State in the Interest of K. K.
State in the Interest of K. K., No. JAK-0014-0479 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. Dec. 17, 2014).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Boyles 134 So. 3d 1183
- State v. Perkins 135 So. 3d 626
- State, in Interest of Jcg 706 So. 2d 1081
- State ex rel. N.W.L. 994 So. 2d 607
- State v. Melanson 259 So. 2d 609
- State Ex Rel. Dpb 846 So. 2d 753
- State ex rel. T.H. 140 So. 3d 911
- State ex rel. T.H. 147 So. 3d 681
- State ex rel. L.D. 139 So. 3d 679
- State ex rel. C.M. 128 So. 3d 1118
- State v. Lopez 140 So. 3d 1172
- State v. Erven 830 So. 2d 368
- State Ex Rel. Kg 778 So. 2d 716
- State v. Dejean 694 So. 2d 284
- State v. Dejean 673 So. 2d 608
- State v. Delanoix 637 So. 2d 515
- State v. Jefferson 838 So. 2d 724
Opinion text
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
14-479
STATE IN THE INTEREST OF K.K.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, DOCKET NO. 2013 JC 1110
HONORABLE HERMAN CLAUSE, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Marc T. Amy, and John E. Conery, Judges.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Jane Hogan
P.O. Box 3622
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 232-9345
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT, K.K.
Michelle M. Breaux
Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Box 3306
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 262-8654
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE, State of Louisiana
Cooks, J.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 6, 2013, K.K.1 was charged by petition with one count of
illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:95.8,
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966, and
illegal possession of a stolen firearm, a violation of La.R.S. 14:69.1. K.K. entered
a denial to the charge on December 18, 2013. On January 6, 2014, he filed a
Motion to Quash Count One of the petition on the grounds of double jeopardy.
The trial court denied the motion on February 6, 2014. K.K. filed a writ
application in this court seeking review of the trial court’s ruling. On February 19,
2014, in State in the Interest of K.K., 14-202 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/19/14) (unpublished
opinion), this court denied K.K.’s writ application finding no error in the trial
court’s ruling. Judge Genovese dissented. K.K. filed a writ application with the
Louisiana Supreme Court, and on March 12, 2014, the court denied the
application, with three justices voting to grant the application. State in the Interest
of K.K., 14-424 (La. 3/12/14), 134 So.3d 1183. A request for reconsideration was
not considered by the supreme court. State in the Interest of K.K., 14-424 (La.
3/21/14), 135 So.3d 626.
Thereafter, on March 24, 2014, K.K. entered an admission to the petition
and was sentenced to a six month suspended sentence with six months of
supervised probation. He is now before this court alleging two assignments of
error. We find two errors patent requiring reversal of the disposition in this case.
ANALYSIS
Although the Louisiana Children’s Code is silent as to whether a juvenile
delinquency proceeding is entitled to an error patent review, this court has found
1
Initials are used to protect the identity of this minor pursuant to Uniform
Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2.
that such a review is mandated by La.Ch.Code art. 104 and La.Code Crim.P. art.
920. See State in the Interest of J.C.G., 97-1044 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/98), 706
So.2d 1081.
The petition charged K.K. with illegal possession of a handgun by a
juvenile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:95.8, possession with the intent to distribute
marijuana, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966, and illegal possession of a stolen firearm,
a violation of La.R.S. 14:69.1. K.K. entered an admission “to Docket Number
2013-1110.” It cannot be determined from the record which offense or offenses he
entered the admission to considering there were three offenses contained in the
petition. The written “Admission to Petition” form signed in this case does not
refer to any particular offense or offenses, nor does it recite any factual basis for
the offenses charged. When K.K. entered his plea in open court there was no
mention of the factual basis for any of the three offenses charged and no mention
of what offense(s) to which he was entering an admission. K.K.’s attorney simply
said “At this time, [K.K.] wishes to enter an admission to Docket Number 2013-
1110.” She then set forth the agreed upon sentence. A single disposition was
imposed.
This court faced a similar issue in State in the Interest of N.W.L., 08-347, pp.
1-2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/27/08), 994 So.2d 607, 608:
The Children’s Code articles and jurisprudence require a trial
court to find that a juvenile violated a specific statute or ordinance; a
general finding of delinquency is insufficient. Louisiana Children’s
Code Article 804(3) defines delinquent act as “an act committed by a
child of ten years of age or older which if committed by an adult is
designated an offense under the statutes or ordinances of this state.”
Louisiana Children’s Code Article 883 provides: “In order for the
court to adjudicate a child delinquent, the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the child committed a delinquent act alleged in
the petition.” Additionally, “[f]or an adjudication of delinquency . . .
it must be proved that the juvenile violated a specific statute or
ordinance, and every element of the crime must be proved.” State v.
2
Melanson, 259 So.2d 609, 613 (La.App. 4 Cir.1972). See also, State
ex rel. D.P.B., 02-1742 (La.5/20/03), 846 So.2d 753.
In N.W.L., on error patent review, this court noted it could not ascertain with
reasonable certainty the offense or offenses which the trial court determined the
juvenile had committed. We reversed the adjudication of delinquency, vacated the
disposition, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
While N.W.L. is distinguishable in that an adjudication hearing was held rather
than an admission to the petition in this case, the facts of this case more strongly
require a reversal.
