State in the Interest of M. H.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-98

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF M.H.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. JC-2023-526
HONORABLE THOMAS R. DUPLANTIER, DISTRICT JUDGE

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CHARLES G. FITZGERALD
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Candyce G. Perret, and Charles G.
Fitzgerald, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Corrie R. Gallien
Gallien Law, LLC
1030 Lafayette Street, Suite 12
Lafayette, Louisiana 70501
(337) 761-1585
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
S.T.

Lloyd Dangerfield
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 91908
Lafayette, Louisiana 70509
(337) 896-3777
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
S.T.

Diane E. Cote
State of Louisiana
Department of Children and Family Services
825 Kaliste Saloom Road
Brandywine III, Suite 150
Lafayette, Louisiana 70508
(337) 262-5970
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana
Department of Children and Family Services

Stephanie R. Reed
Acadiana Legal Services Corporation
1020 Surrey Street
Lafayette, Louisiana 70501
(337) 237-4320
Counsel for Appellee:
M.H.

FITZGERALD, Judge.

The biological father of M.H., a minor, appeals the trial court judgment

terminating his parental rights. 1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

M.H. was born on May 5, 2023. S.H. is the mother. S.T. is the father. S.H.

and S.T. never married, and their dating relationship with each other ended a few

months before M.H. was born.

By instanter order dated May 15, 2023, M.H. was placed in the custody of the

State of Louisiana, through the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

Several years later, in August 2025, DCFS filed a petition for involuntary

termination of the mother and father’s parental rights. Here are the relevant

allegations of the petition:

5.

The minor child, [M.H.], came into custody of the Department
of Children and Family Services on May 12, 2023, on the grounds of
neglect, dependency, medical neglect, lack of adequate supervision. At
five days old, the newborn was brought to the hospital and was placed
into the NICU being tested for infectious diseases and tetanus having
been born in the woods. The child was adjudicated a “Child in Need of
Care” on August 16, 2023. The minor child has remained in the custody
of the Department of Children and Family Services since entering care
and residing in St. Mary Parish, Louisiana with certified adoptive foster
parents.

....

8.

Pursuant to the provisions of Louisiana Children’s Code Article
1015(5), and unless sooner permitted by the Court, the parental rights
of the parents, [S.H. and S.T.], should be terminated in that at least one
year has elapsed since the child was removed from the parents’ custody
pursuant to a court order; case plans for services as to the minor child

1
Initials are used throughout this opinion to protect and maintain the privacy of the minor
child in accordance with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5–2.

were formulated for the mother and father[], but there has been no
substantial compliance with the case plan for services . . . [and] there is
no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parents’
condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and
need for a safe, stable and permanent home, for the following non-
exclusive reasons, to-wit:

(a) The parents’ have repeatedly failed to comply with the
required program of treatment and rehabilitation services
provided in the case plan.

(b) The conditions that led to the removal or similar
potentially harmful conditions continue to persist.

(c) As set forth above, the parents’ have failed to cooperate in
completion of the case plans designated for reunification
of the family.

(d) The parents’ conduct reasonably indicates that they are
unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent safe
home for the minor child, based on expert opinion and/or
based upon an established pattern of behavior, as indicated
above.

(e) The parents’ lack of substantial improvement in redressing
the problems preventing reunification.

(f) The parents suffer from substance abuse issues and/or
mental health issues which render them unable and/or
incapable of exercising parental responsibilities without
exposing the minor child to a substantial risk of serious
harm, based upon expert opinion and/or based upon an
established pattern of behavior, as indicated above.

The termination hearing was held on November 17, 2025. At the close of

evidence, the trial court ruled from the bench, terminating the mother and father’s

parental rights and certifying M.H. for adoption. The trial court provided oral

reasons for its ruling at that time. A final written judgment was then signed by the

court later that day. Only the father, S.T., has appealed this judgment.

On appeal, S.T. asserts three assignments of error (emphasis in original):

I. The court manifestly erred by finding that S.T. had not
substantially complied with his case plan; that DCFS
provided reasonable efforts to assist S.T. to complete his case

2

plan; and that there was no reasonable expectation of a
significant improvement by S.T. in the near future.

