State in the Interest of D.J.S.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-239

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF

D.J.S.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 27944
HONORABLE W. MITCHELL REDD, DISTRICT JUDGE

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VAN H. KYZAR
JUDGE

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Court composed of Marc T. Amy, John E. Conery, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Annette Fuller Roach

Louisiana Appellate Project

P. O. Box 1747

Lake Charles, LA 70602-1747

(337) 436-2900

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
D.J.S.

John F, DeRosier

District Attorney

Elizabeth B. Hollins

Cynthia Guillory

Assistant District Attorneys

Fourteenth Judicial District

P. O. Box 3206

Lake Charles, LA 70602-3206

(337) 437-3400

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

KYZAR, Judge.

The minor, D.J S., appeals from his adjudication as delinquent after having
been found to have committed the offense of telephone harassment, in violation of
La.R.S.14:285(A)(2). For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

On August 17, 2015, the State of Louisiana filed a petition seeking to have
the juvenile, D.J.S., ten years of age at the time, declared a delinquent for having
committed the offense of telephone harassment, by making obscene or threatening
phone calls to the principal of the school he attended, prior to his expulsion based
on other behavior. The petition specifically alleged that D.J.S.:

[V]iolated Louisiana Revised Statute 14:285.A.(1) (Telephone

Harassment) in that, on or about July 9, 2015, he did engage in or

institute at least eight (8) telephone calls to Joy Fox, W/F, age 52,

principal of R.W Vincent Elementary School, 1634 Beglis Parkway,

Sulphur, Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, by using profane language in

attempt to coerce, intimidate, or harass the victim, without the

victim’s consent.

Through his attorney, D.J.S. entered a denial of the charge, and a hearing on
the petition was originally set for September 18, 2015. The hearing was continued
and reset on multiple occasions primarily because of the non-appearance of D.J.S.
and his parent, but also on three occasions on motion of the state. An adjudication
hearing was finally held on May 26, 2017.

During the adjudication hearing, Ms. Fox testified that D.J.S. attended her
schoo! for two years. She stated that she received a telephone call on May 15,
2015, at 10:04 a.m., during which the caller asked, “When is the talent show?” Ms.

Fox testified that she recognized the voice as that of D.J.S., and when she looked at

the number on the caller ID, she recognized the number as that of his mother, Stacy

' pursuant to Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2, the initials of the juvenile are
used to protect his identity.

Bigalow. Ms. Fox said that after she responded that they were not having a talent
show, she asked that the caller identify himself. She stated that the caller’s
response was, “This is your death threat, bitch.” Ms. Fox hung up the phone and
contacted the school system’s risk management office, who in turn contacted the
Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Office.

Ms. Fox testified that she recognized D.J.S.’s voice because she had dealt
with him several times a week for an extended period of time, either for
disciplinary issues and in general conversation, and she recognized the phone
number due to her extensive contact with D.J.S.’s mother. She stated that the
caller’s phone number matched the phone number of D.J.S.’s mother on the
school’s emergency contact card. The card listed D.J.S.’s home number as 274-
7823.’ Ms. Fox testified that the other phone numbers listed on the card were 707-
4830 (D.J.S.’s aunt), 377-7804 (Evette Sibley), and 707-2081 (Karen Thomas).

According to Ms. Fox, D.J.S. had visited her office fourteen times, and she
had visited with him on other occasions outside the school office as well. She
testified that from October 8, 2014 through January 26, 2015, D.J.S. went to her
office every morning and afternoon and visited with either her or the assistant
principal. She said that these visits were started in an effort to curtail the problems
that the school was having with D.J .S” When he was in the office for these visits,
Ms. Fox testified that she spoke with him individually with no other students
present. She stated that after these visits ended in January 2015 (at his mother’s

request), D.J.S. visited the office nine more times, ending on April 16, 2015, which

“At another point in her testimony, Ms. Fox testified that the emergency contact card
filled out by D.J.S.’s mother listed her phone number as 274-7828; however, a review of the
emergency contact card in evidence revealed that the number listed on the card is in fact 274-
7823,

*Ms. Fox testified that the problems with D.J.S. included bus disturbances, class
disturbances, habitual violation of rules, open defiance, disrespect, campus disturbances,
profanity, harassment of students, and willful disobedience.