The record indicates the trial court failed to advise K.K. of his rights as
required by La.Ch.Code art. 855 when he appeared to answer the allegations
contained in the petition.2
Louisiana Children’s Code Article 855 provides in pertinent part:3
A. When the child appears to answer the petition, the court shall
first determine that the child is capable of understanding statements
about his rights under this Code.
B. If the child is capable, the court shall then advise the child of
the following items in terms understandable to the child:
(1) The nature of this delinquency proceeding.
(2) The nature of the allegations of the petition.
(3) His right to an adjudication hearing.
2
La.Ch.Code art. 855 violations have been recognized on error patent review in the
following cases. , State in the Interest of T.H., 14-179 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/14), 140 So.3d 911,
writ denied, 14-1462 (La. 7/18/14), 147 So.3d 681; State in the Interest of L.D., 14-1 (La.App. 3
Cir. 5/7/14) 139 So.3d 679; State in the Interest of C.M., 13-128 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/30/13), 128
So.3d 1118, writ denied, 13-2796 (La. 5/30/14), 140 So.3d 1172; State v. Erven, 36,332 (La.App.
2 Cir. 10/23/02), 830 So.2d 368; State ex rel. K.G., 34,535 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/24/01), 778 So.2d
716.
3
The comments to this article state, “a. Paragraph A is new. Former C.J.P. Article 54
required the court to advise an accused child only ‘insofar as practicable.’ This required
instruction serves two purposes. First, it lays the necessary predicate for the receipt of an
accused child’s admission of guilt, that is, that the child responds voluntarily and with full
knowledge of the consequences of his ‘plea,’ including knowledge of his trial rights. Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Second, it reinforces this Code’s recognition that a child must be
mentally capable of proceeding to trial. See Art. 804(7).”
3
(4) His right to be represented by an attorney, his right to have
counsel appointed as provided in Article 809, and his right in certain
circumstances authorized by Article 810 to waive counsel.
(5) His privilege against self-incrimination.
(6) The range of responses authorized under Article 856.
(7) The possible consequences of his admission that the
allegations are true, including the maximum and minimal dispositions
which the court may impose pursuant to Articles 897 through 900.
Louisiana Children’s Code Article 856 provides:
A. After the child has been advised pursuant to Article 855, the
court shall inquire how the child responds. The child may:
(1) Deny the allegations of the petition, in which case the court
shall set the matter for an adjudication hearing.
(2) Deny the allegations of the petition and contest the request
for adjudication due to insanity as defined in this Title, in which case
the court shall not adjudicate the child without a hearing, at which
time the child has the burden of establishing this defense.
(3) Admit the allegations of the petition, in which case the court
shall further inquire to determine whether there is a factual basis for
adjudication. If so, the court may then adjudicate the child delinquent.
(4) With the court’s permission, enter a response of nolo
contendere. If, in its discretion, the court accepts such response, the
court shall further inquire to determine whether there is a factual basis
for adjudication, and it may then adjudicate the child delinquent.
B. A child shall plead when called upon to answer. If he stands
mute, refuses to plead, or pleads evasively, a denial of the petition
shall be entered of record.
The rights required by La.Ch.Code art. 855 are contained on an “Admission
to the Petition” form which is signed by K.K., his attorney, the trial judge, and
K.K.’s mother. However, our jurisprudence indicates this is insufficient to satisfy
the requirements of La.Ch.Code art. 855. In State v. Dejean, 94-459, p. 5 (La.App.
5 Cir. 11/28/95), 694 So.2d 284, 287, writ denied, 96-547 (La. 5/17/96), 673 So.2d
608 (citing State v. Delanoix, 637 So.2d 515 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1993)), the fifth
4
circuit found a guilty plea form “alone is not sufficient to show a knowing and
voluntary waiver of defendant’s constitutional rights.” In Dejean, the record was
void of any minute entry or transcript showing a colloquy between the defendant
and the trial judge. Id. Specifically noting that the defendant was sixteen-years
old, the fifth circuit found the defendant’s guilty plea was invalid “as there [was]
not sufficient proof as to his knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional
rights prior to the entry of his guilty plea.” Id.4 The record in this case shows there
was no colloquy between K.K. and the trial judge regarding the offenses charged
or the factual basis for each charge or anything except sentencing.
Accordingly, we strike K.K.’s admission to the petition and remand the case
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, the law, and
prior jurisprudence. See State v. Jefferson, 02-1038 (La. 1/10/03), 838 So.2d 724.
If K.K. decides to again enter an admission, the trial court is instructed to specify
to which offense or offenses K.K. is admitting and to properly comply with
La.Ch.Code arts. 855 and 856.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
4
We note additionally that the adjudication (or admission to the petition in this case) was
not held within ninety days of the appearance to answer the petition as required by La.Code
Crim.P. art. 877; however, good cause was shown. At the appearance to answer the petition on
December 18, 2013, the adjudication hearing was timely set for February 20, 2014, but was
continued at the request of the defense to March 24, 2014. Under similar circumstances, this
court found good cause for the delay in State in the Interest of S.D., 13-1028 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/12/14) (unpublished opinion).
Because we have set aside the admission to the petition and the disposition, we will not
discuss any potential errors regarding the disposition, credit for time served, or the failure to
advise of the time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief. We also note the
record contains the probation order of another juvenile, but it is not necessary to order the correct
one due to our ruling. We also pretermit considering K.K.’s double jeopardy argument at this
time.
5