State in the Interest of A.B.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-0870

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF A. B.

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APPEAL FROM THE
NEW IBERIA CITY COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 2009-0005-2
HONORABLE ROBERT L. SEGURA, CITY COURT JUDGE

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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy, and Michael G. Sullivan,
Judges.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Anne G. Stevens
457 East Main Street, Room 202
New Iberia, LA 70560
(337) 369-2333
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Annette Roach
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 1747
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1747
(337) 436-2900
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
A. B.

PETERS, J.

The juvenile, A.B., appeals his adjudication as a delinquent as well as the

disposition of that adjudication.1 For the following reasons, we affirm the

adjudication and disposition, but remand the matter to the juvenile court with

instructions to amend the disposition to give the juvenile credit for time served, if

any, and to amend both the court minutes and custody order to that effect.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

This litigation began as a petition for delinquency filed by the State of

Louisiana (state) on January 13, 2009. In that petition, the state asserted that the

juvenile had committed simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, in violation of

La.R.S. 14:62.2, and was a principal to sexual battery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:43.1.

Initially, on February 3, 2009, the juvenile denied the charges. However, on March

17, 2009, and pursuant to an agreement with the state, the defendant admitted to the

sexual battery charge and was adjudicated a delinquent. In exchange for this

admission, the state dismissed the simple burglary charge.

At the May 5, 2009 disposition hearing, the juvenile court remanded the

juvenile to secure placement with the Office of Juvenile Justice for a period of two

years. The juvenile court modified that disposition on May 18, 2009, by changing the

secure placement disposition to non-secure custody. The juvenile then perfected this

appeal, asserting two assignments of error:

The trial court erred in both failing to assure the juvenile was notified of
his right to receive conflict-free counsel at all stages of the proceedings
and in failing to obtain a waiver of conflict-free counsel before
accepting A.B.’s admission in this case.

and

1
Pursuant to Uniform Rules--Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2, we use initials to protect the
identity of the juvenile.

The trial court erred in imposing an excessive disposition in this case,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

The factual background to this charge is that the juvenile and another juvenile,

J.A., entered a home in New Iberia, Louisiana, and one of the two juveniles fondled

an eleven-year-old girl’s breasts and vaginal area while the other held the victim at

knife point.

OPINION

Both juveniles were charged with the same offense, but in separate petitions.

However, both were called to answer the separate petitions in the same proceeding,

and their individual adjudications occurred in the same proceeding. The only in-court

proceedings where the juveniles were handled separately were the individual

disposition proceedings. In all appearances, the juveniles were represented by the

same court-appointed trial counsel.

The juvenile does not object to the joint proceedings with J.A.2 Instead, he

asserts in his first assignment of error that, not only did he not receive conflict-free

counsel at all stages of the proceedings, but that the juvenile court failed to advise

him of the right to conflict-free counsel.

In asserting that he did not receive conflict-free counsel, the defendant does not

direct us to any specific action or inaction of his trial counsel, but simply argues that

the record standing alone establishes that his trial counsel had divided loyalties. As

to his claim that he was entitled to be advised by the juvenile court of his right to

conflict-free counsel, the juvenile relies on La.Code Crim.P. art. 517, which provides:

2
Louisiana Children’s Code Article 874 requires joint trials of children charged with the same
delinquent act absent the state’s decision to try them separately or a court ordered-severance in the
interests of justice.

2

A. Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged
in a single indictment or have moved to consolidate their indictments for
a joint trial, and are represented by the same retained or appointed
counsel or by retained or appointed counsel who are associated in the
practice of law, the court shall inquire with respect to such joint
representation and shall advise each defendant on the record of his right
to separate representation.

B. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe that no
conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures
as may be appropriate to protect each defendant’s right to counsel.

The record reflects that the juvenile court made no inquiry into the separate

representation issue at any time before or during the March 17, 2009 proceeding.

In response to this argument, the state points out that the juveniles were not

charged in one indictment, nor did anyone move to have their charges consolidated

for a joint trial. Therefore, the state argues, the juvenile court had no obligation under

La.Code Crim.P. art. 517 to make an inquiry with respect to the joint representation.