II. The court manifestly erred by finding that termination of
S.T.’s parental rights was in the best interests of M.H.

III. The Department failed to consider relative placements of
M.H. prior to seeking termination of S.T.’s parental rights.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The involuntary termination of parental rights was at issue in State in the

Interest of C.F., 17-1054 (La. 12/6/17), 235 So.3d 1066. There, the Louisiana

Supreme Court provided the following statement of law:

The termination of parental rights is a two-pronged inquiry. First, the
State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of at
least one ground for termination under La. Ch. Code art. 1015. La. Ch.
Code art. 1035(A) (“The petitioner bears the burden of establishing
each element of a ground for termination of parental rights by clear and
convincing evidence.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct.
1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Only after a ground for termination is
found, the trial court must determine whether the termination is in the
best interest of the child. La. Ch. Code art. 1039; State ex rel. L.B. v.
G.B.B., 02-1715 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 918, 922.

Id. at 1072.

“Whether termination of parental rights is warranted is a question of fact, and

a district court’s factual determinations will not be set aside in the absence of

manifest error.” State ex rel. H.A.B., 10-1111, p. 31 (La. 10/19/10), 49 So.3d 345,

368.

First Assignment of Error

S.T. initially asserts that the trial court manifestly erred by finding that he

failed to substantially comply with his case plan and by finding that there was no

reasonable expectation of significant improvement in his condition or conduct in the

near future.

3

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 1015 provides the grounds for the

involuntary termination of parental rights. In the case before us, DCFS sought

termination of S.T.’s parental rights under paragraph 5 of Article 1015, which states:

(5) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has
elapsed since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant
to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with
a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the
department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return
of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or
conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for
a safe, stable, and permanent home.

Under La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5), DCFS had the burden of proving three

elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that at least one year had elapsed

since M.H. was removed from S.T.’s custody, (2) that S.T. had failed to substantially

comply with his case plan, and (3) that there was no reasonable expectation of

significant improvement in S.T.’s condition or conduct in the near future. State ex

rel. H.A.B., 49 So.3d 345.

As to the first element, the record shows that on May 15, 2023, the trial court

signed an instanter order for removal of M.H. and provisional custody to DCFS.

More than two years later, on November 17, 2025, S.T.’s parental rights were

terminated by the trial court. The first element is thus satisfied.

As to the second element, La.Ch.Code art. 1036(C) provides an illustrative

list of relevant evidence, stating in pertinent part: “In accordance with Article

1015(5), lack of parental compliance with a case plan may be evidenced by one or

more of the following: . . . (6) The parent’s lack of substantial improvement in

redressing the problems preventing reunification. (7) The persistence of conditions

that led to removal or similar potentially harmful conditions.”

4

Here, DCFS sought termination of S.T.’s parental rights because of the

persistence of the conditions that led to removal, as well as the lack of substantial

improvement in redressing the problems preventing reunification, particularly S.T.’s

inability to provide adequate housing, his unwillingness to provide DCFS with a

safety plan addressing mental health issues, and his unwillingness to provide DCFS

with requested financial information.

As stated earlier, M.H. was removed and placed in DCFS’s custody on May

15, 2023. The initial case plan was accepted by the trial court on October 25, 2023.

Thereafter, the trial court approved updated case plans at review hearings on January

24, 2024; May 21, 2024; August 6, 2024; and November 13, 2024. The permanency

goal in all these case plans was reunification, and the conditions for reunification

remained essentially unchanged. 2

Thus, from the beginning, the conditions for reunification required that S.T.

maintain stable housing with his parents, that he and his family maintain a clean and

safe home, that he follow up with mental health support, that he provide proof of

mental health stability and continued treatment as required by his provider, that he

demonstrate good decision-making skills for the safety and well-being of his

daughter, that he complete parent training, and that he pass random drug tests. Then,

in the case plan that was approved by the trial court on November 13, 2024, two

more conditions were added: first, that S.T. “will provide [DCFS] with proof that he

and his family are able to financially provide for [M.H.] and support their household

(paystubs, bank statements, SSI documentation)[.]” And second, that he “will

2
The placement plan changed from reunification to adoption in S.T.’s case plan dated
October 17, 2024. That case plan was approved by the trial court at the review hearing of January
28, 2025.

