State in the Interest of T. L.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-535

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF T.L.

APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 17-JV-18887
HONORABLE LEWIS H. PITMAN, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

CONSOLIDATED WITH

22-536

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF A.L.

APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 17-JV-19039
HONORABLE LEWIS H. PITMAN, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

WILBUR L. STILES
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Van H. Kyzar, Guy E. Bradberry, and Wilbur L. Stiles, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Annette Roach
CINC Appellate Project
2740 Rue de Jardin, Suite 400
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70605
(337) 436-2900
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
G.S.

Maggie Anne Simon Leblanc
Public Defenders Office
301 E. St. Peters Street, Suite 101
New Iberia, Louisiana 70560
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
G.S.

Peggy Garris
Attorney at Law
124 West Washington Street, Suite C
New Iberia, Louisiana 70560
COUNSEL FOR:
B.M.L.

Diane E. Cote
825 Kaliste Saloom Road
Brandywine III, Room 150
Lafayette, Louisiana 70508
(337) 262-5913
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Department of Children and Family Services

Denise Henderson
State of Louisiana, Mental Health Advocacy Service
302 Dulles Drive, Room U-47
Lafayette, Louisiana 70506
COUNSEL FOR:
T.L.
A.L.

STILES, Judge.

G.S.1 appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to her

minor children, T.L. and A.L. In these now consolidated matters, G.S.’s appellate

counsel assigns no specific errors in the trial court’s ruling but instead requests an

independent review of the record on appeal. Following review, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The record reflects that T.L., born to G.S. and B.L. on February 8, 2014, came

into the custody of the Department of Child and Family Services in September 2017

on the grounds of neglect and dependency after G.S. was arrested on outstanding

warrants. Shortly thereafter, A.L. was born to G.S. and B.S. on February 12, 2018

and came into the custody of DCFS in April 2018, again on the grounds of neglect

and dependency. Additionally, A.L. was determined to be a substance-exposed

newborn given a positive screen for marijuana. The instanter order filed at the time

A.L. came into custody indicated that G.S. tested positive for both

methamphetamine and amphetamines. Relatives of the children have served as their

foster parents.

DCFS filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and Certification for

Adoption on September 12, 2019, seeking termination of G.S.’s parental rights to

each of the two children. DCFS also sought the termination of parental rights of

both fathers.2

1
We refer to the parents and the children by the use of initials given the confidential nature
of these proceedings. See Uniform Rules---Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-1(a) and 5-2.
2
The appeal as it relates to T.L. bears appellate docket number 22-535 whereas the appeal
relating to A.L. bears appellate docket number 22-536. We address the consolidated matters
collectively herein.

The trial court heard the matter over the course of three days in May 2021.

DCFS presented the testimony of supervising case workers regarding G.S.’s failure

to comply with the case plans issued in this case, namely G.S.’s ongoing struggles

with housing, employment, and substance abuse. With regard to the latter, G.S. was

briefly hospitalized during the course of the hearing and, upon testing ordered by the

trial court, returned a positive screen for marijuana. The trial court also heard

testimony regarding the bonds the children had established with their respective

foster parents, all of whom have indicated a willingness to adopt the children.

Rendering written reasons, the trial court determined that DCFS met its

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that G.S. did not substantially

comply with her case plan despite the passage of more than one year, that there was

no reasonable expectation of substantial improvement in the near future, and that the

termination of G.S.’s parental rights was in the best interests of the minor children.

By a resulting June 24, 2021 judgment, the trial court terminated G.S.’s parental

rights to both children and further certified the children eligible for adoption. The

trial court further terminated the children’s fathers’ parental rights to the children,

although that ruling is beyond the scope of the present matter which singularly

addresses the judgment as it relates to G.S.

In briefing to this court, G.S.’s appellate counsel assigns no specific error

explaining that examination of the record reveals no “non-frivolous issues to raise

before the court.” Counsel therefore requests that “the court independently review

the records in these consolidated cases to determine whether any possible error exists

that could support a finding that the trial court abused its discretion when rendering

judgment terminating the parental rights of G.S. and certifying the children free for

adoption.” This requested review is in keeping with the procedure identified by this

2

court in State ex rel. M.B., 21-532, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/23/22), 335 So.3d 305, 307

(en banc) (“While counsel for appellant assigns no errors, this court is required to

independently review the record to determine whether any possible error exists.”)

DISCUSSION

Burden of Proof

The supreme court has explained the “[p]ermanent termination of the legal

relationship existing between natural parents and children is one of the most drastic

actions the State can take against its citizens.” State ex rel. A.T., 06-501, p. 5 (La.