We agree with the state that the adjudication process involves separate

petitions, but disagree with the state’s argument that La.Code Crim.P. art. 517 does

not apply absent a motion to consolidate. The cases were consolidated by the

statutory mandate of La.Ch.Code art. 874. Thus, no consolidation motion was

required. The perils of joint representation protected by La.Code Crim.P. art. 517 are

no less important where the consolidation is mandated by statute than where it is

accomplished by motion of a party and order of the trial court. Thus, the juvenile

court was required to inquire as to the joint representation issue and failed to do so.

Our inquiry does not end at that point, however. Louisiana Code of Criminal

Procedure Article 517 does not relieve the juvenile of his obligation to prove actual

prejudice when he objects to lack of conflict-free counsel after trial. See State v.

Cisco, 01-2732 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 118, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1005, 124 S.Ct.

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2023 (2004). Simply pointing to the existence of the conflict is not enough to

overcome this burden. This matter is basically a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

Generally, the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is a matter more
properly addressed in an application for post conviction relief, filed in
the trial court where a full evidentiary hearing can be conducted. Only
if the record discloses sufficient evidence to rule on the merits of the
claim do the interests of judicial economy justify consideration of the
issues on appeal.

State v. Griffin, 02-1703, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/15/03), 838 So.2d 34, 40, writ

denied, 03-809 (La. 11/7/03), 857 So.2d 515 (citations omitted). This court, in State

v. Schexnaider, 03-144 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/03), 852 So.2d 450, adopted the approach

of the fourth circuit with regard to such a claim.

In the matter before us, we cannot determine from the record whether the

juvenile suffered prejudice as a result of the trial counsel conflict. Not being able to

make any definitive findings concerning the trial counsel conflict, we must relegate

the juvenile’s claims to post-conviction relief proceedings where a full evidentiary

hearing may be conducted, if warranted, to develop a sufficient record on the issue.

In his second assignment of error, the juvenile asserts that the juvenile court’s

disposition judgment is excessive. With regard to disposition, La.Ch.Code art. 901

provides, in pertinent part:

A. In considering dispositional options, the court shall not remove
a child from the custody of his parents unless his welfare or the safety
and protection of the public cannot, in the opinion of the court, be
adequately safeguarded without such removal.

B. The court should impose the least restrictive disposition
authorized by Articles 897 through 900 of this Title which the court
finds is consistent with the circumstances of the case, the needs of the
child, and the best interest of society.

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Additionally, this court, in State ex rel. M.N.H., 01-1218, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 3 Cir.

2/6/02), 807 So.2d 1149, 1154-55, writ denied, 02-1041 (La. 5/24/02), 816 So.2d

857, stated:

When an excessive disposition is complained of in a juvenile
proceeding, the record must be reviewed to determine whether the
juvenile court imposed the least restrictive disposition consistent with
the circumstances of the case, the child’s needs, and the best interest of
society. State ex. rel. K.H., 98-632 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98); 725 So.2d
583; State in Interest of T.L., 28,564 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/8/96); 674 So.2d
1122. In any review for excessiveness, the appellate court must first
ascertain whether the lower tribunal took cognizance of the general
guidelines provided for juvenile cases in Louisiana Children’s Code
Article 901, and whether the record reflects an adequate factual basis for
the commitment imposed. State in Interest of T.L., 674 So.2d 1122.
“Following that determination, the reviewing court need only explore
for constitutional excessiveness in light of the circumstances of the case
and the background of the juvenile.” Id. at 1124. “[A]bsent a showing
of manifest abuse of the wide discretion afforded in such cases, a
disposition will not be set aside as constitutionally excessive.” Id.

In imposing his disposition, the juvenile court judge stated that he had read the

pre-disposition report prepared by the Office of Juvenile Justice and found that it

noted “significant problems” with the juvenile’s background, and that he had read the

recommendations found in the written report of Dr. Jessica L. Brown, a psychologist

who had evaluated the juvenile. The juvenile court judge also noted the significance

of the offense committed, the age of the juvenile at the time of disposition (twelve

years of age), and the fact that the juvenile and his family had been previously

involved in the Family in Need of Services (FINS) program, but was most troubled

by the fact that the juvenile had contacted the victim since his adjudication. In his

mind, this fact alone established that the juvenile did not understand the act itself or

the consequences thereof. Based on these findings and this conclusion, the juvenile

court judge disposed of the matter by remanding the juvenile to two years in the

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custody of the Office of Juvenile Services under secure placement. As previously

stated, the juvenile court later amended the placement to non-secure status.