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was his last day to attend the school prior to his suspension pending a hearing. She
stated that there was no doubt in her mind that the call she received was from
D.J.S., although she admitted that she had not previously heard his voice over the
phone. She said that she recognized his voice and knew the number. She stated
that the last time she had contact with D.J.S., prior to the call, was at a hearing held
on May 4, 2015, and the last time he was present at school was April 16, 2015, as
he did not complete the school year.

Corporal Patrick Bordelon, of the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Office,
responded to the school that same day. Ms. Fox testified that she informed
Corporal Bordelon that she recognized the phone number as D.J.S.’s mother’s cell
phone number, and she provided him D.J.S.’s emergency contact information. She
said that she did not provide him with the other phone numbers on the card. Ms.
Fox testified that the only phone number used by the school was (337) 217-4690.

Corporal Bordelon testified that after he arrived at the school the principal
advised him that she had been receiving harassing phone calls, and she believed
they were being made by a student who was recently expelled. She told Corporal
Bordelon that she recognized D.J.S.’s voice. As Corporal Bordelon was taking
down information, he stated that the phone rang. He said that Ms. Fox looked

down, recognized the number, and said, “That’s him, again.” Corporal Bordelon
testified that he answered the phone, announced who he was, and asked for the
name of the caller. He stated that there was silence on the other end and then the

caller hung up. Corporal Bordelon recalled that “they” called back two or three

more times.’ Before he answered the phone, he stated that he wrote down the

“Ms. Fox testified that the call she took came into the school at 10:04. Subsequent calls
came in at 10:24, 10:25, 10:27, 10:28 (all hang up calls), and 10:33 (a wrong number call) and
were answered by Corporal Bordelon.

phone number to include in his report. Corporal Bordelon testified that Ms. Fox
told him who was calling, so he got the school’s emergency contact card and wrote
down the juvenile’s name, date of birth, and contact information. He said that he
noticed that the phone number he wrote down for one of the calls was listed on
D.J.S.’s emergency contact card.”

Corporal Bordelon identified the numbers on the emergency contact card as
274-7832,° 707-4830, 377-7804, and 707-2081. When shown his offense report,
he stated that the numbers listed in his report were 244-3622 and 563-6530 and
that these numbers were either from the caller ID and/or D.J.S.’s emergency
contact card. When shown the emergency contact card in court, Corporal
Bordelon acknowledged that the two numbers in his report differed from those on
the card, and he affirmed that possibly six numbers were associated with this
offense.

Laura Phenice, the assistant principal at R.W. Vincent Elementary School,
testified that her contact with D.J.S. was mostly for disciplinary reasons, which she
summarized during her testimony. She said that during the time that D.J.S. was
checking in with her on a daily basis, he also came into contact with Ms. Fox
because their offices were directly across the hall from each other. Ms. Phenice
testified that after the daily check-ins stopped at the request of D.J.S.’s mother, his
behavior continued to escalate, so both she and Ms. Fox “put him up for

expulsion.”

>On cross-examination, Corporal Bordelon testified that he thought “that [he] was
gathering information and talking to her [Ms. Fox], then the phone rang, then [he] wrote it - -
when she said, ‘That’s them,’ [he] wrote it down and afterwards got the contact information from
the phone.” He testified that the number he noticed on the caller ID matched the number on the
emergency contact card.

“On redirect examination, Corporal Bordelon correctly identified the first number as 274-
7823.

Dewanis Kim Broussard, a hearing officer and a supervisor with the child
welfare and attendance office for the Calcasieu Parish School Board, testified that
she received a request for the expulsion of D.J.S. from R.W. Vincent Elementary
School on April 17, 2015. She stated that although an expulsion hearing was held,
she was forced to end the hearing due to the behavior of D.J.S.’s mother. She said
that the matter was turned over to another hearing officer, who held a second
hearing on May 4, 2015. Ms. Broussard testified that the second hearing officer
noted that Ms. Bigalow was extremely rude and disrespectful, that she accused Ms.
Fox and Ms. Phenice of mishandling D.J.S., and that she called Ms. Phenice an “F-
B.” Ms. Broussard testified that following this hearing, a decision was made to
place D.J.S. in an alternative school starting May 5, 2015.