7/6/06), 936 So.2d 79, 82. Notwithstanding that observation, “the primary concern

of the courts and the State remains to determine and insure the best interest of the

child, which includes termination of parental rights if justiciable statutory grounds

exist and are proven by the State.” Id. (citing State ex rel. S.M.W., 03-3277 (La.

2/21/01), 781 So.2d 1223).

Pertinent to this case, La.Ch.Code art. 1015 provides statutory grounds for

termination of parental rights as follows:

(5) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical
custody of a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him
under circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid
parental responsibility by any of the following:

....

(b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to
provide significant contributions to the child’s care and support for any
period of six consecutive months.

(c) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to
maintain significant contact with the child by visiting him or
communicating with him for any period of six consecutive months.

(6) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has
elapsed since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant
to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with
a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the

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department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return
of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or
conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for
a safe, stable, and permanent home.

The State must establish at least one of those statutory grounds by clear and

convincing evidence. See La.Ch.Code art. 1035. 3 Moreover, even if the State

satisfies its evidentiary burden, the court may not terminate parental rights unless it

determines that doing so is in the child’s best interest. State ex rel. A.T., 936 So.2d

79 (citing La.Ch.Code art. 1039; State ex rel. G.J.L., 00-3278 (La. 6/29/01), 791

So.2d 80). On review, an appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s findings of

fact in a termination matter absent manifest error or unless the findings are clearly

wrong. State in Interest of M.B., 335 So.3d 305 (citing In re A.J.F., 00-948 (La.

6/30/00), 764 So.2d 47).

Grounds

DCFS sought termination of parental rights under the grounds provided by

La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5)(b)4 as well as La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6). The trial court

determined that DCFS established the grounds under both Paragraph 5 and

Paragraph 6. We address these in turn, although DCFS was required to prove only

one ground. See State ex rel. D.L.R., 08-1541 (La. 12/12/08), 998 So.2d 681.

3
Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1035(A) provides that “[t]he petitioner bears the
burden of establishing each element of a ground for termination of parental rights by clear and
convincing evidence.”
4
DCFS sought termination under both La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5)(b) and (c). At trial, DCFS
largely focused on Paragraph 5(b) rather than 5(c), although it introduced evidence regarding
G.S.’s failure to maintain contact with the children through testimony regarding G.S.’s repeated
failure to attend scheduled visitation with the children.

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Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1015(5)

As for the former, La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5)(b) provides the ground of

abandonment for a failure to provide significant contributions for the child’s support

for a period of six months, as of the time the petition is filed, and the circumstances

demonstrate an intention to permanently avoid parental responsibility. On this point,

DCFS case worker Markella Robertson plainly testified that G.S. never provided the

required parental contribution during her multi-year supervision of the matter, which

included the period prior to the filing of the petition for termination. G.S. confirmed

the allegation in her own testimony, explaining that she had only attempted to make

the contribution upon receipt of her “stimulus check” but that the attempt failed. G.S.

suggested that the failure was attributable to Ms. Robertson’s refusal to provide her

with the children’s “social number and case number.” When asked how many times

she made the attempt, G.S. explained: “Just that one time.” G.S. demonstrated no

ability to provide the support contribution in the future given her failure to secure

employment. In any event, the record supports the trial court’s determination that

DCFS proved the ground for termination as provided by La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5)(b).

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1015(6)

As for La.Ch.Code art. 1015(6), DCFS was required to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that 1) more than a year had elapsed since T.L. and A.L. were

placed in DCFS’s custody, 2) there had been no substantial compliance with the case

plan, and that 3) there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in

G.S.’s conduct in the near future. The record supports each of the trial court’s

determinations in this regard.

First, both children were taken into DCFS’s custody and remained in foster

care for more than four years. Further, both Ms. Robertson and subsequent case

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worker Deidra Chevalier testified regarding G.S.’s difficulty in consistently working

through the various components of her case plan.

Significantly, G.S. never provided proof of employment, never provided the

parental support contributions as explained above, and never maintained stable

housing. Ms. Robertson testified that during the period of her supervision, G.S.

moved twenty-nine times, including periods spent in a rehabilitation facility and a

sober living facility. Ms. Chevalier explained that during her subsequent supervision,

G.S. had at least two residences, including one which would have been unsuitable

for the children given inadequate bedding for the children. Ms. Chevalier explained

that when she returned to the home at a later date, she found it would be suitable for

smaller children only with additional childproofing. G.S. acknowledged the

instability in her housing situation “since the case started in 2017[.]” She stated that:

I’m not going to deny the fact that I have been place to place and trying
to find a steady place. I mean, I haven’t stopped trying and it may have
taken a little while to get there, but I’m getting there now. I just recently
got all my paperwork that I’ve been asking OCS to help me get. I got
all that together and not - - I just got to wait for my social security card
to come in that I applied for and I can now apply for Section 8 like I’ve
been asking for help to do.

