State in the Interest of M. D. L.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

23-427

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF M. D. L.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. J-2741-2022B
HONORABLE C. ANTHONY EAVES, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Charles G.
Fitzgerald, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Annette Fuller Roach
Roach & Roach, APLC
2740 Rue de Jardin, Suite 400
Lake Charles, LA 70605
(337) 436-2900
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
I.G.E.L. (mother)

Ruby Norris Freeman
Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services
900 Murray St.
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 487-5218
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

PICKETT, Judge.

I.G.E.L. 1 appeals the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental

rights to her son, M.D.L.

FACTS

M.D.L. was born on March 7, 2018. M.D.L.’s mother, I.G.E.L., and father,

J.D.L., both were incarcerated, and the child was left in the care of his

grandparents. On September 10, 2021, M.D.L. was taken into the custody of the

state pursuant to an instanter order after his grandparents indicated they were no

longer able to care for him. M.D.L. was adjudicated a child in need of care on

December 8, 2021, and has continued in the custody of the state since that time.

On August 26, 2022, the state filed a petition to terminate the parental rights

of J.D.L. and I.G.E.L., alleging failure to comply with their case plans, failure to

provide significant contributions and support for a period of six months pursuant to

La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5)(b) and failure to visit or communicate with the child for

six months pursuant to La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5)(c).2 The petition further alleged

that it was in the best interests of M.D.L. that both parents’ rights be terminated

and M.D.L. be freed for adoption. The petition further sought leave of court to file

the petition even though it had been less than one year since M.D.L. entered state

custody.

Originally, the hearing to determine whether parental rights should be

terminated was set for November 9, 2022. The hearing was continued on the

1
The parties and the minor child are referred to by their initials to preserve
their anonymity in this confidential proceeding.
2
The petition incorrectly cited La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4)(b) and (c).
Louisiana Children’s Code article 1015 was amended by the legislature in 2023 to
delete sections 3 and 9. 2023 La.Acts 271, § 1. The remaining sections were
renumbered, but no change was made to those sections. We refer to the sections as
they were numbered at the time of the trial of this matter.

motion of the state because the attorney for the state had a broken ankle and her

colleague had a medical procedure on that date. The hearing was reset for March

28, 2023.

On the day of the trial, I.G.E.L.’s attorney moved to continue the hearing.

She argued that her client had been incarcerated for the last seven months, but that

she had a court date in her criminal proceedings scheduled for April 5, 2023.

I.G.E.L.’s attorney indicated that she may be released from prison at that time and

be able to begin working her case plan. The state objected to the continuance. The

trial court denied the motion for continuance, and the matter proceeded to trial.

The state called two witnesses: Valerie Lopez, the Department of Children

and Family Services (DCFS) case worker assigned to this case from the time

M.D.L. entered state custody until October 2022, and Serenity Horsley, the DCFS

case worker assigned from October 2022 until the date of trial. The entire record

from the child in need of care proceeding was introduced as evidence. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the state proved by clear and

convincing evidence grounds for termination of the parental rights of J.D.L. and

I.G.E.L. The trial court further found that termination of parental rights was in the

best interests of M.D.L.

On April 19, 2023, the trial court signed a judgment terminating the parental

rights of I.G.E.L. and J.D.L. in conformity with its oral reasons. I.G.E.L. timely

perfected this appeal. J.D.L. has not appealed the judgment, and the termination of

his parental rights is not before this court for review.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

On appeal, I.G.E.L. assigns five errors:

1. The court manifestly erred when it denied I.G.E.L.’s motion for
continuance which was sought to allow I.G.E.L. an opportunity to
resolve her legal issues and current incarceration.
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2. The court manifestly erred in terminating the parental rights of
I.G.E.L. because the agency failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that I.G.E.L. abandoned M.D.L. by failing to provide a
significant contribution toward the child’s care.

3. The court manifestly erred in terminating the parental rights of
I.G.E.L. because the agency failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that I.G.E.L. abandoned M.D.L. by leaving him under
circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid
parental responsibility.