Deanna Conn, a juvenile investigator with the Public Defender’s Office,
testified that she subpoenaed the May 15, 2015 records for the phone numbers
listed in the offense report, 244-3622 and 563-6530, and also for 274-7823, Ms.
Bigalow’s number.’ Introduced into evidence were the records received from
AT&T, the carrier for phone numbers (337) 274-7823 and (337) 244-3622. °
Attached to the records was a verification of authenticity by a custodian of records
for AT&T. Ms. Conn learned that (337) 244-3622 was registered to Mary
Chapman, and she was not able to determine Ms. Chapman’s relationship to this
matter. She testified that she later learned that this phone number was “related to”

Ms. Bigalow’s sister, Brandy Wilkens, who Ms. Conn stated had nothing to do

™Ms. Conn testified that all phone numbers involved have the area code (337).

"The prosecutor stipulated that certified copies of the phone records were received, but
did not stipulate as to their truth or veracity. Later, when the time converter was introduced into
evidence, the prosecutor objected to the truth of the records because they were not reflected in
Central Standard Time. Her concern was that if the conversion was not being done properly,
then there was no way to know if the documents were “true and correct.” The trial court allowed
the exhibit, noting there were valid concerns, but said it would consider the records and give
them the weight to which they were entitled.

with this matter. Ms. Conn testified that she inspected the voice usage phone log
for (337) 244-3622 and contacted AT&T to determine how to interpret the records,
as she was unable to interpret many of the coding items on the records herself. She
testified that she was informed by an unnamed AT&T representative that voice
usage was reflected as an originating number (the person sending the call) and a
terminating number (the person receiving the call.) Ms. Conn stated that her
inspection of the phone log revealed that there were no phone calls on May 15,
2015, from (337) 244-3622 to the school number, (337) 217-4690.

Ms. Conn testified that the first entry in the phone log was at 11:52, which
was in Universal Time (UTC), the time the provider AT&T gave in the records.
This had to be translated to Central Time (CT), the applicable time zone in this
case. Again, Ms. Conn stated that the unnamed AT&T employee informed her that
she should use a website, timetemp.com, to convert the time from UTC to CT. She
explained that she did this by typing in the date of the offense and using the time
converter button, which showed the list of times for the entire day. She stated that
the first phone call that the records picked up for that day was at 11:52, which was
6:52 a.m. CT, and there were no calls on May 15, 2015, from (337) 244-3622 to
the school number. Ms. Conn testified that (337) 244-3622 was active with AT&T
on May 15, 2015, and according to her, it could not be active with another cell
phone provider at the same time.

Ms. Conn testified she also reviewed the subscriber information from AT&T
for (337) 274-7823 and learned that the phone was active on May 15, 2015 and
was registered to Ms. Bigalow. Using the time converter, she learned that the first

phone call shown on the records from Ms. Bigalow’s phone was made at 5:53 UTC,

” UTC stands for Universal Time Coordinated, which prior to 1972, was referred to as
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboututc.shtml (last visited September 11, 2018).

6

which was 12:53 a.m. CT, but there was no log of any calls made to the school
number.

Ms. Conn testified she also subpoenaed records from Sprint. She said that
she learned that (337) 563-6530 was registered to Devon Martin, but she was not
able to identify his relationship to this matter. She also inspected the phone log for
(337) 563-6530 and learned that “[t]hat number was not active at that time of May
15, 2015.”

Ms. Conn testified that her review of the records showed that none of the
numbers she subpoenaed records for showed calls made to the school. She
reiterated that (337) 244-3622 came from the offense report, and it was her
understanding that it was one of the numbers that showed up on the caller ID. She
testified she got (337) 274-7823 from the offense report “from the school
information sheet.” Ms. Conn testified that the provider records were certified as
being authentic, and she had no reason to think that they were not valid.

Ms. Conn testified that according to her investigation, only one provider
could provide service for a phone number at any given time. The prosecutor
showed Ms. Conn a print-out from the internet showing that 274-7823 listed Sprint
Spectrum as the provider. The print-out showed that the phone number was
assigned on June 28, 2001, but it did not specifically show who the carrier was on
May 15, 2015. The AT&T records showed that AT&T was providing service for
this number on May 15, 2015.

Ms. Conn explained on cross-examination that records from May 14, 2015
were not given by the phone companies, but they did include records from May 16,
2015, though she did not request any records from that day.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found D.J.S. to be delinquent

after finding the evidence sufficient to prove that he did commit the delinquent

7

offense. The trial court, thereafter, ordered a disposition of one year supervised
probation, with special conditions. A written judgment of disposition was rendered
by the trial court on June 20, 2017.