Those desires, however, remained only aspirational at the time of the hearing.

Rather, the evidentiary record supports DCFS’s position that G.S. consistently failed

to maintain stable housing as required by her case plans and continued to do so at

the time of the hearing.

Additionally, DCFS maintained that G.S. failed to comply with those aspects

of her case plan regarding mental health evaluation and substance abuse

rehabilitation. As for the former, G.S. failed to follow through with referrals for

mental health evaluation despite her ongoing representations that she was interested

in counseling. With regard to the latter, G.S. lived in a sober living facility for a

6

period and also pursued in-patient drug rehabilitation but did not complete the course

of treatment. In addition to the failure to complete treatment, G.S. acknowledged

that she had twice relapsed whereas the case workers testified that G.S. refused or

missed a number of scheduled drug screenings. G.S. also returned positive drug

screens at other times, including a positive test for amphetamine, methamphetamine,

and marijuana. As discussed below, G.S. also tested positive for marijuana use

during the course of the termination hearing.

Finally, DCFS presented testimony indicating both that G.S. failed to

complete the parenting courses required of her and failed to maintain her visitation

schedule with the children. With regard to her parenting courses, Jennifer Zanazzi,

resource manager for the Extra Mile, explained that G.S. attended only one half of

the parenting classes required for completion of its course but that the agency

discharged G.S. after she failed to appear for four classes. G.S. acknowledged that

she did not complete the Extra Mile coursework, stating that she became frustrated

when the agency required her to “restart” her classes after she gave birth to another

child. G.S. testified when the agency attempted to reschedule the class “it just got

to the point where [she] just kind of gave up.”

Similarly, G.S. failed to maintain the required visitation schedule with the

children. Ms. Robertson stated that G.S. attended only twenty-two of seventy

scheduled visitations, some of which were due to incarceration. Ms. Chevalier also

testified that, despite G.S. having a specific visitation plan each month, she missed

a number of those visits due to alleged miscommunication or failure to confirm the

scheduled visitation and thereafter arrive at the prescribed time.

Given those circumstances, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s

determination that G.S. failed to substantially comply with her case plan. Likewise,

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the circumstances cited above were ongoing at the time of trial. G.S. anticipated

improving compliance in each of the areas but failed to demonstrate positive

evidence of that improvement. To the contrary, she tested positive for marijuana in

the midst of the hearing and did not display a sense of urgency in rectifying her drug

use.5 Similarly, she anticipated obtaining employment but was waiting on receipt of

her social security card and anticipated applying for permanent housing upon

completion of her paperwork. As noted by the trial court at the close of G.S.’s

testimony, G.S.’s involvement with DCFS began in September 2017. Despite the

passage of forty-two months at the time of trial, G.S. had not complied with any

aspect of her case plan and identified only unexecuted plans for achieving the goals

identified in the case plan.

Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s determination that

DCFS demonstrated the grounds for termination provided by La.Ch.Code art.

1015(6).

Best Interests of the Child

As noted, upon finding that a ground for termination has been proven by clear

and convincing evidence, the trial court “must not terminate parental rights unless it

determines that to do so is in the child’s best interests.” State ex rel. A.T., 936 So.2d

at 82 (citing La.Ch.Code art. 1039); State ex rel. G.J.L., 00-3278 (La. 6/29/01), 791

So.2d 80). We conclude that the above-cited evidence, along with the entirety of the

appellate record, supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination of G.S.’s

parental rights is in the best interests of both T.L. and A.L.

5
G.S. admitted at the hearing that she had smoked marijuana the previous day. When
asked whether she had plans to stop using marijuana, G.S. stated that: “After I speak with - - after
I see with my doctors and my mental health counselor then we’ll see where to go from there.” G.S.
acknowledged that she did not have a prescription for marijuana use.

8

G.S. continues to fail to offer a secure environment. DCFS instead

demonstrates that G.S. is unable or unwilling to rectify deficiencies which

undermine her ability to offer T.L. and A.L. a supportive and stable home. Both

children have bonded with the relatives who have served as their foster parents for

years and who are providing the children with the resources required for their

respective developmental delays.

Following review, we find that the evidence supports the trial court’s

determination that DCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parental

rights of G.S. to her children, T.L. and A.L., should be terminated, and that

termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s June 24, 2021 judgment is affirmed.

Costs of this proceeding are assessed to G.S.

AFFIRMED.

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