that DCFS’s efforts at
reunification were reasonable. It did state that the new plan was in
].A.’s best interests. In.A. then perfected this appeal.

A different panel of this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court
maintaining ].A. in the custody of the State of Louisiana with the goal of placing I.A.

for adoption. In so doing, the court concluded as follows:

ee
3

In.A. was exploited by an adult whose inability to control his
baser nature visited lifelong consequences on her. It was the sorry duty
of the trial court to attempt to mitigate the harm to I.A.; the wellbeing
of I.A. being the paramount consideration for the trial court in this
proceeding. The law imposes a heavy burden on parents of any age.
That In.A. experiences difficulty in meeting these standards is to be
expected. I.A., though, can ill afford to wait for his mother to grow up.
He needs stability and care now. The decision of the trial court is
affirmed.

Id. at 886.

On February 10, 2020, the matter was taken up for a termination hearing as to
only the minor mother, In.A, as the father of the child had previously stipulated to
termination of his parental rights. After consideration of the evidence and testimony,
the trial court granted the termination of parental rights as to the mother, continued
the child in State custody, and declared the child eligible for adoption. The mother
timely filed a Motion to Appeal the termination judgment. On appeal, In.A. asserts
three assignments of error, as follows:

The juvenile court manifestly erred by finding clear and
convincing evidence that the mother, In.A., did not substantially
comply with her case plan and that [the] DCFS provided reasonable
efforts to assist In.A. in completing her case plan.

The juvenile court manifestly erred by finding clear and
convincing evidence that there was no reasonable expectation of the
mother, In.A.’s significant improvement in the near future.

The juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to order the
minor child be placed in a relative placement that could continue the
bond of the minor mother, In.A., with her minor child, IA.

OPINION

In State in the Interest of J.A., 17-500, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/4/18), 237
So.3d 69, 72, this court stated with regard to the termination of parental rights:

A parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
establishing and maintaining a meaningful relationship with his or her
children. State in Interest of A.C., 93-1125 (La. 1/27/94), 643 So.2d

719. This parental interest includes the “care, custody, and
management of their child.” State ex rel. J.M., 02-2089, p. 7 (La.

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1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1247, 1252. Consistent with the parental interest,
the state has a legitimate interest in limiting or terminating parental
rights under certain conditions. /d. Because termination of parental
rights is a severe action, the state bears the burden of establishing each
element of a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence.
La.Ch.Code art. 1035; State ex rel. B.H. v. A.H., 42,864 (La.App. 2 Cir.
10/24/07), 968 So.2d 881. The statutory grounds for involuntary
termination of parental rights are found in La.Ch.Code art. 1015,
although “only one ground need be established.” State ex rel. B.H., 968
So.2d at 885. Once a ground for termination has been established, the
parental rights may be terminated by the trial court if it 1s in the child’s
best interest. /a.; La.Ch.Code art. 1037.

Further, in State ex rel. J.A., 99-2905, pp. 7-9 (La. 1/12/00), 752 So.2d 806,
810-11 the supreme court provided the following:

In any case to involuntarily terminate parental rights, there are
two private interests involved: those of the parents and those of the
child. The parents have a natural, fundamental liberty interest to the
continuing companionship, care, custody and management of their
children warranting great deference and vigilant protection under the
law, Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153,
68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981), and due process requires that a fundamentally
fair procedure be followed when the state seeks to terminate the parent-
child legal relationship, State in Interest of Delcuze, 407 So.2d 707
(La.1981). However, the child has a profound interest, often at odds
with those of his parents, in terminating parental rights that prevent
adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, and
continuous relationships found in a home with proper parental care.
Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Serv.’s Agency, 458 U.S. 502,
102 §.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982); see also State in the Interest of
S.M., 98-0922 (La.10/20/98), 719 So.2d 445, 452. In balancing these
interests, the courts of this state have consistently found the interest of
the child to be paramount over that of the parent. See, e.g., State in the
Interest of S.M., 719 So.2d at 452; State in the Interest of A.E., 448
So.2d 183, 186 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984); State in the Interest of Driscoll,
410 So.2d 255, 258 (La.App. 4 Cir.1982).