On June 27, 2017, a motion for a new trial was filed on behalf of D.J.S.,
asserting that the judgment adjudicating him as a delinquent was contrary to the
law and evidence. The motion was denied on January 3, 2018. Following the
denial of the motion for a new trial, D.J.S. moved to appeal his adjudication as a
delinquent, asserting one assignment or error being the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the adjudication.

ERRORS PATENT

Although the Louisiana Children’s Code is silent as to whether a patent error
review is required in a juvenile criminal proceeding, this court has found that such
a review is mandated by La.Ch.Code art. 104, providing that the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure applies in matters not otherwise provided for in the Children’s
Code, together with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, providing for errors patent reviews
in criminal matters. See State in the Interest of J.C.G., 97-1044 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/4/98), 706 So.2d 1081. After reviewing the record, we find one potential error
patent requiring discussion but not reversal.

The record reflects that D.J.S. did not appear to answer the allegations of the
petition within fifteen days as required by La.Ch.Code art. 854, and the
adjudication hearing was not held within ninety days as required by La.Ch.Code
art. 877; however, there is no indication in the record that D.J.S. objected to the
untimely hearings and the record reflects that many of the delays were caused by
D.J.S. himself.

In State in the Interest of D.B., 14-85, pp. 2-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/14), 141

S0.3d 296, 298-99 (alteration in original), addressing the untimeliness of an answer

8

hearing, this court found that the following supreme court jurisprudence suggests
that a juvenile’s failure to object to the setting of a hearing outside the required
time limit is to be considered an extension of the time period for good cause:

The supreme court has rendered a series of rulings holding that
a juvenile’s failure to object to the untimely setting of a hearing
constitutes a good cause extension of the time period. In the most
recent case, State in the Interest of D.J,, 13-1111, p. 1 (La.1/10/14),
131 So.3d 35, 36, the supreme court reversed the fourth circuit’s
decision dismissing a petition filed against a juvenile. In its opinion,
State in the Interest of D.J., 12-1416, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/10/13),
113 So.3d 503, 507, the fourth circuit rejected the State’s argument
that D.J. waived his right to a timely adjudication by failing to object
to the adjudication date when it was initially set. Reversing the fourth
circuit and reinstating the petition against D.J., the supreme court
stated the following:

Here, through administrative error arising from the
movement of the case from one section of the juvenile
court to another, the adjudication hearing was set five
days after the expiration of the 30-day time limit without
objection by the child. Before the expiration of the time
limit, the state recognized the error and requested an
extension to maintain the hearing date apparently agreed
upon by all parties. The juvenile court found that good
cause existed and granted the state’s request. The court
accordingly denied the child’s motion to dismiss on the
date set for the hearing, and thereafter adjudicated the
juvenile delinquent. The court of appeal, relying on State
in the Interest of W.P., 11-1442 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12),
82 So.3d 571 (unpub’d), found that the juvenile court
abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss
because the child’s acquiescence in the setting of an
untimely hearing date did not waive his right to strict
compliance with La.Ch.C. art. 877(A). The court of
appeal therefore reversed the juvenile court’s ruling,
effectively vacating the lower court’s adjudication of the
juvenile as delinquent and its disposition of the case.
State in the Interest of D.J., 12-1416, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 4
Cir. 4/10/13), 113 So.3d 503, 507. The court of appeal
erred in this determination. See State in the Interest of
W.P., 12-0794 (La.9/28/12), 98 So.3d 802 (remanding for
reconsideration). Under the facts of the matter presented,
the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion to dismiss. See State in the Interest of R.D.C.,
93-1865, p. 3 n. 4 (La.2/28/94), 632 So.2d 745, 747
(“The hearing, originally set for June 30, 1992, was
continued by the court until August 4, 1992, a date
outside of the ninety day period [provided by La.Ch.C.

9

art. 877(B) for adjudication hearings when the child is
not continued in custody]. However, since the court, the
child and the state agreed to this August 4, 1992 date, we
will treat it as an extension for good cause by the court.”).

The decision of the court of appeal is therefore
reversed, and the juvenile court’s adjudication of
delinquency and disposition of the case are hereby
reinstated.

DJ, 131 So0.3d at 35-36.

We find that D.B.’s failure to object to the trial court’s setting

of an answer hearing outside of the time limits is to be considered an

extension of the time period for good cause. See also State in the

Interest of W.P., 12-794 (La.9/28/12), 98 So.3d 802, State in the

Interest of J.S., 11-2673 (La.4/20/12), 85 So.3d 1277, and State in the

Interest of R.D.C., Jr., 93-1865, p. 3 (La.2/28/94), 632 So.2d 745.