In his appeal, the juvenile argues that La.Ch.Code art. 901 prohibits the

removal of a child from his parents absent a showing that the removal is for “his

welfare or the safety and protection of the public.” In this case, he argues, there were

less restrictive dispositions available as authorized by La.Ch.Code art. 897, including:

1) reprimand and release to his mother, with or without conditions; 2) probation; 3)

custody in a private or public institution; 4) commitment to the custody of the Office

of Juvenile Justice; or 5) suspending the execution of sentence and placing him on

probation. The juvenile also asserts that the juvenile court judge did not individualize

the disposition of his case; that the exchanges between him and the juvenile court

judge were minimal; and that the juvenile court judge ignored the recommendations

of two probation officers and Dr. Brown.3

In support of the juvenile court’s disposition, the state points to the prior FINS

activity,4 school records reflecting a lack of behavioral progress by the juvenile, the

juvenile’s involvement with sexual voyeurism,5 and his violation of the court order

prohibiting him from contacting the victim.

3
In his report, Pete Bonhomme, a probation and parole supervisor, recommended that the
juvenile be placed on supervised probation, be monitored by Trackers, and receive counseling. Dr.
Brown recommended that he be placed on highly structured supervised probation with daily
Trackers, and that he should participate in treatment for his inappropriate sexual behaviors.
4
The juvenile court judge noted that at some point prior to the disposition, the juvenile had
been adjudicated a FINS. In brief, the state asserts that this activity resulted in the juvenile being
placed on probation. However, the record contains no indication of the juvenile being placed on
probation.
5
The juvenile’s mother told Dr. Brown he had been “regularly accessing inappropriate movies
on the cable movie channels” and “apparently has access to a variety of adult movies.” The mother
also informed Dr. Brown that the juvenile entered into a woman’s home, hid in the closet of her
bedroom, and observed the woman and her boyfriend in bed.

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Our review of the record causes us to conclude that the juvenile court did take

cognizance of the guidelines provided for juvenile cases and that the record does

contain an adequate factual basis for the disposition imposed. We find no abuse of

the juvenile court’s discretion in the disposition imposed and, therefore, find no merit

in the juvenile’s second assignment of error.

Although the Louisiana Children’s Code is silent as to whether a juvenile

criminal proceeding is entitled to an error patent review, this court has found that

such a review is mandated by La.Ch.Code art. 104 and La.Code Crim.P. art. 920. See

State in the Interest of J.C.G., 97-1044 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/98), 706 So.2d 1081. In

reviewing the record pursuant to that obligation, we find one error patent that requires

comment.

In State in the Interest of J.F., 03-321, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/6/03), 851 So.2d

1282, 1287, this court explained, in pertinent part:

[W]e note that the trial court failed to give J.F. credit for predisposition
time served in a secure detention facility. Louisiana Children’s Code
Article 898(A) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he court shall give a
child credit for time spent in secure detention prior to the imposition of
disposition.” While we recognize that the 1997 amendment to La.Code
Crim.P. art. 880 releases us from recognizing the trial court’s failure to
give credit for time served as an error patent in adult criminal cases, we
also recognize that the legislature did not amend La.Ch.Code art.
898(A). Consequently, we find it necessary to continue to recognize as
an error patent the trial court’s failure to give credit for time served in
juvenile cases.

The record in this matter does not reflect whether the juvenile spent any time in

secure detention before imposition of disposition. Thus, we amend his disposition

to reflect that he is given credit, if any is available to him, for time spent in secure

detention prior to disposition as required by La.Ch.Code art. 898(A). We remand this

matter to the juvenile court with instructions to that court to note the amendment in

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the custody order and in the minute entry. See State in the Interest of M.M., 06-607

(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/06), 941 So.2d 716.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the juvenile’s adjudication. We amend the juvenile’s disposition to

reflect credit for time served in secure detention prior to disposition, and affirm the

disposition as amended. We remand this matter to the juvenile court with instructions

to the juvenile court to note the amendment to the disposition in both the custody

order and the minutes of the juvenile court.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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