The State’s parens patriae power allows intervention in the
parent-child relationship only under serious circumstances, such as
where the State seeks the permanent severance of that relationship in
an involuntary termination proceeding. The fundamental purpose of
involuntary termination proceedings is to provide the greatest possible
protection to a child whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide
adequate care for his physical, emotional, and mental health needs and
adequate rearing by providing an expeditious judicial process for the
termination of all parental rights and responsibilities and to achieve
permanency and stability for the child. The focus of an involuntary
termination proceeding is not whether the parent should be deprived of
custody, but whether it would be in the best interest of the child for all

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legal relations with the parents to be terminated. LA. CHILD. CODE
art. 1001. As such, the primary concern of the courts and the State
remains to secure the best interest for the child, including termination
of parental rights if justifiable grounds exist and are proven.
Nonetheless, courts must proceed with care and caution as the
permanent termination of the legal relationship existing between
natural parents and the child is one of the most drastic actions the State
can take against its citizens. The potential loss to the parent is grievous,
perhaps more so than the loss of personal freedom caused by
incarceration. State in the Interest of A.E., 448 So.2d at 185.

A judgment terminating parental rights is reviewed on appeal under the
manifest error standard of review. State in the Interest of K.V., 14-163 (La.App. 3
Cir. 11/21/14), 161 So.3d 795.

In.A. first asserts that the juvenile court manifestly erred by finding clear and
convincing evidence that she did not substantially comply with her case plan and
that the DCFS provided reasonable efforts to assist her in completing her case plan.
She further asserts in assignment of error two that the juvenile court manifestly erred
by finding clear and convincing evidence that there was no reasonable expectation
of In.A.’s significant improvement in the near future. We address these two
assignments together.

The grounds relied upon by the State and the juvenile court for terminating
the parental rights of In.A. in this case are set out in La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6).

Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has
elapsed since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant

to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with

a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the

department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return

of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable

expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or

conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for
a safe, stable, and permanent home.

At the termination hearing, the State presented the testimony of Lisa Nicotra,
In.A.’s counselor, Brittany Johnson, her parenting educator, Zuntia Leger, her first

caseworker, Reneisha Steward, her second case worker, and Quiana Gage, her

current case worker. After the State rested, the minor mother, In.A., presented the
testimony of her aunt and foster placement, Shawnte Arceneaux.

Lisa Nicotra testified that she is a Behavioral Health Specialist for NIAlife
Center for Counselling and that she had been working with the mother for
approximately a year to assist her in her treatment plan. In.A. was twelve years old
when she came to NIAlife and fourteen at the time of trial. In.A. had previously
been diagnosed with anxiety disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and
oppositional defiant disorder. Ms. Nicotra’s role as a Behavioral Health Specialist
was to work with In.A. on her treatment goals from her treatment plan, which
included expressing feelings in a healthy manner, improving academic and
behavioral performance at school, and understanding her diagnoses and alleviating
symptoms. Ms. Nicotra stated that it is her job to “focus on [In.A.’s] well-being, not
outside situations, and making sure that she’s okay, and how to process her feelings
and identify them” and that she is not involved with assisting with parenting skills
for In.A. She stated with regard to In.A.’s progress and treatment for dealing with
her disorders that she anticipates that the process could last anywhere from one to
two years more from the date of trial. When asked on cross-examination if she thinks
that “there is a reasonable expectation to believe [In.A.’s] going to continue
improving with her behaviors as long as she’s seeing you[,}” Ms. Nicotra replied
“yes.” She stated that based on her background and involvement she is not testifying
as to any opinion regarding whether In.A. is fit to care for I.A.

Brittany Johnson then testified as the assistant director through Discovery
Renew Family Resource Center who provided parenting training and counselling to
In.A. beginning in July 2019. The parenting classes ended in December 2019, when

In.A. was thirteen years old. She stated that while In.A. did develop nurturing skills

during the course, she did not believe that In.A. was capable of independently caring

7

for ].A. and that most of her interactions with IJ.A. were akin to playing together as
opposed to parenting. When asked if she thought that at some point in the future,
when In.A. is an adult, if she might be capable of parenting, she responded, “Correct.”