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 854 allows for the time

period to be extended for good cause. Having found that D.B.’s

failure to object to the untimely setting of the answer hearing

constituted a good cause extension of the time period, article 854 has

been complied with.

In accordance with D.B., we find that the D.J.S.’s actions and failure to
object constituted a good cause extension of the time periods, and no reversible
error occurred,

OPINION

On appeal, D.J.S. assigns as error that “[t]he evidence introduced at the
adjudication hearing, when reviewed under the standard of review applicable in
juvenile delinquency proceedings, was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that D.J.S. committed the crime of telephone harassment.” Counsel for
D.J.S. has raised different claims within this assignment, which will be discussed
separately.

Wrong Subsection of La.R.S. 14:285

Within the general allegation that the evidence was insufficient to support

the trial court’s decision finding that D.J.S. committed a delinquent act of

10

telephone harassment, appellate counsel for D.J.S. argues that the trial court erred
when it considered and actually found that D.J.S. committed a violation of La.R.S.
14:285(A)(2), while the state’s petition charged a violation of La.R.S.
14:285(A)(1), which provides that no person shall:

Engage in or institute a telephone call, telephone conversation,
or telephone conference, with another person, anonymously or
otherwise, and therein use obscene, profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious,
or indecent language, or make any suggestion or proposal of an
obscene nature or threaten any illegal or immoral act with the intent to
coerce, intimidate, or harass another person.

At the conclusion of the trial, however, D.J.S. was adjudicated a delinquent
for having violated La.R.S. 14:285(A)(2), which provides that no person shall:

Make repeated telephone communications anonymously or
otherwise in a manner reasonably expected to annoy, abuse, torment,
harass, embarrass, or offend another, whether or not conversation
ensues.

The court made the following findings in adjudicating D.J.S. delinquent:

Revised Statute 14:285 A. (2) was the charge against Mr. [S], [D], in
this matter. It states that “no person shall make repeated telephone
calls anonymously in a manner reasonably expected to annoy, abuse,
torment; harass; embarrass; or offend another person sets forth the
penalty for the violation of that [sic].”

There has been a lot of discussion, as I’ve previously stated on
the Record, about evidence entered through the testimony and
evidence presented by the State of [D.J.S.’s] conduct at school and his
removal from the school. I want the Record to reflect that that
evidence goes to, or was taken, specifically, as evidence of motive or
as to why he may have made such threats to the principal.

For example, the calls occurred the day after the expulsion
hearing -- the second day the expulsion hearing was conducted.
Specifically, that evidence was not considered by the Court in order to
approve or attempt to approve -- to prove or attempt to prove that
[D.J.S.] is a disrespectful child, or he just randomly made a phone call.
So, why he was suspended from school pending his expulsion hearing
was not considered as a factor by the Court. The evidence that was
presented by the State consisted of the testimony of the victim and of
the law enforcement officer and others who were present, and who
were involved in the investigation.

11

The evidence presented by the defense, obviously, is conflicting
and relies heavily upon telephone records received from cellular
phone companies regarding voice usage, data usage, phone logs; dates
of the calls. There’s conflicting information within that information
regarding the ownership of a number being to Mary Chapman, who --
there was no evidence presented as to who she is. But the phone for
one of those numbers, the 244 number, being used by somebody else,
[BrJandy Wilkens, who is a relative of [D.J.S.]. There was a website,
or an app, I think part of the testimony was, used to convert universal
time to central time, I guess on the internet. Which brings into
question the reliability or the credibility of the documents provided.

So, with that, I am going to find that the State did meet their
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that phone calls were
made in a repeated manner, which was reasonably expected to annoy,
abuse, torment; harass; or embarrass or offend the other person. The
other way of summarizing the Court’s reasoning on this is that the
victim and the supporting witnesses -- the victim certainly believed
that it was [D.J.S.]. I find that she was credible and when I weigh her
credibility and that of the supporting witnesses, and all the
circumstances as I have set forth, including some of the evidence
about [D.J.S.], himself, I find that it convinced that it is more reliable
than what was presented in defense of that.

So, with that, I’m going to find that the State met its burden of
proof. I’m going to adjudicate [D.J.S.] as delinquent in this docket
number.