5

provide [DCFS] with a plan for [M.H.] when he begins to hear voices and his anxiety

begins to disrupt his thoughts.”

Adequate Housing

From the inception of this case, S.T. has been unemployed and has lived with

his parents in their house. And during this time, S.T. has been unable to provide a

clean and safe home environment for his daughter.

At the termination hearing, Kasha Milstead, who was the DCFS caseworker

assigned to the case, described the condition of the home this way: “Basically

hoarding, just items all throughout the home, just stuff everywhere.” And when she

was asked about “clear passage” to move around inside the home, she explained:

“Just narrow paths where you can just maneuver your way through, but just things

everywhere, it’s all over, even outside, on the porch it’s full of stuff, under the

carport it’s full of stuff. It’s just a lot, a lot of items.”

In conjunction with Ms. Milstead’s testimony, numerous photographs of the

home, both inside and out, were introduced into evidence. These photographs show

that the hoarding situation makes the home unsafe and inadequate for young children

like M.H.

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court summed things up this way:

[S.T.’s] parents, I begged them to fix the house to be in a position that
they could show the Department that they could provide a safe place
for [M.H.]. Since 2023, we have gone back and forth down that road,
and it is clear to me they are unable and incapable of providing a home
that is safe and free of concerns for a child, even though they know the
result of what is going to happen. [S.T.] is incapable on his own of
providing housing.

Mental Health Issues

In May 2024, S.T. submitted to a psychological evaluation administered by

Dr. Naomi Friedberg. Dr. Friedberg’s written report was admitted into evidence.

6

According to the report, S.T.’s “most current diagnoses are Undifferentiated

Schizophrenia; Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Major Depressive Disorder,

recurrent, moderate; Insomnia, and ADHD, inattentive type.”

The report notes that S.T. “admitted to continuing auditory hallucinations,

even with medication compliance. He indicated that he has some days, although not

often, when it is hard to concentrate due to the voices he hears, and when he gets

overwhelmed with anxiety.” And even though he was hospitalized three times from

June 2022 to April 2023 for inpatient psychiatric treatment, S.T. reported to Dr.

Friedberg “that the frequency and intensity of the hallucinatory phenomena is much

less now that he is compliant and consistent with proper medications.”

Although Dr. Friedberg concluded that S.T. “has the capability to care for his

child[,]” she recommended the following:

Due to his mental health difficulties and the potential severity of
symptoms, he will continue to need the commitment of physical and
financial support from his family, which he appears to have. He will
also need to have a safety plan in place, agreed upon by the family,
when he has episodic difficult symptoms.

Based on Dr. Friedberg’s report, S.T.’s case plan was updated to add that S.T.

“will provide the agency with a plan for [M.H.] when he begins to hear voices and

his anxiety begins to disrupt his thoughts.” But in the twelve months that followed,

Ms. Milstead testified that S.T. failed to provide any safety plan to DCFS.

Proof of Income

Again, the case plan required S.T. to “provide [DCFS] with proof that he and

his family are able to financially provide for [M.H.] and support their household

(paystubs, bank statements, SSI documentation)[.]”

7

Ms. Milstead testified that S.T. was unemployed. She also explained that he

was not receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Thus, from the start of this

case, S.T. has not had any source of income.

Indeed, Dr. Friedberg’s evaluation report summarized S.T.’s unemployment

situation this way:

[S.T.] stated that he graduated from Comeaux High School in regular
education coursework in 2009, and then completed a 2 year degree as a
machine tool technician at SLCC. He said that he could have had a
second Bachelor’s degree in Math if he had taken one more Math
course. [S.T.] reported that he has worked over the past 10 years, for
several companies, as a machinist doing valve work, as well as some
HVAC work. He has worked in and around the Lafayette area, in
Missouri where his grandparents live for a few years, and in Winnfield,
LA where his uncle lives for two years. He admitted that he was always
“let go” for various reasons, usually related to his developing and
worsening psychotic disorder. [S.T.] stated that the auditory
hallucinations he kept experiencing made it difficult for him to
concentrate and focus on his work tasks. He said that the voices would
tell him he “wasn’t good enough”, he was “a punk”, and “to murder
people”. He indicated that he was always struggling with significant
anxiety and depression related to the auditory hallucinations. After
recognizing the progressive nature of his mental health condition, and
not being able to get his work done at his last job at LSS in 2022, he
finally sought mental health treatment at St. Martinville Behavioral
Health Clinic. He also applied for Disability benefits in June 2023, and
this claim is still pending.