4. The court manifestly erred in terminating the parental rights of
I.G.E.L. because the agency failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that I.G.E.L. failed to comply with her case plan.

5. The court manifestly erred by finding that the state proved by clear
and convincing evidence that termination of I.G.E.L.’s parental rights
was in the best interests of M.D.L.

DISCUSSION

In her first assignment of error, I.G.E.L. argues that the trial court erred in

refusing to grant her motion to continue on the day of the hearing.

“[A] continuance may be granted in any case there is good
ground therefor.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 1601. The trial court has great
discretion in granting or denying a motion for a continuance, and
denial of a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the trial
court is shown to have abused its discretion. Jackson v. Royal Ins.
Co., 97-723 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/17/97), 704 So.2d 424. Whether a trial
court should grant or deny a continuance depends on the particular
facts of each case.

Some factors to consider in denying or granting a continuance
are diligence, good faith, and reasonable grounds. Demopulos v.
Jackson, 33,560 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/21/00), 765 So.2d 480. Fairness to
both parties and the need for orderly administration of justice are
additional considerations in deciding whether to grant or deny a
continuance. Gilcrease v. Bacarisse, 26,318 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/7/94),
647 So.2d 1219, writ denied, 95-421 (La.3/30/95), 651 So.2d 845.

Walsh v. Morris, 07-579, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 970 So.2d 94, 96-97,

writ denied, 09-478 (La. 4/17/09), 6 So.3d 795.

I.G.E.L. argues that the trial court should have continued the hearing for a

week for her to resolve the charges for which she was incarcerated. I.G.E.L.

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claims it appeared the charges would be resolved favorably and would allow her to

be released and work her case plan. The state points out that the continuance was

not sought until the morning of trial, and no evidence was introduced to support the

claims that her criminal charges would be favorably resolved. Further, the original

hearing was set for November, so I.G.E.L. had four months to resolve her criminal

charges.

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the

termination of parental rights hearing should not be continued.

The supreme court discussed the law applicable to an action by the state to

terminate parental rights in State ex rel. A.T., 06-501, p. 5 (La. 7/6/06), 936 So.2d

79, 82:

Title X of the Louisiana Children’s Code governs the
involuntary termination of parental rights. Permanent termination of
the legal relationship existing between natural parents and children is
one of the most drastic actions the State can take against its citizens.
However, the primary concern of the courts and the State remains to
determine and insure the best interest of the child, which includes
termination of parental rights if justifiable statutory grounds exist and
are proven by the State. State ex rel. S.M.W., 00-3277 (La.2/21/01),
781 So.2d 1223.

....

In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find that the State
has established at least one of the statutory grounds by clear and
convincing evidence. State ex rel. J.A., 99-2905 (La.1/12/00), 752
So.2d 806, 811 (citing La. Ch. C. Art. 1035(A); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). Further, even
upon finding that the State has met its evidentiary burden, a court still
must not terminate parental rights unless it determines that to do so is
in the child’s best interests. La. Ch. C. Art. 1039; State ex rel. G.J.L.,
00-3278 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 80, 85.

On review, this court will not overturn the findings of fact of the trial court

in a termination proceeding unless the trial court committed manifest error or is

clearly wrong. In re A.J.F., 00-948 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 47.

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In her second assignment of error, I.G.E.L. alleges that the trial court erred

in finding that the state proved by clear and convincing evidence that she

abandoned her child by failing to provide a significant contribution toward the

child’s care. Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1015(5)(b) states:

The grounds for termination of parental rights are:

(5) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody
of a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him under
circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid
parental responsibility by any of the following:

....

(b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has
failed to provide significant contributions to the child's
care and support for any period of six consecutive
months.

As we have discussed, I.G.E.L. was in jail at the time M.D.L. entered state

custody in September 2021. She was released from jail in October 2021. Ms.