The fourth circuit addressed a similar issue in State v. Williams, 02-260

(La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/03), 842 So.2d 1143, writ denied, 03-1991 (La. 1/16/04), 864
So.2d 625, and writ denied, 06-1583 (La. 3/23/07), 951 So.2d 1096, and
determined that the issue was more properly whether the defendant was notified of
the actual charges against him rather than what was set forth in the charging
instrument. In Williams, the bill of information charged the defendant with second
degree kidnapping under subsection B(1) of La.R.S. 14:44.1. Although the
appellate court found that the evidence was insufficient to find the defendant guilty
of a violation of B(1), it held that the evidence was sufficient to find him guilty of
subsection B(3) of La.R.S. 14:441. Thus, the court was called upon to decide

“whether the defendant’s conviction can be upheld based upon subsection B(3)

12

even though the subsection alleged in the bill of information was subsection B(1).”
Id. at 1147.

Finding that Williams’ conviction could be upheld, the court noted that the
defense attorney was present at a motion to suppress hearing held five months prior
to trial, at which evidence to support subsection B(3) was introduced. The court
also noted that it was “apparent that defense counsel had prepared his case based
upon the assumption that the defendant had been charged under subsection B(3),
not B(1) as alleged in the bill of information.” /d. at 1148. The defense counsel
actually moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the case, arguing that he
had arrived that morning under the belief that the State was proceeding under B(3)
only to realize at some point that the bill of information charged his client under
B(1). Thus, the fourth circuit concluded that “this is not a case where counsel had
been misled as to what evidence the State was planning to present and was
unprepared to meet the allegations in the bill of information.” /d.

This court, in State v. Pennywell, 13-1376 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/14), 139
So.3d 587, reached a different conclusion under the facts presented therein.
However, the rationale employed was the same, as the inquiry was whether the
facts were sufficient to show that the defendant was adequately put on notice of the
means or theory on which the state contended that the defendant violated the
statute.

In the present case, in response to discovery motions, the state provided the
defense with case reports from the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Office, which clearly
indicated that after the initial call was received by Ms. Fox, multiple calls were
received and answered by Corporal Bordelon with the caller hanging up. In
addition, the original petition filed refers to multiple calls having been made rather

than only one call. We find that this was sufficient to put D.J.S. on notice that

13

evidence might be introduced regarding repeated phone calls, falling under La.R.S.
14:285(A)(2) (repeated calls “anonymously or otherwise in a manner reasonably
expected to annoy, abuse, torment, harass, embarrass, or offend another, whether
or not conversation ensues”) rather than La.R.S. 14:285(A)(1) which can apply to a
single call (a telephone call “with another person, anonymously or otherwise, and
therein use obscene, profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious, or indecent language . . . or
threaten any illegal or immoral act with the intent to coerce, intimidate, or harass
another person”). We also find that the entire defense strategy on behalf of the
D.J.S. was not predicated on contesting whether a threat of illegal or immoral
action was conveyed, but on whether D.J.S. actually made any calls to Ms. Fox at
all. Accordingly, we find no merit to this assignment of error.
Cell Phone Records

D.J.S. next contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the
adjudication in that the cell phone records submitted by him clearly contradicted
the evidence submitted by the state. In so stating, D.J.S. argues that the reliability
of the cell phone records was not made questionable by the lack of connection of
Mary Chapman to the case nor by the converting of time from UTC to CT as found
by the trial court.

The standard of review in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence presented
in a juvenile case is as follows:

In a juvenile adjudication proceeding, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed a delinquent act
alleged in the petition. LSA-Ch.C. art. 883. The burden of proof,
beyond a reasonable doubt, is no less severe than the burden of proof
required in an adult proceeding. State in Interest of S.T., 95-2187
(La.App. 1 Cir. 6/28/96), 677 So.2d 1071, 1074. In State in Interest
of Giangrosso, 385 So.2d 471, 476 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1980), affirmed,

395 So.2d 709 (La. 1981), this court stated:

In juvenile proceedings, the scope of review of this
court extends to both law and fact. Article 5, Section 10,

14

Constitution of 1974; see State in Interest of Batiste,
367 So.2d 784 (La. 1979). We must, therefore, decide if
the trial judge was clearly wrong in his determination that
the defendants were proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Thereafter, in State in Interest of Giangrosso, 395 So.2d 709,
714 (La. 1981), the supreme court affirmed, concluding that a rational
trier of fact could have found, from the evidence adduced at the trial,
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and State in
Interest of Batiste, 367 So.2d 784 (La. 1979). See In Interest of
L.C., 96-2511 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/20/97), 696 So.2d 668, 669-70.