Zunita Leger, Foster Care Director for the DCFS testified next. She was the
original case manager when I.A. entered into DCFS custody September 15, 2017.
In.A. had already come into foster care services when she was pregnant with I.A,
which is when Ms. Leger was assigned as her case manager. Ms. Leger established
the first case plan, though testified that there was “little to no progress” from In.A.
while she was the case manager. In.A. was initially placed in a home with LA., but
after being hospitalized, the foster placement no longer felt comfortable with In.A.
staying in the home. The two then went to live at Lighthouse, a facility for teen
mothers to learn parenting skills and schooling. Ms. Leger testified that In.A.’s
current age and cognitive abilities did not allow her to understand certain safety
issues concerning I.A.

Ryneisha Stewart testified that she has been the DCFS foster care case worker
for I.A. since January 2018 and was also In.A.’s case manager until summer of 2019,
having taken over for Ms. Leger. In.A. and I.A. stayed at Lighthouse until March of
2018, when In.A. was asked to leave by the staff at Lighthouse following a number
of incidents and a refusal to cooperate with staff. I.A. was then placed with a family
in Lafayette that he still resides with today that is an adoptive resource home. I[n.A.
was placed in a group home in Baton Rouge. In September of 2018, In.A. was asked
to leave this group home as well following defiance and behaviorial incidents and
an unwillingness to cooperate or negotiate with staff. She was then placed in the
home of a relative in Baton Rouge. During this time, Ms. Stewart testified to visits
between In.A. and I.A, and noted that In.A. didn’t appear aware of the age

appropriateness of things with I.A. When asked if she has ever felt as if In.A. and
8

I.A. could be placed in a home together, Ms. Stewart testified no, stating that DCFS
“always had, like, safety concerns for [I.A.].”

During her testimony, she summed up In.A.’s current difficulties in parenting
L.A. as follows:

{I.A.] is - - to [In.A.] [I.A.] is a toy and it’s her possession, it’s

not like a parent wants her child. [In.A.] is a toy to - - I mean, [I.A.] is

a toy to [In.A.]. So it’s not more of, I want my child to parent my child,

it’s | want my child because that’s my baby, that’s my possession. It’s

not more of a parenting, it’s more of, that’s my child, I want it.

Quina Gage testified next. She was the case manager for In.A. from July of
2019 to December 2019. She reiterated problems that she encountered with In.A.
during her involvement including In.A. being uncooperative with her aunt, whom
she was placed in the physical custody of, and other defiant behavior. When asked
if “at any point while you were the case manager did you feel like you were going
to be able to reunite [In.A.] her child, [I.A.]” she replied “No.” She further stated
that she felt that the current placement with the prospective adoptive parents for L.A.
provides him a wholesome and stabie situation.

The court also considered the letter report of Dr. Brennan, a child psychiatrist
who evaluated In.A. The report was introduced without objection from any of the
parties. In her report, dated March 4, 2018, Dr. Brennan stated that she had the
opportunity to evaluate In.A. on February 28, 2018 and administer the Wechsler
Intellectual Scale for Children, Fifth Addition (WISC-V) assessment. The overall
results of the assessment showed “significant intellectual limitations for [In.A.]” Dr.
Brennan’s personal observations of In.A. during the evaluation further “reflected her
limited behavioral control.” Dr. Brennan noted that during the evaluation her office
manager personally observed In.A. exhibiting dangerous behavior towards I.A. Dr.

Brennan summed up her assessment and opinion of In.A.’s ability to parent I.A. at

the conclusion of her report.

[In.A.’s] intellectual abilities, particularly her verbal
comprehension, and her poor judgement and impulse control, all make
it clear that she does not have the ability to care for or protect a child.
It does not appear to me that she has had sufficient structure or
discipline to acquire the self-discipline to structure her own life, much
less that of a dependent infant. She has not protected and does not know
how to protect her child. She loves [I.A.] as a child loves a favorite
baby doll. Unfortunately, that is not sufficient to provide [I.A.] with a
chance for a healthy and successful life. [In.A.] deserved more, and her
child needs and deserves an environment safer and more nurturing than
she has had. Hopefully, [In.A] can also be placed in a safe and
structured environment where she can learn the skills needed to protect
herself and have a happier, more functional lifestyle.