Lopez testified that I.G.E.L. never paid any contributions to M.D.L.’s care, even

during the eleven months she was not in prison. The first case plan approved by

the court on an unknown date in 2021 (“the 27th day of 2021”), stated that I.G.E.L.

would contribute $25 per month towards M.D.L.’s care if she was employed and

$10 per month if she was not employed. At the latest, I.G.E.L. knew about this

requirement of her case plan by February 18, 2022, when she participated in the

family conference via Zoom. The case plan approved by the court on March 9,

2022, included the same requirement for support. Ms. Lopez testified that I.G.E.L.

provided information about a job as a sitter, but Ms. Lopez was unable to verify the

employment. Even if she was not employed, she failed to provide even the $10 per

month for care and support from February 18, 2022, the latest date at which she

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would have been made aware of her obligation to provide support until August 26,

2022, when the petition for termination was filed.

We find no manifest error in the trial court’s factual finding that the state

proved by clear and convincing evidence that I.G.E.L. failed to provide any

contribution to M.D.L.’s support for a period of six months.

I.G.E.L. argues in her third assignment of error that the trial court erred by

finding that the state proved by clear and convincing evidence that I.G.E.L.

abandoned M.D.L. In this assignment of error, I.G.E.L. claims she is the “non-

offending” parent, in that she was already in prison when her husband left M.D.L.

with his parents, who then turned custody over to the state when they could no

longer care for him. Ms. Lopez testified that I.G.E.L. provided information about a

relative for placement, but Ms. Lopez was unable to contact that relative.

I.G.E.L. also argues that the trial court erred in finding that she failed to visit

M.D.L. for a period of six months, a ground for termination found at La.Ch.Code

art. 1015(5)(c), which states:

The grounds for termination of parental rights are:

(5) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody
of a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him under
circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid
parental responsibility by any of the following:

....

(c) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has
failed to maintain significant contact with the child by
visiting him or communicating with him for any period
of six consecutive months.

The evidence presented at trial and in the exhibits presented in the form of

case progress documentation shows that I.G.E.L. did visit M.D.L. when she was

not in prison or in in-patient treatment. The state did not prove that, at the time the

petition was filed, I.G.E.L. did not visit or communicate with M.D.L. for a period
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of six months. Nevertheless, as we have found that the state did prove a statutory

ground for termination in the discussion of the previous assignment of error, our

conclusion that this assignment of error is well-founded does not necessitate a

reversal of the judgment of the trial court.

In her fourth assignment of error, I.G.E.L. argues that the state failed to

prove by clear and convincing evidence that she failed to work her case plan.

I.G.E.L. continued to test positive for illegal drugs or fail to show up for testing.

I.G.E.L. did not receive counseling for her mental health issues. She entered two

different drug treatment programs but completed neither. I.G.E.L. did not

complete parenting classes. Ms. Lopez was unable to verify I.G.E.L.’s

employment. I.G.E.L. did not provide any financial support for the care of M.D.L.

Finally, I.G.E.L. did not resolve her legal issues. All of these were components of

the case plan. I.G.E.L. did attend visitation sporadically. I.G.E.L. also had

housing for the period that she was not in treatment or incarcerated.

We find the evidence presented at trial supports the trial court’s finding that

I.G.E.L. failed to work her case plan as required by La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5),

which states as a ground for termination of parental rights:

(5) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed
since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant to a
court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a
case plan for services which has been previously filed by the
department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return
of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or
conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for
a safe, stable, and permanent home.

We note that the state sought, and the trial court granted, leave for the petition for

termination of parental rights to be filed sooner than a year after the child entered

the state’s custody. We also find that the trial court’s conclusion that there is no

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reasonable expectation of significant improvement was not manifestly erroneous,

especially given that I.G.E.L. was incarcerated at the time of the trial of this matter.

We find no merit in this assignment of error.

Finally, I.G.E.L. argues that the trial court erred in finding that termination

of parental rights was in the best interests of M.D.L. The state introduced evidence

that M.D.L. is in the care of foster parents who are willing to adopt him. He is

healthy and well cared for in the home. We find the evidence clearly and

convincingly supports the trial court’s finding that termination of I.G.E.L.’s

parental rights is in the best interest of M.D.L. This assignment of error lacks

merit.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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