Accordingly, on appeal the standard of review for sufficiency of
the evidence enunciated in Jackson is applicable to delinquency cases,
i.e. viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the state proved the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson,
443 US. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; see also LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821B;
State v. Ordodi, 06-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; and
State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). ...

Further, because a review of the law and facts in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated, an appellate
court must review the record to determine if the trial court was clearly
wrong in its factual findings. See State in Interest of D.M., 97-0628
(La.App. | Cir. 11/07/97), 704 So.2d 786, 789-90. In a juvenile case,
when there is evidence before the trier of fact that, upon its reasonable
evaluation of credibility, furnished a factual basis for its finding, on
review the appellate court should not disturb this factual finding in the
absence of manifest error. Reasonable evaluations of credibility and
reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review.
State in Interest of Wilkerson, 542 So.2d 577, 581 (La.App. 1 Cir.
1989).

The Jackson standard is an objective standard for testing the
overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt.
When analyzing circumstantial evidence, LSA-R.S. 15:438 provides
that, assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove,
in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. State in Interest of D.F., 08-0182 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/6/08),
991 So.2d 1082, 1085, writ denied, 08-1540 (La. 3/27/09), 5 So.3d
138. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the trier of
fact reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the
defendant’s own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is
guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt.
State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La. 1984).

State in the Interest of M.P., 17-892, pp. 6-8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/1/17), 233 So.3d
633, 638-40 (footnote omitted).

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“In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with
physical evidence, one witness’ testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is
sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion.” State v. Robinson, 02-1869, p.
16 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 66, 79, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1023, 125 S.Ct. 658
(2004). Thus, where there is no such conflict, the trial court’s crediting of a
witness’s statement can never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. State in
the Interest of C.D., 11-1701 (La. 7/2/12), 93 So.3d 1272.

In adjudicating D.J.S. delinquent, the trial court stated in pertinent part:

There's conflicting information within that information regarding the

ownership of a number being [sic] to Mary Chapman, who -- there

was no evidence presented as to who she is. But the phone for one of

those numbers, the 244 number, being used by somebody else,

[Br]andy Wilkens, who is a relative of [D.J.S.]. There was a website,

or an app, I think part of the testimony was, used to convert universal

time to central time, I guess on the internet. Which brings into

question the reliability or the credibility of the documents provided.

After reviewing the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing, we find
that the phone records do not so contradict Ms. Fox’s testimony that a reasonable
factfinder would not credit her testimony and, as such, find no manifest error by
the trial court in adjudicating D.J.S. as delinquent. Ms. Fox was adamant that she
recognized the voice on the phone in the initial call when she was threatened as
being that of D.J.S. Evidence offered by the state showed that Ms. Fox had
repeated contacts with D.J.S. in the months leading up to the events of that day,
corroborating her ability to recognize his voice. The testimony of Ms. Phenice
corroborated her many contacts with D.J.S. Additionally, Ms. Fox immediately
advised Corporal Bordelon that the caller was D.J.S.. While Ms. Conn’s
interpretation of the cell phone records was that no calls were made by numbers

associated with D.J.S. to the schoo!, she admitted to having to convert the records

to the proper time zone using an internet-supplied conversion tool.

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In addition, we note that there were no records discussed or admitted
pertaining directly to the school’s phone number, identified as 217-4690, the
number to which the caller identification system attached. Essentially, the trial
court was in the position of weighing the testimony of Ms. Fox against the
testimony of Ms. Conn in interpreting the phone records. It is obvious that the trial
court had some doubts as to the cell phone records, and it gave greater weight to
the direct testimony of Ms. Fox that she recognized D.J.S. by voice as the caller
who made the threatening call immediately prior to the repeated hang up calls that
followed. The testimony of Ms. Fox is not so internally inconsistent with the
documentary evidence from the phone logs, given the testimonial evidence offered
in connection therewith, as to amount to manifest error in choosing the former over
the latter. Thus, we do not conclude that the trial court’s decision was clearly
wrong, and we affirm the adjudication of delinquency based on the finding that
D.J.S. committed the offense of telephone harassment.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons herein, we affirm the adjudication of the trial court finding
the minor, D.J.S., to be delinquent for having committed the offense of telephone
harassment.

AFFIRMED.

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