State in the Interest of D. J.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

14-509

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF

D.J.

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APPEAL FROM THE
LAFAYETTE CITY COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 2013 JC 284
HONORABLE RONALD D. COX, CITY COURT JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Marc T. Amy, and
Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.

ADJUDICATION AND DISPOSITION VACATED.

Michael Harson
District Attorney, Fifteenth Judicial District Court
Sonia Gupta
Assistant District Attorney, Fifteenth Judicial District Court
P.O. Box 3306
Lafayette, LA 70502-3306
(337) 262-8624
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Jane Hogan
Fifteenth Judicial District Public Defender’s Office
P.O. Box 3622
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 232-9345
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
D.J.

GREMILLION, Judge.

D.J. was adjudicated delinquent for disturbing the peace by publicly

engaging in a fistic encounter with another student at his school in February 2013,

a violation of La.R.S. 14:103(A)(1). 1 The juvenile court ordered that D.J. be

placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Division of Juvenile

Justice, for ninety days. The commitment was suspended, and D.J. was placed on

six months active, supervised probation. D.J. now appeals and contends that the

juvenile court erred by adjudicating him guilty of disturbing the peace despite

insufficient evidence. We find that the evidence is insufficient to support D.J.‟s

adjudication and vacate his disposition.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

D.J. contends that the testimony of the State‟s sole witness was not sufficient

to sustain an adjudication of guilty. We agree.

In State In Interest of T.W., 09-532, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/7/09), 21 So.3d

465, 467-68, this court discussed the standard of review in juvenile matters as

follows:

In a juvenile proceeding, the state‟s burden of
proof is the same as in a criminal proceeding against an
adult-to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element
of the offense alleged in the petition. La. Ch.Code art.
883; In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25
L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court in
Louisiana is controlled by the standard enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). . . .
[T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all
of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a
1
The juvenile‟s initials are used in accordance with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal,
Rule 5-2.

reasonable doubt.” State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676,
678 (La.1984).

State in the interest of D.P.B., 02-1742, pp. 4-5 (La.5/20/03), 846
So.2d 753, 756. “[A]ppellate review in juvenile delinquency
proceedings extends to both law and facts.” State in the interest of
L.T., 99-487, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 747 So.2d 148, 152.

In order to reverse a fact finder‟s determination of fact,
an appellate court must review the record in its entirety
and (1) find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist
for the finding, and if such a basis does exist, (2) further
determine that the record establishes that the fact finder is
clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. See Stobart v.
State, through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). If there
are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact
finder‟s choice between them cannot be manifestly
erroneous or clearly wrong. Id. However, where
documents or objective evidence so contradict a
witness‟s story, or the story itself is so internally
inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable
fact finder would not credit the witness‟s story, the
appellate court may find manifest error or clear
wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a
credibility determination. Id.

State in the interest of D.H., 04-2105, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 1 Cir.
2/11/05), 906 So.2d 554, 560.

In State v. Heck, 307 So.2d 332, 334 (La.1975), the supreme court stated,

“The phrase „engaging in a fistic encounter‟ also appears to be reasonably clear.

Taking the words in their usual sense, the phrase means engaging in a fistfight.”

The supreme court further stated that La.R.S. 14:103 “proscribes only those fistic

encounters, or fistfights, that foreseeably disturb or alarm the public.” Id.

Corporal Dennis Labure testified that he was an off-duty police officer

working security at a school on February 28, 2013. 2 He was notified via campus

radio about a disturbance. Upon his arrival at the location of the disturbance,

Labure saw “[D.J.] and another subject being held back by the other students in

2
Labure never gave the name of the school.

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between classes. [D.J.] was yelling with his shirt off at the other subject.” Labure

testified that twenty-five students were present, and it took several students to hold

“him” back. When asked about D.J.‟s demeanor at the scene, Labure testified that

he was aggressive and yelling at the other subject. He further indicated that D.J.

was tense and being held back by other students, whom he was struggling against.

Labure subsequently placed D.J. in handcuffs and escorted him and the other

student involved to the Assistant Principal‟s office, where they were placed under

arrest. At that time, the Assistant Principal questioned D.J. and the other subject.

Labure testified that D.J. stated “he was involved in a physical altercation with the

other subject.” Labure was asked, “did you believe that [D.J.] had been fighting

with the other child” and Labure replied, “[y]es.” On cross-examination, Labure

testified that he did not see D.J. engaged in a fistic encounter. Labure did not

obtain written statements from anyone present on the date in question, and no other

witnesses were called to testify.

D.J. contends that neither his behavior nor his statement in the Assistant

Principal‟s office proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in a fistic

encounter. Additionally, D.J. argues that Labure‟s opinion that D.J. was involved

in a fight did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was involved in a fistic

encounter. The State contends that it met its burden of proof because D.J. admitted

that he had been involved in a physical altercation. The State further argues that

Labure‟s testimony regarding his observations and D.J.‟s statement were weighed

by the trial court and determined to be credible.

We find that the State did not prove the elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. The State failed to set forth any evidence of a “fistic encounter,”

instead relying on hearsay testimony of the officer who arrived on the scene after

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the event took place. Labure did not witness D.J. engaged in a fist fight nor did

D.J. elaborate as to the details of the “physical altercation.” There simply was no

evidence of a fistic encounter beyond the hearsay testimony of Corporal Labure.

Of the many alleged witnesses to the encounter, none were called to testify.

Accordingly, D.J.‟s adjudication and disposition are vacated.

DECREE

D.J.‟s adjudication and disposition for publicly engaging in a fistic

encounter, a violation of La.R.S. 14:103, is hereby vacated.

ADJUDICATION AND DISPOSITION VACATED.

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