Nonetheless, S.T. failed to provide DCFS with documentation showing that

he and his family can financially provide for M.H., including proof of his SSI claim.

DCFS repeatedly requested this information, but S.T. simply ignored these requests.

As the trial court put it:

[S.T.] survives by his parents. His only way that he can survive is with
his parents. He lives with his parents and I don’t say that not in a mean
way or anything else, but because of the limitations, which he has, he
must have the support financially and otherwise of his parents. . . . He
does not have housing, he does not have employment, whether or not
he is going to be entitled to disability at some point in time, I don’t
know that, but since 2023 he has been unable to show the Court and the
Department that.

8

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not

manifestly err in finding that S.T. had not substantially complied with the case plan.

Although S.T. did comply with some aspects of the case plan, the record shows that

the conditions that led to his daughter’s removal have not been remedied. 3

Now to the third element of La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5)—lack of any reasonable

expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or conduct in the

near future. For this element, La.Ch.Code art. 1036(D) provides the following

nonexclusive list of relevant evidence:

D. In accordance with Article 1015(5), lack of any reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s conduct in the
near future may be evidenced by one or more of the following:

(1) Any physical or mental illness, mental deficiency,
substance abuse, or chemical dependency that renders the parent
unable or incapable of exercising parental responsibilities
without exposing the child to a substantial risk of serious harm,
based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern
of behavior.

....

(3) Any other condition or conduct that reasonably
indicates that the parent is unable or unwilling to provide an
adequate permanent home for the child, based upon expert
opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.

The record here shows that S.T. never obtained adequate housing, never

provided DCFS with a safety plan, and never provided DCFS with any income

documentation. In our view, not only does the record show a lack of substantial

compliance with the case plan, but it also shows an established pattern of behavior

3
On appeal, S.T. argues for the first time that DCFS failed to make reasonable efforts to
assist him in complying with his case plan. Two points on this: first, there is no evidence that
DCFS was unavailable or refused to make any necessary referrals for services. And second, this
issue was not raised by S.T. at trial and thus cannot be asserted now for the first time on appeal.

9

which reasonably indicates that S.T. is unwilling or unable to provide an adequate

permanent home for his daughter.

In addition, S.T.’s significant mental health issues appear to render him

incapable of maintaining employment. They also render him incapable of exercising

basic parental responsibilities without exposing M.H. to a substantial risk of harm,

especially considering his unwillingness to provide DCFS with a safety plan.

The trial court took this into account in its reasons for judgment:

Clearly, he suffers from mental diagnosis, which limits his ability to
clearly care for a child on his own. I don’t think -- and I have observed
[S.T.] all these years, I’ve read all the reports, I am of full confidence
that he could not care for that child on his own[.]

Put simply, the record supports the trial court’s finding that there is no

reasonable expectation of significant improvement in S.T.’s condition or conduct in

the near future.

To summarize, DCFS had the burden of proving one of the statutory grounds

for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Ultimately, the trial court found

that the termination ground under La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5) was proven by clear and

convincing evidence. The trial court’s finding is reasonable based on the record in

its entirety—and this means that the finding is not manifestly erroneous.

Second Assignment of Error

In S.T.’s second assignment of error, he contends that the trial court

manifestly erred by finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best

interest of his daughter.

Once a ground for termination is found, the trial court must then determine

whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. State in

the Interest of C.F., 235 So.3d 1066.

10

In other words, a trial court cannot terminate a parent’s parental rights unless

it finds that termination is in the best interest of the child. State in the Interest of

D.H.L., 08-39 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/08), 981 So.2d 906. And “[t]his analysis requires

a balancing of the child’s interests and the parent’s interests; however, it has been

repeatedly held that the interests of the child are paramount to that of the parent.”