Finally, In.A.’s aunt, with whom In.A. has been placed, testified. She stated
that In.A. has lived with her for the last two years. She further stated that she works
outside of the household in addition to taking care of In.A., and also takes care of
In.A.’s younger brother, who is the same approximate age as I.A., although she
receives no child support assistance for doing so and this adds additional stress on
her. While she did testify that In.A.’s behavior and willingness to listen, to help
around the house, and to go to school on time had improved, she still has days where
she does not cooperate. In summary, she stated that In.A. has “[g]ood days and bad
days.” She replied affirmatively when asked by counsel for In.A. “if she gets to a
place where she’s able to care for Isaac, then it would be good for him to join her” ...
“if there was a place?” Notably, however, she did not indicate that she thought that
In.A. was presently capable of parenting I.A.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court provided oral reasons for
terminating In.A.’s parental rights to I.A., stating

Okay. So, first, before I even address [In.A.] I have experienced

many cases in the many years that I’ve been here doing this work, child

welfare work. I’m not sure I have experienced a case where more

traumatic events have been perpetrated upon an individual.
Having said that, I’m bound by law, I’m bound by finding clear
and convincing evidence of noncompliance of a case plan or an ability

to be able to parent a child. On the other hand, and probably on a higher
hand, it’s the ability to look for the child’s best interest as well. [In.A.]

10

so you came and you | met two and a half years ago, I think. During
that time, I did my best to try to address an issue which had happened
to you that should never happen to anybody. I think you’ ve grown as a
young lady over the last few years, and your CASA, obviously, has
spent a great deal of time in this case as well, and she also in her report
tells me of the great progress you have made. Your aunt has said the
same thing. From the days of those ladies coming from Deridder, or
wherever it was, to talk about all the problems that happened with an
eleven-year-old, twelve-year-old, mother to where you are today. And,
yes, it’s not all perfect and there’s still some things, but I think you’ve
grown, you’ve matured as those things that you can do. And I think, I
would say right here, for your aunt having come into your life has been
a huge, great thing for you and for your growth, and I’m, certainly,
indebted to her, as I think you probably will when you understand that
later on in your life. Some day I think you have the chance to be amom.
I really do. You’re going to have to keep growing and keep learning
and doing those things. But right now it’s not the time, it’s just not. At
eleven years old, and twelve years old, and now at fourteen years old,
there’s many years ahead of you before you’re going to be in a position
to where you can parent a child.

I’m not going to read Dr. Brennan’s letter, but when I first
received Dr. Brennan’s letter, it was clear to me that my job from that
day forward in 2018, early ‘18, was to find a way to help you continue
to grow, continue to do the things you need to do as a young person.
And it was, clearly, for me, at that time, 1 knew it wasn’t going to be
for you to be a mom, not for [I.A.] at this ttme. Dr. Brennan’s report
and those things, clearly, indicate to me that there’s a young lady,
fourteen years old, who has a child, who I’m certain loves that child. I
don’t think there’s a doubt in in my mind that you love that child with
all your heart and all your ability, but for [I-A.] now the best interest for
him and, clearly, based on the testimony and those things; you’re unable
to drive; you’re unable to be employed; you’re unable to house him;
you’re unable to do those things that adults can do. And it’s not your
fault, but it’s just not there for you at this time.

So the Court finds at this time it’s, clearly, in the best interest of
the child to terminate parental rights at this time. And I'll sign a
judgment on presentation.

We find no manifest error in the juvenile court’s decision. This case presents

the most tragic of circumstances for this mother, herself a minor child at the time of
the conception and birth of her child, I.A. She was the victim of a horrendous crime;
one no child should endure. She bears no responsibility for her past and present

situation. However, this court is tasked here with the unenviable responsibility in

the paramount to act in the best interest of ].A., as was the juvenile court.

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It is clear from the testimony of the witnesses and other evidence before the
court that there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in In.A.’s
condition or conduct in the near future that would allow her to parent I.A. He is in
his formative years developmentally and needs a safe, stable, and permanent home
now, not years from now when In.A. nears or reaches adulthood and is able to drive,
work to provide financially for a child, and potentially have the skills to nurture and
raise a child. Given her age and circumstances, In.A. herself needs to be nurtured,
parented, and supported, and thankfully has her aunt to attempt to do so. There is
no manifest error in the decision of the trial court finding that she is unable to do
those things now or in the immediate future, and therefore, the decision terminating
In.A.’s parental rights and freeing I.A. for adoption is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.