State in the Interest of G.E.K., 14-682, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/14/15), 155 So.3d 713,

716.

The balancing of these interests was addressed in State in Interest of C.F., 235

So.3d 1066. In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained:

In all proceedings, the primary concern is to secure the best interest of
the child if a ground justifying termination of parental rights is proved.
Termination of parental rights is to be considered the first step toward
permanent placement of the child in a safe and suitable home, and if
possible, to achieve the child’s adoption.

The interests of the parent must be balanced against the child’s
interest, but the child’s interest is paramount. More than simply
protecting parental rights, our judicial system must protect the child’s
right to thrive and survive. A child has an interest in the termination of
rights that prevent adoption and inhibit the child’s establishment of
secure, stable, long term, continuous family relationships. While the
interest of a parent is protected in a termination proceeding by enforcing
procedural rules enacted to insure that the parental rights are not
thoughtlessly severed, those interests must ultimately yield to the
paramount interest of the child. Children have a right to live in a safe,
secure environment and to be reared by someone who is capable of
caring for them.

Id. at 1075 (citations omitted).

In support of this assignment, S.T. argues that he and his family have bonded

with M.H. He contends that termination of his rights cannot rest upon circumstances

arising solely from poverty or treatable mental health conditions and that the trial

court’s determination was driven by S.T.’s poverty. Although we agree that

11

termination of parental rights cannot rest upon poverty or treatable mental health

issues, that is not the situation that is before us.

S.T. has been diagnosed with serious mental health issues and has failed to

offer a safety plan for M.H. in case of a psychotic episode. Although he continues

to address his mental health professionally, he admittedly still hears voices and is

unable to maintain employment due to these issues.

Further, S.T. is unable to support himself, let alone a minor child. He relies

entirely on his parents to provide for his basic necessities of life. He has no house,

no working vehicle, and no job. And on top of that, he made no effort to provide

DCFS with the requested documentation showing that he and his family can

financially provide for M.H. and support their household.

Finally, S.T. and his parents live in a hoarding situation which makes it

impossible to provide a clean and safe home for M.H.

By contrast, M.H. has been in the care and custody of her foster parents since

May 2023. These foster parents have cared for her many health needs, have provided

her with a safe and secure home, and are willing to adopt her.

In sum, the record evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s finding that

the termination of S.T.’s parental rights is in the best interest of his minor daughter.

The trial court’s finding is therefore not manifestly erroneous.

Third Assignment of Error

In his third and final assignment, S.T. asserts that DCFS failed to consider the

placement of M.H. with relatives prior to terminating his parental rights.

Specifically, S.T. argues that placement should have been considered with his

parents or with his sister. We disagree for two reasons.

12

First, S.T. lived with his parents in their house, and the hoarding situation

inside that house made it unsafe for M.H. Thus, placement with the paternal

grandparents was not possible.

And second, there is simply no evidence to support this assignment.

Importantly, S.T. did not testify at the termination hearing. Neither did S.T.’s

parents. In fact, only one witness testified during S.T.’s defense-in-chief, and that

witness was S.T.’s sister.

During her direct examination, S.T.’s sister was asked about her willingness

to have M.H. placed in her home. Counsel for DCFS objected on relevancy grounds.

The trial court sustained the objection, explaining that “this is a [termination of

parental rights hearing], not a dispositional hearing, and I don’t think it’s proper

testimony.” S.T.’s lawyer then proffered the excluded testimony.

Now on appeal, Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 1–3 provides in part

that “[t]he Courts of Appeal shall review issues that were submitted to the trial court

and that are contained in specifications or assignments of error[.]” Yet here, we have

not been asked to review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. In other words, that

ruling is not addressed in S.T.’s specifications or assignments of error, meaning the

issue is not properly preserved for appeal. Consequently, there is no evidence from

the termination hearing that supports this assignment of error.

DISPOSITION

For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment terminating the

parental rights of the father, S.T., to his minor child, M.H.

AFFIRMED.

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